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Abstract 
Theories of human reasoning have tended to assume cognitive universality, i. e. that all 
individuals reason in basically the same way. However, some research (e. g. that of Ford. 
1995) has found evidence of individual differences in the strategies people use for 
syllogistic reasoning. This thesis presents a series of experiments which aimed to identify 
individual differences in strategies for human reasoning and investigate their nature and 
aetiology. Experiment 1 successfully replicated and extended Ford (1995) and provided 
further evidence that most individuals prefer to reason with either verbal-propositional or 
visuo-spatial representations. Data from verbal and written protocols showed that verbal 
reasoners tended to use a method of substitution whereby they obtain a value for the 
common term from one premise and then simply substitute it in the other premise to obtain 
a conclusion. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, presented protocols which resembled 
Euler circles and described the syllogistic premises in terms of sets and subsets. 
Experiment 2 provided some further qualitative evidence about the nature of such 
strategies, especially the verbal reasoners, showing that within strategy variations occurred. 
Experiment 3 extended this line of research, identifying a strong association between 
verbal and spatial strategies for syllogistic reasoning and abstract and concrete strategies 
for transitive inference (the latter having originally been identified by Egan and Grimes- 
Farrow, 1982). Experiments 1-3 also showed that inter-strategic differences in accuracy are 
generally not observed, hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity despite 
underlying differences in reasoning processes. Experiments 5 and 6 investigated individual 
differences in cognitive factors which may underpin strategy preference. Whilst no 
apparent effects of verbal and spatial ability or cognitive style were found, reasoners did 
appear to draw differentially on the verbal and spatial components of working memory. 
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that whilst verbal reasoners draw primarily on the 
verbal memory resource, spatial reasoners draw both on this and on spatial resource. 
Overall, these findings have important implications for theories of human reasoning, which 
need to take into account possible individual differences in strategies if they are to present 
a truly comprehensive account of how people reason. 
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CHAPTER I 
Human Reasoning: A Brief Review 
1.1 General Introduction 
1.1.1 What is reasoning and why study it? 
This thesis is about human reasoning, or, how individuals use knowledge and information 
to make inferences and deduce conclusions about the world. This manipulation and 
transformation of knowledge allows for decision making, revision of beliefs and 
achievement of goals. As such, reasoning is a fundamental cognitive activity and integral 
to everyday thinking (Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993; Evans Over and Manktelow, 
1993; Galotti, 1989; Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991, Kuhn, 
1991). The ability to draw necessary conclusions based on what is known about the world 
lies at the core of human intelligence (Stanovich, 1999). As Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1991, page 3) state: 
"A world without deduction would be a world without science, technology, 
laws, social conventions and culture". 
As such human reasoning has deservedly afforded a long history of psychological research 
dating back to the early 1900s (see for instance Evans et al 1993 for a review). It is a 
process initiated by premises which can take the form of facts, perceptions or beliefs and 
which, ideally, can lead to a conclusion which is not explicit in those premises. However, 
despite decades of research, the intervening processes remain mysterious (Johnson-Laird, 
2001). The programme of research presented in this thesis offers a contribution to the 
understanding of these processes and, more specifically, to our knowledge of the nature of 
the individual strategies people use during reasoning. 
Johnson-Laird, Savary and Bucciarelli (2000) define a strategy as "the sequence of steps 
that an individual follows in solving, or attempting to solve, a problem" (page 210), 
referring to each of these steps as a tactic. This provides a useful basic working definition 
which informs the general use of the word strategy throughout this thesis. However, there 
are also other more complex issues (such as degree of conscious control and the 
relationship to other cognitive mechanisms) which need to be accounted for in any 
comprehensive definition of strategies. These will be discussed at a later stage. This first 
chapter will initially concentrate on reviewing the background to reasoning research, how 
reasoning is studied and the most significant theories which have attempted to explain 
reasoning processes. 
1.1.2 The study of human reasoning 
Most research on the psychology of human reasoning has attempted to use the logical 
analysis of problems as a basis for the classification of errors and correct responses. It is 
not the role of this thesis to investigate or comment on the role of formal logic as a 
normative theory of human reasoning, but a basic understanding of logical terms is 
desirable for the understanding of many tasks used in experimental studies, most especially 
syllogistic reasoning with which this thesis will be extensively concerned. Moreover, many 
terms used in logic occur frequently in the psychological literature on reasoning (and hence 
also in this thesis) and it is useful to define some of these at the outset. 
1.1.3 Syllogistic Reasoning 
Categorical syllogisms are deductive arguments comprising three propositions, two 
premises and a conclusion, and three terms, each of which occur in two of the propositions. 
The propositions are categorical in that they make claims about class membership of the 
terms, affirming or denying that one class S (the subject) is included in another class P (the 
predicate) in whole or part. The third proposition typically is a conclusion which follows 
logically from the two earlier premises. Syllogisms may be presented with abstract content, 
for instance: 
All Bare A 
Some C are B 
Therefore, Some C are A 
Or thematic content, 
All teachers are psychologists 
Some writers are teachers 
Therefore, Some writers are psychologists 
Each syllogism contains three terms (A, B and C or psychologists, teachers and writers in 
the above examples) one of which, the middle term B, is common to both premises. The 
two syllogisms above are logically identical, and the nature of the deduction remains valid 
whatever terms are substituted for A, B and C, whilst the problem retains this form. The 
classic syllogistic inference is to determine, from the information given in the premises, the 
one relationship which is not explicitly stated, i. e. that between the two end terms, A and 
C. This forms the conclusion. Each proposition contains one of four possible quantifiers 
(either : 111, Some, None or Some... not) which describe the relationship between the terms. 
The mood of the syllogism is described in terms of the combination of quantifiers present 
and is given the traditional designation shown in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: The four syllogistic moods 
Quantifier Mood Description Designation 
All Universal affirmative A 
Some Particular affirmative I 
None Universal negative E 
Some.. 
. not Particular negative 0 
Syllogism structure is also described in terms of one of four figures based on the 
arrangement of the terms (see Table 1.2). It should be noted that figural convention varies 
between sources, but for the purposes of this thesis, any reference to figure relates to the 
forms illustrated in Table 1.2. Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) showed that problems tend 
to increase in difficulty in line with these figures from 1 to 4. 
Table 1.2: The four syllogistic figures 
Figure 1 Fig ure 2 Fig ure 3 Fig ure 4 
A-B 
B-C 
B 
C 
-A 
-B 
A 
C 
-B 
-B 
B 
B 
-A 
-C 
As there are four possible quantifiers there are 16 distinct premise combinations (moods) 
associated with each figure, and hence 64 possible syllogistic forms. Given that each 
conclusion will contain one of the four quantifiers and the end terms may follow the order 
A-C or C-A, this gives a total of 512 possible syllogisms. However, of these, relatively few 
have logically valid conclusions - ones which can be logically deduced, given that the 
premises are true. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) present a set of 27 valid syllogistic 
problems and these are those considered as valid for the purposes of the present 
programme of research (Gamham and Oakhill, 1994, Chapter 6, discuss methods of 
determining syllogistic validity in some detail). 
Typically, reasoning tasks centre on the validity of syllogistic conclusions (see Evans et al, 
1993, for a review). The task is presented in three possible basic forms; participants may 
be asked to demonstrate reasoning either by selecting the one valid conclusion from a set 
of alternati\vcs. evaluating whether the one conclusion presented is valid or invalid, or by, 
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generating their own conclusion from the premises given. Error rates are generally high (an 
often cited study by Dickstein, 1978, found that just 52% of conclusions were correctly 
evaluated) and systematic biases are consistently reported associated with the interaction 
between prior knowledge/belief and problem content and these have consistently been 
shown to adversely influence reasoning performance (see for instance Evans, 1989, for an 
extensive discussion of biases in reasoning). 
Although syllogistic tasks may appear hypothetical and circumscribed, researchers such as 
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) have argued that they in fact have a high degree of 
ecological relevance. Everyday reasoning commonly involves deciding what conclusion, if 
any, can be drawn from certain assumptions about category membership and syllogisms 
provide small scale replications of such problems (Galotti, 1989; Gilhooly, 1996). The 
identification of assumptions, use of stored knowledge, evaluation of arguments and 
deduction of conclusions are all processes present in syllogistic reasoning and such 
problems provide a useful test of these abilities in a format that exists in limited, and hence 
controllable, structures (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984). 
1.2 Theories of Human Reasoning 
A considerable body of research has attempted to determine the nature of underlying 
reasoning processes. Two major and opposing schools of thought have emerged and claim 
that reasoning depends either on the use of mental models or on logical rules. The 
following sections consider these in more detail. Both viewpoints form general and wide 
ranging theories which are proposed to apply across all reasoning domains, though both 
have also been specifically, and extensively, applied to reasoning with syllogisms. 
S 
1.2.1. Mental Model Theories 
The fundamental tenet of the mental models theory is that when individuals are presented 
with a problem which requires reasoning, they capture the meaning of the problem by 
imagining the relationships between terms described in the premises (Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne, 1991). In doing so, they construct analogous internal models of the state of the 
world described by those premises. Deductions and inferences depend on three stages of 
thought (ibid., pages 35-36): 
1. Comprehension: reasoners use their knowledge of language and of the world, prior 
experience, etc to understand the premises and construct an analogical internal model. 
2. Description: They attempt to form a parsimonious conclusion by fleshing out the model 
they have constructed. This description should assert a state of affairs which is not 
explicitly stated in the premises. Where no such assertion can be found, reasoners 
conclude that nothing follows from the premises 
3. Validation: Reasoners search for counterexamples - alternative models of the premises 
in which their putative assertion (conclusion) is false, perhaps further fleshing out the 
initial models to do so. If no counterexample if found, they assume the putative 
conclusion to be valid. If counter models are discovered, then prudent reasoners return 
to stage 2 and attempt to discover whether there is any conclusion which is true for all 
the possible models they have constructed. If so, they then search for further 
counterexamples, and so on until the search is exhausted. For deductions which rely on 
quantifiers or connectives, the number of possible models is finite and hence the search 
can, in principle, be exhaustive. 
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Recently, Bara and Bucciarelli (2000) have broken these stages down into five phases; 
construction, integration, conclusion, falsification and response. Their account places 
greater emphasis on the processes involved in the search for counterexamples which may 
falsify the putative conclusion. According to mental models theory, errors occur due to 
incorrect or inadequate fleshing out of the basic model, or failure to find such 
counterexamples. Hence not all possible models of the premises are considered. Although 
reasoners are generally able to search for counter-examples (e. g. Newstead, Pollard, Evans 
and Allen, 1992) they frequently fail to do so, preferring to settle for a conclusion 
consistent with the first model they construct (Handley, Dennis, Evans and Capon, 2000; 
Newstead, Handley and Buck, 1999). This failure has been attributed to variation in 
individual abilities (for instance Handley et al 2000 identified a specific cognitive factor 
which seemed to predict ability to search for counterexamples) and also to limitations in 
working memory capacity (see for instance Gilhooly, 1998; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 
1991; Johnson-Laird, 2001). 
Mental model theory has been extensively applied to syllogistic reasoning, see for example 
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984), Bara, Bucciarelli and Johnson Laird (1995), Johnson- 
Laird and Bucciarelli (1999) to name but a few. Basically, Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) 
argued that the difficulty of a syllogism depends on two main factors: 
1. The number of models to be constructed in attempting to establish a valid conclusion, 
given the limited capacity of working memory. Of the 27 valid syllogisms highlighted 
by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, pp. 107-110), 10 are single model problems, that is 
the conclusion can be drawn from one initial model and no fleshing out is required. The 
remaining 17 are all multi-model problems, that is there are two or three possible 
models of the premises which need to be considered. The data presented by Johnson- 
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Laird and Byrne clearly shows that the single model problems afford reasoners less 
difficulty than multi-model. 
2. The figure of the syllogism (cf. Table 1.2), given that the order in which information is 
retrieved from working memory is optimally the order in which it entered working 
memory. With all but Figure 1 problems (A-B; B-C), in forming an initial model, 
reasoners are required to carry out initial mental operations on syllogistic premises in 
order to bring the two middle (B) terms into contiguity in order to integrate the 
premises. This additional cognitive burden becomes increasingly onerous in line with 
figure from 2 to 4, with more difficult problems eliciting fewer valid conclusions and a 
greater number of "no valid conclusion" responses (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984; 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Bara et al, 1995). 
In constructing models, the theory proposes that finite sets of entities are represented by 
finite sets of mental tokens that accommodate a representation of the relationship between 
entities. Moreover, the initial model will operate according to a principle of economy in 
that it represents only that information which is necessary to determine premise meaning. 
Other information which is implied, but not explicit, will be registered in a mental footnote 
which is retained in memory until it is needed to flesh out the initial model at a later stage. 
One major criticism of mental models has been that although an arbitrary number of tokens 
may suffice for syllogistic quantifiers, if sets are indeed represented this way, the theory 
cannot generalise easily to natural language quantifiers such as "most" or "few". 
Models of syllogistic premises are portrayed according to specific notation, as shown in 
Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3: Mental model representations of syllogistic premises (after Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Premise Initial models Explicit models 
A All A are B [a] b [a] [b] 
[a] b [a] [b] 
[, a] [b] 
[, a] [, b] 
I Some A are B ab ab 
ab ab 
,ab 
a ,b 
,a ,b 
E No A are B [a] [a] ,b 
[a] [a] ,b 
[b] --a [b] 
[b[ ,a [b] 
,a ,b 
0 Some A are not B a a ,b 
a a ,b 
a a [b] 
[b] ,a [b] 
fbl ,a-, b 
tag for negation 
[] indicates exhaustive representation 
... alternative model without explicit content 
As an illustrative example, consider the following syllogism; 
All A are B 
No Bare C 
The first premise could be constructed in an initial model of the form: 
[a] b 
[a] b 
Here the square brackets indicate that this term is exhaustively represented, that is, it 
embodies the knowledge that an a cannot appear in any other case (because All a are b). 
The three dots denote implicit information (the mental footnote). However, it is also 
possible that although there can only be As which are also Bs, there could also be Bs that 
are not As, and even things which are neither As nor Bs. The fleshed out version of the 
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model introduces the symbol for negation (, ) which allows for these possibilities to be 
included: 
[a] [b] 
[a] [b] 
[, a] [b] 
[-a] [, b] 
The second premise of the syllogism will be represented as in the E row of Table 1.3, i. e. 
[b] -c 
[b] ,c 
,b [c] 
,b [c] 
,b ,c 
These two models can be combined, again following the constraint that reasoners will not 
explicitly represent more information that is necessary, for instance they will not represent 
b twice. The combined model will look something like: 
[[a] b] 
[[a] b] 
[c] 
[c] 
For this one model problem, this is the only way in which information about the three 
terms, A, B and C could be combined, so there is no need to find counterexamples. This 
final model is consistent with the valid conclusion No A are C. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) base their empirical predictions on the number of mental 
models required to solve a given problem. They present findings from a series of 
experiments which support this claim, together with details of the percentage of correct 
conclusions generated to all 27 valid problems which they identify (Table 6.1, pages 107- 
I 10). These percentages vary from around 70- 90% correct conclusions for the single 
model syllogisms, to between 15 and 300/o' for three-model syllogisms. Moreover, many 
studies of bclicf bias in syllogistic reasoning also support model theory. Mental models 
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theory suggests that prior knowledge or belief may prejudice reasoning either by biasing 
the initial premise interpretation, by acting as a post hoc censor or by influencing the 
inclinations to search for counter-examples. Reasoners will search more assiduously if 
their initial putative conclusion is unbelievable, than if it is believable. Studies by Oakhill, 
Johnson-Laird and Garnham (1989), Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992) and 
Cherubim, Gamham, Oakhill and Morley (1998) have all shown that belief bias is 
suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises and their results 
are compatible with idea that representation of prior knowledge precedes modelling of the 
combined premises. 
1.2.2 Mental Logic Theories 
Formal logic proposes that an argument is deductively correct if, and only if, the 
conclusion is true in all states of affairs in which the premises are true. The conclusion is 
said to be entailed by the premises and the argument is valid. Two theories of reasoning 
based on logical rules have been proposed (Rips, 1994a; Braine and O'Brien, e. g. 1998). 
These both assume that reasoning proceeds like a logical proof, using rules of inference 
stored in a mental logic. Individuals rely on propositional, or language like, representations 
and on cognitive processes akin to the natural deduction rules developed by logicians, 
where separate rules exist for dealing with every connective or quantifier. 
In a general sense, a formal proof is a finite sequence of propositions in which each 
sentence is either a premise, an axiom of the logical system (such as an additional 
inference rule), or a sentence which follows from a preceding sentence by one of the 
system rules. An argument is deducible if the final sentence in the proof is the conclusion. 
One of the most straightforward proofs is that which logicians have termed modus ponens 
(or affirming the antecedent). According to this principle, the premise lip then q, and the 
sentence p, jointly entail the concluding proposition, q. In more thematic terms, and to 
anglicise one of Rips (1994a) examples; 
If Simon deposits 50 pence, Simon will get a coke 
Simon deposits 50 pence 
Simon gets a coke. 
Furthermore, natural deduction methods allow for temporary supposition in order to 
simplify a proof For instance, again given the premise If p then q, but then given not q, 
then the reasoners can suppose, p and as a result of that, infer q. This temporary conclusion 
contradicts the categorical premise, not q. Reasoners can therefore reverse their original 
supposition and conclude that not p holds. In other words, if we find that Simon does not 
get a coke, we can we can make the supposition that he has not deposited his 50 pence. 
This is an example of another mental proof, that of Modus tollens (or denying the 
consequent). This indirect supposition is more prone to errors, compared to a direct 
inference such as modus ponens. Table 1.4 presents inference rules based on classical 
logic which Rips (1994a) has incorporated into his mental logic account of human 
reasoning. 
For problems such as syllogisms which include quantifiers such as All and Some, similar 
rules are applied, again to borrow an example from Rips (1994a): 
All square blocks are green blocks 
Some big blocks are square blocks 
Some big blocks are green blocks 
Here Rips suggests that reasoning may follow the lines of "some big blocks are square 
blocks; so take an arbitrary big square block and call it b. Block b must be green since b is 
square and all square blocks are green. Hence some big blocks (b for instance) are green, 
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as stated in the conclusion" (page 50). In other words, the proof proceeds by instantiating 
premises to get a new sentence with a temporary name (in the above example b). applying 
the rules for sentence connectives to this instantiation, and then generalising to the 
quantifiers in the conclusion. Hence his system also supplements the rules shown in Table 
1.4 with others for introducing and eliminating quantifiers, as shown in 1.5. 
Table 1.4: Inference rules (from Rips, 1994a, page 45) 
IF elimination (Modus ponens) 
a) If sentence of the form IF P THEN Q and P hold in a given domain, 
b) Then the sentence Q can be added to that domain 
If introduction (Conditionalisation) 
a) If a sentence Q holds in a subdomain whose supposition is P, 
b) then IF P THEN Q can be added to the immediate superdomain 
NOT Elimination (Modus tollens 1) 
a) If the sentences Q and NOT Q hold in a subdomain whose supposition is NOT P, 
b) then the sentence P can be added to the immediate superdomain 
NOT Introduction (modus tollens 2) 
a) If the sentences Q and NOT Q hold in a subdomain whose supposition is P, 
b) then NOT P can be added to the immediate superdomain 
Double negation Elimination 
a) If the sentence NOT NOT P holds in a given domain, 
b) then the sentence P can be added to that domain 
AND Elimination 
a) If the sentence P AND Q holds in a given domain, 
b) then the sentences P and Q can be added to that domain 
AND Introduction 
a) If the sentence P and the sentence Q hold in a given domain, 
b) then the sentence P AND Q can be added to that domain 
OR Elimination 
a) If the sentence P OR Q holds in a given domain D, 
b) and the sentence R holds in an immediate subdomain of D whose supposition is P, 
c) and the sentence R holds in an immediate subdomain of D whose supposition is Q, 
d) then R can be added to D. 
OR Introduction 
a) If the sentence P holds in a given domain, 
b) then the sentences P OR Q and Q OR P can be added to that domain, where Q is an arbitrary 
sentence. 
In the notation P(v) represents a expression containing a variable, v. These quantifier rules 
are more complex as they need to incorporate variables (e. g. big block, green block) in 
terms of whether they are bound by a given quantifier (as in All v) or are free variables 
(such as vl AND v2). Furthermore, some variables may be allocated temporary supposed 
names (which may subsequently become permanent) and these are indicated by t. 
Subscripts indicate temporary names. 
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Table 1.5: Inference rules for elimination and introduction of the quantifiers ALL and SOME (from 
Rips, 1994a, page 52). 
ALL Elimination 
a) If (FOR ALL v) P(v) holds in a given domain, 
b) and P(t) is the results of replacing all free occurrences of N, in P(v) with t. 
c) then P(t) can be added to the domain. 
ALL Introduction 
a) If P(a) holds in a given domain, 
b) and a does not occur in subscript in P(a), 
c) and a was not produced by FOR SOME elimination, 
d) and a does not occur in any suppositions that hold in the domain, 
e) and a does not occur within the scope of (FOR ALL v) or (FOR SOME v) in P(a), 
f) and P(v) is the result of replacing all occurrences of a in P(a) by v, 
g) then (FOR ALL v) P(v) can be added to the domain. 
SOME Elimination 
a) If (FOR SOME v) P(v) holds in some domain, 
b) and b had not yet appeared in the proof, 
c) and a1, a2..., ak is a list of the temporary names (possibly empty) that appear in P(v) and that 
first appeared in a supposition or in an application of FOR ALL elimination, 
d) and P (bai, a2,...., k) is the result of replacing all free occurrences of v in P(v) by bai, a2....., k. 
e) then P(ba,, a2 ....., k) can 
be added to the domain. 
SOME Introduction 
a) If P(t) holds in a given domain, 
b) and t does not occur within the scope of either (FOR ALL v) or (FOR SOME v) in P(t), 
c) and P(v) is the result of replacing all occurrences oft in P(t) with v, 
d) then (FOR SOME v) P(v) can be added to the domain. 
For a more thorough explanation of all these rules see Rips (1994a, Chapter 2). Rips 
proposes a theory which assumes that when confronted with a reasoning problem, 
individuals attempt to solve it by generating, within working memory, a set of propositions 
linking the premises to the conclusion. Each link in this process comprises an inference 
rule similar to those in Tables 1.4 and. 1.5 which the individual "recognises as intuitively 
sound" (page 103). Errors occur because individuals may not possess, or may be unable to 
apply, the appropriate rules for a given proof required for a given problem. They may 
possess non-standard rules which lead them to non-logical conclusions, but Rips claims 
that they at least attempt to construct an internal mental proof of the conclusion entailed by 
the premises. Limitations in working memory capacity also mean that problems which 
require the application of a greater number of rules, or more complex ones, will prove most 
intractable. 
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Working memory plays an important role for it is here that premise information is first 
stored, then scanned for possible inferences. The newly deduced sentences are added to 
memory store, rescanned, and followed up with further deductions. The process is repeated 
until a proof is found or no further rules apply. Rips terms this system PSYCOP (short for 
Psychology of Proof) and has developed a computer program based on the system. 
PSYCOP uses forward rules to draw implications from the premises and backward rules to 
create Subgoals based on the conclusion. In this way, some of the computational 
complexity of formal logical inference rules is reduced. In evaluating a given conclusion, 
backward rules operate initially, pursuing a chain of reasoning until required the subgoal, 
and finally the premises, are reached. If no subgoals are reached, then PSYCOP gives up 
and concludes that no valid conclusion is possible. In situations where PSYCOP is 
expected to produce conclusions rather than evaluate them, it can use only the forward 
rules to complete the task. Where no such rules seem to apply, it assumes there is no 
conclusion. 
When working with syllogistic problems, PSYCOP makes use of the fact that syllogistic 
premises can all be expressed using the basic logical operators together with variables 
(terms). PSYCOP incorporates three additional rules for syllogistic inference, transitivity 
(that if three terms lie in a linear relationship and A implies B which in turn implies C, then 
A implies C), exclusivity (where although A implies B, B does not imply C hence, neither 
does A) and conversion (which allows for the reversal of terms in a premise, e. g. the 
assumption that No A are B is equivalent to No B are A). PSYCOP also incorporates the 
Gricean implicatures (e. g. that some A are B implies some A are not B) and the existential 
presupposition that there are some As and Bs present to begin with. The translations of the 
four quantified expressions and the implicatures proposed by PSYCOP are shown in table 
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1.6. Once the premises have been expressed in this way, the general mental proof rules can 
be applied. 
Table 1.6: The four syllogistic sentences expressed in words (first lines), their translations into 
PSYCOP inference rule notation (second lines), and their implicatures (third lines). From \lankteloww, 
(1999), adapted from Rips (1994a, Chapter 7). 
Mood 
A AllAareB 
IF A(x) THEN B(x) 
A(a) AND B(a) 
I Some A are B 
A(b) AND B(b) 
A(a) AND NOT B(a) 
E NoAareB 
NOT (A(x) AND B(x)) 
A(a) AND NOT B(b) 
[if x is A then x is B] 
[there are things a, which are a and b] 
[there are things b, which are A and B] 
[there are things a, which are A and not B] 
[it is not the case that x is A and x is B] 
[there are things a, which are A and not B] 
O Some A are not B 
A(b) AND NOT B(a) [there are things b, which are A and not B] 
A(a) AND B(a) [There are things a, which are A and B] 
x=a variable (i. e. a label for a class); a and b are temporary names (i. e. labels for possible instances). 
An alternative mental logic theory has been presented by Braine and O'Brien and 
colleagues (e. g. Brame, 1990, Braine, Reiser and Rumain, 1984, Braine and O'Brien, 
1998; O'Brien, 1995). Like Rips' theory, it is based on natural deduction and includes 
many of the same rules. These form part of what Braine and O'Brien term inference 
schemas which, rather than just comprising mental versions of logic rules for the 
introduction and elimination of quantifiers, also comprise a reasoning program which 
controls how the rules are used and includes processes for both inference and conclusion 
evaluation. Schemas are directly applied by the program wherever appropriate propositions 
are encountered. For instance, when working memory holds "p or q" and the premise not 
p" is encountered, the conclusion "q" is automatically supplied. O'Brien (1998, page 29) 
claims that such inferences are made "routinely and without apparent effort" and are 
considered to be fundamental to human deductive competence. Hence, tasks which require 
only, the direct application of these simple rules will tend to be those which are carried out 
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accurately. However, an indirect reasoning routine also allows for individuals to acquire 
more complex schemas through learning, and facilitates their application in appropriate 
problem domains. Problems which require more sophisticated reasoning will call upon this 
indirect reasoning routine and are less likely to be solved accurately by most individuals. 
Unlike Rips' theory which proposes that reasoning inferences are made in order to proceed 
towards a goal or subgoal, the Schemas allow for reasoners to look ahead to the types of 
inferences which will be required later in the reasoning process and to consider possible 
conclusions. Where no clear goal/conclusion is presented, core Schemas are directly 
applied which allows a putative conclusion to be generated. 
The theory also includes a pragmatic component based on natural language understanding 
of quantifiers and connectives. An example is the invited inference, where, for instance, in 
addition to applying a rule such as modus ponens, reasoners may be invited to infer that "if 
p then q" also implies "if not p then not q". This echoes instances in everyday deontic 
reasoning (e. g. if John tidies his room then he will receive £5), the pragmatic assumption 
being that if John does not tidy his room, then the £5 will not be forthcoming. Similarly, 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) suggested pragmatic reasoning schemas which facilitate 
inferences involving conditionals which in natural language express permission and/or 
obligations. However, as their theory has mainly been applied to conditional and deontic 
reasoning, rather than to syllogisms, it is less relevant to the current purpose. O'Brien 
(1995) has suggested that pragmatic schemas also allow for "non-logical" inferences to be 
made, based for instance on schemas of stereotyped social situations. Overall, some of 
these pragmatic inferences may not be logically sound, based as they are on prior 
knowledge and conversational implicatures, but they offer an explanation for some of the 
inaccuracies, fallacious inferences and biases frequently reported in the reasoning 
literature. 
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Rule theories predict errors on the basis of the number and complexity of rules which need 
to be applied in order to solve a given problem. Rips (1994a, Table 7.1, page 235) 
presented the results of extensive testing of PSYCOP which seem to support this 
hypothesis. On simple syllogisms which require the use of just one rule, participants 
typically perform very well. For instance, the syllogism All A are B, All B are C, requires 
only the transitivity rule to reach the conclusion, All A are C. 90% of participants in Rips' 
studies evaluated this conclusion correctly. Similarly, All A are B, No B are C requires 
only the exclusivity rule and 85% of participants made a correct evaluation on this 
problem. However, syllogisms which require multiple rules, such as All A are B; Some C 
are not B, produce just 35% correct evaluations. According to Rips, solving this syllogism 
requires four rules (forward and-elimination, followed by three backward rules, and- 
introduction, not-introduction and if-elimination). Rule theories suggest that effects of 
prior knowledge or belief prejudice reasoning either by biasing the initial premise 
interpretation or by acting as a post hoc censor. As the rules are, by nature, blind to 
semantic content effects, there cannot be any influence of belief on the deduction process 
itself. However, Rips does not place emphasis on explaining this feature any further. 
1.3 Theories Specific to Syllogistic Reasoning 
In addition to rules and mental models, a number of other theories have been specifically 
developed in an attempt to explain syllogistic reasoning. A brief review of the main 
theories is presented below. The first two of these offer explanations primarily from the 
perspective of propositional and spatial processes respectively. Section 1.4 will then 
present theories which assume reasoning results from non-logical heuristic processes. 
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1.3.1 Verbal Reasoning Hypothesis (VRH) 
Polk and Newell (1995) offer a hypothesis which allows for the presence of both 
representational and rule-based processes. Polk and Newell claim that the theories 
discussed thus far are what they term transduction paradigms, that is, individuals initially 
encode premise information into some form of internal representation (be it a proposition, 
schema or model), upon which specialised reasoning mechanisms can operate before the 
results are decoded to produce a conclusion. They proposed that rather than being 
peripheral processes, coding and encoding actually play the central role in reasoning. 
Whilst it remains unclear whether untrained individuals possess sophisticated reasoning- 
specific mechanisms, their linguistic abilities are not in doubt and it is these abilities which 
are deployed adaptively to deductive reasoning tasks. As the same higher-level cognitive 
processes which serve to transform verbal to semantic representations and back again on 
an everyday communicative basis are also those which support deduction, the overall 
deductive process is termed verbal reasoning. However, the process must occur in a way 
which reflects the needs of deduction, rather than those of everyday communication. When 
this does not happen, errors associated with problem content, prior belief and Gricean 
implicature arise. Polk and Newell present a detailed computational model of verbal 
reasoning. The initial stage of the process is to construct a mental model of a situation in 
which the premise in question is true. The objects represented in the model are annotated 
by two additional pieces of information; a not flag indicating that the object does not have 
a specified property, and an identifying flag indicating that the object is identified by a 
specific property. For syllogisms, identifying properties correspond to the grammatical 
subject of the premise and are distinguished from other, secondary, properties by being 
more easily assessable, e. g. given the premise All A are B, the model distinguishes an A 
(identifying) who is a B, from aB (identifying) who is an A. However, there are oftcn 
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several ways in which a premise may be represented, and hence an annotated model may 
contain information which is not inherent in the original premise (an unwarranted model) 
or may fail to encode information which is inherent (an incomplete model). For instance, 
given the premise Some A are B, the model may contain unwarranted information if it also 
encodes the idea that Some A are not B. Similarly, a model for the premise No . -1 are B, 
may be incomplete if it fails to encode the fact that the secondary object (B) cannot be an 
A. Table 1.7 shows encodings for the VR model for all four premise moods. The table 
shows a default encoding, plus how they may be changed or augmented when information 
from a second premise is introduced. 
Table 1.7: Encoding for verbal reasoning model (adapted from Polk and Newell, 1995, page 538). 
Premise Model Augmented model 
All A are B (A' B) all (A... ) - (A' ... 
B) 
Some A are B (A' B) 
(A') 
MR (A 
... 
) - (A' ... 
B) 
(A' 
... 
) 
No A are B (A'-B) all (A... ) (A'... - B) 
Some A are not B (A'-B) 
(A') 
MR (A... )-3(A'... -B) 
(A'... ) 
Key: ` identifying property flag 
not flag 
MR most recently assessed 
... other properties 
Once premises have been encoded, the verbal reasoning process attempts to produce a 
conclusion based on the annotated model. Conclusions about identifying properties are 
generated before those about secondary properties. Simple putative conclusions (which are 
true according to the annotated model) are generated and then tested to ascertain whether 
they form a legitimate syllogistic conclusion (i. e. whether they relate the two end terms 
using one of the four quantifiers). If a suitable conclusion is not found, then the premises 
are rc-encoded and the reasoning process repeated. As a default, Polk and Newell assumed 
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that conclusions of the form All X are Y or No X are Y will be proposed when there is an 
object with X as an identifying property, and all objects with the property X also possess 
the property Y or -Y. Conclusions of the form Some X are Y or Some X are not Y will be 
proposed where there is an object with X as the identifying property and at least one other 
object with the properties X and Y/-Y. 
Polk and Newell present data collected over a number of experiments, with over 100 
participants, to show that their computational model can account for much of the variation 
in syllogistic reasoning data produced by human subjects. This experimental data presented 
an overall accuracy rate of between 40-69%, compared to the 38-75% for the VR model. 
The constantly observed effects of atmosphere, conversion and figure are also predicted by 
the VR system, with an effect size within 10% of that shown by human subjects. Other 
syllogistic reasoning effects such as the number of NVC responses across various problem 
types, and relative accuracy on valid and invalid problems are also accounted for. 
Polk and Newell also present detailed individual differences data to show that VR can 
account for strategic differences such as substitution and describe the system as building 
on ideas from both mental model and rules theories. It uses annotated mental models as a 
basic data structure, but encoding and re-encoding processes resemble the application of 
formal inference rules. As such, verbal reasoning comprises not only language processing 
but also supports the use of visuo-spatial representations and does not preclude the use of 
reasoning-specific mechanisms, especially in trained individuals. However, they deny that 
VR is a hybrid approach, its most important assumption (the one that distinguishes it from 
both rules and models theories) is that the central processes are borrowed form language 
comprehension and generation. Such processes are able to map between verbal and 
semantic representations, hence although the theory bears some resemblance to mental 
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models (indeed Polk and Newell admit that their annotated models were based directly on 
mental models) no mental logic is required. 
1.3.2 Euler Circles 
Like models, Euler circles (Erickson, 1974; 1978) comprise mental analogues of syllogistic 
premises. Terms are represented by circles and syllogistic moods represented by particular 
arrangements of these circles as shown in Table 1.8. As such they explain how premises 
may be both interpreted and combined. 
Table 1.8: Euler circle representations for syllogistic premises 
Premise Euler circle representations 
A AllAareB 
EIIIIII:: 
Identity 
relationship 
I Some A are B 
AB 
Overlap 
relationship 
E No A are B 
O Some A are 
not B 
00 
Disjointed 
relationship 
oB Subset-set 
relationship 
BAA OOB 
Subset-set Set-subset Identity 
relationship relationship relationship 
ABAAB O 
Erickson proposed a detailed process whereby premises are encoded as Euler circles, but 
individuals only have the capacity to handle one diagram per premise, hence wvvcn the 
premise Ill :1 arc B, they will encode it either as a subset or an identity relationship. 
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Subjects then combine the two premise representations into one composite. As again it is 
assumed they can handle only one at time, some possible combinations may be overlooked 
and such omissions lead to errors. Indeed one of the most common criticisms of Euler 
circles is that they lead to a combinatorial explosion because many syllogistic premises call 
for several possible representations, and as such are beyond cognitive processing 
limitations. However, some studies have found that individuals can and do adopt more than 
one Euler model of a premise (e. g. Neimark and Chapman, 1975). 
Another theoretical approach based on Euler circles was proposed by Guyote and 
Sternberg (1981). They also suggested set/subset representations were employed and that 
difficulty should depend on the number of diagrams needed to represent a combination of 
the premises. Their theory offered an explanation of how the premises are combined. 
Transitive chains are essentially links between end terms using the middle terms as a 
connecting device. A positive link is made when the first term has a positive connection 
with the middle term which then in turn has a passive connection with the third term. A 
negative (or ambiguous) chain is established when no positive link can be made via the 
quantifiers. Guyote and Sternberg present a model of transitive chain theory comprising 
symbolic representations based on Euler circles, as shown in their basic form in Table 1.9. 
It is notable that these representations bear resemblance to those in the verbal reasoning 
hypothesis of Polk and Newell (1995, described previously) despite transitive chain theory 
being based on a spatial approach to reasoning, rather than grounded in natural language. 
For equivalent Euler circle representations and syllogistic premise moods, see Table 1.8 
above. As the Table 1.9 implies, the symbolic representation of each premise is comprised 
of components relating to the given terms (here, as in Table 1.8, these are A and B). 
23 
Table 1.9: Symbolic representations of set relations according to transitive chain theory (Guyote and 
Sternberg, 1981, page 468) 
_ 
Set relation Symbolic representation 
Identity a, -* B b, -* A 
a2-B b2-*A 
Subset-set a, -ý Bl b, A 
a2-*B b2->-A 
Set-subset a, ->B I b, ->A 
a2-->-B b2->A 
Overlap a, -ý B b, -A 
a2--B b2-> -A 
Disjoint a, ->-B b, -*-A 
a, ) -> -B b, ) -*-A 
Once both syllogistic premises have been represented, inferences about the relationship 
between A and C terms can be made by integrating the two transitive chains that are 
formed from the components of the two representations. A transitive chain is formed from 
two components in which the first term in a component matches the second term in the 
other (e. g. an AB component and a BC components form an AB-BC transitive chain). A 
major criticism of Euler circles (e. g. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) has been that they 
cannot represent assertions containing more than one quantifier (e. g. All of the A are the 
same as some of the B), a situation which is common in everyday reasoning. Nor do they 
generalise well to natural language quantifiers such as most, or few. Sternberg and 
Guyote's version claims to overcome such difficulties, as well as that of combinatorial 
explosion. They claim that the simplicity of the representations and the rules applied in 
combining them avoid such difficulties. However, the theory also rests upon a strong 
assumption that premises are always encoded completely and correctly and cite evidence 
foram an earlier study by Sternberg and Turner (1981) in support. However, given the 
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ubiquity of systematic errors and biases in the literature, it seems unlikely that this is a 
practical tenet on which to base a competence model. 
Stenning and Oberlander (1995) have proposed a theory which suggest that just one Euler 
circle type representation per premise may be required. They claim that representing 
premise information graphically reduces abstraction, i. e. it allows reasoners specificity in 
representing the information in an easily interpretable fashion. Such representations are 
claimed to be easier to process than abstract rules and hence reasoners which incorporate 
such methods are thought to be most effective. They compare this with mental models and 
claim that the two are in fact isomorphic. Stenning and Yule (1997) later claim that 
equivalent sentential implementations also exist. Model theorists would disagree, claiming 
that although Euler circles allow reasoners to model premises, they are remote from the 
actual perceptual structure of the situation. Mental models on the other hand, are claimed 
to be semantically meaningful discursive structures which may be embedded in a model of 
the real world (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Overall, experimental evidence does not wholly 
support Euler circle based approaches generally. Some of the syllogisms which reasoners 
find easiest actually require a large number of Euler diagrams. For instance, Some A are B; 
All B are C, requires 16 different Eulerian combinations, yet experimental data indicates it 
to be one of the easiest syllogisms (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991, report a 88% accuracy 
rate). 
1.3.3 Monotonicity Theory 
Recently, an alternative and novel theory of syllogistic reasoning based on natural 
language semantics has been proposed (Geurts, 2003). The key tenet of this theory is that 
all quantified premises have a fixed pattern of monotonicity. By this, Geurts means that the 
four possible quantifiers can be seen as lying in a sequence, within which successive 
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quantifiers are either monotone increasing or monotone decreasing. This idea is borrowed 
from linguistic theory which describes each member of a monotone increasing sequence as 
greater than or equal to the preceding member, and each member of a monotone decreasing 
sequence as less than or equal to the preceding member. In terms of syllogistic reasoning, 
in premises with an "all' quantifier, the first term is monotone decreasing and the second 
increasing (denoted by the symbol -/+), premises with quantifier "some" are +/+. with 
"none" are -/- and with "some... not" are +/-. From this implicit knowledge, it is therefore 
possible to substitute terms within syllogisms in order to arrive at the correct conclusion. 
For example, given the syllogism All A are B; No B are C, in the second premise B is 
monotone decreasing. B can therefore be replaced by any term which implies it. From 
premise one, reasoners can assume that A implies B, and therefore can return to premise 2, 
replacing B with A to produce the correct conclusion, No A are C. Geurts also employs a 
number of other linguistic principles to illustrate how the relative difficulty of syllogisms 
are influenced by natural language assumptions, such as that of conversion (as described 
previously), that "aIr' implies "some", "no" implies "all are not", and also that dealing 
with "some... not" premises presents particular difficulty. 
Newstead (in press) has supported the theory in terms of its grounding in linguistic 
principles, and in that it avoids representing terms by means of an arbitrary number of 
tokens. However, he also points out that data from the psychological literature confounds 
some of Geurts' findings. For instance, monotonicity theory predicts that quantifiers such 
as "most" will present more difficulty than Thome" or "at least" because the former is 
linguistically marked. However, work by Bradon, Capon, Dennis, Evans, Handley and 
Newstead (2002) has shown no differences between these quantifiers. Although Geurts' 
linguistic model appears to be supported by the published data he cites, this may be, at 
(cast in part, attributed to the fact that those problems where monotonic substitution applies 
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are also those which are generally known to be easiest to solve. The fit is less impressive 
when more difficult problems are considered. Although the data cited shows a variance of 
over 60% in accuracy, Geurts' theory suggests that these problems should be of equal 
difficulty. Overall the monotonicity theory remains underspecified in a number of ways; it 
does not extend to invalid syllogisms, nor explain figural effects. Nor does Geurts present a 
detailed and testable processing model which may be tested against research data. 
Moreover, (though it must be said that in this aspect Geurts is in line with most other 
theorists) the possibility of individual differences is not considered. 
1.4 Heuristic Approaches to Syllogistic Reasoning 
Other research suggests that reasoning performance may be explained by various heuristic 
processes triggered by interpretation of the quantifiers present. For the present purposes 
three approaches are considered, all of which make similar predictions about performance, 
but offer contrasting explanations for it, suggesting reasoning is based on either 
atmosphere, matching of quantifiers or probability. 
1.4.1 Atmosphere 
One of the earliest heuristic explanations was the atmosphere effect proposed by 
Woodworth and Sells (1935) and refined by Begg and Denny (1969). They argued that 
when two premises are of the same logical form (i. e. both are A, I, E or 0), then the 
"atmosphere" of the syllogism makes it likely that a conclusion of that form will be 
assumed to follow. When the two premises contain different quantifiers, two 
supplementary hypotheses are required: 
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1. A negative premise (i. e. quantifier No or Some... not) creates a negative 
atmosphere, even when the other premise is affirmative (favouring a negative 
conclusion), 
2. A particular premise (i. e. quantifier Some or Some... not) creates a particular 
atmosphere, even when the other premise is universal (favouring a particular 
conclusion). 
So, for the syllogism: 
All B are A 
No Care B 
the theory would predict a prevailing negative atmosphere and hence the conclusion No C 
are A. However, although the atmosphere hypothesis does seem to account for much 
observed reasoning performance (many valid syllogisms have conclusions which are 
consistent with atmosphere) it only describes patterns of performance and cannot show 
differences in difficulty between syllogism (Evans et al, 1993). Moreover, because it can, 
in theory, predict a conclusion for every problem, the atmosphere hypothesis fails to 
explain why participant produce "no valid conclusion" responses. 
1.4.2 Matching 
Wetherick (1989) and Wethenck and Gilhooly (1990; 1995) claim that when the logic of a 
problem is not immediately apparent, reasoners generate a response which has the 
appearance of logic by choosing a conclusion where the quantifier matches that of one of 
the premises. Where there is a choice of premise mood, they select that which is the most 
conservative, i. e. that which makes an assertion about the smaller proportion of whatever 
entities are represented by the subject term. As such, conclusion terms are preferred in the 
order F>0=I »A. An A conclusion (quantifier. 411) may be chosen for the conclusion if 
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both premises contain All, but if only one premise contains the quantifier all, and the other 
some, no or some... not, the chosen conclusion will contain one of the latter forms. To 
consider the syllogism again: 
All Bare A 
No C are B 
the matching theory would predict a conclusion with the logical form No C are A. 
Hence the matching theory predicts the same conclusion for this syllogism as does the 
atmosphere effect. This is so in all but three instances (moods EI, EO and IO, where 
atmosphere predicts an 0 conclusion in each case whereas matching allows for conclusions 
matching the other moods, E or I, E and I respectively. Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) 
compared the two. They re-examined data from a study by Sells (1936) which claimed that 
the atmosphere was a "potent factor" in deciding on a conclusion. They showed that the 
atmosphere did not predict the most frequent responses to syllogisms of the mood AA and 
AE and that in many cases, non-predicted responses were given as frequently as predicted 
ones. The data support matching just as strongly. Moreover, whereas, atmosphere claimed 
to account for reasoning of all individuals, matching theory claims only to account for the 
work of those who are unable, or unwilling to use more logical non-heuristic methods. 
Matching assumes that some people will attempt these methods, with varying standards of 
success. Wetherick and Gilhooly present a premise construction task whereby conclusions 
were presented and participants asked to construct premise pairs from which that 
conclusion could logically follow. Their findings clearly showed that although a significant 
number of subjects showed evidence of matching (by generating correct premise pairs, or 
incorrect but matching pairs), some subjects were also able to construct non-matching 
premise pairs, which were also logically valid. This suggested that these individuals were 
employing a more sophisticated logical strategy. 
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Many of the syllogisms which reasoners find easiest do have at least one premise where 
the mood matches the that of the correct conclusion. Such a conclusion may be obtained by 
matching, but, equally, some other strategy may be at work. Wetherick and Gilhooly 
(1990) report data which indicates that for syllogisms where a non-matched conclusion is 
correct, 28% of reasoners provided conclusions in accordance with matching theory, and 
this figure rose to 53% in the data provided by Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984). They offer 
this as evidence of matching by these participants and suggest that, as it is reasonable to 
suppose some consistency in the use of this approach, at least a proportion of correct 
conclusions to matchable syllogisms must also have been obtained by this method. 
Matching theory predicts most difficulty with syllogisms with non-matching conclusions. 
However, mental-model theorists have pointed out that the latter problems are also 
multiple-model. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) argue that if reasoners are 
responding simply to premise mood, then they should be unaffected by model count. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have shown that individuals are more likely to draw a 
conclusion matching one of premises for one model problems, than they are for multiple 
model problems. But then, as participants could equally be obtaining these conclusions by 
matching in the majority of cases, this argument seems somewhat circular. However, they 
also make the more salient point that if reasoners were governed by mood they would 
never respond "no valid conclusion". Wetherick and Gilhooly (1990) make a similar point, 
adding that although matchers in their study did produce this conclusion, they had been 
instructed that over half of the problems had no conclusion. Moreover, they frequently 
produced this response to valid problems, whilst participants who used a more logical 
approach did so only when it was the correct response. 
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1.4.3 Probability Heuristics Model (PHM) 
The Probability Heuristics Model (PHM) proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999) also 
predicts that reasoners will draw syllogistic conclusions of the same logical form as the 
least informative (i. e. most conservative) premise. However, rather than simply matching 
quantifiers, they argue that individuals use probability based heuristics based on their 
knowledge of the informational strength of the premises. This allows for the generation of 
the most informative valid conclusion. The theory presents some fairly complex 
computational detail, but in basic terms it proposes three main heuristics for conclusion 
generation: 
GI: The min-heuristic suggests that the quantifier for the conclusion will be the same as 
that for the least informative premise (the min-premise). Almost all valid syllogisms 
follow this rule as shown by the matching theory above, producing a min-conclusion. 
G2: P-entailments: some conclusions probabilistically entail (p-entail) further logical 
conclusions of a form different to either premise. For example, if All X are Y, then it 
is probable that Some X are Y (this follows as long as there are at least some Xs 
present). P-entailments are the next most preferred conclusions to those predicted by 
the min-heuristic. P-entailments include a family of heuristics corresponding to the 
probabilistic relationships between quantifiers. 
G3: Attachment heuristic. Whereas heuristic 1 and 2 specify the end quantifier, the 
attachment heuristic specifies the order of end term in the conclusion. If the min- 
premise has an end term (i. e. either A are C) as its subject, this becomes the subject 
Of the conclusion. 
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Chater and Oaksford (1999) present the following illustrations: 
All X are Y 
Some Z are Y 
I type conclusion 
Some Z are X 
(max-premise) 
(min-premise) 
(by min) 
(by attachment) 
By the min-heuristic, the conclusion is I (some). The min-premise has an end-term (Z) as 
its subject, therefore by attachment, this will also be the subject of the conclusion, resulting 
in the conclusion, Some Z are X In contrast, were the order of terms in both above 
premises reversed, the min-heuristic would still suggest an I conclusion but the min- 
premise would not have an end term as its subject. In this case, the end-term of the max- 
premise would become the end-subject instead, giving the conclusion Some X are Z. 
A more complex example is shown below. In this case the valid conclusion is of a different 
form to that of either premise, hence the min-heuristic does not suggest the 
probabilistically-valid conclusion (type 0 or, quantifier Some... not). 
Some X are Y 
Mn 7 Ara V 
0-type conclusion 
Some X are not Z 
E-type conclusion 
NoZareX 
(max-premise) 
(min-premise) 
(by p-entailment, p-validity or logic) 
(by attachment) 
(by min) 
(by attachment) 
In this case, use of the min-heuristic produces the incorrect conclusion, No Z are X. In 
order to generate the correct conclusion, reasoners have to then use p-entailment (if No Z 
are X, then it is probable that Some X are not Z). Alternatively, more skilled reasoners may 
reach this conclusion by use of logic. Two test heuristics are proposed to facilitate the 
assessment of the probabilistic validity of a putative conclusion: 
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TI: The max-heuristic: Confidence in the conclusion generated by GI to G3 in proportion 
to the informativeness of the most informative premise (the max-premise). 
T2: The 0-heuristic: Avoid producing or accepting 0 conclusions (those with Some ... not) 
as they are so uninformative relative to other forms of conclusion. 
Chater and Oaksford conducted a detailed meta-analysis of five experiments that used all 
64 syllogistic forms (two studies by Dickstein, 1978; two by Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 
1978; and that of Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984). In testing the predictions of PHM against 
this experimental data, conclusion types (including NVC) were examined across the 
individual syllogistic forms. PHM was found to account for over 80% of the variance in 
the data. The min-heuristic accounted for over 90% of conclusions drawn across both valid 
and invalid problems and a highly significant linear trend for conclusion preference in the 
order A>I>0=E (as predicted by the model) was also observed. The min-heuristic also 
predicts that the majority of such responses will not rely on p-entailment. On appropriate 
syllogisms across the five studies, over 50 min-responses were observed compared to 
between 5 and 13 p-entailed responses. In terms of the attachment-heuristic, conclusion 
order across the three Johnson-Laird studies (which required subjects to generate 
conclusions) found that in 54 out of 56 cases, the conclusion order conformed to that 
predicted by the attachment-heuristic. 
Overall, the PHM argues that reasoning about the likely relationship between terms is 
based on the relative informativeness of the premises and claims that such simple, but 
rational, syllogistic reasoning strategies are justified by probability theory rather than 
formal logic. Chater and Oaksford (1999) present a detailed comparison between the PHM 
and the rules. mental models and verbal reasoning theories, showing that, in every case. 
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PHM not only fits the data as well as any of these theories, but also provides a more 
accurate account of details including figural effects, NVC responses and effects of model 
count. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks on Theories of Reasoning 
Overall, reasoning is a wide ranging phenomenon, fundamental in everyday cognition, and 
which has attracted a range of differing theories all attempting to explain both the process 
people use to reason, and the source of the systematic errors and biases which are reported 
in the literature. Although reasoning has been investigated by means of a range of 
established experimental paradigms, this thesis will be fundamentally concerned with 
syllogistic reasoning, at least at the outset, and hence the theories reviewed above have 
focused particularly on attempts to explain reasoning on those problems. Where the 
programme of research diverges into other tasks, full explanations of those will be 
presented as appropriate. Rule and mental model theories have been designed to provide a 
unified account of reasoning across domains, but have been extensively applied to 
syllogistic reasoning. Other heuristic based theories have been developed with the specific 
goal of explaining syllogistic reasoning. The above theoretical review is not exhaustive, 
but presents a flavour of some of the main issues and constructs which will be addressed 
during the course of this thesis. 
However, most syllogistic reasoning theories, and any models of reasoning data based 
around them, have assumed cognitive universality - that all individuals reason in basically 
the same way, for instance with logical rules, or with mental models, but not both (see for 
instance, Roberts. 1993; 2000, for further discussion of this point). Conversely, individual 
diffcrenccs in other areas of cognitive function have been the subject of much research. 
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This thesis will be concerned with the investigation of such differences with respect to 
reasoning. Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) have presented data which suggest such 
differences exist, certainly with respect to their matching hypothesis, and Section 1.7 later 
will deal further with strategic differences of this kind. Firstly however, Section 1.6 to 
follow, will introduce the concept of individual differences research generally, and outline 
some of the differences which have been observed in some key aspects of cognitive 
function thought to be central to human reasoning; working memory, verbal and spatial 
abilities and cognitive style. 
1.6 Individual Differences 
As the above review reflects, much research has been aimed at supporting the primacy of 
one reasoning theory over others. However, this current programme of work is concerned 
not with upholding one particular theory, but in investigating possible individual 
differences in the ways that people reason. This next section will introduce the concept of 
individual differences research and will outline some of the major research which has been 
carried out in this area. It will then develop this line of thinking further by considering 
evidence for qualitative differences in how individuals choose to reason, i. e. in the 
strategies they choose to adopt in attempting to solve reasoning problems. Finally, this 
chapter will conclude with an overview of the remainder of the thesis and the overall aims 
of the programme of research presented within it. 
1.6.1 Introduction to Individual Differences Research 
The individual differences approach tries to identify components which can be measured 
indepcndcntly and in which there is independent individual variation. It offers an 
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alternative way to examine which components are involved in cognitive tasks such as 
reasoning, and how they may differentially influence individual performance. Individual 
differences are readily observed across a range of abilities and capacities, including the 
ability to perceive and remember events and other stimuli, to use and comprehend verbal 
and propositional material (including language), to form concepts, to learn complex tasks, 
to represent and manipulate spatial information and not least, to reason, make inferences 
and arrive at conclusions. According to Carroll (1983), the study of individual differences 
is concerned with six basic and interrelated questions: 
1. How individual differences can be observed, measured and described, 
2. The dimensions of such differences, 
3. Whether these dimensions are consistent across different populations, 
4. The sources and causes of the differences, 
5. The extent that differences can be modified by intervention, training etc, 
6. How differences affect an individual in their everyday activities and social status. 
Mental models and rules are certainly the two most influential explanations of how people 
actually attempt to reason, rather than rely on heuristics. Although the two theories present 
very different approaches and have relied heavily on different methodologies in providing 
supporting data (rules theorists preferring to present conclusions for evaluation whilst 
mental modellers tend towards production tasks), they do have some factors in common. 
One major similarity is the assumption that errors frequently result from limitations in 
cognitive capacity, particular in working memory (WM). Both schools of thought 
recognise that some individuals seem to have greater capacity than others, and that some 
are more competent rcasoners than others. This may suggest that individual differences in 
cognitive capacity may be associated with similar differences in reasoning ability. The 
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following section will present a brief review of research which has shown this to be the 
case, firstly with regard to working memory, then in terms of verbal and spatial abilities. 
and finally dispositional and cognitive style factors. 
However, although the following section is ostensibly divided into three parts, they cannot 
be considered mutually exclusive. Many of the cognitive factors under investigation are 
inextricably linked, not only by association with various facets of WM, but also with that 
nebulous construct we refer to as intelligence. Hence it is worth attempting to define some 
basic terms concerning intelligence at this point. Intelligence itself is notoriously difficult 
to capture in a single, simple definition (see for instance, Kline, 1991). Baron (1998, page 
110) describes intelligence as "those general mental abilities that help people achieve their 
goals, whatever their goals may be, in any real environment". As such it can be seen to be 
constituted from a whole range of cognitive processes, some of which are inherent and 
fixed (capacities/abilities), whilst others, such as cognitive styles or dispositions (Baron 
uses the terms interchangeably), may be learned and under conscious control. The 
psychometric measurement of intelligence was initiated by Spearman (1904) when he 
introduced the concept of general intelligence or, g, a factor thought to be common to all 
problem solving tasks. This approach remains to the present day, and as factor analytical 
techniques have developed, a wide range of abilities have been sampled and biological and 
neurological correlates of the g factor identified (e. g. Matarazzo, 1992). Cattell (1971) has 
broken down g into two forms, crystallised and fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence (gF) is 
the basic reasoning ability of an individual, dependent largely on genetic and neurological 
factors (and hence is a fairly stable characteristic) whilst crystallised intelligence (gC) 
represents this ability as it is evinced in the particular culture or situation that the 
individual finds themselves in and may be evidenced by ability to accumulate knowledge 
through the lifespan and reflect on experience (and is therefore somewhat more malleable). 
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Fluid intelligence provides the innate ability for crystallised intelligence to develop, whilst 
crystallised intelligence combines with fluid in activities such as using prior experience to 
solve novel problems. 
1.6.2 Working Memory 
Working memory capacity is a factor long associated with reasoning performance (see for 
instance Gilhooly, 1998; Johnson-Laird, 2001). Baddeley (1986) describes a tripartite 
model of working memory (WM) comprising a controlling attentional system, termed the 
central executive which oversees and co-ordinates the operation of two slave systems. The 
phonological loop (PL) is concerned with processing linguistic material and a visuo-spatial 
sketchpad (VSSP) which is responsible for the construction and manipulation of visuo- 
spatial images. A considerable amount of research, primarily using dual-task methodology, 
has indicated WM involvement in an array of cognitive activities, including reasoning. 
Generally a decrement in performance is observed on a primary task when performed 
concurrently with a secondary task. The WM slave systems are thought to play a fairly 
passive role in higher level cognitive tasks, those which involve processing as well as 
storage of information. For instance, simple measures of PL capacity, such as digit recall 
span, do not predict accuracy in reading comprehension. However, more complex 
measures, which are assumed to also reflect the role of the CE, do predict performance on 
such tasks (e. g. Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Gilhooly, 1998; Shah and Miyake, 1996). 
For a discussion of recent developments in the WM model see Baddeley and Logie (1999). 
This work will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Limitations in capacity are believed to arise from the need to simultaneously satisfy both 
storage and processing demands. Reasoning is typical of tasks which place high demand on 
both of these aspects. The mental models theory of reasoning suggests a crucial role for 
1ý 
working memory in the storage of initial models and of mental footnotes. These must be 
retained whilst further models are constructed. The information must then be accurately 
recalled and used during the fleshing out process. If stored material is subject to decay, 
and/or is inaccurately recalled, then errors will result. Similarly, in mental logic theories, 
storage of progress on temporary subgoals must be retained whilst the ongoing processing 
of logical rules takes place. Hence both theories place importance on WM capacity in 
determining competence. Tasks which tax ability to store verbal and/or spatial information 
produce data which can inform about the individual's capacity in respect to these systems. 
Similarly, tasks which require storage and processing concurrently may also tell us about 
CE capacity. Systematic individual differences in WM capacity have been found to be 
central factors in explaining individual differences in a array of cognitive tasks, including 
reading comprehension (Just and Carpenter, 1992), acquisition of logic skills (Kyllonen 
and Stephens, 1990) and of skills in the workplace (Gitomer, 1988) and more importantly 
for the current discussion, syllogistic reasoning (e. g. Gilhooly, 1998). 
Engle, Kane and Tuholski (1999) describe working memory capacity as being the 
capabilities of the limited attention mechanism which Baddeley and colleagues have 
termed the central executive (CE). Kane and Engle (1999) also argued that WM capacity 
is isomorphic to the capacity for controlled processing, which in turn is shown to be 
strongly related to fluid intelligence (gF). This relates to the ability to solve novel 
problems and is putatively non-verbal and culture free (e. g. Horn and Cattell, 1967). Engle 
and colleagues have shown, through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), that although 
performance on complex WM measures was related to g, performance on simple span 
measures was not. They argue that the CE is crucial to complex tasks, where processing, 
rather than storage. is the more important factor. 
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Kyllonen and Christal (1990) investigated the relationship between WM capacity and 
reasoning ability. CFA indicated the correlation between WM capacity and reasoning 
ability to be between .8 and .9 across 
four independent studies, using a wide range of 
measures for both constructs. Like Engle et al, their findings support the idea that general 
abilities reflect availability of attentional resources. Developmental work has also 
suggested that the early stages of skill acquisition (which requires a high degree of 
resource limited processing and hence WM capacity) depend on general abilities which are 
primarily reasoning ability or g (e. g. Gustafsson, 1984). Kyllonen and Christal also 
conclude that these general reasoning abilities reflect WM. However, they concede that 
their results are equally supportive of the hypothesis that WM capacity is primarily 
determined by reasoning ability. Capacity may be partly characterised by the size of 
storage buffers such as the PL. This capacity may in turn be managed through some kind 
of reasoning process. Hence, success in WM span tasks requires an ability to reason 
successfully about how to manage short-term storage resources. Such reasoning is likely to 
be a CE function and, as Baddeley (1986) has argued, many processes within the CE 
remain underspecified. 
Kyllonen (1996) provides an extensive review of empirical findings which suggest that 
WM capacity is more highly related to reasoning performance and learning than any other 
cognitive factor. He concludes that WM capacity is, essentially, Spearman's g. Reasoning 
ability is traditionally "considered to be at the core of what is ordinarily meant by 
intelligence" (Carroll, 1989, page 56). It is also one of the primary determinants of the 
degi-cc to which an individual benefits from instruction (e. g. Snow and Yallow, 1982) and 
is successful at accumulating lifelong crystallised knowledge. Overall, it would seem that 
individual differences in reasoning ability do reflect differences in WM capacity, which in 
turn seems to support claims made by both rules and mental model theories of reasoning. 
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Recent work by Capon, Handley and Dennis (2003) and Handley, Capon, Copp and Harper 
(2002) has indicated that individual differences in verbal and spatial working memory 
capacity are indeed associated with reasoning performance, and these findings will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
1.6.3 Verbal and Spatial Abilities 
Cognitive abilities may be defined as "any non-ephemeral characteristics of an individual 
that determine the level of performance on a cognitive task when maximal performance is 
attempted" (Carroll, 1983, page 4). By non-ephemeral, Carroll means that the 
characteristic is relatively stable, if it does change or develop, the process occurs only very 
gradually over considerable time. Cognitive tasks can comprise any activity which requires 
the mental processing of information, from simple everyday decisions to complex 
experimental tasks presented in the laboratory. Tests of cognitive ability typically consist 
of a series of tasks, either homogenous repetitions of trials in order to obtain fine data such 
as response times, repetitions of a task under differing conditions, or batteries of 
psychometric tests such as those typically used to measure intelligence. Statistical 
techniques such as factor analysis are frequently used to reduce the resulting data to a 
handful of cognitive factors which are thought to draw on the abilities being measured. 
However, such techniques can be limited if it is assumed that the required abilities for a 
given task are the same for all individuals. 
Section 1.5.1 above has already discussed one aspect of cognitive ability, working memory 
capacity. Another aspect which has been extensively researched is verbal and spatial 
ability. To refer back again to the two main theories of human reasoning, rule theories 
emphasise the requirement to reason propositionally (which would seem to be a verbal 
skill) whilst mental models can be seen to be examples of more spatial representational 
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approach. Other such as Polk and Newell's (1995) verbal reasoning hypothesis, suggest the 
possibility for both propositional and spatial modes of representation. Abilities in the 
verbal domain can encompass a wide range of skills from reading (in terms of both speed 
and comprehension) to vocabulary, grammatical and syntactic knowledge, to the ability to 
solve verbal analogy problems and manipulate information in a propositional form. Hence. 
no single task might be said to wholly and uniquely capture or define the verbal capacity 
possessed by an individual (Carroll, 1993; Pellegrino and Goldman, 1983). However, 
intelligence and aptitude tests have tended to concentrate primarily on vocabulary, 
comprehension and verbal analogy. Psychologists have frequently used scores on the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), a test of supposed general intelligence which is used as an 
assessment of suitability for University entrance in the USA. The SAT includes a measure 
of verbal reasoning ability, and performance on this measure shows high levels of inter- 
correlation with other cognitive tasks which emphasise verbal skills. 
Individual differences in verbal ability have also been closely associated WM. In an 
investigation of reading comprehension (which is of course a key skill in many reasoning 
tasks), Daneman and Carpenter (1980) presented participants with a typical comprehension 
task, where they were asked to read a passage of text and then answer questions on it's 
content and structure. They also presented a complex reading span test as a measure of 
functional WM span for language. This involved reading sentences whilst also keeping 
track of the final word of each sentence as to-be-remembered items. After a series if 
sentences, participants were asked to recall these items. Performance on this task has been 
repeatedly shown to correlate highly with performance on Verbal SAT (see for instance 
Daneman and Merikle, 1996, for meta-analysis). Daneman and Carpenter also examined 
results alongside verbal SAT scores. Those subjects who presented higher comprehension 
scores, also presented higher reading span scores and this WM measure also correlated 
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significantly (r =. 6) with SAT scores. The findings have since been replicated (for instance, 
Just and Carpenter, 1992). This seems to suggest that verbal WM ability (possibly 
facilitated by the PL) is a strong predictor of reading comprehension. However, this may 
also be facilitated by factors such as educational level, vocabulary knowledge etc which 
also involve different aspects of memory. 
However, the same reading span test used by Daneman and Carpenter was also employed 
on a later study by Oakhill, Yuill and Parkin (1986). They tested two groups of children 
one of which performed poorly on tests of comprehension, but normally on reading and 
vocabulary, the other group performed at a normal level for their age on all three measures. 
The children in the latter group performed significantly better on the WM task than those 
in the low comprehension group. This difference increased in line with the number of to- 
be-remembered items. This, together with Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) findings, 
suggest that the two groups of children differed in the additional capacity offered by the 
CE. Just and Carpenter (1992) have also found similar associations between verbal WM 
and cognitive ability in other linguistic tasks. The above research informs the current thesis 
in that it indicates significant individual differences in verbal abilities, these in turn 
underpin the verbal skills necessarily required for reasoning, especially with linguistic 
material such as syllogistic premises. Chapter 4 will investigate verbal abilities with regard 
to individual differences in reasoning strategy. 
Similarly, individual differences in the ability to work with material which involves spatial 
representation have been observed. Carroll (1993, page 309) defines this as the "process of 
apprehending, encoding and mentally manipulating spatial forms". Just and Carpenter 
(1985) presented subjects with a test of spatial ability followed by an experimental task 
which required them to compare two serially presented novel representations of the same 
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object. Eye tracking measures showed that those with low spatial ability frequently had to 
rotate the object repeatedly during the comparison process, suggesting they had forgotten 
the previous representation. High ability individuals however rarely had to rotate the object 
more than once. This suggested that low spatial ability individuals may have difficulty 
maintaining spatial memory traces whilst concurrently processing transformations 
Therefore, it would seem that individual differences in spatial visualisation ability may be, 
at least in part, accounted for by differences in spatial WM capacity (presumably VSSP 
function). Later work such as that by Shah and Miyake (1996) and Capon, Handley and 
Dennis (2003) has also used the verbal WM span tasks designed by Daneman and 
Carpenter, together with spatial WM span measures, in investigating the relative 
contribution of the three working memory components during reasoning. Their findings 
strongly suggest individual differences in the roles of the verbal and spatial WM 
components. 
Both verbal and spatial ability measures were employed by MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews 
(1978) in an investigation of individual differences in reasoning on a sentence-picture 
verification task (where subjects are first presented with a simple verbal description, 
followed by a picture, and have to decide whether the picture accurately represents the 
sentence). This work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, but, in essence, two 
distinct groups of participants were identified. It was suggested that whilst one adopted a 
pictorial strategy, the other used a linguistic approach. Although the two differed in spatial 
ability (the pictorial group presenting higher levels) measures of verbal ability (which 
incorporated comprehension, vocabulary and verbal analogy) could not discriminate 
between individuals. Overall, and most importantly for the current thesis, when the 
research reviewed above is taken together, findings strongly suggest that individual 
differences in menmory, verbal-spatial abilities and reasoning are inextricably linked. 
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1.6.4 Cognitive Style and Thinking Disposition 
In addition to cognitive abilities, thinking dispositions and cognitive style, behavioural 
concepts which lie further towards the personality end of the spectrum, have also attracted 
attention as possible sources of individual differences. Sternberg (e. g. 1997) describes how 
individuals may possess preferred ways of thinking which are not in themselves abilities, 
but represent preferred ways of using abilities. Sternberg and Grigorenko (1997) state that 
these preferences are but one aspect of what has been termed "cognitive styles", 
characteristic, stable and typically preferred modes of processing information. Such styles 
have also been variously termed "thinking dispositions" (e. g. Stanovich and West, 1998; 
Perkins, Farady and Bushey, 1991), "intellectual styles" (e. g. Sternberg, 1988) and 
"information processing styles" (e. g. Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth, 1997), these terms 
often being used interchangeably. According to Sternberg (1997), these styles are not in 
themselves cognitive abilities, but reflect how abilities are used. Hence, individuals may 
have similar abilities, but their styles of thinking may differ considerably. 
Stanovich, West and Sä (1999) prefer the term thinking dispositions and suggest that these 
tend to generate characteristic behavioural tendencies and tactics during reasoning. They 
further propose that cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions are constructs at 
different levels of analysis in cognitive theory, hence their joint relationship to 
performance on thinking and reasoning tasks must be considered in attempting to explain 
the origin of errors. Baron (1988) and Perkins (e. g. 1993) make a similar distinction 
between cognitive abilities and style. For example, Baron refers to abilities as the 
processes underlying performance on psychometric and experimental tasks, such as 
perceptual speed and WM capacity - what Baltes (1987) has called the "mechanics of 
intelligence". These are stable characteristics inherent to the individual. In contrast, 
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thinking dispositions are viewed as cognitive styles which are malleable, i. e. they can be 
improved/changed by practice or instruction. According to Baron (1988). thinking 
dispositions are those things which relate to the adequacy of belief formation and 
modification, perseverance, motivation etc and he comments that traditional psychometric 
measures do not tap into such dispositions. Stanovich (1999) takes a similar view and adds 
that as dispositions and abilities may differ in the degree of malleability and stability they 
afford, variance in reasoning performance may in fact be independently motivated by the 
two. Overall it might seem that whilst cognitive style refers to the preferred way that 
information is used in a cognitive processing sense, disposition relates to personality and 
situational factors such as motivation which may themselves influence style. 
According to Sternberg and Grigorenko (1997) cognitive style is a broad concept which, 
although encompassing thinking dispositions, also includes other aspects which 
characterise preferred ways of processing information. Cognitive styles have been 
extensively investigated as a dimensional construct, whereby individuals are assessed and 
placed on a continuum of behaviour, examples include reflection vs. impulsively (e. g. 
Kagan, 1966), assimilator-explorer (e. g. Martinsen and Kaufman, 2000), rational vs. 
experimental (e. g. Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier, 1996), adapter vs. innovator 
(Kirton, 1976), visualiser vs. verbaliser (Paivio, 1971) to name but a few. Cognitive style 
has been associated with reasoning performance, including as a source of errors and belief 
bias (e. g. Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Handley, Newstead and Wright, 2000) and also with 
individual differences in a range of real-world behaviours including educational 
achievement (e. g. Perkins, Jay and Tishman, 1993). interpersonal conduct (e. g. Salmon, 
1991), creativity (e. g. Baron 1988), reasoning about everyday problems (e. g. Perkins, 
Faradv and Bushy, 1991; Schrihncr. 1986) and occupational choice and performance (e. g. 
Sternberg. 1997; Armstrong. 2000). 
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A substantial amount of research in this area has been carried out by Riding and colleagues 
(see Riding and Rayner, 1998, for a comprehensive review). Riding and Cheema (1991) 
introduced a computer based measurement tool which they term Cognitive Style Analysis 
(CSA). The CSA measures cognitive style across two dimensions, wholist-analytic (the 
tendency to process information wholistically or in parts) and verbal-visual (the tendency 
to represent information in words or pictures). Hence scores on the CSA place individuals 
in one of four cognitive style categories, according to their position on the two dimensions. 
Riding and Rayner (1998) review an immense range of studies in which CSA style 
category membership has been significantly associated with a variety of factors, primarily 
concerned with education and learning style across the lifespan. Their concept of cognitive 
style has also been associated with social behaviours (e. g. Riding, Burton, Rees and 
Sharratt, 1995), susceptibility to stress (Borg and Riding, 1993), challenging behaviour in 
school (Riding and Craig, 1995) and many other social and cognitive questions. Sternberg 
and Grigorenko (1997) present a useful and concise review of cognitive style research and 
its implications. More about the association between cognitive style and reasoning is 
presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Thinking disposition is a closely related concept and the term is often used interchangeably 
with cognitive style (e. g. Baron, 1988). A major programme of research into the 
relationship between thinking dispositions and reasoning has been carried out by Keith 
Stanovich and colleagues, (e. g. Stanovich and West, 1997,1998; Sä, West and Stanovich, 
1999; the many studies reviewed in Stanovich, 1999). Stanovich and West (1998) report an 
extensive investigation of associations between a cognitive ability score (composite of 
several measures, including SAT, Raven's matrices and reading comprehension) and 
thinking disposition. The latter was measured by a questionnaire designed to tap into 
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behaviours with potential epistemic significance, such as the tendency to weigh new 
evidence (or the opinions of others) against a favoured belief, or the disposition to spend a 
lot/very little time on attempting to solve a problem. Overall the questionnaire subscales 
measured epistemological absolutism, willingness to switch perspective, willingness to 
decontextualise and tendency to consider alternative opinions and evidence. Reasoning 
tasks including syllogisms and an informal argument evaluation task were also included. 
Stanovich and West report significant correlations between syllogistic reasoning 
performance and both SAT scores (r = 0.4) and thinking disposition composite scores (r = 
0.3). However, it must be noted that these correlations are of moderate strength only. They 
are statistically significant, though this may be an artefact of the large number of 
participants (N = 546) in Stanovich and West's study. In some earlier research, Stanovich 
and West (1997) used an informal argument evaluation task (supposedly more indicative of 
everyday reasoning) where subjects were asked to assess the strength of rebuttals to 
arguments about everyday topics such as education and other social issues. They found that 
individual differences in the ability to evaluate arguments objectively (i. e. independently of 
prior belief) were reliably associated with cognitive ability (as measured by SAT score) 
and performance on informal argument evaluation. Moreover, actively open-minded 
thinking (a disposition connected with thoroughness in searching for possibilities, ability at 
self-reflection, criticism and revision of beliefs) was also found to predict argument 
evaluation score, even when individual differences in cognitive ability had been partialled 
out. 
Another dispositional factor studied extensively by Stanovich and colleagues is 
decontextualisation, what Donaldson (1978) has called "disembedding", the ability to 
move thought processes away from the immediacy of the present context and apply than 
within other contexts which are not immediately apparent. In everyday life, such skills are 
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required for thinking which involves abstract rule systems, such as in mathematics and 
logic (which of course some theorists claim are also required to solve syllogistic 
problems). The belief bias effect in reasoning occurs when decontextualisation does not 
take place, in other words, conclusions are placed on prior belief, rather than on logical 
validity. Details of this bias are beyond the remit of this review, but are well documented 
in the reasoning literature (see for instance Evans, 1989; Markovits and Nantel, 1989, 
Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen, 1992; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird and Garnham, 1989). 
Stanovich (1999) reviews a range of developmental studies which emphasise the 
importance of such skills to the development of higher level thought processes in children. 
Individuals who showed higher cognitive abilities also showed greater skills appropriate to 
decontextualisation on a syllogistic reasoning task, were less prone to making errors 
associated with belief bias (Sä et al, 1999). This supported earlier findings reported by 
Klaczynski (1997) and Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth (1997) who also found that thinking 
disposition could predict belief bias in reasoning problems. These effects are explained in 
terms of the depth of processing employed by individuals who were able to reason beyond 
the cognitive boundaries imposed by pre-existing theories and beliefs. A recent study by 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright and Farrelly (in press) has also examined individual 
differences in a range of deductive reasoning tasks, including syllogisms, together with 
measures of thinking disposition, ability to generate alternative representations (which 
involves decontextualisation) and intellectual ability (the latter included both verbal and 
spatial ability items among others). They found that intellectual ability was a good 
predictor of logical performance on syllogistic reasoning, especially where there was a 
conflict between logic and believability, and the ability to generate alternative 
representations proved an excellent predictor. However, other aspects of thinking 
disposition (as measured by a self-report questionnaire) were not associated with reasoning 
E)erlonnancc. 
49 
In summary, individual differences have been observed in a range of cognitive functions, 
including working memory capacity, verbal and spatial abilities and cognitiveithinking 
style. Research such as that of Capon et al (2003), Newstead et al (in press) and Stanovich 
and colleagues, has presented evidence for some clear associations between such 
differences and reasoning ability. Moreover, there is evidence that individual differences in 
cognitive ability may also predict differences in reasoning strategy (e. g. MacLeod et al, 
1978). 
1.7 Individual Differences in Reasoning Strategy 
1.7.1 What exactly do we mean by strategy? 
Section 1 of this Chapter touched briefly on the subject of strategies and presented a simple 
working definition of strategy as described by Johnson-Laird et al (2000). This idea of a 
strategy being composed of a series of tactics, echoes that of earlier definitions offered by 
Sternberg (for instance, 1982) who described the execution of a reasoning strategy as 
comprising a combination of processes which he termed components. Evans (2000) adds 
that strategy use is dynamic and flexible. Individuals can therefore choose whether or not 
to adopt a particular strategy, or can change strategy as task demands differ. Hence, he 
claims, strategies do not result from the operation of hardwired mechanisms, nor are they 
constrained by the demands of earlier learning. The notion of explicit conscious control is 
key to Evans' idea of strategy. Processes which are goal-directed and systematic, but 
which occur rapidly and without conscious thought or planning, are not strategic according 
to I-'vans. rather the), arise from intuitive and unconscious reactions to stimuli. Evans' 
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account of strategy emphasises awareness, the ability to be conscious of and to articulate a 
process, and intentionality, having choice and control over the process which is carried 
out, for instance if a certain strategy proves unsuccessful, they can decide to try another. 
The issue of whether knowledge of available strategies, or when to use them, is conscious 
or not is avoided by other definitions such as that of Siegler and Jenkins (1989). They 
define strategies simply as being any procedure which is goal-directed and non-obligatory. 
Roberts (1993) offers an essentially similar explanation, a set of cognitive processes which 
have been observed in deductive reasoning tasks but for which there is insufficient 
evidence to suggest that these processes are themselves the fundamental reasoning 
mechanism. Roberts (2000) also makes an important distinction between intrastrategic 
differences, where all reasoners use a given strategy for a particular task, although they 
may vary as to the exact processes used (e. g. they all use some form of mental models but 
vary in exactly how they do so), and interstrategic differences, where individual differ in 
the strategies used on a task (e. g. some use mental models whilst others use rules). 
Research has indeed shown that individuals do adopt different strategies for reasoning 
which seem to fit Roberts' description quite well, as the following short review will 
demonstrate. 
1.7.2 Rules or Mental Models...? 
Chapter 1 has presented a brief review of some the main theories which have attempted to 
explain human reasoning. Two have been particularly influential; rule based theories (e. g. 
Rips, 1994a) suggest that individuals possess inherent knowledge of logical rules which 
can be applied to premises to generate a conclusion. Errors can be accounted for by the 
types and the number of rules which need to be applied to a given problem; mental models 
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theory (e. g. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) suggests that reasoning involves the 
construction of mental representational analogous to the possible states of the world 
described by the premises. Errors occur as a function of the number of models required for 
given problems. 
The two approaches share the assumption of a universal fundamental reasoning 
mechanism, used by all reasoners over all reasoning domains. Much research has been 
oriented to supporting claims of primacy and exclusivity, proposing that any fundamental 
reasoning process must be based upon either mental models or rules, but not both (Roberts, 
1993; 2000). For instance, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, p. x) in the introduction to their 
classic text on mental models, state "we have formulated the first comprehensive theory in 
psychology to explain all the main varieties of deductive reasoning". In contrast, Rips 
(1986) launched a scathing attack on what he termed "mental muddles" describing them as 
mere thought experiments which are vague and underspecified. Johnson-Laird (1989) in 
turn claimed that rules theories cannot explain how propositions relate to the world, and 
therefore the role of semantics in reasoning. Whereas a mental model can be judged to be 
true if it can be symbolically embedded in a model of the world, according to Johnson- 
Laird, rules or abstract propositions alone do not allow for an assertion of truth or falsity to 
be made. Rips however contests this argument by asserting that although mental models 
claim to account for content effects such as belief bias, because they are comprised of 
tokens (which have consistent properties) they are just as abstract as rules. In a later article 
(Rips, 1994b) reiterates his earlier view, and adds that Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (1991) 
claim that models become semantically meaningful because of their causal link with the 
world, could equally apply to other forms of representation, including propositional ones. 
Indeed, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) state that mental models may not always take the 
form of' explicit images and may "transcend the perceptible" (page 39). 1 lowevcr. in cases 
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where a premise contains negation, nothing in the perceptual world environment 
corresponds to the part of the model symbolised by "-'". Rips (1994b) argues that the 
abstract nature of this notion is evident from the fact that representation of such negated 
premises are often isomorphic to expressions in formal logic. Johnson-Laird, Byrne and 
Schaeken (1992) acknowledge as such, but go on to deny that this makes models theory 
equivalent to rules theory, claiming that any abstraction model requires a semantic 
interpretation which connect the model to the world. 
Moreover, Rips claims that developmental research supports the idea of an inherent mental 
logic. Rules are likely to be innate as they are just the sort of processes which are thought 
to be central to cognitive development and learning. He claims that if mental models 
formed the basis of reasoning, they, or at least the quantifiers and connectives on which 
they are based, would have to be consciously learned before a great deal of the cognitive 
development which requires reasoning ability could occur. Indeed some developmental 
research, e. g. that of Crowley, Shrager and Siegler (1997) and Siegler (1996) has suggested 
that cognitive development in children can be understood in terms of reasoning ability, and 
interestingly, in term of the development of strategies, although neither of these studies 
place particular emphasis on either rules or mental model theories. Whereas rules theorist 
claim that they explain how individuals can reason across any domain about any subject, 
regardless of content, Model theory can be said to be more parsimonious, Rips has to 
introduce additional specialised components to extend his theory to syllogisms and to 
account for conclusion generation tasks, whereas mental model theory readily incorporate 
both these aspects. Moreover, model theory can predict not only the kinds of syllogisms 
where errors will be made, but also the nature of those errors. for instance, where fleshing 
out of an initial model is required, errors Neill be consistent with the initial model, and 
\w-here multiple models are required, errors will be consistent with the final model 
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produced. Johnson-Laird (1995) present evidence for both such effects, but they are 
beyond the capability of the rule models. Other rule theory proponents (e. g. Braine, 
1993)have suggested that individuals may reason by use of both inference-rules and mental 
models (but exactly how this may occur also remains unspecified). 
Several observers have questioned the value of the rules vs. model debate. Stenning and 
Yule (1997) have claimed that in essence, the two approaches reduce to the same thing and 
that both rules and models are in fact members of what they term "a family of individual 
identification algorithms" which are variously implemented, either in diagrams or 
propositionally. Hence, all reasoners are using the same reasoning algorithm, but 
individual differences arise in how the algorithm is implemented. Moreover, Oaksford and 
Chater (1995) have argued that mental models theory simply replaces a logic system based 
on syntactic proof methods with one based on semantic proofs. Similar claims have been 
made by Evans, Over and Handley (in press). It has also been suggested that neither theory 
is sufficiently well developed to be fully testable and therefore attempts to decide 
empirically between the two are futile (Evans and Over, 1996). Roberts (1993) has 
highlighted that the research strategies for both camps are similar, both resting on data 
from a specific task (involving either evaluation of generation of conclusions) and research 
by a small number of individuals committed to one or other cause. Overall, the models vs. 
rules debate remains unresolved and continues to present another of the dichotomies of 
opinion of which psychology seems so fond. See for instance, Johnson-Laird (1999) and 
Rips (1994a, 1994b) for discussions of the debate from the models and rules perspectives 
respectively. 
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1.7.3 ... Or Individual Differences in Strategy? 
However, although such processes may indeed underpin deductive reasoning, differences 
have been observed whereby some individuals appear to use higher-level processes based 
on spatial models, whilst others employ strategies that are propositional in nature. Two 
major forms of representational strategy have been identified - spatial strategies whereby 
information is represented in a spatial configuration which corresponds to the environment 
(e. g. Gattis and Dupeyrat, 2000; Roberts, Gilmore and Wood, 1997) and verbal strategies 
whereby information is represented in the form of linguistic or abstract propositions (e. g. 
Rips, 1994a, b). Individual differences in the spatial-verbal distinction was apparent in 
reasoning on sentence-picture verification tasks where participants are presented with a 
series of trials in which simple sentences are followed by a diagram. The task is to 
determine whether the picture depicts the state of affairs described in the sentence. 
MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) found that strategic preferences on such tasks were 
associated with performance on independent tests of verbal and spatial ability. Moreover, a 
recent magnetic resonance imaging study (Reichle, Carpenter and Just, 2000) found 
differential neural correlates for verbal and spatial reasoning during sentence-picture 
verification. 
Individual differences in strategy have also been identified on reasoning with linear 
syllogisms, which require deductions about the physical relationships between entities. 
Sternberg and Weil (1980) identified four strategies for this task, spatial, verbal, mixed and 
algorithmic (a task-specific heuristic approach). Again these were correlated with scores at 
verbal and spatial ability tests. Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982) identified two distinct 
strategies for linear syllogisms which, although not described in terms of a verbal-spatial 
distinction, presented elements which suggested either pictorial or abstract approaches 
were being used. Strategics observed during solving of linear syllogisms and in sentence- 
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picture verification will be discussed further in Chapter 3, which presents a specific 
experimental study involving these tasks. 
Similar verbal-spatial strategy differences have been observed in individuals solving a 
compass-point direction task. On this task, subjects have to decide where a person 
following a set of compass point directions (e. g. one step north, two steps south ... 
) will 
finish up in relation to a given starting point. The natural strategy here appears to be 
spatial, representing the entire path and hence the spatial relationship between the final 
location and the start. However, some people adopt a heuristic cancellation strategy 
whereby they cancel out opposite steps and those which remain constitute the correct 
answer. A running total of cancellation would appear to be less demanding on WM than 
remembering the whole path, and this strategy reduces both response time and error rate 
significantly. Roberts et al (1997) reported not only verbal-spatial differences, but also 
evidence of ability to develop and switch strategy according to task demands. 
However, the above research, like much of that concerned with differences in cognitive 
ability (see section 1.5.3 previously), have relied on standardised tests of verbal and spatial 
ability. These may themselves be subject to use of different strategies (e. g. Just and 
Carpenter, 1985). Lohman and Kyllonen (1983) have observed that individuals with higher 
spatial abilities as measured by such tests, seem to have a greater range of strategies at 
their disposal generally, and do not always use a spatial representational approach when 
solving reasoning problems. Similarly, Roberts et al (1997) found that low spatial ability 
individuals failed to realise that there were any alternatives to the spatial approach. They 
found this strategy onerous but continued with it, even though cancellation would have 
savcd them much effort. High spatial ability individuals however, tended not to choose the 
spatial strategy (even though they had the aptitude for it), instead identifying the savings of 
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effort that cancellation afforded. Moreover, on more difficult problems where cancellation 
was less effective, they could change back to a spatial strategy in order to successfully 
complete the problem. Overall, high ability individuals seemed to have more choices 
available to them and possessed a cognitive flexibility not observed in the low spatial 
ability reasoners. 
1.7.4 Strategies for Syllogistic Reasoning 
Few studies have attempted to investigate possible inter-strategic differences in syllogistic 
reasoning and it remains unclear whether a natural or prevalent strategy for solving such 
problems exists (Roberts, 2000). One significant study involving categorical syllogisms 
has been conducted by Ford (1995). Participants were asked to generate conclusions to all 
27 valid syllogisms as identified by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). Although the main 
aim was to show that cognitive representations assumed in mental models theory were 
inadequate to account for reasoning performance, one of the most interesting findings 
concerns the identification of individual differences in reasoning behaviour. Ford presented 
extensive verbal and written protocol data to show that, of the 20 subjects, all but four 
appeared to display one of two types of behaviour. Those which Ford termed spatial 
reasoner s used shapes such as circles or squares placed in different spatial relationships to 
represent the relationship between the terms in the premises. They provided written 
protocols illustrating such models diagrammatically and their verbal reports frequently 
described these relationships in terms of group membership, sets and subsets. 
Ford understandably likens the spatial diagrams to traditional Euler circles, diagrammatic 
models representing set membership and the relationship between sets (see Table 1.4). 
Interestingly, these are an example of reasoning-specific strategies which Polk and Newell 
(1995) claim are unlikely to be employed by untrained individuals. I : ricksun (1978) 
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proposed that reasoners use a mental analogue of Euler circles in syllogistic tasks, 
representing each premise in turn and then combining the two diagrams to represent the 
relationship between all three terms in the syllogism. However, Ford described how spatial 
reasoners represent the relationship between terms in the first premise and then add 
information about the third term to that representation in a way which reflected its 
relationship with the common term. The other main strategy group Ford identified are 
referred to as verbal reasoners. Ford claims these showed no evidence of using mental 
models at all. Rather, they displayed various types of substitution behaviour, that is, they 
replaced the middle term from one premise with the end term from the other premise to 
reach a conclusion, as if solving an algebraic problem. Their protocols seemed to suggest 
that they represented the premises propositionally and applied simple heuristic rules to 
reach a conclusion. 
But are the protocols presented in Ford's work actually evidence of individual differences 
in strategies? To return to Evans (2000) and the issue of conscious control, at some level 
these participants have selected their strategy, but it seems unlikely (indeed Ford presents 
no evidence to suggest) that they consciously weighed up the benefits of one strategy 
against another and consciously chose to use the strategy they did. Rather they approached 
the problems they were given in what appeared to them to be the best way they knew. 
However, equally, there is nothing to suggest that they could not have adopted other 
strategies, had they been aware of that possibility. In this sense the strategies were non- 
obligatory as suggested by Siegler and Jenkins (1989). This may by the crux of the 
conscious control issue - reasoners cannot make conscious choices about which strategy to 
use unless they have had some experience (or training) which makes them aware that there 
are an array of possibilities to choose from. In logically naive individuals, this may rarely 
be the case (however, also sec findings of Roberts et al, 1997, discussed prc\ iously). 
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Hence, for such individuals, the strategy they present may be instinctive. It may not always 
be the most logically appropriate for the task, but something within the individual impels 
them towards that particular way of working. It is these issues that the current thesis aims 
to address. As Roberts (2000) points out, most of the studies which have considered 
strategies have been concerned with identifying strategies rather than explaining why 
people differ. The existence of individual differences in strategies, i. e. qualitative 
differences in how people reason, has important implications for what has at times been a 
heated debate between proponents of mental model and rules theories, which may help to 
explain why such differences remain largely under-researched. 
Ford's remains the most detailed study into possible inter-strategic differences in 
syllogistic reasoning and she presents some useful insights into individual differences in 
strategies. She rightly concludes that the data on syllogistic reasoning are complex and 
there are many subtleties in the strategies used which have not been explored. Her findings 
seem to suggest that individual differences are present and that these are not taken into 
account within the prevalent mental model or rule based theories. Roberts (1993; 2000) 
agrees with Ford that strategies remain underspecified and remain a matter for 
investigation. As Roberts (2000) points out, the number of individual differences studies is 
very small, and replications are desirable. Overall, the way in which individuals 
differentially represent and manipulate information in reasoning is a neglected area that 
merits further research. Thus provides the rationale for the programme of work reported in 
this thesis. 
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1.8 Overview of Thesis 
Roberts (1993,2000) has argued cogently that the issue of individual differences in the 
strategies people use for reasoning is a neglected area which merits further research. The 
experimental programme outlined in the coming chapters of this thesis offers an 
investigation into this issue. The broad, overall aims are: 
1. To establish further evidence for the existence of individual differences in reasoning 
strategies, 
2. To investigate the nature of such differences, 
3. To determine whether they are a product of individual reasoning tasks or whether they 
are inherent to individuals and hence universal across reasoning domains, 
4. To investigate some of the factors which may give rise to such differences. 
The outcomes of such aims have clear implications for our understanding of how people 
reason, for the interpretation of experimental data (both past and present) and hence for 
theories and models of human reasoning based upon such data. 
Chapters 2 to 5 present a series of experimental studies which were carried out in pursuit of 
the four aims outlined above. Chapter 2 presents two major individual differences studies. 
Experiment I replicates and extends the work of Ford (1995) with a view to ameliorating 
some of the methodological concerns surrounding her original study. Experiment 2, 
extends this work to consider invalid syllogisms and both the production and evaluation 
forms of the syllogistic reasoning task. This reveals more about the nature of strategies 
adopted. In Chapter 3. Experiments 3 and 4 continue this line of research into two further 
reasonin paradigms, linear syllogisms (transitive inference) and sentence-picture 
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verification. These tasks were briefly outlined earlier, further details and background are 
presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents an experiment which begins to consider some of 
the possible origins of strategic differences, specifically factors of cognitive ability and 
style. The concluding study in the programme is described in Chapter 5. Here individual 
strategies are considered in terms of how they may draw differentially on working memory 
resources. The final chapter, Chapter 6, will present an overall discussion of experimental 
findings across the six studies, their implications for human reasoning within both applied 
and theoretical settings and offers suggestions as to future directions for research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STRATEGIES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
2.1 Introduction to Experiment 1 
Chapter 1 has reviewed some of the main theories of human reasoning and discussed how 
individual differences in cognitive abilities may be associated with individual differences 
in reasoning strategies. In doing so, Section 1.6.4 referred to the work of Ford (1995) 
which presented detailed written and verbal protocols to show that while some individuals 
appeared to use a visuo-spatial strategy for generating syllogistic conclusions, others 
seemed to employ a verbal-propositional approach. As this thesis is primarily concerned 
with the investigation of individual differences in reasoning strategies, and as Ford's paper 
is one of the few which explicitly advocates this possibility, her findings deserve further 
consideration both as an introduction to the current programme of research, and as a 
foundation for Experiment 1. 
Ford proposed that the written and verbal protocols produced by her participants present 
evidence about the nature of their individual reasoning strategy. Those individuals which 
Ford termed spatial reasoners used shapes such as circles or squares placed in different 
spatial relationships to represent the relationship between the terms in the premises. They 
provided written protocols illustrating such models diagrammatically and their verbal 
reports frequently described these relationships in terms of group membership, sets and 
subsets. Figure 2.1 below presents Ford's example 73: 
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Figure 2.1: A typical protocol produced by spatial reasoners (Ford, 1995, page 67) 
Syllogism: All of the teetotallers are reporters 
Some of the artists are not reporters. 
Written protocol: 
Verbal protocol: 
"so if all of the teetotallers are reporters the they're inside then that that's a smaller subset 
of reporters then some of the artists are not reporters, that means if some of them are not 
reporters then there are definitely some artists that are not teetotallers". 
Correct conclusion: Some of the artists are not teetotallers. 
Ford identified six syllogisms where she claimed there was just one way in which this 
relationship could be represented. These largely correspond to the single-model syllogisms 
identified by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). Ford described these 
as having totally constrained representations and claimed that spatial reasoners perform 
best on these problems. The remaining syllogisms, Ford described as having less- 
constrained representations and she identified multiple ways in which the premises might 
be represented. The majority of Ford's less-constrained syllogisms would be described as 
multi-model according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne with just four (those containing All- 
some premises) classed as single-model. Ford presents data to show that her spatial 
reasoners performed less well on less-constrained problems though interestingly, the 
difference was not significant when the comparison involved only single mental model 
problems. 
Ford understandably likens the spatial diagrams to traditional Euler circles, diagrammatic 
models representing set membership and the relationship between sets (see Table 1.8). 
Interestingly, these are an example of reasoning-specific strategies which Polk and Newell 
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(1995) claim are unlikely to be employed by untrained individuals. Erickson (1978) 
proposed that reasoners use a mental analogue of Euler circles in syllogistic tasks. 
representing each premise in turn and then combining the two diagrams to represent the 
relationship between all three terms in the syllogism. However, Ford described how spatial 
reasoners represent the relationship between terms in the first premise and then add 
information about the third term to that representation in a way which reflected its 
relationship with the common term. 
The other main strategy group Ford identified are referred to as verbal reasoners. Ford 
claims these showed no evidence of using mental models at all. Rather, they displayed 
various types of substitution behaviour, that is, they replaced the middle term from one 
premise with the end term from the other premise to reach a conclusion, as if solving an 
algebraic problem. A typical example (Ford's example 24) is presented in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: A typical protocol produced by verbal reasoners (Ford, 1995, page 16) 
Syllogism: All of the secretaries are football fans 
None of the soccer players are secretaries 
Written protocol: All of the secretaries ar football fans 
None of the soccer players are secretaries 
Verbal protocol: " ... when you 
have all or none then you can replace something like if all 
the secretaries are football fans then you can replace this secretaries with this secretaries 
and since all the secretaries are football fans means none of the soccer players are football 
fans... " [excerpt only presented as this protocol was very lengthy]. 
Correct conclusion: Some of the football fans are not soccer players 
These protocols suggested to Ford that verbal reasoners represented the premises 
propositionally and applied simple heuristic rules to reach a conclusion. Although Ford 
does highlight cases of what she termed "naive" substitution" (page 25), where terms were 
64 
replaced literally and without regard for quantifiers or logical relationships (Figure 2.2 
above is a good example), she claims that the majority (7 out of 8 verbal reasoners in her 
sample) showed awareness of logical principles (for instance that All A are B is not 
logically equivalent to All B are A) on at least some of the problems. According to Ford, 
such awareness is evident from statements to that effect in the verbal protocols or by 
simply generating a correct conclusion to at least one syllogism where such principles 
apply. Ford concluded that verbal reasoners were employing a "simple substitution" 
strategy which involved the application of the following logical inference rules (page 21): 
A. If a rule exists affirming of every member of the class C the properttiy P then: 
i. whenever a specific object 0, that is a member of C is encountered it can be 
inferred that 0 has the property P, and 
ii. whenever a specific object 0, that lacks property P is encountered it can be 
inferred that 0 is not a member of C 
B. If a rule exists denying of every member of the class C the property P then: 
i. whenever a specific object 0, that is a member of C is encountered it can be 
inferred that 0 does not have the property P, and 
ii. whenever a specific object 0, that possesses the property P is encountered it 
can be inferred that 0 is not a member of C 
In general terms, Ford compared verbal reasoners' performance on syllogisms where she 
claimed such simple substitution rules could be directly applied, and those where the 
logical form of the problem made this more difficult. Here she proposed that verbal 
reasoners use "sophisticated substitution" -a process which involved the reformulation of 
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one of the premises in order that the simple rules can be applied (for instance, realising that 
All A are B implies that Some B are A), or modification of both premises (for instance, 
combining them into a single statement) in order to establish the relationship between the 
two end terms and the common term. Ford generally found significant detriment in 
performance for verbal reasoners on the syllogisms requiring sophisticated substitution 
(see Ford, pages 25-34 for a more detailed exposition of these analyses). Moreover, Ford 
made distinctions between problems where the i and ii versions of her rules apply. She 
likens these versions to modus ponens and modus tollens respectively - inference rules 
recognised by logicians for centuries. Much syllogistic research has shown that the latter 
are notoriously more difficult to apply and Ford reports significant detriment in verbal 
reasoners' performance on syllogisms which she claims require Aii or Bii. Throughout this 
complex analysis Ford commented on the relative homogeneity of spatial reasoner 
performance, and suggested that the variations in performance observed in the verbal 
group stemmed from the differing application of rules which are irrelevant for spatial 
reasoners. 
However, some methodological issues are apparent with the Ford (1995) study. Firstly, the 
small sample size (total N=20) must raise some doubt about generalisability of findings. 
Some of the variations in performance which Ford presents are very small - for instance, 
the difference between spatial reasoners' performance on constrained and less-constrained 
syllogisms does not reach significance. Given the sample size of just 8 participants in each 
strategy group, such differences might not be strong evidence for strategy-driven 
disparities in performance. The other major issue concerns the use of verbal protocols. 
Chater and Oaksford (1999) claim that individual differences such as those described by 
Ford occur as a function of employing verbal protocol methodology. They suggest that 
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reasoners are forced to change their strategy when a protocol has to be generated and this 
leads to subtle individual differences in the heuristics used. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 
1993) have written at length about the implications of using verbal protocols as data and 
present evidence that asking subjects to think aloud may produce additional cognitive 
workload which alters both the course and nature of the processes under observation. 
Memory limitations may influence the accuracy and completeness of retrospective reports, 
and data may reflect a subject's inferences about the research question and their own meta- 
memory, rather than comprise an accurate account of their mental events. Also, as 
Johnson-Laird et al (2000) point out, some cognitive processes involved in reasoning may 
occur unconsciously and be unavailable for articulation. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 
(1999) present written protocol evidence which appears similar to that in Ford's work, 
however, the corresponding verbal accounts were wholly uninformative. 
However, Larkin and Simon (1987) have suggested that is valid to treat internal and 
external spatial representations as equivalent. They define mental imagery as "... the use of 
diagrams and other pictorial representations that are not stored on paper but are held in 
human memory" (page 97) and also claim that "... the creation of a mental image (for 
instance from a verbal description) employs inference processes like those that make 
information explicit in the course of drawing a diagram" (page 98). This might suggest that 
the protocols drawn by participants in Ford's study are, at least in part, representative of 
the mental processes at work during reasoning about syllogisms. 
Overall, Ford presented important evidence for the existence of both verbal and spatial 
strategies for syllogistic reasoning. Given the paucity of research into individual 
differences in reasoning strategies generally, her findings provided a useful foundation for 
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the current programme of research. Experiment 1 presents a replication and extension of 
Ford (1995) aimed at overcoming some of the methodological criticisms levelled at her 
research. It also offers an incipient investigation into whether insight into strategy choice 
can be reliably obtained by alternative, less laborious, methods which avoid the possible 
pitfalls of verbal protocol. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
2.2.1 Aims 
Experiment I had two main aims: 
1. Given the paucity of individual differences research, the main aim of experiment I 
was to replicate and extend the work of Ford (1995) using a larger sample. It was 
predicted that evidence of two main reasoning strategies would emerge and that 
these would be identifiable as being verbal and spatial in nature, according to 
Ford's criteria. Strategy was not expected to influence overall task performance. 
2. To conduct an initial investigation into whether insight into strategy choice could 
be reliably obtained by means of alternative, less laborious, methods which avoid 
the possible pitfalls of verbal protocol. To this end, a second experimental 
condition was introduced, over and above the replication, where no verbal 
protocols were collected. Also, a questionnaire was developed to be completed by 
all participants. This comprised 13 items, gathered both qualitative and quantitative 
data about participant's strategy choice and was designed to identify the types of 
reasoning behaviours which Ford associated with verbal and spatial strategies. 
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2.2.2 Methods 
Participants 
A total of 51 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth volunteered to take 
part in the study in return for course credit. This sample comprised 7 males and 44 females 
with a mean age of 22.82 years. None had received formal training in logic. 
Materials 
Syllogistic Reasoning Test Items 
In line with the procedure adopted by Ford (1995), participants were presented with a set 
of 27 thematic syllogisms generated from the 27 valid forms identified by Johnson-Laird 
and Bara (1984) and Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). As in Ford's (1995) study, the 
common terms were names of people with given occupations (e. g. lawyers or librarians) 
and the end terms were names given to people with certain hobbies or persuasions (for 
instance vegetarians or beekeepers). In each case, the two premises were presented and 
participants asked to generate the appropriate conclusion. Each participant was given a 
booklet containing the appropriate instructions (see procedures for each condition) 
followed by two practice items. The test items were presented in a different random order 
within each booklet, each on a single page, having space below for written notes. The 27 
syllogisms are presented, along with their logical conclusions, in Appendix 2A. 
Reasoning Behaviours Questionnaire 
Participants were also presented with a Reasoning Behaviours Questionnaire. The 13 items 
comprised a mixture of quantitative and qualitative items designed to identify the types of 
reasoning processes employed without support from verbal protocols. The items were 
developed in line with the types of reasoning behaviours which Ford described and 
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associated with verbal and spatial strategies (as discussed previously). The questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix 2B, together with indication of which items were intended to 
identify which strategy. Experiment I acted as a pilot for the questionnaire. 
Procedures 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions. 
Condition 1: Replication of Ford (1995) (N=19) 
Participants were run individually in a single session lasting around 1 hour. As this 
condition was designed to be a replication of Ford's (1995) study, her procedure was 
followed as closely as possible. The written instructions in Table 2.1 duplicate those 
presented by Ford. 
Table 2.1: Written instructions presented to participants in the replication condition 
This is an experiment on how people combine information in order to draw conclusions 
from it. You will be given a series of pairs of statements about different groups of 
people. You are to read the statements and figure out what, if anything, follows 
necessarily from these premises about the people. Your conclusion should be based 
solely on the information in the premises, and not on plausible suppositions or general 
knowledge. Because we are trying to find out how people solve these problems, it is 
VITAL that you "think aloud" while working out your answer, so there should not be 
any silent periods on the tapes. Also if you would like to use pen and paper to help you 
come to your answer, please do so. When you have reached your conclusion, simply 
state your conclusion. 
There are 27 pages in the booklet you will be given. Each page has a pair of statements 
about different groups of people on it. You are to read the statements aloud and then 
proceed to work out what conclusion, if any, follows from the premises. Remember it is 
important to "think aloud": don 't sit there being silent. Feel free to use a pen and 
paper. You can use the space below the statements. Once you have finished with the first 
pair of statements go to the next page and the next problem. Take as much time as you 
need to figure out the problems. 
Participants w ere then asked to complete 2 practice items which comprised generating 
conclusions to two syllogisms of the type presented in Appendix 2A, whilst also producing 
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concurrent written protocols. Whilst generating conclusions to the 27 test items, they also 
provided a verbal protocol of their reasoning which was recorded on a standard cassette 
tape recorder. Following this, they were asked to go through the 27 items a second time, 
explaining to the researcher how they approached the task in each case, producing written 
notes in the test booklet illustrating their explanation (regardless of whether or not they had 
chosen to write anything during their first attempt). These verbal explanations were also 
tape recorded. Finally, they completed the questionnaire as described previously and 
shown in Appendix 2B. 20 participants were originally allocated to this condition in line 
with Ford's sample size. However, one participant was unable to produce any written 
accounts of her working out, or explain her thinking, and hence her data was dropped from 
the study. 
Condition 2: Written protocol only (N=32) 
Again participants were run individually with each single session lasting around 45 
minutes. In this condition, participants worked through the same 27 items but no verbal 
reports were collected. Instead, they were specifically asked to illustrate their reasoning by 
making written notes in whatever format they felt appropriate. The written instructions for 
these participants are presented in Table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2: Written instructions presented to participants in the written protocol only condition 
This is an experiment on how people combine information in order to draw conclusions 
from it. You will be given a series of pairs of statements about different groups of people. 
You are to read the statements and figure out what, if anything follows necessarily from 
these premises about the people. Your conclusion should be based solely on the 
information in the premises, and not on plausible suppositions or general knowledge. 
Because vv c arc truing to find out how people solve these problems, it is VITAL that iv e 
haue a written record of your work. We would therefore like you to USE PEN A. % D 
PAPER to help you come to your conclusion. Feel tree to write doit'n anything that helps 
i ou. Wien you have reached your conclusion, simple' state that conclusion clearly in 
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writing. 
There are 27 pages in the booklet you will be given. Each page has a pair of statements 
about different groups ofpeople on it. You are to read the statements and then proceed 
to work out what conclusion, if any, follows from the premises. Remember it is important 
that you write down your workings out. You can use the space below the statements to 
write in. Once you have finished with the first pair of statements go to the next page and 
the next problem. Take as much time as you need to figure out the problems. 
These instructions were designed to be as consistent as possible with those used in 
condition 1, differing only as was necessary to accommodate the revised procedure. 
Participants in this condition also attempted the two practice items and completed the 
questionnaire. 
2.2.3 Results 
2.2.3.1 Identification of strategy types 
The descriptions of verbal and spatial strategies presented by Ford (1995) suggested that 
their written protocols show very specific characteristics. Using these characteristics as 
classification criteria, a visual examination of the written protocols produced in the present 
study clearly indicated the presence of both verbal and spatial reasoners. In addition, 
participants in the replication condition (V/WP condition) produced verbal protocols which 
provided supporting evidence of individual differences in strategy choice. Verbal reasoners 
frequently referred to actions such as replacing, substituting and cancelling syllogistic 
terms, while spatial reasoners often described the terms, and their inter-relationships, as 
groups or subsets. However, unlike the written protocols, not all verbal reports provided 
substantial evidence in themselves. Quality varied considerably both between individuals 
and bet\vccn syllogisms and, in some cases, there was insufficient data to clearly identify 
the strategy used without additional support from written protocols. Participants in the 
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written protocol only (WP-only) condition produced written protocols of a very similar 
nature to those in the V/WP condition and hence could be categorised into strategy groups 
without the necessity for supporting verbal data. 
In the majority of cases the data were highly consistent, participants producing typical 
verbal or spatial style protocols for all syllogisms. However, 5 participants produced 
protocols which suggested somewhat mixed behaviour, for instance using what appeared to 
be verbal written representations (arrows, mathematical symbols etc) but presenting the 
information spatially, or producing verbal style protocols for some problems and spatial 
style ones for others. The distribution of verbal and spatial reasoners across both 
experimental conditions in shown in Table 2.3. As so few mixed reasoners were identified, 
they are not included in this analysis. Pearson's Chi square suggested no association 
between condition and strategy type employed; x1= 0.71, df = 1, p>0.05. 
Table 2.3 Distribution of strategy types across two experimental conditions, presented by count and 
within-strategy percentage. 
VA NT Condition \V'-only Condition 
Strategy (N=19) (N=32) 
Verbal 9(32.1%) 19 (67.9%) 
Spatial 8 (44.4%) 10 (55.6%) 
2.2.3.2 Evidence from Questionnaire Responses 
Following data collection, reliability analysis was conducted on the 13 quantitative 
questionnaire items. Reliability analysis suggested the elimination of 5 items with low item 
to total correlations resulting in an optimum Cronbach's Alpha of 0.68. SPSS output 
showing this analysis is presented in Appendix 2C and the final 8 reliable items are shown 
in Table 2.4 below. 
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Table 2.4: The final 8 valid questionnaire items. Note that items 1 to 6 were presented with a5 point 
response scale as shown in original questionnaire, Appendix 2B. V' or S in parentheses indicates 
whether item intended to identify verbal or spatial reasoning behaviours respectively. 
To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the occupations within the statements'? (V) 
2. To what extent did you use mental images of shapes (e. g. circles squares) in spatial relationship in 
deciding on a conclusion? (S) 
3. To what extent did you attempt to substitute terms/occupations from one statement to another (i. e. 
switch the occupations around between statements)? (V) 
4. To what extent did you think about the words used in the statements? (V) 
5. To what extent did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to form a single, longer 
verbal description? (V) 
6. To what extent did you represent the information in linguistic form(e. g. sentences words) in 
deciding on a conclusion? (V) 
7. Did you develop a rule, or set of rules, to help you which you then reapplied to each subsequent 
problems? YES/NO (V) 
8. Did you think about sets/Venn Diagrams (similar to that shown below) either using circles or any 
other shape? YES/NO OD (S) 
Questionnaire item responses appeared to provide converging evidence for the presence of 
verbal and spatial strategies, with reasoners whose written protocols identified them as 
verbal responding positively to verbal questionnaire items and spatial reasoners responding 
most positively to the spatial items (see Appendix 2B for which items were intended to 
identify which strategy). Interestingly, participants allocated to the mixed strategy group 
generally provided mixed or conflicting responses to the eight questionnaire items, for 
instance, answering yes to both question 3 (a spatial item) and also to one or more of 
questions 4 to 7 (verbal items). Reverse-scaling the items relating to the verbal strategy 
resulted in an overall reasoning behaviour scale with a maximum score of 40, on which a 
high score represented a high degree of spatial reasoning traits and a low score indicated a 
high degree of verbal reasoning traits. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing mean 
scale scores for the 3 strategy groups indicated a significant difference between verbal (M 
= 18.18, sd = 4.0) and spatial reasoners (M = 24.78, sd = 5.5), with the mixed group falling 
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between (M = 22.20, sd = 2.7), F(2,48) =10.35, p<0.001. Scheffe post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that the difference between scores for the verbal and spatial groups was highly 
significant (p<0.001). All ANOVA tables for Experiment I analyses are shown in 
Appendix 2E. However, examination of the distribution of scores on this scale revealed 
that although the majority of verbal and spatial reasoners presented distinct mean scores, 
some degree of overlap between the two groups was apparent. This is illustrated in the 
plots shown in Figure 2.3 below. 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of reasoning behaviour scale scores across verbal and spatial strategy groups. 
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When the mixed strategy group were removed from analysis, K-means cluster analysis (see 
Hartigan and Wong, 1979, for explanation of this procedure) applied to responses to the 8 
reliable questionnaire items (as given in Table 2.4) revealed two distinct clusters of 
participants. These clusters are crosstabulated with the verbal and spatial strategy groups in 
Table 2.5. Pearson's Chi square suggests a highly significant association between strategy 
type and questionnaire response, x2 (1) = 12.3, p<0.001. 
Table 2.5: K-means cluster analysis of questionnaire responses: cluster membership by strategy. 
Figures represent within strategy group numbers and percentages. 
Strategy Cluster 1 (N=25) Cluster 2 N=21 Totals 
Verbal 
Spatial 
21 (75%) 
4(22.2%) 
7(25%) 
14 (77.8° o) 
28 (100%) 
18 (100%) 
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As Appendix 2B showed, the questionnaire also contained a number of qualitative items 
aimed at obtaining more detail about specific aspects of the strategies. Unfortunately. these 
yielded very little information, with many reasoners failing to complete them at all, whilst 
others made very general comments such as "I found it hard". Informal feedback suggcsted 
that people found difficulty in articulating their strategy in such depth. Often, individuals 
were seen to struggle for some time with these items, at the end of what was, for many, an 
already demanding experimental session. No analysis was therefore conducted on 
responses to these items. 
2.2.3.3 Characteristics of Verbal and Spatial Reasoners 
As so few mixed reasoners were identified, the remainder of this chapter will concentrate 
on the verbal and spatial strategies. 
Verbal Reasoners (N=28) 
Participants in the replication (V/WP) consistently produced written protocols which 
presented features typical of those Ford claims describe the behaviours exhibited by verbal 
reasoners. These are supported by the content of verbal reports as illustrated in the 
following two protocols. 
Protocol 2.1 
Syllogism 15: Birdwatchers 
Participant 3: Some of the painters are linguists 
All of the linguists are birdwatchers 
epIace 
"Sonic o/the painters must be birdwatchers, because again you know that all linguists are 
birdie atchcrs, y'ou can just replace there. You can just replace linguists with birdivatchers. 
So moll can just put arrows there and some of the painters are birdtit'atchers 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the painters are birdwatchers 
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Protocol 2.2 
Syllogism 10: 
Participant 17: 
All of the librarians are skaters 
Some of the sculptors are librarians 
all lios skate 
some sculpt 
_ , 7, _ _, 
"All the librarians skate, some of the librarians sculpt. So all of them do that... some of 
them do that [draws arrows]. Put it all into one sentence... some of the sculptors skate ". 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the sculptors are skaters 
Participants in the written protocol only condition (WP-only) presented written protocols 
with notable similarities, for instance: 
Protocol 2.3 
Syllogism 9: 
Participant 22 
Written protocol only: 
All of the bookworms are cooks 
None of the poets are bookworms 
Bookwornls 
. 
All 
ý bookworm 
cooks - 
poets - none 
Correct conclusion given: None of the poets are cooks 
For many of the verbal reasoners, initial examination of the protocols suggests that they 
apply what Ford termed naive substitution, that is, they simply obtain a value for the B 
term from the first universal affirmative premise they encounter, then substitute that value 
for B in the other premise to obtain a conclusion with the same quantifier as that premise. 
This substitution seems to be made literally by term and position, irrespective of the 
quantifier in the premise where the substitution is made. 
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Spatial Reasoners (N=18) 
Participants across both conditions produced written protocols which suggest, accordin` to 
Ford's criteria, that they were using a spatial reasoning strategy. These protocols typically 
represented terms within shapes (usually circles or ovals) placed in differing spatial 
relationships to represent the relationship of the terms within and between the premises. 
Verbal protocols in the V/WP condition suggested they were thinking about the premises 
in terms of sets or groups, for instance: 
Protocol 2.4 
Syllogism 27: None of the chessplayers are bookbinders 
All of the dancers are bookbinders 
Participant 23 
Ch BB 
D 
"So now we have the chessplayers and the bookbinders as two completely separate 
groups... and all of the dancers are bookbinders so we have the dancers as a subset of 
bookbinders... and dancers... none of the dancers are chessplayers ". 
Correct conclusion given: None of the dancers are chessplayers 
W-only participants' protocols were again comparable, for instance: 
Protocol 2.5 
Syllogism 21: 
Participant 12: 
Written protocol only: 
Some of the farmers are freemasons 
All of the farmers are prizewinners 
wFM 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the freemasons are prizewinners 
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Whereas the verbal reasoners consistently appear to begin their reasoning with the 
universal premise, spatial reasoners appear to begin by constructing a representation of the 
first premise they are presented with, irrespective of its mood, and even when the later 
premise is universal affirmative. Information from the second premise regarding the C 
term (prizewinners) is then added to this representation in a manner which describes its 
relationship with the common term (farmers). These representations resemble traditional 
Euler circles but there is little evidence that spatial reasoners attempt to represent all the 
logical possibilities of the premises. For instance, Protocol 2.6 below represents the 
disjointed relationship between beekeepers and historians (premise two), and by 
implication, the same relationship between beekeepers and philatelists. The verbal protocol 
suggests that this subject may in fact have had some awareness that an alternative 
interpretation of the premises was possible, allowing for a subset relationship between 
beekeepers and philatelists. Had she pursued this line of thought further, it might have led 
her to the correct conclusion (Some of the philatelists are not beekeepers). Instead, she 
seems almost to dismiss it, preferring to work with her original representation and so 
generating an incorrect conclusion. 
Protocol 2.6 
Syllogism 12: All of the historians are philatelists 
None of the beekeepers are historians 
Participant 33: 
P 
hb 
"All historians are philatelists so they are in there [draws subset representation of first 
premise] and none of the beekeepers are historians so I'll put them separate but you could 
also have it on because it doesn 't actually sai' that none of them are philatelists ". 
Incorrect conclusion given: None of the beekeepers are philatelists 
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Whereas Ford (1995) cites several examples where she claims reasoners represent more 
than one possibility in their diagrams, in the present study only two spatial participants 
attempted this. Neither were from the V/WP condition but their written reports merit 
consideration and are presented below: 
Protocol 2.7 
Syllogism 13: 
Participant 47 
Written protocol only 
Some of the clubbers are pilots 
None of the rockclimbers are pilots 
R 
OR 
OCP 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the clubbers are not rockclimbers 
Protocol 2.8 
Syllogism 6: None of the boxers are saxophonists 
Some of the boxers are philosophers 
Participant 12 
Written protocol only 
Ph ,' ,' -BeýC `, Sax 
Correct conclusion given: Some boxers are not saxophonists 
2.2.3.4 Performance of Verbal and Spatial Reasoners 
Overall Accuracy 
Overall performance on the syllogistic reasoning task was assessed in terms of number of 
correct conclusions generated. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.6. No 
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significant differences in performance were apparent between the two strategies overall; t 
(44) = 1.39, p>0.05, or between experimental conditions (V/'WP M= 12.1. \V-only \1 = 
13.6); t(41.26) = 0.96, p>0.05. 
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics illustrating overall syllogistic reasoning performance across the two 
main strategy groups. Performance assessed according to number of correct conclusions generated out 
of 27 syllogisms. 
Strategy Mean 
N correct Std. Dev. Min Max 
Verbal 28 12.00 3.31 7 20 
Spatial 18 13.61 4.48 8 23 
Total 51 12.69 3.81 7 23 
Same and Different Form Syllogisms 
For verbal reasoners, the naive substitution described previously can be successfully 
applied to all same-form (SF) syllogisms (those where the form of the conclusion matches 
that of one of the premises). However, a correct conclusion may not be as easily obtained 
for different-form (DF) syllogisms (those where the form of the conclusion does not match 
that of either premise), even when the syllogism contains an All premise. Verbal reasoners' 
inclination towards naive substitution would suggest that their performance on DF 
syllogisms is likely to be considerably worse than on SF problems. Spatial reasoners on the 
other hand may find syllogisms intractable if there is more than one way in which the 
premises might be represented. In fact, the DF syllogisms are also those which Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne (1991) suggest are three-model problems and hence afford greatest 
difficulty. A 2x2 mixed analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second factor 
(2 x strategy group; 2x syllogism form) showed no main effect of strategy (p > 0.05). 
However, a highly significant main effect of syllogism form; F (1,44) = 144.05, MSE _ 
58909.12, p<0.001, was observed and the interaction between form and strategy 
approached significance; F (1.44) = 2.914, MSE = 1191.53, p=0.09. These effects are 
illustrated by the means shown in Table 2.7 below. 
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Table 2.7: Percentage of correct responses to same-form and different-form syllogisms. 
Form Strategy Mean Std. Dev. 
Same Verbal 73.0 15.8 
Spatial 71.8 12.8 
Different Verbal 13.7 17.6 
Spatial 27.4 33.1 
Simple main effects analysis of the interaction indicated that although the two groups 
performed similarly on SF syllogisms, spatial reasoners significantly outperformed verbal 
on DF; F (1,44) = 5.0, MSE = 408.9, p<0.05. When the nature of errors is examined it is 
apparent that 72.3% of conclusions generated by verbal reasoners to DF syllogisms were of 
the same form as one of the premises. Spatial reasoners presented a similar, if less extreme, 
trend with 60.7% same-form conclusions. 
Replication of Ford's Analyses 
Ford's analyses were outlined in the introduction to this chapter and these were applied to 
data from the present study. Given the significant effects of syllogism form for both 
strategies, and that the same-different form distinction maps closely onto the levels of 
difficulty predicted by mental model count, the following sections summarise findings 
from the present study according to those factors. Comparisons with Ford's findings 
regarding the reasoning processes observed are also highlighted with protocol evidence as 
appropriate. All syllogism numbers refer to the present study and means indicate mean 
percentage correct. Appendix 2D presents a corresponding summary of responses to all 27 
syllogisms, also by form and model count and cross referenced with Ford's analysis. 
`2 
Same-form, Single-model Syllogisms (N = 10) 
For verbal reasoners, these comprise all seven of the syllogisms which Ford describes as 
requiring direct application of her simple substitution rule (syllogisms 3.8 9.10,15,25 
and 27). As in Ford's study, all participants do well on these problems, ho« ever, unlike 
Ford, in no instance did we find significant differences in verbal reasoners' performance 
between syllogisms requiring the Ai/Bi (syllogisms 10,15,25/ 8) and Aii/Bii (syllogism 
9/27) forms of her inference rule or as function of whether the rule required application to 
the first or second universal premise (syllogism 3) (p > 0.05 in every case). The 
introduction to this chapter presents the rules in detail. Also in contrast to Ford, verbal 
reasoners appeared to use naive substitution behaviour throughout, obtaining their value 
for B from the universal premise, irrespective of presentation order. Even on the problems 
Ford highlights as presenting greater difficulty, they were able to apply naive substitution 
in the usual way by making the assumption that All A are B is equivalent to All B are A. 
For instance on syllogism 27, which Ford suggests requires rule Bii; 
Protocol 2.9 
Syllogism 27: dancers 
Participant 3; None of the chessplayers ar ers 
All of the dancers are book riders 
replace 
"Again, you can just replace dancers with bookbinders, and put that into the first 
statement so that changes to none of the chessplayers are dancers " 
For two SF, single-model problems (syllogisms 14 and 21), Ford suggests that although 
naive substitution will obtain a correct conclusion, sophisticated substitution involving rule 
Ii is logically required. She duly reports a detriment in performance as a function of this. 
Our verbal reasoners actually performed significantly better on these two syllogisms 
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(M=92.6, sd = 25.2) than on those discussed previously where Ai can be directly applied in 
simple substitution (M=72.6, sd = 35.5); 1(27) = 3.6 ,p=0.001 or, on syllogism 26 which 
requires sophisticated substitution (M= 3.57, sd = 19.9); t(27) = 18.9, p<0.001. Again 
they appear to use naive substitution rather than attempting more sophisticated reasoning. 
For example, the two written protocols to follow were produced by the same participant, 
the first to syllogism 10, a "simple substitution" problem and the second to syllogism 14. 
The mood is consistent between problems, and in both cases she provides the correct 
conclusion. 
Protocol 2.10 
Syllogism 10: All of the librarians are skaters 
Some of the sculptors are librarians 
Participant 50: L=S 
Some Sc =L 
. '. Some 
Sc =S 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the sculptors are skaters 
Syllogism 14: All of the plumbers are gamblers 
Some of the plumbers are snowboarders 
Participant 50: P=G 
Some P=S 
. *. Some 
G=S 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the gamblers are snowboarders 
For spatial reasoners, the SF, single model problems comprise all 6 of Ford's totally- 
constrained syllogisms (syllogisms 3,8,9,11,25,27) and the 4 less-constrained problems 
with . 11/-some premises 
(10,14,15,21). In the present study, in contrast to Ford, spatial 
reasoners performed better on the less-constrained syllogisms, t (17) = 3.2, p<0.05 
(constrained Ni-: 78.7, sd = 38.6; less-constrained M= 94.4, sd = 19.8). Protocols 4 and 5. 
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previously, present typical examples of spatial protocols on SF totally-constrained and 
less-constrained syllogisms respectively. These seem to present a single model of the 
premises and, unlike Ford, show little evidence of considering, any alternative 
representations in the latter case 
Same-form; multi-model Syllogisms (N = 4) 
The four remaining SF syllogisms are two mental model problems and have a premise and 
conclusion with the form Some of the X are not Y. Inspection of the data reveals anomalies 
in performance on these problems which concur with Ford's findings. As Ford maintains, 
and the table in Appendix 2D shows, on two syllogisms (numbers 5 and 17) naive 
substitution works well (M= 69.7, sd = 46.7). On the other two syllogisms however 
(numbers 2 and 20), verbal reasoners perform significantly less well (M = 19.7, sd = 40.4); 
t (27) = 5.9, p<0.001. For example; 
Protocol 2.11 
Syllogism 2: All of the parents are teachers 
Some of the teetotallers are not teachers 
Participant 39: 
parents 
some teetotallers 
" Nell this one was difficult. Had the repeated term at the end but you have the are not " 
in. When you have the same words leading up to the repeated occupation it 's easier, but 
when they are different it's harder. This one... I looked at some and then had a look at 
parents. Then that had to come back down to teetotallers. I think I cancel out teachers in 
the first one, I have established that all of the parents are teachers so I don 't need that any 
more. Some of the teetotallers are not teachers... so I kept that as it was and think if some 
of the parents are teachers vet some of the teetotallers are not teachers, that means that 
some of the parents are teetotallers. I think the key word here is some, it 's not all ". 
Incorrect conclusion given: Some of the parents are teetotallers 
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This reasoner is easily able to establish the relationship between parents and teachers from 
premise one in the usual way but a difficulty arises in establishing the relationship between 
parents and not teachers - because there is no common B term naive substitution is not 
applicable. However, by making the Gricean error of assuming that if some teetotallers are 
not teachers, then some are, the reasoner can substitute into premise 2 as she did on other 
SF syllogisms, hence drawing the incorrect conclusion: Some of the parents are 
teetotallers. Ironically, participants who just ignored the word not and substituted naively, 
tended to obtain the right conclusion, as in protocol 2.12: 
Protocol 2.12 
Syllogism 20: Some of the hikers are not politiciarjý 
Participant 3: All of the cycli is are politici eplace 
"Because all the cyclists are politicians you can replace cyclists into the first statement so 
some of the hikers are not cyclists ". 
Spatial reasoners present a different error profile across these four problems. Syllogisms 17 
and 20 present the some-not premise first and in both cases the most popular spatial 
conclusion generated was Some A are not C. As in protocol 2.13, below, when the some- 
not premise is presented first, spatial reasoners typically process the second premise first. 
This seems to be the only syllogistic form where spatial reasoners do this and may be 
reflected in the characteristic conclusion direction errors they present on these two 
syllogisms. However, this does not lead to a significant detriment in performance for these 
problems compared to syllogisms 2 and 5 (p > 0.05). 
Protocol 2.13 
Syllogism 17: Some of the doctors are not singers 
All of the doctors are intellectuals 
Participant 19: 
D+IS 
86 
"So everybody's an intellectual but some of them aren 't singers, so some of 'the singers are 
not intellectuals ". 
Incorrect conclusion given: Some of the singers are not intellectuals 
In summary, naive substitution seems to cause problems for verbal reasoners where the end 
premise contains not B and this is reflected in their percentage correct conclusions for 
syllogisms 5/17 (M = 69.7) and syllogisms 2/20 (M = 19.7). Spatial reasoners however 
perform similarly on these two pairs of syllogisms, although some variance in their 
performance is observed (M = 38.9 in both cases, sd = 51.5 for item 5 and 46.1 for item 
17). A 2x2 mixed analysis of variance (2 x syllogism pair; 2x strategy) revealed no 
significant main effects for strategy (p > 0.05). However, a highly significant effect of 
syllogism pair; F (1,44) = 10.96, MSE = 5.48, p<0.005, and a significant two-way 
interaction between syllogism type and strategy, F (1,44) = 10.96, MSE = 5.48, p<0.005 
were indicated. 
Different-form; multi-model Syllogisms (N= 13) 
Ford claims simple substitution rules apply to just four of these syllogisms (4,6,13,19). In 
line with her findings, verbal reasoners in the present study perform significantly better on 
these problems (M =25.9, sd = 44.2) compared to other DF multi-model problems which 
Ford claims require sophisticated substitution; 1 (27) = 3.4, p<0.005 for "sophisticated" 
syllogisms with All-None premises (M= 4.3,15.3); and t (27) = 2.5, p<0.05, for those 
with Some-None premises (M=13.4, sd = 34.6). However, again we found no significant 
differences in performance between syllogisms requiring Ai/Bi and Aii/Bii (p > 0.05 in 
each case) and this, together with consistency in protocol content and a strong preference 
for Nom' conclusions throughout, suggests that once again verbal reasoners applied naive 
substitution for all these syllogisms. Those Ford claims require sophisticated substitution 
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present similar difficulties to those described for the SF two-model problems previously. 
For instance, where there is no all premise, more successful participants use the alternative 
universal negative premise instead to gain a value for not B". Again participant 3 was 
accomplished at this. 
Protocol 2.14 
Replace 
Syllogism 18: None of the criminals are fists 
Participant 3: Some of the florists a trainspotters 
A 
not 
"Because if none of the criminals are florists, you can replace criminals and florists... but 
put it negative. So some of the criminals are not.. . make that negative and turn it round the 
other way, so some of the trainspotters are not criminals ". 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the trainspotters are not criminals 
Conversely, participant 17 was typical of many who performed less well on these 
problems. In every case, she attempted to work with the most conservative premise (some) 
and substitute into the least conservative (none), giving a None conclusion. For instance, in 
protocol 2.15, she almost gets the correct answer and then decides to go with the more 
conservative option. 
Protocol 2.15 
Syllogism 4: 
Participant 17: None of the pianists are mechanics 
Some of the e erts are mechanics 
"So some... some of the experts are mechanics but no pianists are. Hox do I say that in 
another tiway... Some experts, are no pianists, no pianists are experts ". 
For spatial reasoners, Ford described how the most commonly drawn representations 
present an overlapping relationship between the end terms, but that these are generally 
interpreted as Sonic X are Z, rather than Some X are not Z. As this appears incompatible 
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with the premises, reasoners are led to decide on either a None conclusion or that no valid 
conclusion is possible. The participant in protocol 2.16 also considers such possibilities but 
presents the disjointed relationship between end terms which was characteristic of 
reasoners in the present study. 
Protocol 2.16 
Syllogism 4: None of the pianists are mechanics 
Some of the experts are mechanics 
Participant 37: 
EIII:: 
M Exp 
"So we have two separate circles... a population of pianists... and mechanics separate. 
Some of the experts are mechanics, so it's circle will overlap... E. KP. So that 
means ... um... no pianists are mechanics, some of the experts are mechanics, so... that 
means.. . 
[long pause] no valid conclusion.... hold on... does that mean that none of the 
experts are pianists ". 
Incorrect conclusion given: None of the experts are pianists 
In contrast to Ford, this type of written representation is typical of those used by 88.8% of 
spatial participants in the present study, irrespective of performance. The following is an 
example from a participant who clearly shows awareness that her overlapping circles may 
indicate a some-not relationship. 
Protocol 2.17 
Syllogism 19: Some of the gymnasts are nurses 
None of the nurses are alcoholics 
Participant 13: 
alco 
gym 
nurs 
"Right we 're got nurses, alcoholics and gl"ninasts. None of the nurses are alcoholics, so 
º ou can 't be a nurse and an alcoholic [draws two lines between these groups] but some of 
the gymnasts are nurses so there 's a subgroup of gymnasts who are nurses, so that 
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subgroup who are nurses cannot be alcoholics as well ... so some of the gymnasts are not 
alcoholics ". 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the gymnasts are not alcoholics 
In Ford's terms, all the DF syllogisms have less-constrained representations. She 
categorises all DF syllogisms with Some-None premises together (syllogisms 1.4,6,13, 
18,19,22,23) and points out the relative homogeneity of spatial performance as evidence 
that this categorisation of syllogisms is appropriate for these reasoners. In contrast, the 
present data indicates ranges of 27.7 (16.7-44.4) for spatial and 11.4 (10.7-22.1) for verbal 
reasoners. Spatial reasoners perform the better of the two strategies on these problems 
(spatial M=31.9, sd = 46.7, ; verbal M=19.7, sd = 39.4) but the difference is not significant 
(p > 0.05). Like the verbal reasoners, spatial people perform less well on these DF Some- 
None syllogisms compared to the SF All-Some syllogisms; t (17) = 4.8, p<0.001, and SF 
All-None syllogisms; t (17) = 6.8, p<0.001, see also page 84 previously. Similarly, for the 
four DF All-None syllogisms (M = 19.4, sd = 45.1), again our findings concur with Ford in 
that spatial reasoners perform less well than on the SF All-none syllogisms; t (17) = 6, p< 
0.001 and the SF All-some syllogisms; t (17) = 8.5, p<0.001. However, all these SF 
syllogisms are single-mental model problems - those which research has repeatedly shown 
to be least difficult and where the verbal reasoners also perform better than they do on DF 
problems. Moreover, while stating that "spatial reasoners tend to be at a loss" (page 59) 
Ford does not appear to directly compare the two strategies. In the present study, verbal 
reasoners performed noticeably worse than spatial on all these DF problems, and for those 
with All-None premises the difference was significant; t (44) = 2.0, p=0.05, suggesting 
they may be equally at a loss. 
Spatial Representations of the . 111 Premise 
Ford states that, for her spatial reasoners, the preferred representation of the universal 
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affirmative premise, All of the X are Y, was as a subset relationship, as below: 
O 
In the present study, just 7 spatial reasoners (38.8% of total) consistently represented such 
premises in this way. Examples of these can be seen in several of the protocols cited 
previously. The majority(10 people, 55.6%) represented All of the X are Y In the form of an 
identity relationship, mostly in the classical form: 
XY 
But also as variations of. 
or, ((D(D (D-0 
The one remaining spatial reasoner used a mixture of the two approaches. Of the 17 people 
who used one or other representation consistently, there was no significant difference in 
overall performance for syllogisms with All premises as a function of how that premise 
was represented (p > 0.05). On the three problems with two All premises (syllogisms 3,25, 
26), 50% of participants represented the two premises as a three-way identity: 
XY 
Z 
Again this was not detrimental to their performance compared with other reasoners (p > 
0.05). When considered in terms of Ford's syllogism categorisations, the only category 
where a noticeable difference in performance was observed was the DF . 111-None 
syllogisms (numbers 7.12,16 and 24) where only two identity users got any of the 
problems correct (identity M 10.0, sd = 25.4. subset M= 32.5, sd = 44). Howe% cr, due 
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to the exceptional performance of one identity user, this difference in performance as a 
function of representation type was still not significant (p > 0.05). 
2.2.4 Discussion 
The general aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend the work of Ford (1995). It 
was predicted that two main reasoning strategies would be identified, verbal and spatial, 
and that written and verbal protocols together with questionnaire responses would provide 
converging evidence of these strategies. In addition, it was hoped that the WP-only 
condition would allow for the reliable identification of the strategies without the need for 
onerous verbal reports. The findings appear to support these predictions. In condition 
V/WP (the replication), consistent trends in the written and verbal protocols clearly 
indicated the presence of two major forms of reasoning behaviour and these correspond to 
those which typify the verbal and spatial strategies described by Ford. In the W-only 
condition, written protocols show the same general characteristics and participants can be 
similarly categorised as belonging to one of the two strategy groups on the basis of these 
alone. In both conditions, questionnaire data supported the strategy categorisation. 
Participants generally answered in the affirmative to questions which probed either verbal 
or spatial reasoning behaviours and these in turn corresponded to the strategy suggested by 
their written and verbal reports. However, scores on the reasoning behaviours scale 
generated from questionnaire responses did indicate some overlap between the two 
strategy groups, albeit for a minority of reasoners. This may suggest that, although there is 
clear evidence for qualitatively distinct verbal and spatial strategies, some individuals may 
he employing, a more mixed approach which wasn't immediately apparent from their 
protocols. The individual differences observed may in fact lie on a strategic continuum, a 
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spectrum of strategies with what appear to be verbal and spatial reasoners positioned at the 
two extremes. 
With the exception of the four same-form, multi-model syllogisms discussed previously, 
neither the present study, nor that of Ford, found any significant difference in overall 
performance across different strategy types and both strategies perform least well on DF 
problems. However, the present data suggests that spatial reasoners do significantly better 
than verbal on those syllogisms. Moreover, the present study found none of the within- 
strategy variations in performance which Ford identified as a function of type of 
substitution rule (verbal reasoners) or constraint of premises (spatial reasoners). In contrast 
to Ford, reasoners showed a consistent approach for all problems. Verbal reasoners appear 
to apply naive substitution throughout, performing least well on syllogisms where the 
mood makes this form of substitution most difficult. There is no evidence that they applied 
the formal simple substitution rules or sophisticated substitution process which Ford 
describes. Moreover, on the more difficult problems, verbal reasoners present evidence of 
precisely those Gricean conversion errors that Ford claims her reasoners eschew. Spatial 
reasoners produce similar representations for all problems, rarely appearing to represent 
multiple possibilities even for Ford's less-constrained syllogisms. Where performance 
variations were observed between syllogisms, they tended to apply similarly to both verbal 
and spatial reasoners. Even when the nature of fallacious responses is examined, there is 
little difference between the strategy groups, both verbal and spatial reasoners generate 
similar types of responses, presenting an outward appearance of universality. 
However, such ubiquity may be superficial. Examination of the underlying processes 
reveals that errors occur for very different reasons. Verbal reasoners rely very literally on 
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premise form which leads them into erroneous conclusions, especially for DF syllogisms. 
In this aspect, their conclusions give the appearance of those predicted by the matching 
hypothesis of Wetherick and Gilhooly (1990). Wetherick and Gilhooly asked participants 
to evaluate presented conclusions and hence responses could be directly matched to one of 
the premises. In the present study, participants were required to produce their own 
conclusions and it would appear that verbal reasoners generated responses which appeared 
to match the form of one of the premises. They appeared to choose the All premise to 
obtain a value for B because it affords the greatest informativeness about the individuals 
represented by the terms (in matching theory terms, this premise is the least conservative). 
Hence, the All premise is always selected for processing first, even when it is presented as 
the second premise in the syllogism. The remaining premise (the most conservative) is the 
one which is in effect "matched". Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) highlight that such a 
strategy will work for 14 of the 27 valid syllogistic forms (i. e. the SF problems) but not for 
the other 13 (the DF). But, as Wetherick and Gilhooly allow, some reasoners do get DF 
syllogisms right. They state: "subjects who give correct conclusions to syllogisms in these 
moods cannot be matching, and it seems reasonable to suppose that their correct responses 
to other moods may not have been obtained by matching either" (1995, pp. 172-3). 
Wetherick and Gilhooly maintain that matching is a heuristic adopted when subjects are 
unable or unwilling to reason with logic. But the fact that some verbal reasoners are able to 
generate correct conclusions to DF syllogisms suggests that they are capable of some form 
of reasoning, albeit not necessarily one which is compatible with the rules of formal logic. 
Certainly, it seems that some verbal reasoners are able to modify their strategy to cope with 
more difficult syllogisms, but there is little evidence of the more formal modifications to 
premises that Ford describes as sophisticated substitution. The prevalent use of identity as 
representative of the . -l/1 premise 
in the present study might suggest that our participants 
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were less sophisticated reasoners then those of Ford. An assumption of identity could lead 
reasoners into illicit premise conversion and hence to believe that simple substitution was 
appropriate whenever an All quantifier was present. 
However, spatial reasoners also find SF syllogisms easier than DF. Mental model theory 
suggests that the former are in fact easier for everyone because they require the 
construction of fewer models (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). The theory predicts errors 
on DF syllogisms because reasoners often fail to search for counter-examples which may 
refute their putative model. Certainly few spatial reasoners appear to consider the 
possibility of alternative models, and when they do, they tend to dismiss it, preferring to 
retain their original model. Spatial reasoners construct Euler circle type representations, 
but show no evidence of attempting to construct representations of all possible states of the 
premises. Erickson (1978) suggests that reasoners can only handle sufficient cognitive load 
for one diagram per premise, thus, if presented for instance with the premise All X are Y, 
they will encode the relationship as either subset or identity. Only one spatial reasoner in 
the present study adopted both representations. However, nor did they construct separate 
diagrams for each premise and then combine them, as traditional Euler circle theory would 
suggest. Rather, every spatial reasoner appeared to follow the same three-stage process: 
1. Represent premise one diagrammatically 
2. Draw an amendment, or addition, to this initial diagram in order to incorporate 
the information presented in premise two. 
3. Derive a conclusion from the final composite representation. 
As such, both interpretation of premise two and combination of the premises occur in one 
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stage. How spatial reasoners then draw their conclusion remains unclear. Neither -verbal 
nor written protocols make explicit how stage 3 above occurs. Conclusions may be based 
on a literal interpretation of diagram structure, although Johnson-Laird (1989, page 473) 
has stated that "Mental models are symbolic structures, and the relation of a model to the 
world cannot simply be read off from the model. "[my emphasis]. If this is so. either spatial 
reasoners' diagrams are not manifestations of the use of mental models, or, conclusions 
may be drawn from a more complex process which may yet involve the application of 
some as yet unspecified inference rule. 
Verbal reasoners can also be accused of failing to search for counter-conclusions, but then 
they show no sign of generating and/or using mental models. Polk and Newell's Verbal 
Reasoning hypothesis does not preclude the use of some form of mental model or non- 
linguistic representation, but unlike mental model theory it does not posit the search for 
counter-examples as a key element in conclusion generation. Rather, the two premises are 
encoded individually and then combined to form an initial putative conclusion. If this 
conclusion is not acceptable, the premises are repeatedly re-encoded until a valid 
conclusion is suggested. However, the present data present no evidence that verbal 
reasoners are any more likely than spatial to encode the two premises separately, or that 
reasoners using either strategy attempt to re-encode or re-formulate premise combinations 
in any way in an attempt to reconsider their initial conclusion. 
Overall, the present findings seem to suggest that individual differences in strategies 
cannot be wholly accounted for by any one deductive theory. Johnson-Laird and Bara 
(19S 4) and others have suggested that manipulation of models may underpin substitution 
behaviour, and later work by Johnson-Laird (2001) has suggested that, over time, reasoners 
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may learn to construct formal rules and that this is an essential stage in the development of 
logic. However the present data suggest no more evidence for this than they do for spatial 
reasoning underpinned by propositional rules. Although the diagrammatic models of 
spatial reasoners may be likened to Euler circles or mental models, neither theory can fully 
account for their reasoning. However, Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) do highlight 
individual differences in heuristic processing of syllogisms, suggesting that while some 
participants indeed appear to be matchers, some may employ other non-logical methods. 
Chater and Oaksford's (1999) model of non-logical heuristic reasoning also predicts that 
conclusion mood will be the same as that for the least informative premise, but computed 
probabilistically, rather than obtained by simple matching of quantifiers. For DF 
syllogisms, initiation of the p-entailment heuristic would depend on an ability to identify 
that a further conclusion is probabilistically entailed by the min-conclusion. If participants 
in the present study were reasoning probabilistically, in these aspects at least, the PHM 
might account for the fact that both verbal and spatial reasoners performed similarly across 
different forms of syllogism. However, the fact that W-only participants showed strikingly 
similar individual differences to those in the V/WP condition appears to refute Chater and 
Oaksford's suggestion that the verbal-spatial distinction is nothing more than a 
methodological artefact arising from the use of verbal protocol. This in turn calls into 
question their claim that the PHM provides an accurate fit for experimental data without 
the need to account for such differences. Whether verbal and spatial reasoners are indeed 
similarly probabilistic in their deduction is an area that requires further research. 
An important question that remains is why different people prefer to represent premise 
information in different forms in order to deduce conclusions, especially given that overall 
performance does not seem to change as a function of strategy. This may reflect individual 
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differences in other cognitive abilities, and such differences may be equally apparent in 
individual approaches to other forms of reasoning task. Furthermore, participants in both 
this and Ford's study were drawn from a student population who are (presumably) fairly 
high in general intelligence. Conversely, Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) learned 
little from verbal reports produced by Italian students who are admitted to university 
without selection criteria, and hence may be more representative of the general population. 
Levels of intelligence and education may influence both ability to make inferences and 
reasoning strategy. Moreover, any association between strategy choice and differences in 
abilities known to be influential in reasoning (such as working memory capacity) may help 
to clarify whether protocol data actually reflects differences in underlying cognitive 
processes, rather than in manner of representation. 
Furthermore, some authors (for instance Johnson-Laird et al 2000) have claimed that Euler 
circle type representations rely on vestigial memories of procedures learned in school. 
However, item 9 of the questionnaire (see Appendix 3A) asked reasoners: 
"Did you apply a rule or procedure which you already knew about from things 
you have done in the past, rather than develop a new rule/procedure for this 
task? If yes, please describe the rule/procedure and how you knew about it". 
Of the 51 participants in Experiment 1, only 5 answered in the affirmative to this item, and 
three of these were verbal reasoners who described algebra and/or equations (Ford 
describes these as typical of verbal reasoners' methods). Of the other two, one mentioned 
"spider diagrams" for summarising information and just one mentioned Venn diagrams 
learncd in mathematics lessons at school. Although this indicates that the vestigial 
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memories argument cannot be totally discounted, it does suggest that it applies only to a 
small minority of individuals and is not limited to spatial reasoners. Such memories may 
be selective and the nature of recalled material consistent with a predisposition to 
reasoning in a verbal or spatial way. It is suggested that such predispositions to a particular 
strategy are inherent factors of the individual, and hence will be robust across different task 
formats. 
Certainly, both strategic processes remain underspecified in a number of aspects. In 
particular, how spatial reasoners draw conclusions from their representations and how 
verbal reasoners modify premise information when naive substitution is inappropriate, may 
prove to involve some form of rule, as yet undetermined. Verbal and spatial reasoning may 
in fact be examples of the transduction strategies which Polk and Newell overtly reject. 
The construction of the distinctive spatial representations may arise because of a need to 
convert premise information into a form which spatial reasoners find more conducive to 
cognitive processing. Similarly, for syllogisms where the naive substitution heuristic is not 
effective, verbal reasoners may be required to convert premise information into a form 
where they can then apply this principle. The mixed strategy group appear to use a 
combination of verbal and spatial behaviours within or between different syllogisms. The 
small number of mixed reasoners identified in the present sample precludes drawing any 
firm conclusions. This strategy may be some kind of compromise because these people are 
unsure of the best approach to take, or they may possess some cognitive factor which 
makes this mix of approaches a natural way of working for these individuals. Experiment 2 
aimed to discover more about the nature of strategies. 
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2.3 Experiment 2 
2.3.1 Introduction to Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 has shown that most individuals adopt one of two reasoning strategies when 
solving syllogistic problems and that these appear to be verbal-propositional and spatial in 
character. In this respect Experiment 1 has replicated the findings of Ford (1995) and 
further shown that such strategies can be identified from written accounts alone, without 
the need for verbal protocol data. Moreover, a questionnaire has been piloted which seems 
to support the classification of strategies. 
Individuals who adopt the verbal strategy seem to use a form of naive substitution, that is, 
they gain a value for the B term from a universal affirmative premise and substitute that 
value for B in the other premise to form a conclusion. Although this process lends itself 
well to problems where conclusions are of the same-form as one of the premises (SF 
syllogisms), verbal reasoners have difficulty with those syllogisms where the conclusion is 
of a different form (DF) to either premise and they perform significantly less well on these 
problems. Individuals using the spatial strategy use representations of the premises which 
are similar to traditional Euler circles, or Venn diagrams, though they rarely attempt to 
represent more than one possible model of the premises. DF syllogisms tend largely to be 
those problems which both mental models theory and Ford (1995) suggest have more than 
one possible way to represent the premises. Hence, spatial reasoners also have greatest 
difficulty with these syllogisms, though they still perform significantly better than verbal 
reasoners. 
Otherwise howc\'cr. these strategies are a weak indicator of differences in reasoning 
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performance. Overall performance in terms of accuracy of conclusions generated tends not 
to differentiate between strategy users, which may be why many theories of reasoning have 
assumed that a single universal process is at work. However, from the pattern of 
performance observed over different syllogistic forms, it may be possible to make certain 
predictions about how verbal and spatial reasoners will respond. For instance, if verbal 
reasoners are indeed substituting terms in the manner described above, they will be likely 
to produce SF conclusions, even to DF problems. One way of testing such predictions is to 
examine not only the conclusions that reasoners produce, but also how they choose to 
evaluate conclusions they are presented with and how they deal with invalid problems. On 
evaluation tasks, all reasoners tend to perform better than when asked to generate their own 
conclusions (see for instance Evans et al 1993 for a review). However, substitution 
behaviour would suggest that verbal reasoners will be likely to endorse SF conclusions as 
valid, even when logically invalid. Conversely, they may rate valid DF conclusions as 
invalid. Spatial reasoners rely less on premise form and therefore may make fewer such 
errors. Experimental evidence in defence of such predictions would add further support to 
the argument for individual differences in reasoning strategies, as discussed in Experiment 
1. Moreover, if the findings of Experiment I are robust, they will afford further replication. 
These were therefore the main aims of Experiment 2. 
2.3.2 Aims 
The aims of experiment 2 were threefold: 
1. To replicate the findings from experiment I in terms of identifying verbal and spatial 
strategies. 
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2. To discover more about the nature of these strategies by examining their performance 
across tasks involving the production and evaluation of syllogistic conclusions, and 
including invalid problems. The following predictions were made: 
a) On a production task (as Experiment 1), verbal reasoners will produce more 
same-form conclusions than different form, even for invalid/indeterminate 
syllogisms. They will also be less likely than spatial reasoners to state "no valid 
conclusion" for invalid/indeterminate syllogisms, instead generating an invalid 
same-form conclusion. 
b) On an evaluation task, verbal reasoners will be more likely than spatial to 
endorse same-form conclusions as valid when the conclusion presented is 
logically invalid. Valid different-form conclusions are more likely to be rated as 
invalid by verbal reasoners. 
3. To further develop the questionnaire as a tool for the identification of strategies 
2.3.3 Methods 
Participants 
73 undergraduate students volunteered to take part in return for course credit. This sample 
comprised 7 males and 66 females, mean age 20.53 years. None had received formal 
training in logic. 
Materials 
Syllogistic Problems 
Evans et al (1999) reported percentage endorsement of conclusions under both necessity 
and possibility instructions, for all 512 possible syllogistic forms. This extensive resource 
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was used to identify syllogisms for use in the present study. As reasoners tend to stru`g`(le 
with DF syllogisms, problems were used which were endorsed as necessary at a high rate 
in the Evans et al data, in order to avoid a floor effect. Similarly, people tend to find SF 
problems easiest, so problems were identified where necessity endorsements were high to 
avoid a ceiling effect. In total, 20 syllogisms were identified from this source, half SF and 
half DF according to the conclusions presented by Evans et al. All four figures were 
represented amongst this set. As in Experiment 1, thematic content comprised occupations 
and persuasions, and this content was varied across the two tasks. In the production task, 
ten valid problems and five indeterminate ones (not from Evans et al) were presented. For 
evaluation, the same ten valid problems together with a further ten invalid ones were used. 
The presentation order was randomised prior to the experiment and then remained constant 
for all participants. All 25 syllogisms are presented in Appendix 2F, in abstract form, 
together with the endorsement rates as shown by Evans et al (1999). For the purposes of 
this experiment, validity was defined as per Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) i. e. a problem 
which has a necessary conclusion, one that must be true given that the premises are true. 
Some of the problems classed here as invalid may have possible conclusions (i. e. a 
conclusion that can be true for one model of the premises), however this definition of 
validity is in line with the procedure used in Experiment I and the valid syllogisms used by 
Ford (1995). 
Questionnaire Development 
Experiment I piloted a reasoning behaviours questionnaire designed to elicit information 
about strategy usage. Items were developed from the descriptions of verbal and spatial 
reasoning behaviours presented by Ford (1995). These behaviours were clearly replicated 
in Experiment I and strategy groups identified from written and verbal protocols were 
103 
fully supported by questionnaire responses. Reliability analysis of these responses resulted 
in a final eight item questionnaire (see Table 2.4 previously) with an Alpha = 0.68. Six of 
these reliable items were designed to identify verbal reasoning behaviours (in Table 2.4 
these are item l and items 3 to 7) but only two items appeared to be reliable indicators of 
spatial reasoning (items 2 and 8 in Table 2.4). Because of this imbalance, the questionnaire 
was extended for use in Experiment 2, using the eight original reliable items as a basis. 
Three additional items were developed based on spatial reasoning behaviours identified in 
Experiment 1 and which appeared to discriminate between them and verbal reasoners (the 
tendency to group information into sets and subsets, to use diagrams and to deal with 
premises in the order presented, irrespective of quantifier). A final questionnaire item was 
also included in the form of a general request for qualitative information about the 
approach used. Very little useful information was gleaned from the behaviour specific 
qualitative items in Experiment 1. It appeared that many participants found their specific 
tactics difficult to articulate and this part of the process laborious, especially coming as it 
did at the end of the experimental session. However, qualitative data can potentially offer 
useful supporting evidence and it was anticipated that a single, more general, question may 
encourage more reasoners to offer some details of their strategy not covered by the other 
questionnaire items. A copy of this revised questionnaire as used in Experiment 2 is 
presented in Appendix 2G (the new items added for this experiment are numbers 7,8,9 and 
12). 
Procedure 
Participants \N'cre run in small groups of around eight individuals in single sessions lasting 
around 45 minutes. Each was seated at a separate desk to minimise sight of other 
participants' work. In a within-subjects design, all participants were presented with both 
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the production and evaluation tasks, with task presentation order counterbalanced to avoid 
possible order effects. In each case, they were asked to provide written protocols of their 
reasoning but no verbal reports were collected (as in the WP-only condition of Experiment 
1). After the two tasks they completed the questionnaire as in Appendix 2G. All the above 
were presented on paper in a single workbook. Participants were instructed to work 
through the booklet in the order presented. Each task was preceded by a set of written 
instructions and these are shown in Appendix 2H. Within each of the two tasks, syllogism 
were presented in a different random order for each participant. Each syllogism was 
presented on a single page with room below for written workings. 
2.3.4 Results 
2.3.4.1 Identification of Verbal and Spatial Strategies 
Strategies were identified from the written protocols presented for the production tasks, 
according to the same criteria as in Experiment 1. Protocol 2.18 presents an example of a 
verbal reasoner who seemed to be using a similar type of naive substitution described in 
Experiment 1. 
Protocol 2.18 
Syllogism 2: 
Participant 30: All of the freemasons are r ceptionists 
All of the reception' s are joggers 
Correct conclusion given: All of the freemasons are joggers 
Protocol 2.19 below shows a spatial reasoner. 
l0S 
Protocol 2.19 
Syllogism 4: 
Participant 49: 
None of the builders are flautists 
All of the shotputters are flautists 
EEI0 
Correct conclusion given: None of the builders are shotputters 
Preferred strategy was identified from protocols produced on the conclusion production 
task as this was comparable to the process used in Experiment I and previously by Ford 
(1995). However, when these protocols were then compared to those produced during the 
conclusion evaluation task, the latter were found to be remarkably similar. Protocols 2.20 
and 2.21 present examples of verbal and spatial reasoners respectively, across the two task 
types. The latter is interesting because, although using exactly the same approach as the 
Euler circle type reasoners such as that in protocol 2.19 above, she has chosen to represent 
the three terms using different shapes, presenting a shape identification key for each item. 
Protocol 2.20 
Production Task 
Syllogism 1: Some of the opticians are shopkeepers 
All of the opticians are Buddhists 
Participant 17: opticians = Buddhists 
some opt = shopkeepers some Buddhists 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the Buddhists are shopkeepers 
Evaluation Task 
Syllogism 3: All of the biologists are prizewinners 
Some of the singers are biologists 
Conclusion: Some of the singers are biologists 
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Participant 17: biologists = prizewinners 
some singers = biologists prizewinners 
Correct evaluation given: Conclusion is valid. 
Protocol 2.21 
Production Task 
Syllogism 5: 
Participant 15: 
All of the carpenters are hedonists 
None of the engineers are hedonists 
carp =A 
hed =O 
eng = 00 Correct conclusion given: None of the engineers are carpenters 
Evaluation Task 
Syllogism 6: None of the linguists are vegetarians 
Some of the criminals are linguists 
Conclusion: Some of the criminals are not vegetarians 
Participant 15: 
ling =A 
veg =O 
crim = 
Correct evaluation given: Conclusion is valid 
However, the strategy classifications were not as straightforward as in Experiment 1. 
Whereas many verbal reasoners who perform substitution use arrows to show how terms 
were moved around within and between premises, others used arrows to represent 
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relationships between terms. They did this on both production and evaluation problems. 
The protocols typically represent the common, or B, term centrally and then link the other 
terms to it by arrows. For instance: 
Protocol 2.22 
Evaluation task 
Syllogism 9: Some of the chessplayers are poets 
None of the chessplayers are parents 
Conclusion: Some of the poets are not parents 
Participant 66: chessplayers 
none 
poets 
parents 
Correct evaluation given: Conclusion is valid 
A few similar protocols (N=8) were also observed in Experiment 1 and were categorised as 
evidence of verbal reasoning according to Ford's criteria (see for example Protocol 2.2 
previously). The protocols resemble several of those shown by Ford (e. g. example numbers 
39 and 43, pages 35 and 37) and the account of verbal reasoning which she gives on page 
16 (see also Chapter 1 of this thesis). In the present study, when responding to item 12 of 
the questionnaire, participants who produced such protocols frequently referred to them as 
"flow-charts" or "arrow diagrams" and described using the arrow to follow the connection 
between terms. Participant 66 above is fairly typical in referring to some quantifiers as 
being "stronger" than others and how this influenced her choice of conclusion. 
Participant 66; response to Q 12: "1 tried to see whether the connection between the 
occupation which was mentioned twice and the other txwo occupations was stronger, 
ee. g.. -1 /l or some. If one co/'the statements was none 1 tended to, most of the time, put 
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"none of the... " in my conclusion " 
Others made similar comments and indicated the relative quantifiers by thicknesses, or 
different forms, of arrow as in protocol 2.23. 
Protocol 2.23 
Syllogism 8P: None of the cleaners are jugglers 
All of the jugglers are jockeys 
Participant 14: clean ------ No. ---- jugg 
jockey 
Incorrect conclusion given: None of the cleaners are jockeys 
Response to Q12: "dotted line meant some, solid meant all, cross meant none and 
the arrow showed the direction of information given. If the arrows did not follow 
then no conclusion could be made, i. e. 
xº 
t 
z no conc. no road to 
xy follow & link 
Z 
Xý y 
1 
Z 
conclusion coz there's 
a pathway" 
On this DF problem, the reasoner presents the incorrect conclusion which might be 
predicted were she using substitution, yet her protocols do not make this explicit. These 
data suggest that such flow-charts do likely indicate a form of verbal reasoning, but that the 
strategy does not seem to be substitution, either in terms of the naive form described in 
Experiment 1, or the more sophisticated forms described by Ford. Conversely, it could be 
argued that, although dealing with the information propositionally, this approach seems to 
have a visuo-spatial element as evidenced by the description of "following pathways". 
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Altogether 31 (42.3% of total sample) of participants in Experiment 2 showed evidence of 
using these flow-chart diagrams. 
Some variation was also apparent within the spatial strategy group. Of the 7 spatial 
reasoners identified in Experiment 2, five presented the typical Euler circle type 
representations. However, two individuals produced protocols of the type shown in 
protocol 2.24 below. 
Protocol 2.24 
Syllogism lop Some of the managers are boxers 
None of the boxers are judges 
Participant 65: M-BJ 
M-B J 
M 
M 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the managers are not judges. 
These protocols present striking similarities to the classic notation for mental models (see 
chapter 2) however both participants denied ever having heard of them. Although only two 
reasoners presented such protocols, they merit attention as they still represent almost a 
third (28.7%) of the spatial reasoners. However, they present fewer classification problems 
than the flow-charters as these protocols clearly indicate some form of set based 
representation, which is an indictor of a spatial strategy. 
2.3.4.2 Evidence from Questionnaire Responses 
In Experiment 1, a Cronbach's Alpha = 0.68 was observed for eight valid questionnaire 
items and these formed the basis for the revised form of the questionnaire administered in 
Fxperimcnt 2 (Appendix 2G). In determining reliability of this revised questionnaire, the 
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same procedure was applied as reported previously for Experiment 1. Reliability analysis 
of the 11 quantitative items suggested the elimination of 8 of these in order to obtain an 
optimum Cronbach's Alpha of 0.77. SPSS output showing this analysis is presented in 
Appendix 21. However, the remaining 3 items (numbers 4,5 and 6) were all verbal strategy 
questions. The most reliable spatial item was number 10. As it was desirable to have at 
least one spatial item included, it was decided to retain item 10 as that had also proved 
reliable in Experiment 1. These four items produced a final Alpha = 0.70. The list of final 4 
valid items is shown in Table 2.8 below. 
Table 2.8: The final 4 questionnaire items. Note that items 4,5 and 6 were presented with a5 point 
response scale as shown in original questionnaire, Appendix 2G. V or S in parentheses indictes whther 
item was intended to identify verbal or spatial reasoning behaviours repectively. 
4. Did you attempt to substitute terms/occupations from one statement to another (i. e. switch the 
occupations around between statements)? (V) 
5. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to form a single, longer verbal description'? 
(V) 
6. To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the occupations within the statements? (V) 
10. Did you think about sets/Venn Diagrams (similar to that shown below) either using circles or any 
other shape'? YES/NO 
(S) 
Questionnaire item responses again appeared to provide converging evidence for the 
presence of verbal and spatial strategies, with reasoners whose written protocols identified 
thetas as verbal, responding positively to verbal questionnaire items and spatial reasoners 
responding most positively to the spatial items. Participants allocated to the mixed and 
indeterminate strategy groups generally provided mixed or conflicting responses to the 
questionnaire items. The low number of spatial reasoners may have reduced the influence 
of spatial items in questionnaire reliability. 
The 31 reasoners who used the "flow-charting' approach presented varying questionnaire 
response profiles. In order to determine whether these represented a third distinct strategy 
group, flow-chart users were divided into two groups on the basis of whether or not they 
answered "Yes" to item 10. Hence it was assumed that one group of flowcharters (N=9) 
were using some kind of mixed strategy (part verbal and part spatial) whilst others (N=22) 
were employing a verbal-propositional strategy. This classification is supported by 
comments made in response to item 12 of the questionnaire where participants were asked 
to try and describe their overall approach. Participants in the verbal flowchart group tended 
to describe typical verbal reasoning actions such as: 
"wrote each stage out again and used arrows to form the reinterpreted 
phrases... inserted some, all or None" (Participant 46) 
"kept sight of words all and some, I tried to make the statements into one 
sentence" (Participant 63). 
Those in the mixed flowchart group tended to use terminology typical of spatial reasoners, 
for instance: 
"it was easier to look visually at the problem rather than put it in a sentence" 
(Participant 57). 
"tried to find relationships between sets... " (Participant 4); 
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Others in this category indicated they had used a mixture of verbal and spatial approaches. 
for instance, (comments in square brackets added for clarification): 
"... switch the top one for the bottom one" [as verbal substitution]........ using 
diagrams to keep the groups distinct from one another" [as spatial reasoning]. 
(Participant 40). 
"Firstly represent he information diagrammatically [as spatial reasoning].... then 
put information into a verbal form to move it around"[as verbal substitution] 
(Participant 18). 
Reverse-scaling the questionnaire items relating to the spatial strategy resulted in an 
overall reasoning behaviour scale with a maximum score of 47, on which a high score 
represented a high degree of spatial reasoning traits and a low score indicated a high 
degree of verbal reasoning traits. The mean scores for all five strategy groups (no 
indeterminate included) are shown in Table 2.9 both when the scale is based on all eleven 
quantitative questionnaire items, and for when it is based on just the four most reliable 
items. In both cases, the predicted pattern of scale scores was observed, with the spatial 
group scoring highest, followed by the mixed groups. The verbal and verbal-flowchart 
groups present very similar scores and these are also the lowest scores overall. 
Table 2.9: Mean reasoning behaviour scores for all strategy groups based on scales derived from 
questionnaire responses. Shown in terms of scales based on all 11 original items, and on 4 most reliable 
items (Litter as in table 2.8). 
Strategy N Mean S. Dev. 
11 items 4 items 11 items 4 items 
Verbal 23 23.57 8.30 5.12 3.39 
Spatial 7 33.43 11.14 3.82 3.57 
Mixed 2 33.50 10.00 5.00 1.41 
Flowchart (verbal) 22 27.00 8.95 4.54 3.42 
1'lo\ýchart (nixed) 9 30.44 11.67 4.53 3.28 
11) 
When all II questionnaire items are considered, analysis of variance comparing mean 
scale scores for all five strategies indicated significant differences between the groups; 
E(4,58) =8.47, MSE = 187.58, p<0.001. Scheffe post-hoc comparisons indicated 
significant differences in scores between the verbal and spatial groups. Differences are also 
observed between these and the mixed and verbal flowchart groups respectively, (p<0.05 
in every case). When this analysis was repeated using a scale comprised of scores on the 
four most reliable questionnaire items only (as Table 2.8), ANOVA indicated that inter- 
group differences approached significance: F (4,58) = 2.19, MSE = 25.04, p=0.08. All 
analysis of variance tables pertaining to Experiment 2 are presented in Appendix 2J. 
With the indeterminate group again removed from analysis, K-means cluster analysis was 
applied to the responses to the 4 valid questionnaire items. Two distinct clusters of 
participants were revealed and the distribution of strategies across these clusters is shown 
in Table 2.10. However, because several cells have an expected count of less than 5, 
Pearson's Chi square was not computed in this case. 
Table 2.10: K-means cluster analysis of questionnaire responses: cluster membership by strategy. 
Figures represent within strategy group numbers and percentages. 
Strategy Cluster 1 (N=34) Cluster 2 (N=29) Totals (100%) 
Verbal 16 (69.6%) 7 (30.4%) 23 
Spatial 3 (42.9%) 4(57.1%) 7 
Mixed 1(50%) 1 (50%0 2 
Flow (verbal) 13 (59.1%) 9(40.9%) 22 
Flow (mixed) 1 (11.1 %) 8(88.9%) 9 
2.3.4.3 Reasoning Performance 
Overall 
The performance of all five strategy groups was compared across the two tasks. All 
reasoners performed best on evaluation as might be expected and this difference was 
significant in every case (p < 0.01). Table 2.11 presents the descriptive statistics. Groups 
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are compared in terms of percentages correct as there are unequal numbers of items in the 
two tasks. A5 (strategy) x2 (task) mixed analysis of variance duly indicated a significant 
main effect of task type, F(1,58) = 225.21, MSE = 21477.53, p<0.001; but no significant 
interaction between task and strategy, nor main effect of strategy (p > 0.05). 
Table 2.11: Overall performance in terms of percentage of correct items compared across strategy 
group and task type 
Strategy N Mean Std. Dev. 
Production Evaluation Production Evaluation 
Verbal 23 25.22 61.52 15.43 12.74 
Spatial 7 34.28 62.14 24.17 9.06 
Mixed 2 13.33 67.50 9.43 12.12 
Flow (verbal) 22 22.72 57.27 10.82 10.20 
Flow (mixed) 9 25.93 63.33 9.69 10.61 
Performance on the Conclusion Production Task 
Table 2.12 compares accuracy in terms of mean numbers of correct conclusions to valid 
problems and "no valid conclusion" (NVC) responses to invalid problems. The mean 
numbers of same-form conclusions generated to all three types of syllogism are also 
presented. The accuracy values in Table 2.12 show that, in line with Experiment 1, spatial 
reasoners perform slightly better than verbal. 
Table 2.12: Conclusion production task: Descriptive statistics comparing all strategy groups in terms 
of accuracy and number of SF conclusions produced. 
Strategy 
Valid Same-form 
(Item N= 5) 
Valid Different-form 
(Item N= 5) 
Invalid 
(Item N= 5) 
Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. 
Accuracy 
Verbal 2.17 1.40 0.91 0.95 0.70 1.11 
Spatial 3.14 0.38 0.71 0.50 1.29 1.98 
Mixed 2.00 0.41 
. 
00 . 
00 
. 
00 
. 
00 
Flow (verbal) 2.45 1.18 0.55 1.01 0.41 0.80 
Flow (mixed) 2.00 1.41 . 
00 
. 
00 0.67 1.12 
SF conclusions 
Verbal 3.65 1.70 2.39 1.41 1.91 0.79 
Spatial 4.86 0.38 3.71 1.38 1.43 0.98 
Mixed 4.50 0.71 4.00 1.41 2.00 1.41 
Flow (verbal) 3.91 1.60 3.59 1.65 2.23 0.75 
Flow (mixed) 4.67 0.71 3.44 1.51 2.11 1.41 
This holds across all three syllogism types. however the differences were not significant (p 
`O. 05 in every case). For invalid syllogisms, accuracy entailed producing a NVC response 
II 
and. in line with prediction, verbal reasoners produced fewer of these than spatial, though 
not significantly so (p > 0.05). 
Again in line with the findings from Experiment 1, all reasoners performed less well on 
valid DF problems, compared to valid SF. A mixed analysis of variance shows a 
significant main effect of form; F(1,58) = 59.03, MSE = 61.16, p<0.001. But again there 
is no significant interaction between form and strategy or main effect of strategy. The ä 
priori predictions for invalid syllogisms seem to be supported as verbal reasoners indeed 
produce more invalid SF conclusions than spatial reasoners, and this difference is 
marginally significant; t (51) = 1.97, p=0.06. Furthermore, when verbal reasoners 
responses to invalid syllogisms are compared, they are found to produce significantly more 
invalid SF conclusions than they do correct NVC responses; t(45) = 6.41, p<0.001. 
Performance on Conclusion Evaluation Task 
For all items on this task there were only two possible responses, the conclusion presented 
could be rated as valid or invalid. Table 2.13 compares performance between reasoners in 
terms of how many items they correctly evaluated across the four types of syllogism 
presented. 
Table 2.13: Conclusion evaluation task: Descriptive statistics comparing all strategy groups in terms of 
numbers of conclusions correctly evaluated. 
Valid Valid Invalid Invalid 
Same-form Different-form Same-form Different-form 
Strategy (N = 5) N= 5) (N = 5) (N = 5) 
Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. 
Verbal 4.26 0.96 3.43 1.34 2.47 1.08 2.13 1.35 
Spatial 5.00 0.00 3.57 1.62 2.00 1.41 1.86 1.07 
Mt ixed 5.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.50 2.12 
Flow (verbal) 4.23 0.92 3.23 1.34 1.82 1.33 2.18 1.33 
Flow (mixed) 4.56 0.73 2.89 1.17 2.56 1.33 2.67 1.32 
On the valid SF conclusions, all participants perform well, and spatial reasoners are 
signiticantly better than verbal. All spatial reasoners got all these items correct and hence 
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endorsed significantly more SF conclusions as valid, t(45) = 5.15, p<0.001. There was 
little difference between the performance of verbal and spatial reasoners on the other three 
forms of syllogism in this task (p > 0.1 in every case). A 5x2x2 (strategy x form x validity) 
mixed analysis of variance indicated significant main effects for syllogism form; F (1,58) = 
44.68, MSE = 95.86, p<0.001; and for validity; F(1,58) = 11.77, MSE = 8.77, p=0.001; 
but not for strategy (p > 0.05). A significant interaction between syllogism form and 
validity; F (1,58) = 8.24, MSE =12.17, p<0.05 was also apparent. On valid syllogisms, 
reasoners evaluated more conclusions correctly when they were the same form as one of 
the premises, compared to when the conclusion was of a different form. On invalid 
syllogisms, however, they performed similarly on all problems, irrespective of conclusion 
form. 
Given the diversity of strategies identified in Experiment 2, and the small numbers in some 
groups, it was difficult to draw any firm conclusions based on the data, hence analysis was 
concluded at this point. The nature of the verbal and mixed flowchart strategies, as 
evidenced by the protocols and questionnaire responses discussed previously, provides a 
rationale for combining these with the verbal and mixed strategy groups respectively. 
When the above analyses were replicated with these new, larger, strategy groupings, the 
results were virtually identical. 
2.3.4 Discussion 
The aims of Experiment 2 were to further support the evidence for individual differences in 
strategies idcntified in Experiment 1. The first aim was to replicate the verbal and spatial 
stnitegics identified previously. However. although clear evidence of these strategies was 
again obscrv ed, for some participants the classification was not straightforward. These 
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individuals presented diagrams which they tended to describe as flowcharts, and which 
seemed to present both verbal and spatial reasoning characteristics. They used verbal tools 
such as arrows and propositional terms, but laid out the diagrams in a spatial fashion. 
Moreover, when asked to describe their approach in the questionnaire, some participants 
wrote of representing sets/groups (a typically spatial reasoning trait), whilst others 
described typically verbal reasoning behaviours such as rewriting the premises into one 
sentence or swapping terms between premises. Examination of the quantitative 
questionnaire responses for these individuals suggested that some presented a mixed 
profile whilst others appeared to use a verbal strategy. Without further evidence however, 
it may be inappropriate to simply amalgamate these participants with the verbal and mixed 
strategy users. 
There are a couple of possible reasons why this may have occurred. One major procedural 
difference to Experiment 1 was that participants were run in groups. Whilst every attempt 
was made to arrange seating so as to minimise the sight of others work, it was impossible 
to eliminate this completely. It is therefore possible that some participants sought 
inspiration from their neighbour's work and saw flowcharts as a recognisable and 
understandable approach which they could emulate. In Experiment 1, some participants 
were unsure about the written protocols aspect and sought reassurance from the researcher 
that they were "doing it right". In a group situation, subjects are reluctant to do this, or to 
ask for clarification at all. This may also explain the relatively high number of 
indeterminate strategies, where, despite instructions, no protocols were produced. 
Another explanation may simply be that there are variations within the verbal and spatial 
strategics with not all spatial reasoners using Euler circles and not all verbal reasoner, 
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substitution. They may still however be reasoning with information in a spatial or 
propositional form respectively. This requires further investigation. Certainly the above 
data suggest some justification for classifying verbal-flowchart and mixed-flowchart 
reasoners within the verbal and mixed strategy groups respectively. Furthermore, 
Experiment 1 showed that even when the vast majority of reasoners seem to adopt either a 
verbal or spatial approach, some overlap in their reasoning scale scores is observed. If a 
strategic continuum is envisaged, then it may be that the "flowcharters" lie somewhat 
towards the centre of the spectrum, with some showing strategies which incline towards 
the verbal end of the continuum, with others more allied to spatial strategies. 
The second aim of Experiment 2 was to test predictions regarding the nature of verbal and 
spatial strategies, based on observations from Experiment 1. Two reasoning tasks were 
presented, involving the production and evaluation of syllogistic conclusions, and 
including invalid problems. It was expected that naive substitution would lead verbal 
reasoners towards a tendency to produce SF conclusions even for indeterminate 
syllogisms. Similarly, they were expected to be more likely to endorse SF conclusions as 
valid, than DF, even when the conclusion was logically invalid. However, the diversity of 
approaches identified in Experiment 2 meant that it was difficult to analyse performance 
meaningfully in line with these predictions. The figures presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 
above, however, suggest little differences between strategy groups. 
Little difference in accuracy was observed between strategy groups in terms of the 
predictions regarding performance across conclusion and evaluation tasks. Indeed, on 
invalid syllogisms where the greatest differentiation between verbal and spatial reasoners 
was expected, both groups seemed similarly reluctant to suggest a No Valid Conclusion 
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response, preferring to produce an incorrect SF conclusion. For instance, syllogism 21 
(Some A are B; Some B are C), is a problem where previous studies have indicated that 
reasoners often do produce the correct response (for instance, Dickstein, 1978, found that 
58% of subjects correctly presented a NVC response to this syllogism). However, in 
Experiment 2, only 9 reasoners (12.5%) of the entire sample produced this response, of 
whom only 1 fell into the verbal strategy group and 2 into the spatial group, the remaining 
6 exhibiting other strategies. 
The third aim was to further develop the questionnaire as tool for identifying reasoning 
strategy. Reliability analysis again produced a satisfactory alpha value, though only for a 
minority of items, and only one of these measured spatial reasoning behaviours. Given that 
this questionnaire was an extension of the reliable eight item measure from Experiment 1, 
it might be expected that these items at least would prove to be good predictors of strategy 
in Experiment 2. One possible explanation that the sample population differed in some 
way. Certainly a more diverse array of representational approaches was observed in the 
later study. However, the majority of these do seem to be closely related to the verbal and 
spatial strategies observed previously. The issue of group administration mentioned above 
may be a factor here also, with some participants possibly producing a style of protocol 
which was not representative of their own reasoning processes. However, the four most 
reliable items, (numbers 4,5,6 and 10) were also identified as reliable in Experiment 1, 
suggesting that they may indeed provide useful indicators of these aspects of strategy. 
Moreover, the addition of a final qualitative item provided some useful information which 
assisted with the understanding of the "flowchart" strategies. However, the predominance 
of such non-typical approaches raises further questions about the nature of strategies and 
possible intra-strategy variations which Ford's work (and hence also the replication in 
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Experiment 1) does not address. 
2.4 Overall Summary of Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 presented two initial experiments which investigated the existence and nature of 
individual differences in strategies adopted for syllogistic reasoning. Experiment 1 
successfully replicated the work of Ford (1995) which identified two main types of 
strategy. Like Ford, the findings of Experiment 1 suggest that these strategies involve 
reasoning with information in either a verbal-propositional or visuo-spatial form. This is 
clearly supported by the evidence for written and verbal protocols presented in Protocols 
2.1 to 2.17. However, whereas the spatial reasoners adopted Euler circle type 
representations like those presented by Ford, the present data showed little evidence of the 
substitution rules which Ford described for verbal reasoners. Rather, these reasoners use a 
naive substitution which relies little on quantifiers, and heavily on premise form, in 
drawing a conclusion. Also contrary to Ford's findings, the only significant differences in 
conclusion accuracy observed as a function of strategy were between SF and DF 
syllogisms, with spatial reasoners performing significantly better than verbal on the latter. 
These findings led to the rationale for Experiment 2. Firstly it was desirable to further 
replicate the findings regarding the presence of verbal and spatial strategies. Also, if verbal 
strategy users are indeed reasoning by means of naive substitution and relying on premise 
form, it is possible to predict how they will perform over different types of syllogism. 
Ho\vever, the strategy data from Experiment 2 were not as clear as expected. Although 
verbal and spatial reasoners were again identified (as evidenced in Protocols 2.18 to 2.21), 
a fair proportion of individuals in Experiment 2 presented written protocols which 
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resembled flowchart diagrams which appeared to incorporate elements of both verbal and 
spatial representations (see protocols 2.22 and 2.23). Qualitative questionnaire data 
suggests that some of these reasoners are adopting an alternative verbal strategy whilst 
others seem to use a mixed approach. Moreover, some spatial reasoners appeared to use a 
process which, although clearly spatial, did not involve the characteristic Euler circle type 
representations (See Protocol 2.24). 
A questionnaire was developed with the aim of identifying verbal and spatial reasoning 
behaviours, but only 4 items (3 verbal and one spatial) have shown consistent reliability. 
As such, the questionnaire seems better at identifying verbal than spatial behaviours, 
though the latter remain seriously underspecified anyway, especially in terms of how the 
conclusions are actually drawn from the spatial diagrams. 
Despite the data from Experiment 2 being less clean than expected, the fact that it was 
possible to replicate Ford (1995) strategies in Experiment 1, and that clear evidence for 
verbal and spatial strategies was again observed in Experiment 2, does suggest that the 
strategies are present and robust. This raises the question as to what factors give rise to one 
strategy rather than another. Moreover, the strategies have thus far been identified only for 
syllogistic reasoning. If there exists some inherent difference between individuals that 
leads to the employment of either a verbal or spatial strategy, those strategies should be 
apparent across other reasoning tasks also. Experiment 3 began an investigation into this 
possibility. Moreover, Experiment 3 returned to the original methodology of running 
subjects individually, in order to minimise any group effects and try to ensure that 
protocols produced are a reflection of an individual's own work, and not inspired by that of 
others around them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRATEGIES IN OTHER REASONING DOMAINS 
3.1 General Introduction to Experiments 3 and 4 
Experiments 1 and 2 have revealed clear evidence of individual differences in strategies for 
syllogistic reasoning. Verbal and written protocol evidence has suggested that, for most 
people, reasoning with syllogistic premises involves using information in either a verbal- 
propositional or visuo-spatial form. A smaller number of individuals have also presented 
mixed profiles whereby they seem to use a combination of the two approaches, either 
across different problems or at different stages within the generation/evaluation of a 
conclusion. Now chapter 3 presents two experiments which extend these findings to a 
wider range of reasoning tasks. If the tendency to adopt a verbal or spatial strategy on 
syllogistic tasks is due to inherent individual differences in preference for how information 
is cognitively processed and manipulated, then it would be expected that these individuals 
will also adopt related strategies in other reasoning domains. Experiments 3 and 4 will 
investigate this hypothesis with regard to two other reasoning paradigms, transitive 
inference and sentence-picture verification. In both cases, previous research has indicated 
possible individual differences in strategies. 
3.2 Experiment 3: Strategies in Transitive Inference 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Many everyday decisions are based on inferences about the relationship between objects, 
for instance, evaluating the relative merits of two products before deciding which to 
purchase. Many such relations are transitive, that is, when the relationship holds for two 
entities a and b, and also for b and another entity, c. Then it can be inferred that the 
relationship also holds between a and c. For instance, if a is greater than b, and b is greater 
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than c, then it follows necessarily that a is greater than c. Relationships such as "is less 
than, " "is greater than, " "is subsequent to, " "is parallel to" are all transitive and can link 
together three terms in a unique fashion. Conversely, other everyday relationships such as 
"is next to" is not transitive. 
Such inferences have usually been studied in the form of three-term series problems, i. e. 
linear syllogisms. For instance, if three terms can be arranged in a linear sequence, ABC 
according to their relative properties, and given that property to be height, the information 
can be expressed as two premises in the linear syllogism: 
A is taller than B or alternatively, B is not as tall as A 
B is taller than CC is shorter than B 
Both describe the same linear array of objects unambiguously. By introducing inverse 
relational adjectives and negations, and given two possible premise orders in which these 
can be presented, overall there are 32 possible pairs of premises which describe a single 
given three-term array, such as that above, and which give rise to valid transitive 
inferences. Experimental tasks which present such linear syllogisms typically ask 
participants to determine the relationship between the initial and end terms (A and C in the 
above example), or to decide which is the taller/shorter etc of the two terms. Although 
most people tend to get the correct answers to such simple linear syllogisms, the time 
taken to reach those conclusions varies between problems and such variations in latencies 
suggests variations in difficulty (see Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993 for review). In 
general, problems which contain negation or inverse relational adjectives tend to require 
longer response times. 
124 
The mental models versus logical rules debate has also been contested over linear 
syllogisms. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have proposed that reasoners construct a 
mental array of the entities described in terms of their spatial layout, relative properties etc. 
As with categorical syllogisms discussed previously, in some cases the layout is 
ambiguous and more than one possible model can be constructed. Hence, errors on such 
problems can be attributed to failure to consider all possible models of the premises. In 
contrast, rule theorists (e. g. Rips, 1994; Hagert, 1985) suggest that humans possess an 
implicit logical rule for transitive inference. For simpler problems, the required 
relationship can easily be inferred from such a rule. On more complex problems however, 
for instance those with larger number of terms, which operate in more than one spatial 
dimension, or which involve negation, additional rules are required. Again as for 
categorical syllogisms, more rules equals more errors. However, the problem complexity 
suggested by rules theories does not map cleanly onto that predicted by model theory and 
some one-model problems require more rules than do multi-model problems (Byrne and 
Johnson-Laird (1989). Some studies of relational inference, where the adjectives describe a 
spatial relationship between terms (i. e. to the left/right of, behind, above etc) or temporal 
reasoning (before, after) have suggested that such relations encourage a spatial strategy and 
present support for a models approach (Vandierendonck and De Vooght, 1996). However, 
Roberts (2000) has shown that although a mental-model based approach seems to be the 
prevalent strategy, some individuals (around 10%) will spontaneously use a verbal strategy 
and their data seem to match the predictions of the rule theories. Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1991) conclude that the model theory assumes an understanding of the semantic meaning 
of the relational adjective, rather than of its logical properties. They argue, for instance, 
that both "on the right of' and on the left of' are transitive. Being able to make an 
appropriate inference based on such information relies on semantic knowledge. An abstract 
eile for transitivity would not be able to distinguish between the two meanings. 
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Theories specific to linear syllogisms have also tended to favour either a models or rules 
perspective. Spatial array theories such as those proposed by DeSoto, London and Handel 
(1965) and Huttenlocher (1968) were precursors of the early mental model theories (e. g. 
Johnson-Laird, 1983). They suggest that information from the two premises is integrated 
and then represented in a spatial array. To return again to the previous example: 
A is taller than B 
B is taller than C 
the spatial array would be: 
A 
B 
C 
Such theories propose that some linguistic descriptions more readily lead to the 
construction of models than others. Descriptions such as "taller" typically lead to a vertical 
array (as above), whereas others, e. g. "faster", typically lead to a horizontal array. 
Moreover, whilst an array such as that above will tend to be constructed in a top down- 
order (i. e. A, then B, then Q. Alternative descriptions, which contain negations and/or 
inverses, such as: 
B is not as tall as A 
C is shorter than B 
would lend for construction of the same array but from the bottom up (i. e. C, then B, then 
A). Such bottom-up construction is more difficult and hence leads to longer response times 
for such problems. 
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An alternative view is that people use a linguistic representation which allows them to 
understand the relational meaning of the premises (Clark, 1969). Information from the two 
premises is not integrated, rather it represented by a set of linguistic propositions, for 
instance in the first example above, as a dimension of tallness, (A is tall, B is less tall, C is 
even less tall). Premises which describe negation are constructed on an inverse dimension, 
for instance in the second example above, a dimension of badness (C is bad, B is less bad, 
A is even less bad). In this latter case, longer response times result from the increased 
difficulty of constructing negated propositions. 
In addition, the linguistic theories attempt to explain differences in difficulty between 
problems which have the same adjectives (e. g. A is better than B, B is better than C). It 
suggests that the information is compressed in working memory, i. e. the representation is 
reduced to information about the most extreme relationship only (i. e. A is best) effectively 
eliminating the pivot (common) term B. This must then be recalled from memory in order 
for comparison with premise two. For other forms of this problem however, (such as, B is 
better than C, A is better than B) the common term is retained in the compressed 
representation (B is best) allowing for an immediate comparison to be made, B being then 
discarded in favour of A. 
A related model was proposed by Quinton and Fellows (1975) who claim that only a 
superficial linguistic representation of premises is sufficient to solve most linear 
syllogisms. This is facilitated by a simple algorithm which removes the need for more 
sophisticated (and hence cognitively intensive) representations proposed by the abovc 
linguistic theories. In addition, Sternberg (1980) proposed a mixed model whereby 
premise information was first decoded into a linguistic format and then recoded into a 
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spatial format. The final response is elicited from scanning the spatial array, supplemented 
by a rechecking the linguistic propositions where required on more difficult problems. 
A further source of difficulty concerns marked and unmarked adjectives. Dimensions often 
have a marked and unmarked end. The unmarked form of an adjective is usually that used 
to name the scale (e. g. taller, faster), whereas the marked adjective for is the negative form, 
usually used in a contrastive sense (e. g. shorter, slower). Research has shown that 
inferences involving marked adjectives are more difficult than those involving unmarked 
ones - though again the differences are measured in milliseconds. The spatial array view 
(e. g. DeSoto, et al 1965) maintains that individuals prefer to construct top-down arrays, so 
problems which contain premises which allow for this will be processed fastest. These 
premises are also those which contain unmarked adjectives. Those with marked adjectives 
in contrast, are those which take longer to process because their model requires bottom-up 
construction (e. g. "A is worse than B" requires a bottom-up array). The linguistic rule 
view (e. g. Clark, 1969) suggests that a marked adjective provides information about both 
entities involved (e. g. the taller and the shorter) and hence requires more information about 
their position in the array to be stored in working memory, than is required for unmarked 
adjectives. 
All of the above theories, as with those concerning syllogistic reasoning, tend to assume 
universality of processes across all individuals. However, using the theories outlined above 
as a basis, Sternberg and Weil (1980) have shown that individuals may adopt different 
representational strategies for linear syllogisms, both spontaneously and under the 
influence of instruction. They found that many subjects spontaneously adopted a visuo- 
spatial stratc y, but that others, who initially used a more linguistic approach, could be 
prompted to do so through training. The algorithmic model (Quinton and Fellows. 1975) 
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proved the most efficient in terms of latencies, but, for logically untrained individuals. the 
mixed model advocated by Sternberg (1980) and involving a combination of verbal and 
spatial processes was most likely used. 
Egan and Gnmes-Farrow (1982) also found evidence of individual differences in stratcov 
for this task, identifying two strategy types from written and verbal protocols. They 
presented linear syllogisms which they claimed encouraged the use of spatial 
representations: problems involving relational adjectives (e. g. above-below, left-right) or 
visual comparatives (e. g. rougher- smoother, fatter-thinner). The three terrns wcre always 
the geometric figures circle, square and triangle, and premises were presented in both 
auditory and visual modalities over two experiments. Retrospective verbal and written 
reports indicated that some participants established a scale or continuum onto which the 
three terms were placed and then compared according to their relationship. This same 
process occurred whatever the relational adjective in the problem and the appearance of the 
terms remained standardised throughout (i. e. the three shapes appeared uniform 
throughout). These people were tenned abstract directional thinkers. Other subjects 
attributed physical properties to the terms according to the relational adjectives and 
represented the objects as having these properties (i. e. the shapes were variously 
represented as large, small, light, dark etc) in their protocols. The relative properties were 
then simply compared to reach a conclusion. These individuals were termed concrete 
properties thinkers. Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982, page 301) describe the two strategies 
as "verbal and non-verbal modes of descnbing problem representations-. Although no 
diagrammatic data is presented in their paper, Egan and Grimes-Farrow do present 
cxai-nplcs of written retrospective reports produced by partIcIpants when asked to descrIbe 
their reasoning. Some examples are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Examples of written reports of reasoning on linear sYllogisms for the two strategies 
identified by Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982, page 301 . 
Abstract directional thinkers Concrete properties thinkers 
Problem relation: Rougher-smoother 
"Rather than imagining a rough/smooth figure, I put -I drew a picture, and if something was rough -I 
the figures in a horizontal line, in my mind, in the would put craters in it in my mind-smooth was just 
order of left/right rather than rough/smooth" plain vvhite". 
Problem relation: Darker-Lighter 
"I set up a scale with the lightest on the far right ""In my mind, I coloured in the object that was 
and darkest on the far left and [placed the figures on darkest" 
their appropriate spots". 
Problem relation: Fatter-Thinner 
"Put shapes in order from thinner to fatter" I .... Made the figures fatter and thinner in my head". 
A content analysis of the protocols was conducted, and found that the two strategy groups 
differed in the key words they used when describing their reasoning. Concrete properties 
(CP) thinkers used more words suggesting an image (e. g. picture) whilst Abstract 
directional (AD) thinkers tended to use words which suggested a scale (e. g. line, order). 
The words used to describe the process of creating such arrays also differed, with CP 
thinkers preferring words such as "draw" whilst AD thinkers used functional words such as 
41 put". 
Importantly, Egan and Grimes-Farrow also found differences in the errors made by the two 
groups of reasoners. AD thinkers made significantly fewer errors than CP which was 
attributed to the greater efficiency of generating a linear mental array over a concrete 
11 the types of pictorial representation. Moreover, the two groups also seemed to differ in 
problem they found most difficult. Spatial model theories (e. g. DeSoto et al, 1965) suggest 
an end-anchoring effect which leads reasoners using a directional representation to have 
least difficulty constructing their mental array if it is "end anchored", that is, conducted 
frorn the ends towards the middle. The implication for AD thinkers is that the difficulty of 
solvin,, a problern should be related to the number of premises which have the common, or 
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pivot, term first. This premise form leads reasoners to construct an array from the middle 
(starting with the pivot) to the ends (non-pivot terms then placed in appropriate positions in 
relation to the pivot). Egan and Gnmes-Farrow's data suggested that this was indeed the 
case, AD thinkers had greatest difficulty with problems where the pivot term was presented 
first in at least one premise, their error rate increasing monotonically with number of 
premises where this was the case. 
CP thinkers showed no such effect. Egan and Grimes-Farrow claim that the qualitative 
differences in the spatial arrays constructed by those reasoners suggest that end-anchoring 
is not an issue for them. However, they make greater use of inverse adjectives than do AD 
thinkers which leads to an alternative source of difficulty. Problems for CP thinkers occur 
where a change or alternation in relations is presented (for example, where one premise 
contains the adjective larger and the other smaller). If a relation and its inverse require 
differing concrete representations, then both will require storage and retrieval from 
working memory. CP error rate increased monotonically with the number of changes or 
alternations in relational adjectives contained in problems. AD thinkers showed no such 
effect. 
According to the model proposed by Egan and Grimes-Farrow, AD reasoners encode 
premise one, establish a mental scale to encompass those two terms, the grammatical 
subject being placed first. In encoding the second premise, the subject searches for the 
third, missing terrn, which once located, is placed appropriately on the scale. The easiest 
case is when this position occurs immediately following the two terms already established 
(e. g. if the first two are placed smooth > rough and term three Is the roughest of the three). 
Com, ei-scly, the more difficult cases anse when the third ten-n must be placed at the othcr 
cnd of the scale associated with the inverse (e. g. if the first two terms are placed smooth > 
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rough and then term three turns out to be the smoothest of the three). CP thinkers on the 
other hand, are assumed to encode the premises and then create an Image palnng, In whIch 
the subject of the premise takes on a property (e. g. rough) and the object remains neutral. 
Two such pairs are generated, one for each premise. When the question is encoded, the two 
image pairs are scanned for the response. CP thi II irs inkers find difficulty in generating pa' 
requiring an inverse relation, and where two pairs either present alternate relations or are 
inconclusive. Egan and Grimes-Farrow presented a process model of their data which 
accounted for the strategic differences and errors. Tested with multiple regression, the 
model was shown to account for 90% of variance in performance for AD and 80% in CP. 
Both of Egan and Grimes-Farrow's strategies are assumed to possess a spatial element, 
indeed they set up their experiment in such way as to encourage this. However, clear 
qualitative differences are apparent between the two strategies, one (CP) is clearly visuo- 
spatial, the other (AD) comprising a more abstract representation which remained constant 
irrespective of the relational properties. An obvious parallel with the verbal and spatial 
strategies identified for categorical syllogisms in Experiments I and 2 suggest itself, more 
so given also that Sternberg and Weil (1980) have identified spatial, verbal and mixed 
strategies in solving linear syllogisms. Hence, Expenment 3 attempted to investigate a 
possible relationship between strategies used for syllogistic reasoning and for transitive 
inference involving linear three-term series problems. To avoid possible confusion 
between the two fon'ns of syllogism, henceforth, linear syllogisms will be referred to as 
three-term series problems. When the term syllogism is used, it will refer to categorical 
syllogisms as presented in Experiments I and 2. 
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3.2.2 Aims 
For syllogisms, individuals differ in whether they use visuo-spatial or verb al-propositional 
representations. The review above suggests that there may also be individual differences in 
strategies used for solving three-term series problems. A further question to investigate is 
whether there is cross-task consistency in strategy usage. A positive finding would Indicate 
that strategy usage is a stable and consistent factor in reasoning, rather than merely an 
3 aimed to investigate the artefact of a given reasoning task. Hence Expen III 
relationship between strategies on syllogistic reasoning and three term series problems. 
Specifically it was predicted that: 
1. Verbal and spatial strategies would be identified on a syllogistic task, as for 
Experiment 1, 
2. Verbal reasoners would be most likely to adopt an abstract directional (AD) strategy on 
three term series problems, whilst spatial reasoners would be most likely to adopt a 
concrete properties (CP) strategy. 
3.2.3 Methods 
Participants 
66 undergraduate students from University of Plymouth volunteered to take part in return 
for course credit. The sample compnsed 10 males and 56 females with a mean age of 22.52 
years. None had received fonnal training in logic. 
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Materials 
Categorical Syllogisms 
Ten categorical syllogisms were presented as shown In Appendix 3A. Five , vere same- 
form problems and five different-form, with all four syllogistic figures represented. As in 
Experiments I and 2, the three terms comprised hobbles and occupations. Written 
instructions were presented exactly as for the syllogisti I in ic conclusion production task i 
Expenment 2, and shown in Appendix 2H. 
Three-term Series Problems 
Sixteen problems were presented as shown Appendix 3B. These were chosen to represent a 
range of premise forrns and hence difficulty. Four problems contained two positive 
premises, four had two negated premises, and eight problems comprised one of each, four 
in each order. The positions of the pivot term vaned, with 4 problems having neither pivot 
occurring first, 8 having one pivot first and four having both pivots first. The task was 
preceded by written instructions and two practice items, similar to those presented for the 
syllogistic task. These are reproduced in Appendix 3C. In order to avoid jargon for the 
participants' benefit, the above tasks were referred to as a "Conclusion Production Task" 
and an "Object Relationship Task" respectively. 
Questionnaires 
A reasoning behaviour questionnaire was administered following each task. For 
syllogisms, reliability analysis on the questionnaire administered in Experiment I has 
established a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.86 for 8 reliable items. Expenment 2 presented an II 
itern questionnaire based on these items which proved less reliable due to the wide vanety 
of strategies which became apparent in that experiment (Alpha = 0.72 but for just four 
reliable items, see Tablc 3.9). Howevcr, it also included an additional qualitative question 
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which did yield some useful additional information about how people reason. For 
Experiment 3, an 9 item questionnaire was compiled which comprised the 8 most reliable 
spatial and verbal items Experiment I (which also included the four reliable items from 
Experiment 2) together with the qualitative item which asked participants to describe their 
approach. The questionnaire items are presented in Appendix 3D. 
For the three-term series problems, a questionnaire was devised along similar lines, again 
with 8 items followed by the same final qualitative enquiry into the approach used. As it 
was intended to compare strategies across the two tasks, the questions are similar to those 
for syllogisms, but tailored to the task and tied into some of the key tenets of transitive 
inference described above. Four items attempted to capture the CP reasoning strategy by 
reference to the use of images and physical properties whilst four aimed at identifying the 
AD strategy, referring to representations of series, scales, continua etc. The 9 items are 
shown in Appendix 3E and include a final qualitative item as for syllogistic reasoning 
questionnaire. 
Procedures 
This experiment returned to the original procedure of running each participant individually, 
in sessions lasting around 45 minutes. Each participant completed both tasks, presentation 
order counterbalanced to control for possible order effects. Items were presented in a 
different randomised order for each person. The two tasks were presented together in a 
booklet, each task preceded by the relevant instructions and followed by the appropriate 
questionnaire. For both tasks, participants were instructed to write down their working out 
as in the previous two experiments and hence each item was again presented on a separate 
page, with room beneath to present the written protocol and conclusion. Participants Nvere 
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instructed, both in writing on the front cover of the booklet, and verbally by the 
experimenter, to work through the booklet in order presented. 
3.2.4 Results 
The data from 4 participants was excluded from analysis as they were found to have 
attended a course where logic had been taught. Hence for all the following analyses, total 
N=62. 
3.2.4.1 Strategies for Syllogistic Reasoning 
The vast majority of subjects were classified as either verbal (N = 38) or spatial reasoners 
(N = 17) based on their written protocols. Where necessary for clanfication, responses to 
qualitative item 9 of the questionnaire were also taken into account. A few mixed reasoners 
were also identified (N=5) with protocols and questionnaire responses clearly suggesting a 
combination of verbal and spatial approaches. Only a small minority (N = 2) were using a 
totally indeterminate strategy, and interestingly did so on both syllogisms and the three- 
term series task. 
Questionnaire Responses 
As in Experiment 1, strategy classifications based on protocols were fully supported by 
questionnaire responses. Reliability analysis conducted on the 8 quantitative items in the 
syllogistic reasoning behaviours questionnaire (Appendix 3D) suggested a Cronbach's 
Alpha of 0.83 when all 62 participants are included. SPSS output showing this analysis is 
presented in Appendix 3F. When just the verbal and spatial reasoners are included (N = 
55), a repeat of this analysis produced an Alpha of 0.84. Reverse scoring the vcrbal 
questionnaire itcms produced a reasoning behaviour scale on w1lich a high score indicated 
a high lc\, cl of spatial reasoning behaviour and a low score indicated a high Icvel of vcrbal 
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reasoning behaviour. When the verbal and spatial strategy groups (as determined from 
their protocols and qualitative questionnaire item 9) are compared in terms of their scores 
on this scale, spatial reasoners (M = 31.24, sd = 3.4) scored significantly higher than verbal 
reasoners (M = 17.26, sd = 4.4); t (53) = 11.57, p<0.001. As in Experiment 1, the mixed 
strategy group score lay in between (M = 24.6, sd = 4). K-means cluster analysis (see 
chapter 3, Experiment I for ftirther explanation) on the 8 questionnaire items revealed 2 
distinct clusters of participants. The distribution of verbal and spatial reasoners across 
these clusters is illustrated in Table 4.2. As so few mixed reasoners were identified, they 
have not been included in this analysis. The association between strategy grouping and 
cluster membership proved highly significant; Xý = 43.1, df = 1, p<0.001. 
Table 3.2 K-means cluster analysis of syllogistic reasoning questionnaire responses: cluster 
membership by strategy. Figures represent within strategy group numbers and percentages. 
Strategy Cluster 1 (N=35) Cluster 2 (N=20) Totals 
Verbal 
Spatial 
35(92.1%) 
0 
3(7.9%) 
17(100%) 
38(100%) 
17(100%) 
Characteristics of the strategies identified in Experiment 3 will now be considered in more 
detail. 
Verbal Reasoners (N = 38) 
Of the verbal reasoners identified, II showed clear evidence of classic verbal substitution 
behaviour, for example: 
Protocol 3.1 
Participant 54 
Syllogism 6 All singers are athletes 
Some plumbers are 
; 
gýý 
Correct conclusion given: Some plumbers are athletes 
Sonic people cven managed this on diffcrcnt form (DF) syllogisms, for instance, 
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Protocol 3.2 
Participant 12 
Syllogism 3 
6ýO ýDIOIOKS 
re musicians ýý, 
0s 
CI 
sicians Some vegetarians arueeslý *, 
Correct conclusion given: Some vegetarians are not biologists 
However, others made the typical error for substitution on DF syllogisms. The correct 
conclusion in Protocol 3.3 should be Some bellringers are not gardeners. 
Protocol 3.3 
Participant 17 
Syllogism 5 No gardeners are_JerffirstS 
All dentists are bellringers 
Incorrect SF conclusion given: No gardeners are bellringers 
The remainder of the verbal reasoners produced protocols along the lines of those observed 
in Experiment 2, with the flowchart type diagram being again prevalent. These people 
typically showed a classic verbal questionnaire profile (answering in the affirmative to 
verbal items and negative to spatial items). However, on this occasion, the inclusion of 
questionnaire item 9 revealed some insight into this reasoning. By far the most prevalent 
form of protocol typically showed the middle term as central, with the other terms linked to 
it by lines or arrows, with the quantifiers indicated by words. as typified by the following: 
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Protocol 3.4 
Participant II 
Syllogism 3 
Protocol: 
No biologists are musicians 
Some vegetarians are musicians 
Musicians 
NI 
/o 
ome 
biologists vegetanans 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the vegetarians are not biologists 
Protocol 3.5 
Participant 34 
Syllogism 2 
Protocol: 
All smokers are cyclists 
Some cricketers are not cyclists 
smokers 
ae 
cyclist 
somc-ýt 
cricketers 
Correct conclusion given: Some cricketers are not smokers 
For these people, the diagram seems to be a way of simplifying and integrating the 
premises in propositional fon-n. After drawing the diagram, they frequently cancel out the 
middle ten-n (literally on paper or mentally) and link the other two terrns together 
according to their quantifiers to form a conclusion. This latter part of the process is 
frequently difficult to articulate and remains under-specified in some cases though it is 
probable that some kind of informal rule is applied. Participants frequently spoke of 
linking or joining the two end temis and their quantifiers to get a conclusion, frequently 
ignoring tile middle ternis. for instance; 
13O 
Participant 34: 
"... mentally cancelled out the common link and then joined the other parts together 
to get the conclusion. " 
Participant 30 
.. "attempted to combine the parts of the sentences not concerning the repeated 
one 
Participant 66 
"... conclusion drawn by looking at the two occupations and whether they were 
some, all etc and then linking them together according to the arrows 
Participant 50 was one who was able to describe this process in more detail. She described 
a rule for linking quantifiers to produce a conclusion along the lines of- 
all + some = some 
all + no no 
all + some-not = some-not 
no + some = no 
This would produce a typical verbal outcome with end quantifiers in line with those 
predicted by matching theory (Wethenck and Gilhooly, 1990; 1995, described earlier) and 
by verbal substitution. As the "linking-rule" shown above clearly results in a conclusion 
containing a quantifier corresponding to that from one of the premises, its application leads 
to errors for different-form syllogisms. Many of these participants seem to have a feel for 
the substitution proccss but havc not quite cottoned on to the fact that they can just swap 
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terms around to get the answer. Instead they try to work the problem out (i. e. actually 
attempt to reason) but are often unsure how to. Protocols 3.4 and 3.5 above show that the 
strategy is sufficient to obtain the correct conclusion to both SF and DF syllogisms, 
however, many of these people present a similar error profile to those using substitution. 
The use of a rule along the lines of that outlined above may lead to particular problems 
with DF syllogisms as Protocol 3.6 shows. In this case, by following the all + no = no 
rule, the incorrect conclusion produced is that which would generally be predicted by 
substitution. The correct conclusion should be: Some parents are not chemists: 
Protocol 3.6 
Participant 34 
Syllogism 7 All actors are parents 
No chemists are actors 
Protocol: 
Al parents 
actors 
chemist 
Incorrect conclusion given: No parents are chemists 
However, in some cases, incorrect conclusions to DF syllogisms may differ to those 
predicted by substitution. Whereas substitution often leads to an incorrect end quantifier 
(as in Protocol 3.6 above), Protocol 3.7 shows that when these linking rules are used, the 
end quantifier may be correct but terrn order is incorrectly reversed. The correct conclusion 
here should be Some pilots are not butchers. This may reflect the order in which reasoners 
have simply read the terrns off their diagram. This in turn, may be a reflection of 
presentation order in the syllogism. 
141 
Protocol 3.7 
Participant 57 
Syllogism I Some churchgoers are not butchers 
All churchgoers are pilots 
Protocol: churchgoers 
S0,54 
11 
pilots 
Incorrect conclusion given: Some butchers are not pilots 
butchers 
This "linking rule" approach is clearly verbal -propositional in nature and related to 
substitution, though not as effective: Comparison of perfon-nance revealed that people who 
were clearly using substitution (N= 11, sd = 13.5) perforined significantly better (65% 
correct) than those who employed the linking rule strategy (N = 27,35.7% correct, sd = 
15.5); t(36) = 5.2, p < . 
01. 
Spatial Reasoners (N = 17) 
There was far less variation in tactics amongst the spatial reasoners with all but one 
producing the typical Euler circle type diagrams observed in Expenments I and 2, and by 
Ford (1995). Protocols 3.8 and 3.9 below illustrate cases for a SF and a DF syllogism 
respectively. 
Protocol 3.8 
Participant 48 
Syllogism 4 All criminals are chessplayers 
Some criminals are not Catholics 
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Correct conclusion given: Some chessplayers are not catholics 
Protocol 3.9 
Participant 13 
Syllogism 5 No gardeners are dentists 
All dentists are bellringers 
GD BR 
Correct conclusion given: Some bellnngers are not gardeners 
The one remaining spatial reasoner presented the "mental models" type approach as shown 
by participants in Experiment 2, Protocol 3.24 previously. 
Mixed Reasoners (N = 5) 
The 5 mixed reasoners all presented flow-chart type protocols very similar to those shown 
above for verbal reasoners. These participants tended to first draw the diagram which they 
described (questionnaire item 9) as a spatial layout which helped them to clarify 
infonriation and organise the occupation groups in their mind. Then, secondly, they applied 
some kind of verbal rule to link the A and C parts of the model and draw a conclusion 
according to the quantifiers - in a very similar way to the verbal flow-charters described 
earlier. Participant 41 gave a very good descnption of her rule which was like that 
described earlier but with the addition of some + no = some-not. She used this principle 
successfully on the DF syllogism in Protocol 3.10. 
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Protocol 3.10 
Participant 41 
Syllogism 3 No biologists are musicians 
Some vegetarians are musicians 
biologists 
vegetanans musicians 
Correct conclusion given: Some vegetarians are not biologists 
Other mixed reasoners applied substitution after drawing their diagram, though not always 
successfully. In Protocol 3.11, the participant makes a typical substitution error on this DF 
syllogism, even with the additional aid of his diagram. The correct conclusion is Some 
bellringers are not gardeners. 
Protocol 3.11 
Participant 40 
Syllogism 5 None of the gardeners are dentists 
All of the dentists are bellringers 
De tists 10 Bellringers 
Gardeners 
No eardeners are dentists '0 
All dentistv6re bellfinge s:: 
) 
create new statement 
Incorrect conclusion givcn: No gardeners are bellringers 
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The mixed reasoners typically gave mixed questionnaire responses and emphasised that 
they needed to use both spatial and linguistic processes in the ways described above. As 
such, this is a two stage strategy, involving the spatial organ'satIon of mate followed 
by application of a verbal rule. However, it remains unclear whether these people really are 
actually generating their conclusions verbally, or whether they are first forming a putatiý'c 
conclusion from the spatial representation, then verifying it propositionally. 
Performance on Syllogisms 
Measuring inter-strategic performance was not the main alm of Experiment 3 but somc 
basic analysis indicated very similar trends to Experiment 1. Again spatial reasoners 
performed best overall (52.9% of syllogisms correct, sd = 15.3, as opposed to 43.4%, sd = 
19.8, for verbal reasoners) though this difference was not significant (p > 0.05). Table 3.3 
summanses performance across same-form and different-form syllogisms. On same-forrn 
problems the two strategy groups performed comparably and both verbal and spatial 
reasoners perfon-ned better on these than on different-fon-n problems. On the DF problems 
alone, spatial reasoners did noticeably better than verbal. 
Table 3.3: Percentage correct on same-form and different-form syllogisms, by strategy. 
Strategy Same form S. Dev. Different form S. Dev. 
Verbal 
Spatial 
95.8 
85.8 
79.8 
75.4 
43.2 
52.9 
96.9 
62.4 
A2 (strategy) x2 (forin) mixed Analysis of Variance indicated a significant main effect of 
syllogism forrn; F (1,53) = 5.35, MSE = 43004.20, p<0.05 though not of strategy (p> 
0-9). The interaction between strategy and syllogism fon-n suggested by the data in Table 
3.3) was not found to be significant, F (1,53) = 0.28, MSE = 2276.93, p>0.1. 
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3.2.4.2 Strategies for Transitive Inference 
To recap, Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982) suggested two strategy types for this task which 
they identified from written and verbal protocols. Some of their subjects established a scale 
or continuum onto which the three terms were placed and then compared according to their 
relationship. These people were termed abstract directional thinkers. Other subjects 
attributed physical properties to the terrns and simply compared the relative properties to 
reach a conclusion. These individuals were termed concrete properties thinkers. The 
characteristics described by Egan and Grimes-Farrow were clearly evident in the present 
protocol data with abstract directional (N = 39) and concrete properties (N = 22) strategy 
groups identified. However the two strategies did not seem to be as distinct as Egan and 
Grimes-Farrow suggested, as the more detailed descriptions to follow will illustrate. Just 
one participant presented indeten-ninate protocols. For this task, the strategy classification 
could be made from protocols alone without recourse even to qualitative item 9 of the 
questionnaire. 
Questionnaire Responses 
The transitive inference questionnaire responses were subject to the same analyses as the 
syllogistic reasoning questionnaire, described above. Reliability analysis on all 8 items (see 
Appendix 3E) initially revealed a disappointing Cronbach's Alpha of 0.38. By removing 6 
items stepwise it was possible to obtain a maximal Alpha = 0.82, but this was for just 2 
questionnaire items. Perhaps surpnsingly, all of the items aimed at capturing the AD 
strategy (such as items 2 and 6 which deal with putting objects onto a scale) were 
eliminated in early stages of this analysis. The two remaining invalid items (numbers I and 
3) both involved the use of physical properties. SPSS output from this anal,,,, sis is presented 
in Appcndix 3G. As only two reliable items were identified, no fUrther analysis was 
146 
conducted on the questionnaire. The nature of the two strategies identified for three-term 
series reasoning will now be discussed in more detail. 
Abstract Directional Reasoners (N = 39) 
39 participants (62.9% of sample) presented written protocols which clearly showed the 
characteristics of AD reasoning as described above. Protocols 3.12 and 3.13 are typical. 
Protocol 3.12 
Participant 18 
Problem 10 E is darker than V 
V is not as light as T 
What is the relationship between T and E? 
Protocol EVT 
dark light lighter 
Correct conclusion given: T is lighter than E 
Protocol 3.13 
Participant 34 
Problem 4G is happier than M 
G is sadder than V 
What is the relationship between V and M? 
Protocol: 
happy sad 
Correct conclusion given: V is happier than M 
Others chose to represent tenns in a vertical array, for instance: 
Protocol 3.14 
Participant '10 
Problem 7 H Is not as rough as Z 
is not as smooth as Z 
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What is the relationship between 0 and H? 
Protocol 0 roughest 
Z rough 
H smoothest 
Correct conclusion given: 0 is rougher than H. 
However, people who chose to do this tended to do so on all problems, rather than Just on 
those which theories suggest induce a vertical representation. In addition to the above, five 
participants presented protocols which, although clearly abstract and proposi I tional (and 
hence warranted inclusion within the abstract strategy group), did not include an explicit 
scale. Protocol 3.15 is typical . 
Protocol 3.15 
Participant 26 
Problem 15 N is not as rough as D 
J is rougher than D 
What is the relationship between J and N? 
Protocol: N not as rough 
J rougher 
Correct conclusion given: J is rougher than N 
For AD reasoners, questionnaire responses typically indicated strong positive responses to 
items 2 and 6, and negative responses to items I and 3. Comments at Item 9 typ, cally 
describe putting the letters on a scale, for instance: 
Participant 12: 
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"Picked out the stronger relationship (i. e. rougher). Wrote two letters down in order 
with a symbol (>) to show which was greater than other. Fitted the third letter into 
sequence 
Participant 46: 
"... I placed the letters in order from big to small, from thick to thin, frorn rough to 
smooth. " 
Concrete Properties Reasoners (N = 22) 
22 participants (35.5%) showed evidence of using the physical properties of the terms. 
Their protocols clearly showed representations of these properties but, unl1kc the subjects 
in the Egan and Grimes-Farrow study, they also tended to put the letters on a scale or 
continuum. Only 2 of the people who used a CP strategy seemed to consider the properties 
only, without any directional element to their reasoning. Protocols 3.16 and 3.17 present 
examples typical of the CP reasoners: 
Protocol 3.16 
Participant 36 
Problem IS is lighter than P 
P is lighter than D 
What is the relatIonshIp between S and D? 
Protocol: 
s 
Corrcct conclusion given: S is lighter than D 
149 
Protocol 3.17 
Participant 37 
Problem 7H is not as smooth as Z 
0 is not as smooth as Z 
What is the relationship between 0 and H? 
Protocol: 
H0 
0ýz0 
Correct conclusion given: H is not as rough as 0 
These examples are fairly typical of the representations presented by CP reasoners. 
However, some protocols were not as detailed as these. For instance, the participant in 
Protocol 3.18 gave questionnaire responses which indicated that physical properties were 
central to his reasoning. However, rather than attempting to represent all the properties 
literally, many of his protocols were of the form below, with relationships shown by 
relative size, simply because he found this easiest to draw. In this example, a larger object 
represents strength, and a smaller one relative weakness. Other CP reasoners used height 
in a similar way. 
Protocol 3.18 
Participant 49 
Problem 16 B is not as weak as P 
B is weaker than L 
What is the relationship between L and P? 
Protocol: 
Correct conclusion given: L is, not as weak as P 
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Conversely, some participants embellished their protocols enormously, drawing arms with 
muscles for strength, floating balloons for lightness and faces with changing expressions 
for happiness and sadness. Participant 52 produced some lovely examples, one of which is 
shown in Protocol 3.19. 
Protocol 3.19 
Participant 52 
Problem IS is lighter than D 
P is lighter than D 
What is the relationship between S and D? 
Protocol 
H2 
P 
Correct conclusion given: S is lighter than D 
CP reasoners typically answered affirmatively not only to the items referring to use of 
physical properties (particularly item 1) but also to those which referred to use of a scale 
(especially item 2) and which had been intended to capture the AD approach. These 
responses are ftilly in line with their protocols as the above examples show. 
Performance on Transitive Inference 
Latencies were not measured in this experiment as the aim was to identify strategies rather 
than measure perfon-nance. As would be expected, accuracy rate was high with CP (94.6% 
correct, sd = 2.5) and AD (94.2% correct, sd = 1.5) reasoners performing almost identically 
Overall. 
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3.2.4.3 Comparing Strategies across the Two Tasks 
Table 3.4 below shows the relationship between strate ies adopted for syllogistic reasonill- 91 
and that adopted for three-ten-n series problems. For this analysis, total N= 55 as all 
participants who used either a mixed or indeterminate strategy on either/both tasks have 
been removed. 
Table 3.4: Crosstabulation showing the association between strategies adopted for syllogistic reasoning 
and transitive inference. 
Syllogistic Transitive inference strategy 
Strategy Abstract Concrete Total 
directional properties 
Verbal 30 8 38 
Spatial 5 12 17 
Total 35 20 55 
Tablc 3.4 clearly suggests an association between the strategies that people adopt across 
the two tasks. The majority of people who adopt a verbal strategy for categoncal 
syllogisms use the AD strategy for three-term senes problems. The spatial reasoners on 
syllogisms however, tend to adopt the CP approach to three-term problems described 
above, using concrete properties but placing the terms on a scale. These findings are fully 
in line with predictions. Pearson Chi square suggests that this association between 
strategies on the two tasks is highly significant, X' = 12.45, df = 1, p<0.001. Strategy 
choice cannot be attributed to presentation order effect. Presentation order of the two tasks 
was counterbalanced and there seems to be no association between this and strategy used 
X2 = X2 for either task; 1.87, df = 1, p>0.05 for syllogisms; = 1.03, df = 1, p>0.05 for 
transitive inference 
3.2.5 Discussion 
The amis of Fxperiment 3 Nvere twofold: Firstly, and especially in the light of the 
sonicN\ hat fragmented strategies identified in Exper-iment 2, to further replicatc the verbal 
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and spatial strategies identified by Ford (1995) and in Expenment 1. The second aim was 
to investigate whether such strategies were associated with those identified on a transitive 
inference task involving three-term series problems. Such an association would support the 
idea that strategies are an inherent individual difference. Egan and Gnmes-Farrow (1982) 
identified two strategies for transitive inference, a concrete properties (CP) strategy (where 
reasoners use detailed representations of the actual physical properties of the terms as 
described by the relational adjectives) and an abstract directional (AD) strategy (where 
reasoners simply place terms on a directional scale according to their relative properties). 
Although Egan and Grimes-Farrow claim a spatial element for both of these approaches, 
they do seem to differ in the level of semantic representation required, as do the spatial and 
verbal strategies identified for syllogistic reasoning in Expenments I and 2. Hence, for 
Experiment 3, it was predicted that people who adopted a verbal strategy for syllogisms 
would use an AD strategy for transitive inference, whilst spatial syllogistic reasoners 
would adopt a CP strategy. The above results strongly suggest that both aims were fully 
reallsed. 
On the syllogistic task, both verbal and spatial reasoners were easily identified from 
protocols and, as in Experiment 1, the classification was supported by questionnaire 
responses. Moreover, qualitative data provided further insight into the strategy behind the 
"flowchart" representations identified in Experiment 2. The vast majority of these are 
clearly verbal strategies (as Ford's work also suggested) but they do not rely purely on 
substitution (either naive or sophisticated) - although this is an element for some 
individuals. In many cases, reasoni II the application of a simple rule for 
obtaining a conclusion based on linking of the two quantifiers. Such rules present 
similantles, to the principles highlighted in the matching theory (Wetherick and Gilhooly, 
1QQ01 lQ1)5), and make similar predictions, the linking-rule also resulting in a conclusion 
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containing a quantifier corresponding to that from one of the premises. Hence, like 
substitution, its application leads to errors for different-form syllogisms. 
It could be argued that there is also a spatial element to the use of flowchart diagrams and a 
minority of subjects who presented such data appeared to use a mixed reasoning strategy. 
For them, the strategy appeared to involve two stages, first spatial then verbal, the 
inference process therefore being propositional, even though the premise information is 
initially represented spatially. A similar description of the relationship between spatial 
representations and rule-based reasoning has been suggested by Rips (1986), who purports 
that reasoning with mental models also depends on what he terms "non- standard" rules 
(i. e. not fonnal logic) in the manipulation of models and evaluation of conclusions. 
On the transitive inference task, protocols clearly suggested the presence of both the 
concrete properties (CP) and abstract directional (AD) strategies, however the two were 
not as distinct as Egan and Grimes-Farrow suggested. 39 participants presented protocols 
which identified them as using the AD strategy. Just as Egan and Grimes-Farrow 
described, they placed the terms on a scale according to their physical properties and drew 
their conclusion from their relative positions on that scale. 20 subjects showed evidence of 
using a CP strategy. Their protocols clearly showed representations of the actual physical 
properties of terins, for instance drawing shapes which were taller or shorter, with darker 
or lighter shading, with rougher or smoother edges etc, but, unlike the subjects in the Egan 
and Grimes-Farrow study, they also tended to put the letters on a continuum or in order of 
their linear relationship. Only 2 of the people who used the concrete properties approach 
included no directional element in their protocol. 
1-54 
In ten-ns of the theories of transitive inference outlined earlier. the vast majority of subjects 
used some form of dimensional spatial array, either with (CP reasoners) or without (AD 
reasoners) explicit representation of physical properties of the terms. Only a small minorItV 
of subjects overall (N=5,8% of sample) used a purely propositional strategy (such as that 
advocated by Clark, 1969), a similar percentage to that observed by Roberts (2000) in 
studies of relational inference. These individuals presented evidence of refonnulating 
premises to simplify difficult relationships (e. g. rewriting X is not as tall as Yas Fis taller 
than X) and also tended to present protocols which effectively eliminated the pivot ten-n, as 
linguistic theories suggest occurs with problems which contain two matching relational 
adjectives. However, in the present data, these few individuals tended to adopt this 
approach for all problems, see for instance Protocol 3.15 above. If the continua used by 
AD reasoners is classed as a form of spatial array (as it is by Egan and Grimes-Farrow) 
than it would seem that spatial strategies dominate in the present study. However, AD 
reasoners may also be incorporating a linguistic element in their strategy. The mixed model 
advocated by Sternberg (1980) suggested that premises are first encoded linguistically and 
then represented spatially. This may be what is occurring here with the AD reasoners. 
Certainly these make up the majority of subjects (63% of sample) and Sternberg and Weil 
(1980) have suggested Stemberg's mixed model to be the preferred approach for the 
majority of untrained reasoners. 
In the light of this, responses to the questionnaire completed after the transitive inference 
task are interesting. The questionnaire was designed to identify strategy use based on the 
criteria suggested by Egan and Grimes-Farrow - i. e. discriminate between two distinct 
strate-les, one based on properties, one on an abstract scale. However, the only reliable 
questionnairc iterns were those txN, o pertaining specifically to the use of physical properties 
(items I and 1). Those iterns refemng to use of a scale/'continuum -were found to be some 
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of the least reliable. Initially, this was a surprising result given the predominance of the AD 
strategy. However, the protocols offer some explanation. The explicit representation ot' 
physical properties seems to be the only feature which discriminates bet, ýveen the two 
strategies. Both use a directional aspect, and as such, both could be said to possess a spatial 
element. The directional arrays are similar to those proposed by spatial theorists such as 
Huttenlocher, however they do not vary with adjective, or with markedness, participants 
preferring to use either a vertical or horizontal array throughout. However, -ýý, here the m'o 
strategy groups differ is in the degree to which the physical properties of the terins are 
represented. Abstract directional thinkers can simply use letters to denote the terms, but 
concrete properties thinkers seem to require a more explicit visual comparison - rather as 
do spatial reasoners for syllogisms. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have claimed that the 
use of mental models relies on semantic knowledge of premises, for CP reasoners, this 
would seem to be an important factor, whilst for AD reasoners, beyond an initial 
recognition of the transitivity of relationships, semantics are immaterial, just as they are for 
syllogistic reasoners using substitution and allied verbal strategies. 
In line with the above, a highly significant association was observed between strategies 
adopted across the two tasks, verbal syllogistic reasoners tending to opt for the AD strategy 
for transitive inference and spatial syllogistic reasoners for the CP strategy. This is fully in 
line with a priori predictions and clearly suggests the presence of an inherent reasoning 
preference which differs across individual. The verbal strategy for syllogisms and abstract 
directional strategy for transitive inference are alike in that semantic meaning Is not the 
major factor in determining a conclusion. In the former, the quantifiers are largely ignored 
dunng substitution and the relevant term simply replaced, whilst with the linking rule 
method, quantifiers are used, but only in so far as identifying the most appropriate heuristic 
rule to apply. Their actual logical meanin-g, is irrelevant. In the AD strate-7y. reasoners riced 
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to understand the transitive nature of the relationships depicted in order to place the terrns 
appropriately upon a scale. Over and above this basic function however, the actual nature 
of terrns is immaterial and they are represented in abstract form. However, the actual 
nature is and the terms simply rearranged and represented in an abstract form. 
Consequently, in both tasks, identification of the conclusion is straightforward and the 
reasoning process is identical for all problems. 
Both transitive inference strategies are similarly effective in terms of accuracy, however, 
informal observation of subjects performing the AD strategy suggests that III it is highly 
efficient in terrns of processing speed (although actual latencies were not directly 
measured). Although CP reasoners also place terms in a linear order, they need to visualise 
the material more clearly in order to understand the semantics of the problem, hence they 
supplement their representations with visual images which make clear the physical 
properties as suggested by the relational adjectives in the problems. This must involve 
additional processing stages, and hence it can be predicted that their response times would 
be greater than those of AD reasoners. 
Overall, the findings of Experiment 3 further support the existence of individual strategies 
for reasoning and suggest that the tendency to employ either an abstract/syntactic or a 
concrete/semantic strategy is likely to be a stable and robust feature of individual reasoning 
preferciice. Experiment 4 will extend these findings to a further task, sentence-picture 
verification, and also allow for the comparison of problem solution latencies between 
strategy groups. 
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3.3 Experiment 4: Do Strategic Differences also Extend to Sentence- 
Picture Verification? 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 has shown that strategic preference is not limited to syllogistic reasoning 
tasks and that strategies which appear to be propositional and spatial in nature are also 
observed in transitive inference. Moreover, the strategies on the two tasks are strongly 
related, with almost all individuals consistently preferring one or the other. However, 
whilst there is great variation in difficulty in syllogistic problems and inter-strategic 
perfon-nance can be measured in ten-ns of accuracy across problem type (e. g. as function of 
conclusion forrn or model count), participants almost always provide correct responses to 
transitive inference problems. In this case, differences are more easily measured by 
latencies, the time taken to solve the problems reflecting relative level of difficulty. This 
aspect was not measured in Experiment 2 which aimed primarily to establish the existence 
of individual differences in strategy. Having fulfilled that aim, Experiment 4 aimed to 
extend this line of enquiry in two ways, firstly by examining the performance of the two 
transitive inference strategies in terms of latencies, and also by companng those with 
strategies and latencies for a further reasoning task, sentence-picture verification. 
Deciding whether a linguistic statement accurately reflects an observation of the world is a 
key task in everyday language comprehension. Representations of both media have to be 
fonned and compared, and the sentence-picture verification (SPV) task has been a pnmary 
research tool in investigating how this process occurs. In the SPV task (first devised by 
Clark and Chase, 1972) participants are presented with a simple sentence such as-, 
is abovc B 
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and then a picture, for instance either 
A or B 
BA 
The task is to indicate whether the sentence is a true representation of the picture. 
Latencies can be measured from the onset of the picture, the chief independent variable 
being the linguistic complexity of the sentence. Within this paradigm, four trial types can 
be produced by combining affin-native or negative sentences (e. g. A is above B, or, A is 
not above B) with pictures for which the sentences are either true or false representations. 
Carpenter and Just (1975) proposed a three stage model of sentence-picture verification: 
1. Sentence representation: Mental representations are generated in the forrn of logical 
propositions analogical to the sentences. 
2. Picture representation: mental representations of the pictures are generated which also 
take the form of logical propositions analogous to the affirmative statement which 
describes the picture. 
3. Comparison: The two representations are compared, one component at a time. When a 
mismatch is identified, those components are tagged as "resolved" and the comparison 
process begun again for another component. When all constituents are either found to 
be resolved or to match another, a response is generated. The nature of the responses 
depends on whether an odd or even number of attempts at completing a comparison 
Nvas required. 
159 
This model predicts that more difficult trial types result in longer response times, and this 
increases monotonically in the order TA > FA > FN > TN. The increase in latencies occurs 
as function of the number of constituent comparisons which need to be made. Table 3.5 
illustrates the SPV sentence-pairs as a function of trial type, hypothetical representation 
and number of constituent comparisons suggested by Carpenter and Just's model. This 
illustration is based on one presented by MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) and assumes 
that each constituent comparison process takes a constant amount of time (K). 
Table 3.5: The sentence-picture stimulus pairs by trial type, hypothetical representation and number 
of constituent comparisons (c. f. MacLeod et al, 1978, Table 1, Page 494). 
Trial type Sentence Picture Sentence Picture No. of 
representation represent- constituent 
-ation comparisons 
True Affirmative A is above B A [AFF(A, TOP)] (A, TOP) K 
(TA) B is below A B 
False Affirmative B is above A A [AFF (13, TOP)] (A, TOP) K+ I 
(FA) A is below B B 
True Negative A is not above B A JNEG [AFF (13, TOP]) (A, TOP) K+5 
(TN) B is not below A B 
False Negative B is not above A A NEG [AFF (A, TOP)] (A, TOP) K+4 
(FN) A is not below B B 
In effect, the constituent comparison model places each trial type at a unique point on an 
interval scale, and predicts that observed response times will be a linear function of this 
scale. As Table 3.5 suggests, data typically present an interaction in response times 
between truth and polarity of trials (TA > FA; FN > TN). Carpenter and Just (1975, Tables 
4 and 5, pages 59-60) reviewed 15 earlier studies of SPV and show that their linear model 
effectl\, ely accounts for over 95% of the variance in response time across the trial types. 
Moreovei-, although Carpenter and Just refer to the internal representations as 
I. propositions" they sLiggcst that these may not necessarily always be linguistic in nature, 
but may takc the forni of abstract tokens. The SPV task clearIV presents both a linguistic 
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and a visuo-spatial element and so, given the nature of the two main reasoning strategies 
identified in Experiments I to 3, would seem a useful topic of study where both spatial and 
verbal strategies might be observed, either as general strategic preferences, or, at different 
stages of the SPV process. 
MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) tested the Carpenter and Just model against SPV 
latency data provided by 70 participants. Two response time measures were taken, firstly 
for sentence comprehension (CRT) (from sentence onset to initial key press) and 
verification (VRT) (from onset of picture to press of true or false key). They identified 
two groups of participants based on how well their data fitted the model. The "well-fit 
group" they suggested used a linguistic strategy compatible with Carpenter and Just's 
model. This strategy consisted of representing the sentence linguistically, without recoding 
any negation as affinnation, followed by a linguistic recoding of the picture, after which 
the two linguistic representations were compared. These reasoners presented patterns of 
verification RTs in line with those suggested in Table 3.5 in terrns of the truth-polarity 
interaction. The "poorly-fit group" did not present this pattern of latencies and were 
assumed to use a strategy involving an iconic recoding of the sentence into a pictorial form 
before the onset of the picture. This was then compared to the image. As such, the 
linguistic group took longest over the verification stage, whilst the pictorial group required 
a longer comprehension time. The effect of markedness was significant in the linguistic 
group, increasing both comprehension and verification times. No such effect was observed 
for the pictorial group. Table 3.6 presents the pattern of response times (RTs) for both 
groups across the two phases of the task. 
Table 3.6: Response times for the comprehension and verification stages of SPNI (in nisecs) across two 
strategy groups as recorded by NlacLeod et al (1978) 
I CRT VRT 
Well-fit group (linguistic strategy) 1652 1-110 
Poorly-fit group (pictorial strategy) 2579 651 
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MacLeod et al also examined verbal and spatial ability scores from the relevant 
components of the Washington Pre-college Test, a test similar to SAT taken by 
Washington state high school students considering higher education. Subjects also 
completed a reading comprehension test. In general terms, none of these measures seemed 
to predict CRT very well, whilst both verbal and spatial ability significantly predicted 
VRT, and to a similar magnitude (r = between 0.46 and 0.6 across the four trial types). 
This aspect will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
However, MacLeod et al also observed considerable inter-subject variability and claim that 
a single model of the type proposed by Carpenter and Just (1975) was inadequate for 
capturing individual differences in RT, along with the underlying strategic differences. In 
replicating this work, Marquer and Pereira (1985) and Richards and French (1987) 
emphasise that MacLeod et al imposed strategies on their data, and that these may differ 
from spontaneous strategies. Their replications showed that whilst verification response 
times supported the strategy groups identified by MacLeod et al in terms of the patterns of 
RTs across trial type (one group presenting the truth x polarity interaction, whilst the other 
did not), verbal protocols presented a different picture. The well-fitting group reported a 
diverse range of strategies, including the pictorial one thought to be used by the poorly 
fitting group. Conversely, in the poorly-fitting group, only one person reported such a 
strategy, most having used a linguistic approach. However, what these reasoners had done, 
was recode negations as affirmations prior to picture presentation, resulting in a RT profile 
more typical of the pictorial strategy, hence their inclusion in the poorly fitting group. 
Marquer (1990) also showed that individual differences may be masked by RTs and 
sug-ested that RT data be supplemented with that from other sources, such as verbal 
rcports. 
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Marquer and Pereira (1990) also commented on the lack of homogeneity in MacLeod et 
al's two strategy groups, especially the "poorly-fitting" pictorial group. Marquer and 
Pereira compared latencies across four strategies, two linguistic and two pictorial. Those 
strategies they termed Ll and PI reflect the linguistic and pictorial strategies respectively 
described by MacLeod et al. Participants were instructed to use those strategies and RT 
data was expected to present the well and poorly fitting profiles described by MacLeod et 
al. In linguistic strategy 2 (1-2) participants were instructed to reason as in LI except that 
they were told to recode negative sentences into affirmatives during the comprehension 
stage. Hence only the true false decision should affect VRT, as with PI. Similarly, for 
pictorial strategy 2 (P2) they were instructed to proceed as PI except that the sentence 
must be revised iconically only after pressing a computer key to record the end of 
comprehension time. As such, both affirmative-negative and true-false factors should 
influence VRT as with Ll. In addition, subjects provided both retrospective and think 
aloud protocols. Similar RT profiles were observed for strategies Ll and P2, and for 
strategies L2 and P 1. Hence Marquer and Pereira (1990) succeeded in showing that similar 
patterns of RT latencies can in fact reflect the use of either a pictorial or linguistic strategy, 
whereas differing RT patterns may result from the use of a single strategy. Figure 3.1 
presents a comparison of their models (L2 and P2) and those of MacLeod et al (LI and 
P1). 
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Fig. 3.1: SPV strategy models proposed by MacLeod et al (1978) and Nlarquer & 
Pereira (1990) 
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The work of MacLeod et al (1978) and Marquer and Pereira (1990), together xvith the 
findings from Experiment 3, informed the rationale for Experiment 4. Experiments 1-3 of 
the present thesis have shown two distinct strategies for syllogistic reasoning and for 
transitive inference. For the latter however, accuracy ceiling effects mean that no 
differences in performance between strategies could be identified. However, informal 
observation suggests that the CP strategy is more time consuming than AD and hence 
overall latencies may discriminate between the strategies, offering further con--ý'erging 
evidence for the distinction. Also, if the strategies are processing semantic inforination 
differentially, latencies across the different three-term series trial types may further 
differentiate between them. As the introduction to Experiment 3 described, AD reasoners 
show an effect of end-anchonng whilst CP reasoners find problems containing inverse 
adjectives most problematic. Linguistic and spatial strategies have also been identified in 
SPV, although Marquer and Pereira's work casts some doubt on whether latencies alone 
can effectively discriminate between strategy types. However, a convergence between RT 
data on this task and strategy grouping from syllogistic reasoning would suggest that 
different strategies are indeed present. The purpose of Expenment 4 was to investigate 
these issues. 
3.3.2 Aims 
Experiment 4 had two main aims: 
1. To replicate and extend Experiment 3 in two ways: 
a) firstly to test the robustness of the findings regarding strategies for transitive 
inference and their relationship with those identified for syllogistic reasoning, 
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b) secondly, to investigate whether the inter-strategic differences observed for 
transitive inference are also reflected in differences in latencies across trial types in 
that task. 
2. To compare the findings from I above with latencies for SPV and specifically with the 
models and pattems of latencies suggested by MacLeod et al (1978) and Marquer and 
Pereira (1990). In terrns of the strategies identified for syllogistic reasoning, it was 
predicted that verbal reasoners would present a pattern which suggests the use of a 
linguistic SPV strategy, whilst spatial reasoners would present latencies suggestive of a 
pictorial SPV strategy. 
3.3.3 Methods 
Participants 
70 undergraduates from University of Plymouth volunteered to take part in return for 
course credit. This sample compnsed 21 males and 49 females, mean age 25.20 years. 
None had participated in Experiment 3. 
Materials and Procedures 
Participants were run individually in sessions lasting around I hour. Each experimental 
session comprised two phases: 
Phase 1: Pen and paper tasks to elicit evidence of strategies 
Each participant was issued with a booklet containing a shortened version of Experiment 3 
xvith 5 each of the syllogistic and three-term series problems. Again participants were 
asked to write down their working out and complete a questionnaire following each part of 
the task. As in I'xperiment 3, task presentation order Nvas counterbalanced. Fonnat of 
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problems, instructions and questions were exactly as in Experiment 3 and as presented in 
Appendices 3A to 3C. The questionnaire presented after the syllogistic reasoning task was 
identical to that which proved reliable in Experiment 3 (a = 0.80) and which was presented 
in Appendix 3D. For the three-term series problems, the questionnaire administered in 
Experiment 3 yielded only 2 reliable items, numbers I and 3 (cc = 0.82). Thus, for 
Experiment 4a revised questionnaire was presented. This comprised the 6 most reliable 
items from Experiment 3, plus a qualitative item. It is presented in Appendix 3H. 
Phase 2: Computer based tasks to measure response times 
Secondly, each participant completed the following two tasks which were presented on an 
RM Accelerator computer with Intel Pentium IV processor and a 17 inch screen. Again, 
task presentation order was counterbalanced. 
Task 1: Sentencc-Picture Verification: Procedures were based on those used by MacLeod 
et al (1978). 64 sentence-picture verification items were presented, which Comprised 4 sets 
of 16 basic item types as shown in Appendix 31. Items were presented In a different 
random order for each participant. Premise terrns were single letters (as in the example 
presented earlier in section 3.3.1 and Table 3.6) and these letters vaned with repeated 
presentation of trial. Written instructions as shown in Appendix 3J were first presented on 
the computer screen, followed by 16 practice items. Each trial was preceded by a red 
warning dot in the centre of the screen which appeared for 500 msecs. This was followed 
by the stimulus sentence presented horizontally across the centre of the screen, together 
with a button marked "ready". This stimulus remained on the screen until the participant 
clicked the ready button. The picture then appeared after 500 msecs, together with two 
buttons marked -true- and "false". Participants wcre instructed to click on either button as 
appropniate to indicate their response. The computer recorded the comprehension response 
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time (CRT) from the point of sentence onset to when the ready button was clicked. The 
veriffication response time (VRT) was measured from the onset of the picture to when 
either the true or false button was clicked. After an interstimulus interval of 1000 msecs 
another warning dot then appeared to herald presentation of the next trial. 
Task 2: Transitive Inference: This task comprised 64 three-term senes problems, four of 
each of the 16 problem types (see Appendix 3B). As in Experiment 3 and the pen and 
paper task above, terins were represented by letters. Instructions presented on the computer 
screen prior to the experiment replicated those from Experiment 3, as shown in Appendix 
3C. Following these, 16 practice trials were presented. Each trial was preceded by the red 
warning dot for 500 msecs followed by the premise pair and a "ready" button. The 
premises remained on screen until the button was clicked. After 500 msecs, a conclusion 
appeared beneath the premises together with "true" and "false" buttons. The task required 
the participants to click the appropriate button to indicate whether they thought the 
conclusion was true or false. Again two sets of response times were collected, CRT was 
measured from onset of the premises to when the ready button was clicked. VRT was 
measured from onset of conclusion to when either the true or false response button was 
selected. After 500 msecs, another red warning dot appeared. This remained on screen for 
1000 msecs, followed by the next trial. 
As such, although the conclusion appears alongside the premises, this forrn of presentation 
cannot be considered truly parallel (i. e. when premises and question are presented together 
from the outset) nor serial (when the premises disappear after the comprehension stage). 
Clark (1969) concluded that -verbal process tended to be employed with parallel 
presciltation of material whilst Iluttenlocher (1968) concluded that with serial presentation, 
spatial strategies were cinploycd because verbal strategies were too onerous on working 
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memory unless all material was presented simultaneous] y. Potts and Scholz (197-5) and 
Ormrod (1979) have presented evidence which further supports these. Roberts (2000) has 
described how parallel presentation of material is associated with the use of task-specific 
heuristic strategies and how serial presentation may be employed in an attempt to 
overcome this. However, in both cases, the predominant strategy for unpractised reasoners 
tends to be spatial, with possibly only around 10% of individual attempting a verbal 
approach (Nd. ). However, in the present study, the method of presentation ý, N, as chosen in 
order to as nearly as possible replicate the conditions of Experiment 3 and of the paper 
version of this task in the present study. These are those tasks which have presented 
evidence for the strategies which Experiment 4 predicts will be reflected in latencies 
measured during the computer version of the task. Uniformity of this part of the procedure 
was intended to ensure compatibility of strategies adopted across the two forrns of the task, 
whilst hopefully not unduly encouraging either a verbal or spatial strategy. 
3.3.4 Results 
3.3.4.1 Strategies for Syllogistic Reasoning 
The two short pen and paper tasks were designed to elicit evidence of strategies for 
syllogistic and three-tenn series reasoning. The findings of Experiment 3 were easily 
replicated even with only 5 items per task. For syllogistic reasoning, 38 verbal, 27 spatial 
and 5 mixed reasoners were identified. Written protocols for verbal and spatial reasoners 
were of the type identified previously, as the examples in Protocols 3.20 and 1 21 
respectively illustrate. 
Protocol 3.20 
Participant 65 
Syllogism 4 Sornc of tlý-ýbýankers reýQolfers 
All of the doctors arýý,, 
-j 
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Correct conclusion given: Some of the bankers are golfers 
Protocol 3.21 
Participant 17 
Syllogism 3 All of the librarians are florists 
None of the painters are florists 
Protocol: Cp D 
florists 
librarians 
Correct conclusion given: None of the painters are florists 
Reasoning Behaviours Questionnaire (Syllogisms) 
Experiment 3 established a reliable 8 item questionnaire for discrimination between 
syllogistic reasoning strategies (a = 0.82). This same questionnaire (see Appendix 3D) was 
administered in Experiment 4 and the responses analysed by the same methods as 
previously. Again this proved a reliable 8 item questionnaire with a Cronbach's Alpha = 
0.7. This analysis is presented in Appendix 3K. Reverse scoring the items referring to the 
spatial strategy (numbers, 1,6 and 7) resulted in a reasoning behaviour scale on which a 
high score indicted a high level of spatial reasoning behaviour and a low score a high level 
of verbal reasoning behaviour. As previously, the spatial strategy group (M = 27.52) scored 
significantly higher than the verbal group (M- 18.58); t (63) = 8.02, p<0.001. With mixed 
reasoners removed from analysis, K-Means cluster analysis revealed two clusters of 
participants and their relationship with the verbal and spatial strategies is shown in Table 
3.7. 
Table 3.7 K-means cluster analysis of syllogistic reasoning questionnaire responses: cluster 
membership by strategy. Figures represent within strategy group numbers and percentages. 
Strategy Cluster 1 (N=37) Cluster 2 (N=28) Totals 
Verbal 
Spatial 
10(26.3%) 
27(100%) 
28(73.7%) 
0 
38(100%) 
27(100%) 
A highly significant association is observed between strategy grouping and cluster 
membership; X2 = 34.95, df = 1, p<0.001. Once again, as in Experiments I and 3, it would 
appear that questionnaire responses strongly support strategy categorisation by protocol. 
3.3.4.2 Strategies for Transitive Inference 
For transitive inference, protocols produced while solving the five three-term series 
problems indicated 41 abstract directional reasoners, 24 concrete properties reasoners and 
2 reasoners who presented a mixed approach (using AD on some problems and CP on 
others). Three participants produced indetenninate protocols as all they had done was to 
rewrite the premises. Protocols 3.22. and 3.23 show typical examples of the AD and CP 
strategies respectively: 
Protocol 3.22 
Participant 13 
3-TS Problem I 
Protocol: 
fat 
W is fatter than A 
Q is thinner than A 
wA Q 
' thin 
Correct relationship given: Q is thinner than W 
Protocol 3.23 
Participant 54 
3-TS Problem 4D is taller than X 
L is not as tall as X 
Protocol: 
Correct relationship given: D is taller than L 
Reasoning Behaviour Questionnaire (Transitive inference) 
For the three-term series questionnaire (Appendix 3E) a similar analysis was carried out. In 
Experiment 3, the questionnaire for this task proved less reliable than that for syllogisms 
(initial u=0.38, final a=0.82 for just 2 items). The revised questionnaire used in 
Experiment 4 proved even less reliable (Cronbach's a=0.21 initially with all 8 items 
included, rising to just a=0.39 for two items 4 and 5). The SPSS output for this analysis 
is presented in Appendix 3L. Interestingly, neither of these items relate directly to either 
AD or CP reasoning, rather they are intended to capture alternative strategies, allied to the 
verbal strategies in reasoning and which include behaviours suggested by verbal inference 
theories such as that of Clark (1969). However, protocols clearly indicate the presence of 
AD and CP strategies (as in Experiment 3) and very few people showed any indication in 
their protocols of either reversing terms within the premises or combining them into one 
sentence, as the two reliable questionnaire items would suggest. As so few items again 
proved reliable, as in Experiment 3, questionnaire analysis was concluded at this point. 
Overall, it would seem that although written protocols present clear evidence for CP and 
AD strategies, this questionnaire is not a particularly reliable predictor of these. 
3.3.4.3 Comparison of Strategies across the Two Tasks 
When the mixed and indeterminate reasoners from both/either task were removed from the 
sample, strategies on the two tasks Nvere compared as in Experiment 3, with the same 
outcome. As in Experiment 3. N, crbal syllogistic reasoners were most likely to adopt an 
abstract directional strategy for solving three-tenn series problems, whilst spatial 
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syllogistic reasoners were most likely to adopt a concrete properties strategy for three-terrn 
series problems. This association was highly significant: X2 = 20.95, df = 1, p<0.001. The 
relationship is illustrated in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8: Crosstabulation showing the association between strategies adopted for syllogistic reasoning 
and transitive inference 
Syllogistic Transitive inference strategy 
Strategy Abstract Concrete Total 
directional properties 
Verbal 30 4 34 
Spatial 8 18 26 
Total 38 22 60 
3.3.4.4 Response Times for Transitive Inference 
These latencies were analysed in terms of the two strategies identified for this task as 
above. Table 3.9 shows the mean RTs across the two response stages (comprehension and 
verification) for the two groups: 
Table 3.9: Mean response times in msecs for the two strate2v 2roups identified for transitive inference 
Strategy CRT (msecs) VRT (msees) 
Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. 
Abstract directional 9384.84 3465.11 4008.17 3057.84 
Concrete DroDerties 8726.36 3660.40 4416.38 3315.24 
As Table 3.9 shows, although CP reasoners were quickest of the two groups on CRT and 
AD quickest on VRT, overall both groups took significantly longer for the comprehension 
stage of the task. A2 (strategy) x 2(response time) mixed ANOVA indicated a significant 
main effect of RT. F(l, 63) = 38-01, p<0.001, however no significant main effect of 
strategy or interaction between strategy and response stage was apparent (p > 0.1 in both 
cases). 
Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982) have shown that AD reasoners perform least well on 
probicnis which are not end anchored (i. e. where the pivot term is presented first in one or 
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both premises). CP thinkers have most difficulty with problems where the m-o premises 
contain inverse adjectives. Latencies presented by the two strategy groups were therefore 
compared in terms of these two factors. Table 3.10 presents the mean response times. 
Table 3.10: Mean response times (in msecs) for problems with and NOthout end-anchoring and with 
and without inverse adiectives. bv stratei! v 2rouD. 
End an choring Inverse adjectives 
Yes No N'es No 
(pivot is first term (pivot is second (premises have (adjective same in 
Strategy in at least I term in both inverse adjectives) both premises) 
premise) premises) 
CRT VRT CRT VRT CRT VRT CRT NRT 
Abstract Mean 9175.09 4042.22 9812.61 3864.96 9198.87 3944.26 9099.74 4227.84 
directional 
(N = 41) 
S. Dev. 3362.58 2988.04 3872.01 3090.54 3629.11 2938.41 8852.02 2931.21 
Concrete Mean 8549.93 4481.57 9252.15 4255.80 8405.43 4419.92 8852.02 4614.63 
properties 
(N = 24) 
S. Dev. 
1 
3601.23 
1 
3128.22 
1 
4132.67 
1 
2905.11 
1- 
3459.05 
I 
3219.52 
I 
3862.75 3454.02 
As Table 3.10 indicates, the RT trends were fairly similar across strategy groups. Firstly to 
consider end-anchoring, a2 (RT) x2 (end-anchonng status, yes or no) X2 (strategy) 
mixed Analysis of Variance presented a significant main effect of RT; F (1,63) = 41.16, 
MSE = 1535910852.7, p<0.001, and interaction between RT and anchoring status; F (1, 
63) = 11.51, MSE = 11494750.44, p=0.001. The main effect of end-anchonng 
approximated to significance (p = 0.06). No main effect of strategy, or significant 
interactions involving strategy were observed (p > 0.8 in every case). When possible 
effects of inverse adjectives are examined, a2 (RT) x2 (inverse status, yes or no) x2 
(strategy) Analysis of Variance showed a significant main effect of RT only; F (1,63) = 
3-5.86, MSE = 1274282932.2, p<0.001. No other main effects or significant interactions 
werc obscrved (p > 0.1 in cvcry case). 
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Sentence-Picture Verification 
3.3.4.5 Response Times for Sentence- Picture Verification 
Comprehension response time 
Previous research, reviewed earlier, has shown that during comprehension time (CRT), 
affirmative sentences are processed more quickly than negative sentences. The present data 
indicate this to be the case for participants in Experiment 4 (N = 70); affiri-native (M = 
1611.12 msecs, sd = 717.08), negative (M = 2365.89 msecs, sd = 1054.24), t (69) = 9.02, p 
0.001. 
Verification response time 
For verification response time (VRT), an interaction between truth and polarity of items is 
expected. A2 (truth) x2 (polarity) Analysis of Variance indicated a significant main 
effects of truth; F (1,69) = 74.80, MSE = 2736910.37, ,p<0.001, and of polarity; 
F (1,69) 
= 32.41, MSE = 6096809.48, p<0.001. A significant interaction between the two was also 
observed and is further illustrated in the chart in Figure 3.2; F (1,69) = 6.86, MSE = 
342439.4 1, p=0.0 1. The relevant mean response times are presented in Table 3.11. 
Figure 3.2: SPV: Verification response times (in msecs) as a function of truth and polarity (N = 70). 
2000 
0 
Aftimiative Ncoative 
Polaritv 
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Table 3.11: SPN' Verification response times (in msecs), by trial type as a function of truth and 
DOlaritv. 
True affirmative True n gative False affirmative False n gative 
Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. 
1043.69 258.87 1408.76 652.59 1311.37 339.25 1536.55 613.90 
Overall therefore, it would appear that data in Experiment 4 replicates the usual patterns 
observed for sentence-picture verification latencies. 
3.3.4.6 Strategies for Sentence-Picture Verification 
Aim 2 predicted that participants using differing strategies for SPV would present distinct 
patterns of latencies on that task. Throughout Experiments I to 3, consistent individual 
differences in syllogistic reasoning strategies have been identified, and these are thought to 
be verbal and spatial in nature. Section 3.3.4.1 above has shown that these strategies have 
again been observed in Experiment 4. In Experiment 3, and during the analysis in Section 
3.3.4.2 above, these strategies have been successfully mapped onto data provided for a 
transitive inference task. Hence this procedure will also be followed for SPV. The 
syllogistic strategy groupings identified in Section 3.3.4.2 were used to define potential 
strategy groups for SPV, but in terms of latencies. All mixed strategy syllogistic reasoners 
(N = 5) have been removed from sample prior to the following analyses. 
Response times compared by strategy 
The mean sentence-picture verification CRT and VRT for the verbal and spatial groups are 
silown in Table 3.12. Also, in italic, are the comparative values presented by MacLeod et 
al (1978) for their linguistic and pictorial strategies. 
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Table 3.12: Mean comprehension and verification response times (in msecs) as a function of strategy 
group as defined by written protocols during syllogistic reasoning, and by total sample. 
Strategy CRT VRT 
Mean S. Dev. Mean S. Dev. 
Verbal (N = 38) 1898.06 603.98 1269.91 381.23 
Linguistic 1652 - 1-110 - 
Spatial (N = 27) 2064.15 963.15 1402.62 471.30 
Pictorial 2579 - 651 - 
Total (N = 65) 1967.05 771.08 1325.03 422.61 
Total (MacLeod et al) 
ý 
4231 - 1831 - 
Comparison of data with that of MacLeod et al shows a clear discrepancy with regard to 
VRT for the spatial group. Whilst in MacLeod et al's study, the pictonal group present 
very fast latencies in comparison with the linguistic (mean difference, - 559), the spatial 
group identified here in Experiment 4 show an RT higher than that of the verbal group 
(although the mean difference in this case is only 132.71 msecs). A2 (strategy) x2 (RT) 
Analysis of Variance presented a significant main effect of RT as expected; F (1,63) = 
36.97, MSE = 13127068.04, p<0.001. However, no main effect of strategy or interaction 
between strategy and RT were observed (p>0.1 in both cases). 
Verification response times compared by strategy 
Another potential way to differentiate between the strategy groups is by examInIng the 
truth-polarity interaction which is typical of verification response times on which the 
Carpenter and Just model was based (and which was observed in the overall sample in the 
present study). If the verbal and spatial strategies do map onto the linguistic and pictorial 
ones identified by MacLeod et al, it would be expected that the verbal strategy data will fit 
the Carpenter and Just model NN, cll (i. e. the interaction will. be observed) whilst the spatial 
group will fit the model less wcIl (the interaction will not be observed). To test this 
pi-ediction, a2 (strategy) x 22(truth) x2 
(polanty) mixed Analysis of Vafinance was 
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conducted. The expected significant main effects of both truth; F (1,63) = 60.28, MSE = 
2357492.32, p<0.001, and polarity; F (1,63) = 30.64, MSE = 23989.34, p<0.001, were 
both observed, together with a significant interaction between the two; F (1,63) = 7.74, 
MSE = 371480.46, p<0.01. However, no main effect of strategy or 2-way interaction 
involving strategy was apparent (p > 0.2 in every case). Most important for the present 
purpose however was the absence of a significant 3 -way interaction between strategy, truth 
and polanty (p > 0.1). Hence, it would seem that patterns of latencies on SPV cannot 
discriminate between the verbal and spatial strategies, at least, not according to the 
MacLeod et al criteria. The means for each trial type are shown in Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13: SPV: VRT (in msecs) as a function of strategy group, truth and polarity. 
Strategy TA TN FA FN 
Verbal 
Mean 1021.55 1312.57 1267.94 1491.63 
S. Dev. 262.81 576.94 292.78 594.61 
Spatial 
Mean 1083.33 1564.12 1376.81 1618.12 
S. Dev. 273.98 762.37 396.08 678.41 
3.3.5 Discussion 
Experiment 4 had two aims. The first of these was to replicate and extend the findings of 
Experiment 3. To recap, Experiment 3 replicated earlier findings which suggested that a 
verbal and a spatial strategy for syllogistic reasoning could be identified from written 
protocols. Moreover, Experiment 3 found that these strategies respectively could be 
mapped directly onto abstract directional and concrete properties strategies for transitive 
inference. These latter strategies had previously been identified by Egan and Gnmes- 
Farrow (1982). in phase I of Experiment 4, participants completed a pen and paper task 
which comprised a mini version of Experiment 3. Again, written protocols clearly 
indicated verbal and spatial strategics for syllogistic reasoning, and abstract directional and ýi II 
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concrete properties strategies for transitive inference. The nature of these strategies was 
just as observed in Experiment 3. However, and again in line with Experiment 3, the 
transitive inference strategies were not as distinct as previous research by Egan and 
Grimes-Farrow (1982) had suggested, with both strategy groups tending to incorporate a 
directional element in their protocols. Responses to reasoning behaviour questionnaires 
strongly supported strategy group membership for syllogistic reasoning, though not so for 
transitive inference. This was also the case in Experiment 3 and may again be attributable 
to the lack of distinction between the two transitive inference strategies, the only 
differentiation between them being the degree to which physical properties were used. 
Furthermore, when strategies across the two tasks were examined, a highly significant 
association was observed between use of the verbal syllogistic strategy and abstract 
transitive inference strategy, and between the spatial syllogistic strategy and the concrete 
properties transitive inference strategy. Altogether these are important findings. They 
indicate that the effects are robust and replicable across new samples. Moreover, they add 
substantial weight to the argument that forms a key tenet of this thesis, namely that 
preference for a visuo-spatial or abstract-propositional strategy is a stable and inherent 
cognitive factor which differs between individuals. 
In phase two of the investigation, latencies for both transitive inference and SPV problems 
were measured. In both cases, two response time measures were recorded, a 
comprehension response time (CRT, the time from onset of premises to participant 
indicating they were ready for next stage) and a venfication response time (VRT, from 
onset of conclusion/picture to when a true or false response was given). For transitive 
inference, and in line with previous research by Egan and Grimes-Farrow, it was predicted 
that abstract directional reasoners would present longer response times for those problems 
which wcre not end-anchored (I. c. those which presented the pivot terrn first in at least one 
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premise). Concrete properties reasoners, on the other hand, would show no such effect. 
Instead, they would present longer times on problems which contained inverse adjectives. 
No such effects were observed, both strategies presenting similar patterns of latencies 
across both sets of problems. Overall, any differences observed were consistent across both 
strategy groups. Both groups presented significantly longer latencies at the comprehension 
stage, compared with verification. Informal discussion with participants suggested that 
almost all were using a similar approach: the question was presented simultaneously to the 
premises (as in the pen and paper task). Participants tended to work out the relationship in 
question from the premises during the comprehension stage, and then simply compared 
this with the conclusion they were later presented with. If it matched, they clicked true, if 
not, they clicked false. Hence, the majority of subjects in Experiment 4 were apparently 
using a heuristic approach which may have masked any potential discriminatory trends in 
the data. Overall, the complete lack of an effect of strategy on transitive inference latencies 
suggests that these data alone are not an accurate predictor of strategy for this task. 
Marquer and Pereira (1990) have made a similar observation about latencies for sentence- 
picture verification (SPV), and phase two of Experiment 4 also measured latencies for this 
task. It was predicted that the strategies identified for syllogistic reasoning would map onto 
those for SPV identified by MacLeod et al (1978). Specifically, verbal reasoners would 
present the latency profiles for SPV suggested by the linguistic SPV strategy whilst the 
spatial reasoning strategy would map onto the latency profile typical of the pictorial SPV 
strategy. Previous research reviewed earlier has shown that typically, during the 
cornprehension stage of SPV, affirmative sentences are processed more quickly than 
negativc sentences. This was also the case in Experiment 4. Also, on verification latencies, 
an interaction between truth and polarity is typically observed and again this was the case 
in the present data. Having cstablished that the overall data matched the expected pattems 
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of latencies, response times were examined in tenns of the strategy groups identified for 
syllogistic reasoning. However, no differences between the two groups were obscrved. 
Both presented longer comprehension time than verification. The model proposed by 
Carpenter and Just (1975) and which was found to fit the latencies presented by the 
linguistic strategy group identified by MacLeod et al (178) deschbes a latency profile 
which presents the typical interaction between truth and polarity described previously. It 
was therefore expected that if the verbal syllogistic group were tending to use a linguisitc 
strategy for SPV, the latencies produced by that group would present the interaction. No 
such effect was predicted for the spatial group. However, this interaction was in fact 
observed in the data from both verbal and spatial reasoners. 
Overall, an association between strategies identified on syllogisms and those for SPV had 
been predicted, and this was clearly not the case. The foriner strategy groupings are now 
established and replicable phenomena. However, they do not seem to map onto SPV 
latencies, and SPV latencies in turn cannot seem to predict strategies for that task. There is 
a possibility that participants may not have been perfonning the task according to 
instructions. However, the findings from phase I are well in keeping with those from 
Experiments I and 3, and suggest that participants were attempting to perforin the tasks 
they had been set. There is no reason to doubt whether this motivation continued into phase 
2. There are two further possible explanations for the SPV findings. Firstly, individual 
differences in strategies for SPV may simply not exist. This is unlikely, given that such 
differences are so clear in the other reasoning tasks. However, SPV is in some ways a very 
different kind of task to either syllogisms or transitive inference. SPV bears resemblance to 
other reasoning tasks in that it involves the comparison of representations in order to 
conclude whether or not they match. As such, it has been regarded as a simple reasoning 
uisk, howcvcr, rcspon,, c times are extremely fast compared to those for say SvIIOLýisms or 
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transitive inference. Consider, for instance, the overall latencies shown in Tables 3.9 
(transitive inference) and 3.11 (SPV). Whereas for the former, VRT varies between about 
4000-4400 msecs, for SPV, RTs are less than half this magnitude (around 1900-1500 
msecs for VRT). This raises the question regarding the degree to which a conscious 
strategy may be employed during such a rapid process, and reservations about how much 
actual reasoning takes place during solution of an SPV item. A similar point has been made 
by Evans (1982) who suggested that reasoners on SPV do not need to understand any 
logical principles (for example, that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the 
conclusion) they merely have to decide whether or not a description is accurate. Hence he 
concludes that such tasks "do not actually require deductive reasoning" (page 24). 
A further possibility is that distinct strategies for SPV are present, but that latency 
information alone is insufficiently sensitive to discriminate between them. Marquer and 
Pereira suggested that such data be supplemented by verbal protocols in order for strategies 
to be identified. They claimed that different strategies may present similar latency profiles 
and this certainly seemed to be the case in the present study. Experiment 4 collected no 
verbal reports which, in retrospect, might have proved useful. However, these in turn may 
have raised other concerns. Given the nature of the SPV task, the only protocols which can 
be collected are retrospective verbal accounts and, although Marquer and Pereira offer 
some persuasive arguments in their favour, such accounts are likely to consist mainly of 
post-hoc rational 1 sation, rather than an accurate record of reasoning processes. This may be 
further exacerbated with SPV given that responses are so rapid. Participants must be 
consciously aware of their strategies if they are to articulate them (be it concurrently or 
retrospcctl\, cly). There is some doubt whether this could ever be the case with SPV. 
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Given that no effects of strategy on RT were found, it would seem that for the , 'ast 
majority of individuals, RTs remain fairly consistent throughout the task. Those who find 
the task most difficult will produce longer RTs at both comprehension and verification 
stages, whereas those who find the task easier, will produce faster RTs. Whatever strategy 
they may be using, reasoners tend to produce the typical truth-polarity Interaction as has 
been observed in previous research and which, it was hoped given MacLeod et al's claims, 
would discriminate between verbal (linguistic) and spatial (pictorial) reasoners in the 
present study. A tendency towards either verbal or spatial reasoning may however be 
present in SPV and, with the above reservations in mind, future studies may wish to collect 
verbal accounts in addition to latencies in an attempt to identify such differences. 
However, the above data suggest that even then, strategies may not map cleanly onto those 
for other tasks. It may be that the combined verbal and pictorial demands of SPV mean 
that, for many reasoners, a mixed strategy involving both approaches is the most efficient. 
Given that individuals are likely to experience some difficulty in articulating their SPV 
reasoning processes in detail, identifying any strategic differences among them will 
probably require converging evidence form a range of measures. 
3.4 Summary of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 has presented two further experiments which have supported the existence of 
individual differences in reasoning strategies. Following up Experiments I and 2, which 
presented evidence for verbal and spatial strategies in syllogistic reasoning, Experiment 3 
was able to replicate and extend these finding to a further task. transitive inference. For this 
task, although both of the strategies identified possessed a directional element, a strong 
association was observed between these and the strategies for syllogistic reasoning. The 
verbal syllogistic reasoning strategy mapped onto the abstract strategy for transitive 
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inference, whilst the spatial syllogistic strategy mapped onto the concrete strategy. The 
main discriminating feature between the two transitive inference strategies -ýý-as the degree 
to which the properties of the terms were necessanly represented in order for a conclusion 
to be reached, concrete properties reasoners requiring the most explicit representation. 
Comparisons can be drawn between this and the differing semantic requirements of the 
two respective syllogistic strategies, where spatial reasoners present expli it c 
representations of relationships between terms, whereas most verbal reasoners simply 
manipulate the linguistic form of the premises. Experiment 4 introduced a third task, 
sentence-picture verification with the aim that differing patterns of latencies for this task 
would reveal corresponding strategic differences. The findings from Experiment 3 were 
replicated but unfortunately when SPV latency profiles across the groups of reasoners 
identified during syllogistic reasoning were compared, no differences were observed. 
Overall, however, it remains that evidence for a verbal-spatial distinction in strategies has 
now been replicated four times for syllogistic reasoning (what Evans, 1982, would call a 
bonafide deductive reasoning task) and these strategies map strongly onto those identified 
for transitive inference. Moreover, the findings for SPV do not necessarily refute the 
possibility of individual differences in strategies for that task. Latency data alone may be 
simply not sensitive enough to capture such differences. However, the question as to what 
deten-nines verbal or spatial strategic preferences still remains, and Experiments 5 and 6 
investigate this issue. A number of researchers have associated strategies with individual 
differences in verbal and spatial cognitive ability (including MacLeod et al's, 1978, work 
on SPV discussed in Experiment 4), or with working memory (both mental models and 
rules theories suggest that working memory capacity is a key factor in reasoning 
perfornianee). Experiment 5 will investigate whether the reasoning strategies identified 
thus far are associated vvith individual diffcrences in vcrbal and spatial abilities, and/or in 
other aspects of cognitive style. Expenment 6 will then extend this line of research to 
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consider whether individual differences in verbal and spatial working memory capacity 
influences whether a verbal or spatial reasoning strategy is adopted. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Reasoning Strategies, Abilities and Cognitive Style 
4.1 Introduction to Experiment 5 
Chapters 2 and 3 have presented a series of studies which show that individual differences 
in strategy use for reasoning do exist and that they are robust across different reasoning 
domains. This strongly suggests that the strategies are somehow inherent to the nature of 
the individual, rather than artefacts of experimental reasoning tasks. One interpretation of 
these findings is that the two main strategies involve the representation and manipulation 
of information in either a verbal -propositional, or a spatial, manner. However, a major 
question which remains is why individuals differ in the sorts of strategies they adopt. 
Experiment 5 aimed to address this question by means of an investigation into a possible 
association between reasoning strategy preference and two aspects of cognitive function 
where individual differences have consistently been observed; spatial-verbal ability and 
cognitive style. 
In discussing the concept of individual differences research generally, Chapter I presented 
a definition of cognitive abilities offered by Carroll (1983). Carroll described abilities as 
traits which deten-nine how an individual processes mental information when perfon-ning a 
cognitive task such as reasoning. Such abilities necessarily involve not only perfon-nance 
itself, but the potential for perforinance, across a range of tasks. Such abilities are 
suggested to be stable characteristics, possessed to a greater or lesser extent by all 
individuals. Section 1.5.3 presented a general discussion of research on verbal and spatial 
abilities, hence this review will limit itself to some issues which are of particular rele-vancc 
to Experiment 5. As Chapter I described, researchers have frequently relied on measures 
such as Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores in evaluating verbal and spatial ability, and 
IS6 
it has been suggested that these can discr-iminate between individuals who use different 
strategies for reasoning. A good example is the work of MacLeod, Hunt and Matheývs 
(1978) reviewed in Chapter 3. To recap, MacLeod et al suggested that patterns of latencies 
across the comprehension and venfication stages of a sentence-picture venfication task 
were indicative of two distinct strategies, a pictorial strategy and a linguistic strategy. 
These strategies were also found to be related to spatial and verbal ability respectively. 
Abilities were assessed from verbal and spatial components of the Washington pre-college 
test (a test similar to SAT taken by Washington state high school students considering 
further education) together with an additional verbal measure of reading comprehension. 
The correlations between verification response times and ability scores were highly 
significant for both strategy groups (linguistic group, r=-. 47 and -. 52 with the two verbal 
ability measures; pictorial group r=-. 68 with the spatial measure). The negative values 
indicate that higher ability individuals produced faster latencies. No significant 
relationships were observed between linguistic group latencies and spatial ability, or 
between pictorial group latencies and verbal ability. 
Other measures specifically designed to assess verbal and spatial ability have also been 
associated with reasoning strategy. Cooper and Mumaw (1985) presented a series of 
studies which suggested that individual differences in strategies for spatial problem solving 
were related to differences in spatial ability. They assessed ability by means of a mental 
rotation test developed by Shepard and Metzler (1971) and also a visual comparison task 
which involved matching a three-dimensional figure to a corresponding (or not) 
orthographic representation. Two strategies ývere first identified from verbal protocols; a 
constructive strategy (thought to involve the construction of a three-dimensional internal 
repi-csciltation) and an analytic strategy (involving the sequential comparison of individual 
teatures). It was predicted that high spatial ability IndIvIduals would adopt the former 
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strategy and low ability individuals the latter. However, when ability test scores were 
examined, the opposite trend was observed, high spatial ability was associated with a 
tendency to use the analytic strategy, whilst low spatial ability individuals tended to opt for 
the constructive method. However, comparison of latencies indicated that for the minority 
of high ability individuals who did adopt the constructive strategy (thought to be most 
compatible with their ability) reasoning was both faster and more accurate. Low spatial 
ability individuals using an analytic strategy however, performed similarly, suggesting that 
this approach was more suited to their level of aptitude. Kyllonen, Woltz and Lohman 
(1981) also showed that even when aptitude is not reflected in initial strategy choice, it can 
influence accuracy and efficiency in appropriate tasks (e. g. high spatial ability individuals 
perforining a spatial task). On the reasoning tasks examined in Experiments I to 4, it might 
be predicted that individuals with high spatial ability will prefer a spatial strategy, whilst 
those with high verbal ability will prefer a verbal approach. However, it should be noted 
that in both the above cases, all strategies are assumed to be spatial, no mention is made of 
the possibility of a propositional strategy being employed for the spatial task. 
A further related factor may be individual differences in cognitive or thinking style. 
Research in this area has been extensive, as is the number of dichotomies in the literature 
(see for instance Roberts and Newton, 2001, for a discussion), hence, this short review will 
limit itself to some of the major work involving human reasoning. Sternberg (e. g. 1997) 
describes how individuals may possess preferred ways of thinking and Sternberg and 
Grigorenko (1997) state that these preferences are but one aspect of what has been termed 
-cogrnitivc styles", charactenstic. stable and typically preferred modes of processing 
infon-nation. Such styles have also been variously termed "thinking dispositions" (e. g. 
Stanovich and West, 1998; Perkins, Farady and Bushey, 1991), "Intellectual stylc,, '" (c. g. 
Sternberg, 1988) and -Inforniation processing styles" (e. g. Klaczynski. Gordon and Fauth , 
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1997), these terins often being used interchangeably. For the present purposes, and to avoid 
confusion, the term cognitive style will be used throughout, assuming the useful definition 
of "an individual's preferred and habitual approach to organising and representing 
information" (Riding and Rayner, 1998, page 8). According to Sternberg (1997). these 
styles are not in themselves cognitive abilities, but reflect how abilities are used. Hence, 
individuals may have similar abilities, but their style of thinking may differ considerably. 
A large amount of research into individual differences in thinking dispositions, cognitive 
ability and reasoning has been camed out by Keith Stanovich and colleagues (e. g. 
Stanovich, West and Sd, 1999; Stanovich and West, 1998). These studies examined a range 
of reasoning tasks, including syllogistic reasoning and the Wason Selection Task, and also 
took into consideration cognitive abilities as determined by SAT scores. They found 
evidence indicating there was a systematic variance in performance on reasoning tasks 
which was not accounted for by the computational limitations imposed by cognitive 
ability. They proposed that abilities and styles are constructs which exist at different levels 
of analysis within cognitive theory and differ in the degree of malleability that they afford. 
Abilities may be relatively stable psychological mechanisms, whereas styles may be 
influenced by training, prior knowledge or intentional factors such as personal goals or 
motivation (Stanovich et al, 1999). Others (e. g. Baron, 1988) have made a similar point, 
highlighting also that cognitive abilities have traditionally tended to be measured using 
psychometric instruments such as IQ tests, which do not tap into differences in cognitive 
style. 
Stanovich and Wcst (1998) used a composite measure of cognitive style which assessed 
individuals on four subscales. epistemological absolutism, willingness to switch 
perspcctivc. to dccontextualisc and to consider counter-arguments. Their data suggest that 
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these factors did offer predictable and systematic explanation for some of the outstanding 
variance in reasoning performance after ability had been accounted for. Howe-ver, 
examining their data reveals that the actual amount of variance explained was quite small, 
SAT scores accounted for 19% whilst cognitive style accounted for Just 71 o. The fact that 
these values were found to be highly significant ( (p < 0.001 in both cases) may be, at least 
in part, attri ibutable to the large sample size in Stanovich and West's study (N = 546). 
However, similar findings have been reported by Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth (1997) 
and Klaczynski, Fauth and Swanger (1998). Verbal and inductive ability were measured by 
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. This scale provides scores for both vocabulary and 
verbal abstract reasoning. These skills are considered to be key elements in critical 
reasoning and indices of fluid and crystallised intelligence respectively (Cattell, 1967). In 
basic terms these "intelligences" can be considered as verbal IQ and domain general 
reasoning ability (see for instance, Kline, 1991, for further explanation). However, the data 
presented by Klaczynski et al suggested that although some aspects of critical reasoning 
were predicted by ability, reasoning biases (and hence performance influenced by them) 
were more likely to be associated with cognitive style. This finding is consistent with 
earlier work on informal reasoning (Perkins, 1985; Perkins, Jay and Tishman, 1993) which 
has suggested that factors other than those associated with intelligence may be necessary to 
explain why some intelligent and well-educated people seem incapable of reasoning 
logically when logic conflicts with their beliefs, whilst others seem able to override and 
disregard their prior knowledge. Klaczynski et al (1997; 1998) used a measure of cognitive 
style developed initially by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) and based around 
their Cognitive Expenential Self Theory (CEST). This theory suggests that individuals use 
two parallel but intcracting inforrnation processing systems, one rational, the other 
cxj)crlcntlal. Epstein ct al (1996, page 39 1) describe these in the following terms: 
190 
"the rational system operates primarily at the conscious level and is intentional, 
analytic, primarily verbal and relatively affect free. The experiential system is 
assumed to be automatic, preconscious, holistic, associationistic, primarily non- 
verbal and intimately associated with affect" 
Although behaviour is influenced by both systems, one may dominate according to 
situational, expectational or emotional factors. Importantly for the present purpose, 
individual differences have been observed whereby some people are more inclined towards 
rational approaches whilst others seem to prefer experiential. Moreover, given the apparent 
nature of the reasoning strategies identified thus far, the two systems are also of interest in 
view of the verbal - non verbal distinction made by Epstein et al. The Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI) is a psychometric tool for measurement of individual 
differences in rational-experiential cognitive styles. In the onginal version (Epstein et al, 
1996), the rational thinking element was based on the concept of "need for cognition" 
defined as the tendency to enjoy and engage in thinking (Cacloppo and Petty, 1982). The 
expenential element evolved from a new scale "Faith in intuition" developed by Epstein 
and his colleagues. 
Recent work which has investigated the REI with respect to syllogistic reasoning has been 
conducted by Handley, Harley, Wright and Farrelly (in press). This research found that 
although intellectual ability (as measured by a psychometric test of intelligence) was a 
good predictor of logical syllogistic reasoning where belief conflicts were present. 
cognitive motivation (i. e. need for cognition) consistently predicted perfonnance on non- 
contlict problerns. Need for cognition has consistently been shown to predict willingncss to 
scarch for counter-exarnpIcs inconsistent x-vith prior belief (e. g. Furlong (1993) and hence 
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to be a predictor of syllogistic reasoning performance (e. g. Handley, Dennis, Evans and 
Capon, 2000; Newstead, Handley and Buck, 1999). Torrens, Thompson and Cramer (1999) 
present similar findings and also data to show that abstract reasoning ability (again as 
measured by the Shipley Institute of Living Scale) was also associated ý, N, ith logical 
reasoning ability. 
Riding and Cheema (1991) have presented an alternative explanation of cognitive style 
which also proposes that thinking behaviours may be grouped into two principal 
dimensions: 
a) The wholist-analytic style dimension of whether an individual tends to organise 
infonnation into wholes or parts. 
b) The verbal-imagery style dimension of whether an individual is inclined to represent 
inforination verbally or in mental pictures. 
The Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA, Riding, 1991) is a computer presented tool for the 
assessment of thinking style on these two constructs, i. e. it measures how individuals both 
organise and represent information. In contrast to measures of either spatial or verbal 
ability (i. e. levels of performance), the CSA claims to measure manner of performance. It 
presents three subtests comprised of simple tasks which claim to reflect underlying 
processing style and how individuals habitually organise and represent material during 
thinking. A ratio of subtest scores detennines an individuals position on the two style 
dimensions which allows them to be allocated to a given cognitive style category, as 
iII ustrated inFi gure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: The dimensions of cognitive style (reproduced from Riding, 1998) 
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Numerous studies have claimed to support the notion of style according to the two 
dimensions (i. e. Riding, 1997; Rayner and Riding, 1997) and neurological evidence has 
shown associated individual differences in recorded EEG during inforination processing 
(for instance, Riding, Glass, Butler and Pleydell-Pearce, 1997). The dimensions have been 
shown to differentiate between behaviours as diverse as learning performance in school 
(e. g. Riding and Douglas, 1993) and social harmony among flat-sharers (Riding and 
Wright, 1995). Riding and Rayner (1998) present a comprehensive review of research. The 
style dimensions appear to evaluate individuals on the basis of their tendency towards 
thinking in either a verbal or a imagistic way. However, to this author's knowledge, the 
CSA has not been investigated as a possible predictor of performance or strategy forinal 
reasoning tasks. 
Roberts and Newton (2001) howcver, are sceptical of the cognitive style approach to 
understanding stratcgics, The), criticise advocates of cognitive style for a reluctance to t, 
integate the divci-sc array of cognitivc stl,, -Ic constructs and personality variables which 
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have been proposed to influence reasoning. They accuse cogniti\ e styles of simply 
redescribing behaviour, rather than explaining it, as Entwistle (1979) has pointed out, 
fuzzy definitions may lead to confusion between the nature of cognitive styles and of 
strategies themselves. Moreover, connotations of the word style imply a flexibility undcr 
differing task demands which is frequently not observed. For instance, Newton and 
Roberts (2000) have highlighted that cognitive style may lead to some individuals 
sabotaging their performance on a compass-point direction task because of an inability to 
discover altemative methods. 
Overall, despite these reservations, it remains that a wealth of research into cognitive styles 
has suggested that individual differences do exist. The research reviewed above has 
indicated associations between styles, cognitive abilities and reasoning perfonnancc, even 
if the association with reasoning strategies is rather more tenuous. Individual differences in 
verbal and spatial ability, on the other hand, have been shown to predict strategies on 
various reasoning tasks. Experiments I to 4 previously do suggest the presence of some 
cognitive factor which is stable within individuals and which facilitates strategy choice. 
Given the apparent verbal and spatial nature of reasoning strategies so far identified, a 
possible association with levels of verbal and spatial ability seems reasonable. Similarly, 
with regard to cognitive style, the nature of style dimensions on the CSA and REI 
particularly do seem to suggest some level of differentiation between analytic- 
propositional and imagistic-spatial thinking. Hence, Experiment 5 aimed to investigate the 
possible relationship between these factors and reasoning strategies. As Roberts and 
Newton concede, even if cognitive styles cannot themselves explain strategies, they may 
act as a uscful starting point for the greater understanding of individual differences in 
stratqýv use. 
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4.2 Aims 
The overall aim of Experiment 5 was to investigate the relationship between verbal and 
spatial reasoning strategies, verbal-spatial ability and cognitive style. More specifically: 
1. Abilities: It was predicted that individual differences in verbal and spatial ability -ýould 
in turn predict whether an individual adopted a verbal or spatial syllogistic reasoning 
strategy respectively. 
2. Cognitive style: Two measures, the REI and CSA were administered. These were 
exploratory measures and no specific predictions were made as to how cognitive style 
and reasoning strategy might be associated. 
4.3 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were I 10 undergraduate students at University of Plymouth who participated 
in return for their choice of course credit or E5 cash. The sample comprised 24 males and 
86 females with total mean age of 21.7 years. All were native English speakers and none 
had received formal training in logic. 
Procedures 
Participants were run in groups of up to 4 people seated at separate desks, each with a 
computer ten-ninal. Each participant was presented with six experimental tasks in a session 
lastim, around I hour. Two syllogistic reasoning tasks were first administered, one to 
identify strategy and one to assess reasoning performance. Two measures of abilitv Nvere 
used, the Vandenberg Mental Rotation task (spatial ability) and The Shipley Institute of 
I () Z, 
Living Scale (verbal ability). As the experiment would be employing student participants 
(who are all presumably of fairly high IQ and have all reached university level of 
education), a measure of general intelligence or scholastic ability (such as that employed in 
the studies reported by Stanovich, 1999) may not provide much insight into differences in 
abilities. Hence, ability measures were selected which would feasibly tap into distinct 
cognitive capacities which may differentiate between verbal and spatial reasoners. Both 
measures are also established psychometric tools with good levels of intemal reliability. 
Two cognitive style measures were also included, the Rational Experimental Inventory and 
the Cognitive Styles Analysis. These were selected because botb bave been subject to a 
substantial amount of research and been shown to be reliable. Moreover, both measure 
style in tenns of subscales which suggest a possible differentiation between propositional 
and spatial ways of thinking. Further details of all tasks are presented below. The six tasks 
are described to follow in the order presented to every participant. All are pen and paper 
tasks except syllogistic perforinance and Cognitive Style Analysis, which were presented 
on a computer as described. 
1. Reasoning Strategy 
This comprised exactly the same procedure as used in Experiments 3 and 4. Each 
participant was presented with five syllogistic problems and asked to deduce the 
conclusion whilst writing down their working out. These were the same five problems used 
in Experiment 4 in terrns of figure and mood, however the occupation names (terms) were 
changed for this study. The problems were presented in a booklet, one to a page, preceded 
by written instructions identical to those used previously and shown in Appendix 2H. No 
reasoning behaviour questionnaire was completed on this occasion. 
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2. Syllogistic Performance 
Participants were asked to generate conclusions to 16 syllogistic problems presented 
individually on a computer screen. Conclusions were typed into a box provided and the 
computer recorded these responses. No written working out was allowed. The 16 
problems, together with their logical conclusions, are shown in Appendix 4A in the order 
presented to every participant. All possible syllogistic figures and mental model counts are 
represented within this list, affording a range of problem difficulty. Prior to beginning the 
task, participants were presented with written instructions and a practice Item as shown in 
Appendix 4B. This task was one previously employed by Capon, Handley and Dennis 
(2003) and shown by them to possess a high level of internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha 
= 0.82). 
3. Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) 
The REI is a self-report inventory which claims to measure cognitive style on two 
subscales, a rational scale (verbal, analytic thinking) and an experiential scale (non-verbal, 
associationistic thinking). The latest version (Pacini and Epstein, 1999) contains 40 items, 
20 on each scale. Within each, there are two further subscales, corresponding to 
engagement (the enjoyment of using either rational or intuitive thinking) and ability (the 
confidence in carrying out such thinking). Pacini and Epstein report internal reliabilities of 
cc = 0.9 and a=0.87 for the rationality and experiential scales respectively. The two were 
shown to be independent factors and the subscales presented a robust distinction in each 
case. Handley, Newstead and Wright (2000) have replicated these findings in the UK with 
both undergraduate students and a sample from the general population, and also present 
test-retest reliabilities of between 0.6 and 0.88 across the four subscales. The 40 REI items, 
to(, ether Nvith the 5 point response scale used, are presented in Appendix 4C. Scoring 
1Q7 
according to the scale shown results in overall scores for rational and experiential thinking 
and for each of the two subscales. 
4. Vandenberg Mental Rotations Test (VMRT) 
The VMRT (Vandenberg and Kuse, 1978) is a pen and paper test of spatial visualisation 
ability developed from the classic Shepard and Metzler (197 1) mental rotation task, as used 
by Cooper and Mumaw (1985) described earlier. Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) presented 
significant correlations between the VMRT and 20 other established and validated tests of 
spatial ability (r = between 0.32 and 68). Internal reliability of the test was high (r = 0.88) 
and test-retest reliability has been shown to be between 0.7 and 0.83. The test has been 
associated with spatial working memory ability on various cognitive tasks (e. g. Hamilton, 
1999). The VMRT comprises 24 items, each consisting of a cfitenon figure, presented 
with two correct alternative representations and two incorrect distracters. The figures are 
three-dimensional drawings of cubes stacked in various arrays In each case, the task is to 
identify the two alternative representations which are identical to the criterion object, but 
presented rotated about the vertical axis to varying degrees. For instance, in Figure 4.2 
below, the correct response would be to highlight the second and fourth alternatives as 
these are rotated representations of the criterion figure, shown far left. 
Figure 4.2: Example item from the Vandenberg Mental Rotation Task (Vandenberg and Kuse, 1978). 
. s. a 
A5 minute time limit was imposed for the task. Participants scored I point if they 
identified both correct altematives for an item. Performance on the VMRT was treated as 
ail indicator of spatial ability. It was predicted that if a spatial reasoning strategy is indecd 
I (), ý 
a reflection of enhanced spatial abilities or preference for , vorking with spatial 
representations, then spatial reasoners would outperform verbal on this task. 
5. Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS) 
The SILS is a self-administered pen and paper task comprising 2 subtests, a 40 itein 
vocabulary test and a 20 item test of abstract reasoning. The SILS has also been widely 
used as a measure of general intellectual ability, and the well-establi shed Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1989) has served as one of the basic 
criterion measures for validating SILS in predicting individual IQ scores. The two tasks 
correlate highly (r = 0.8) and WAIS-R full-scale IQ scores can be estimated from SILS 
data (Zachary, 2000). SILS can also be used as a measure of cognitive impain-nent in 
which case a 10-minute time limit is imposed for each subtest. However, for a student 
population, this time proved excessive and no time limits were imposed in the present 
study, all participants finishing both SILS tests in well under 10 minutes. 
Although the SILS Yields six major summary scores, only four were used for the present 
purposes; a) vocabulary score, b) abstraction score, c) combined total score and d) 
estimated WAIS-R IQ score. The other two scores (the conceptual and abstraction 
quotients) are derived from the above but are generally utilised in assessing cognitive 
impain-nent in clinical settings and hence were not appropriate for current purposes. For 
more infon-nation on these, see Zachary (2000). 
The Vocabzilai-v Tcst: 40 items are presented in order of increasing difficulty. Multi-choice 
fon-nat in which the respondent is asked to select which of four possible words is closest in 
meaning to a target word. For instance, in Figure 4.3 below, the correct response would be 
to circle the word "rashness' 
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Figure 4.3: An example item from the SILS vocabulary subtest. 
TEMERITY rashness timidity desire kindness 
One point was awarded for every correct response. 0.25 of a point is added for each item 
which was not attempted, to give a total vocabulary score. This task relies on verbal skills 
including reading ability, comprehension, acquired knowledge and long-term memory. 
The Abstraction Test: 20 items presented in order of increasing difficulty. Each comprises 
a sequence of numbers, letters or words with the final element in each sequence omitted. 
The task is to complete the sequence. In Figure 4.4 below, the correct response would be to 
finish the sequence with the word "at". 
Figure 4.4: Example item from the SILS abstraction subtest. 
"it in spud up both to stay -- 
One point is awarded for each correct item, this total is then multiplied by 2 to give a final 
abstraction score. This task also relies on long-terrn memory, but also on attentional 
abilities, abstract concept formulation and cognitive flexibility. 
The combined total score is obtained by summing the vocabulary and abstraction scores. 
The estimated WAIS-R IQ score is obtained from conversion table D2 provided within the 
SILS test manual (Zachary, 2000, pp. 87-88). In the present study, SILS perfon-nance was 
treated as an indicator of verbal/abstract reasoning ability, and the estimated WAIS-R 
score as a measure of a more general intellectual ability. 
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It was predicted that verbal reasoners may score more highly than spatial on SILS. 
especially on the abstract reasoning subtest. Vocabulary may be more concerned with 
educational attainment and would be assumed to be similar for all of the undergraduate 
population. 
6. Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) 
The CSA (Riding, 1991) is a computer presented tool for the assessment of thinking style 
on the wholist-analytic and verbal-imagistic dimensions, i. e. it measure of how individuals 
both organise and represent information. Whereas the VMRT and SILS claim to assess 
spatial and verbal abilities respectively (i. e. levels of performance), the CSA claims to 
measure manner of perfon-nance. It presents three subtests comprised of simple tasks 
which claim to reflect underlying processing style and how individuals habitually organise 
and represent material during thinking. 
The Verbal - Imagety Subtest: 48 items each consisting of a statement about two objects, 
either that they are the same type (conceptual category) or colour (appearance). Half of 
each type of item are true. It is assumed that imagers will respond more quickly to the 
appearance statements because the objects can be readily represented as mental pictures 
and a comparison rapidly made from these images. Verbalisers are expected to present 
shorter response times for the conceptual category items because the semantic conceptual 
category membership is verbally abstract and cannot be represented visually (Riding and 
Rayner, 1998). The task is to indicate whether the statement is right or wrong by pressing 
one of txN,, o marked keys. For instance, in Figure 4.5, the correct response would be "Right 
because both cricket and skiing are sports. 
Figure 4.5: Example itenis from the CSA verbal-imagery subtest. 
SKIING and CRICKET are the same TYPE 
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The Two "olist - Analytic Subtests: The first wholist-analytic subtest presents 20 items 
each comprising two complex geometrical figures. Participants are asked to respond "Yes" 
or "No" by pressing marked keys to indicate whether the two shapes are the same. As this 
task involves judgement of similarity, it is assumed that faster responses wIII be attained by 
wholists (ibid. ). In Figure 4.6, the correct response is "Yes". 
Figure 4.6: Example item from the first CSA N-,, holist-analytic subtest. 
X 
Is this <> the same as 
<> 
In the second wholist-analytic subtest, again 20 items of two shapes are presented, a simple 
geometric shape and a complex figure. This time the yes/no response is made according to 
whether the simple shape is contained within the other. This task requires a degree of 
disembedding and analytic thinkers are assumed to be quicker at this (ibid. ). In Figure 4.7, 
the correct response is "No". 
Figure 4.7: Example item from the second CSA wholist-analytic subtest. 
Is this contained in 
The computer records the number of correct items and an index of the overall speed for 
completion of the items on each dimension. Based on this data, a ratio value is calculated 
for each of the two style dimensions and this is used to place each participant in one of 
nine cogniti%, c style categories, as illustrated previously in Figure 4.1. Central positions on 
the above two dimensions are referred to as bimodal or inten-nediate styles respectively. 
For Experiment 5, it was prcdicted that the vct-bal-imagery dinicnsion would be 
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particularly useful in differentiating between verbal reasoners (verbal representation) and 
spatial (imagistic representation). 
4.4 Results 
4.4 .1 Strategies for Syllogistic Reasoning 
Once again reasoning strategies were easily identifiable from written reports produced 
when generating conclusions to the five syllogisms in the strategy identification task. Table 
4.1 below shows the proportion of participants who presented reasoning behaviours 
indicative of each of the strategy types. 
Table 4.1: Syllogistic reasoning strategies identifled in Experiment 5 
Strategy N 
Verbal 69 
Spatial 34 
Mixed 6 
Incletenninate I 
Total 110 
Protocols were highly alike to those observed in Experiments I to 4. Protocols 4.1 and 4.2 
present examples for spatial and verbal reasoners respectively. 
Protocol 4.1: 
Syllogism 2 All of the cooks are soldiers 
None of the hikers are cooks 
Participant 55 
8 
Correct conclusion given: None of the hikers are soldiers 
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Protocol 4.2 
Syllogism 3 All of the bookbinders are drivers 
Some of the bookbinders are not poets 
Participant 62 BOOKBINDERS = ýýVERS 
(Instead of bookbinders) 
SOME DRIVERS ARE NOT POETS 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the drivers are not poets 
4.4.2 Syllogistic Reasoning Performance 
The descriptive statistics for syllogistic performance are in line with those found in 
Experiments I to 4. Again spatial reasoners (M= 8.03 correct out of possible 16, sd = 2.79) 
performed slightly better than verbal (M= 7.68, sd = 2.34) but the difference was far from 
significant (p= 0.5). 
4.4.3 The Ability Measures (VMRT and SILS) 
As the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 show, the two ability measures indicated little 
difference in verbal or spatial ability between the verbal and spatial reasoners. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics showing verbal and spatial reasoners' performance on the two ability 
measures 
Measure 
VMRT (SI)atial ability) 
No. items correct (max. 24) 
No. items attempted in 5 mins. 
SILS (Uerbal abilitj) 
Vocabulary (max. 40) 
Abstraction (max. 40) 
Total score (max. 80) 
Est. NNIAIS-R IQ score 
Means I Std. Dev. 
Verbal (N=69) I SDatial (N=34) I Verbal (N=69) I St)atial (N=34 
7.3 6.94 3.9 3.7 
14.4 15.7 
1 
4.6 4.7 
29.3 30.1 3.5 3.6 
31.3 30.4 4.6 3.8 
60.6 60.4 6.7 5.7 
104.9 104.5 6.9 5.7 
Although the abovc data do suggest a slight trend towards spatial reasoners performing 
best on the VMRT and vcrbal reasoners on SILS abstract reasoning, in no instance were 
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these differences significant (p > 0.05 in every case). Estimated WAIS-R IQ scores were 
also virtually identical. 
4.4.4 The Cognitive Style Measures (REI and CSA) 
No significant differences were observed between verbal and spatial reasoners on any of 
the REI or CSA constructs, as Table 4.3 shows, (p > 0.05 in every case). 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics showing performance of verbal and spatial reasoners on the two 
thinking style measures 
Measure Means Std. Dev. 
Verbal (N=69) I Spatial (N= 34) Verbal (N=69) I Spatial (N=34) 
REI 
Rational ability 31.4 31.7 3.2 2.4 
Rational engagement 28.1 28.6 3.3 3.3 
Rational total 59.4 60.3 4.8 3.5 
Experiential ability 32.0 31.9 3.1 3.4 
Experiential engagement 30.2 30.5 2.7 3.3 
Experiential total 62.1 62.4 4.4 5.5 
CSA 
Wholist-analytic ratio 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.3 
Wholist-analytic speed 6.5 7.2 1.8 1.6 
Wholist analytic correct 92.0 92.9 4.5 4.5 
Verbal-Imagery ratio 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 
Verbal-imagery speed 4.2 4.3 1.1 1.1 
Verbal-ima2erv correct 90.9 90.2 6.2 7.3 
The CSA also categorises participants according to their position on the wholist-analytic 
and verbal-imagery dimensions. Table 4.4 presents a crosstabulation of these 9 possible 
categories with the verbal and spatial strategy groups. No significant relationships are 
observed between strategy group membership and CSA cognitive style classification; X2= 
8.04, df = 8, p>0.05. For definitions of the abbreviated CSA categories. cf, Figure 4.1 
above. 
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Table 4.4: Relationship between reasoning strategy and cognitive style as measured by CSA. Figures 
represent numbers in category and within strategy group percentages. 
Cogni ive style classification (from CSA) 
Strategy A -V I-V W-V A-13 I-B W- B A-I I-I Total 
Verbal 4 7 12 9 7 5 2 8 15 69 
% 5.8 10.1 17.4 13.0 10.1 7.2 2.9 11.6 217 100 
Spatial 2 4 4 2 5 8 1 4 4 34 
% 5.9 11.8 11.8 5.9 14.7 23.5 2.9 11.8 11.8 100 
Total N. 6 11 16 11 12 13 3 12 19 103 
4.4.5 Correlational Analyses 
Although no inter-strategic differences were observed in either abilities or cognitive style, 
associations between the measures may yet differentiate between strategy groups and/or 
differentially predict syllogistic reasoning perfon-nance. Hence a series of correlational 
analyses was also conducted, initially using the whole sample (N = 110) and then 
examining verbal and spatial reasoners separately. 
A matrix showing the relationships between all measures, for the entire sample, is 
presented in Appendix 4D. Table 4.5 present the significant correlations with syllogistic 
perfon-nance. 
Table 4.5: Significant correlations between ability and cognitive style measures and syllogistic 
reasoning. 
Measure Correlation with I 
syllogistic reasoning (r 
Verbal Ability 
Vocabulary 0.27** 
Abstraction 0.24 
WAIS IQ 0.3 1 
Spatial Ability 
VMRT correct 0.23 
Cognitive Style: REI 
Fxpenential ability -0.25** 
Cognitive style: CSA 
Verbal- 111 ia, -, cry speed 
0.23 
sig. at 0.05 level 
sig. at 0.01 level 
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All correlations are of a similar magnitude and suggest that spatial ability, verbal ability in 
terms of vocabulary, and also IQ all predict syllogistic performance. FcNN, aspects of the 
cognitive style measures have any impact on reasoning. Spatial and verbal abilities wcre 
correlated in terms of verbal abstraction (r = 0.31), but not vocabulary (r = 0.09). IQ 
necessarily predicted both aspects of verbal ability, given that the IQ estimate was den%*ed 
from these scores (r = 0.72 for vocabulary and r=0.86 for abstraction). Howeýxr, it also 
predicted spatial ability, though not as strongly (r = 0.29). No relationships were observed 
between the various subscales of the cognitive style measures (refer to Appendix 4D for r 
values). Table 4.6 presents the inter-correlations between ability measures and syllogistic 
performance, by strategy group. 
Table 4.6: Correlations between syllogistic reasoning performance and ability measures 
Measure Syllogisms SILS SILS SILS NVAIS-R 
Strategy correct vocabulary abstraction total 
SILS vocabulary 
V 0.22 - 
S 0.37* - 
SILS abstraction 
V 0.27* 0.40* 
S 0.27 0.19 
SILS total 
V 0.30* 0.78** 0.88** 
S 0.41 0.76** 0.79** 
WAIS-R IQ score 
V 0.30* 0.74** 0.88** 0.98** 
S 0.40* 0.69** 0.82** 0.98** 
VMRT correct 
V 0.17 0.20 0.41 0.39** 0.43** 
S 0.35* 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.00 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
As the table shows, the main predictors of syllogistic perforinance for verbal reasoners 
appear to be the SILS scores (verbal ability), and the WAIS-R IQ score devolved from this. 
WAIS and SILS (especially the abstract reasoning subtask) also correlated significantly 
with perforinance on the VMRT (spatial reasoning task). However, for spatial reasoners, 
performance in the VMRT is also a significant predictor of syllogistic reasoning, whercas 
it seenis to have no relationship Nvith SILS at all. The tendcncy for spatial ability to predict 
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perforinance for spatial reasoners, but not verbal, is fully in line with prediction. However, 
when the correlations are compared across strategy group, the difference does not reach 
significance (z = 0.89, p>0.3). Table 4.6 indicates that many of the correlations are of 
similar magnitude across strategy and none present significant differences between verbal 
and spatial reasoners (z between 0.03 and 1.43, p>0.1 in every case). 
When a similar analysis was conducted for the cognitive style measures, very few 
significant associations were observed. In fact, for many of the relationships observed 
between variables, the r value is less than 0.1. The correlations are all presented in 
Appendix 4E. In summary, verbal reasoners presented a similar profile as the overall 
sample shown in Table 4.5. Syllogistic performance was predicted by the REI experiential 
ability subscale (r = -0.37) and by speed of completion of the CSA verbal-imager trials (r 
0.49) only. For spatial reasoners, these two correlations were very small (r = -0.17 and r=- 
0.07 respectively) and no other measures predicted syllogistic reasoning accuracy either. 
Overall, cognitive style, at least as measured by these particular tests, does not seem to be 
a factor in syllogistic reasoning performance. Moreover, almost all correlations are of 
similar magnitude when compared across strategy groups. No significant differences were 
observed between r values (p > 0.1 in every case). 
4.5 Discussion 
The aim of Expenment 5 was to investigate whether strategies employed for syllogistic 
reasoning could be predicted by verbal-spatial abilities and/or by cognitive style. Firstly, 
written protocols produced during a syllogistic reasoning task again identified verbal and 
spatial reasoners, as in Experiments I to 4. All participants also completed two ability 
measures, the VMRT (spatial ability) and the SILS (\, crbal ability). It -was predicted that 
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verbal reasoners would score more highly on the SILS (especially abstract reasoning which 
is less a measure of educational level than vocabulary) and spatial reasoners would do best 
on the VMRT. However, this was not the case and the scores attained by the two strategy 
groups were virtually identical. However, correlational analysis indicated some slight 
differences. Although the relationship between SILS performance and syllogistic reasoning 
was similar for both strategies, there was a tendency for spatial ability (as measured by 
VMRT) to predict reasoning perforinance for spatial reasoners, but not for verbal. This was 
in line with prediction, but the difference between the groups did not reach significance. 
Estimated WAIS-R IQ scores did significantly predict performance on the VMRT for 
verbal reasoners, perhaps surprisingly given that the SILS scores (from which the IQ 
estimate was derived) did not. Furthennore, those verbal reasoners who did well on spatial 
reasoning, also did so on abstract reasoning. 
There are two possible explanations. Firstly, those verbal reasoners who are good abstract 
reasoners may have better spatial ability. Secondly, these verbal reasoners may be using an 
effective, but propositional, strategy for the VMRT. Roberts and Newton (2001) argue that 
individual differences in strategies have implications for the interpretation of the very 
ability measures with which styles may be experimentally associated. The psychometric 
properties of such measures are based on statistical analyses which assume that the same 
cognitive factor loadings apply to everyone, i. e. that everyone employs the same strategy. 
They particularly highlight spatial ability tasks which involve cube folding. These tasks 
tend to assume that high spatial ability individuals will use an imagistic strategy to imagine 
folding the cube. In fact, many use an analytical strategy whereby they make inferences 
from the appearance of the flattened cube presented in test items. When the results of such 
a tc,,, t are t, Lictor analysed. the two strategic users typically present different pattmis of 
Lictor loadings. YIcrice, cN en when tcst results correlate with performance at another task, it 
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cannot be inferred which strategy was being used. Lohman and KvIlonen (1983) and 
Kyllonen, Lohman and Snow (1994) have identified numerous instances of strategic 
impurity on spatial tasks such as mental rotation and found that strongest perfon-ners had 
the ability to be flexible in their strategy choice. Rather than using complex spatial or 
imagistic representations, better performers simplified their strategies to reduce cogmtiVe 
load. Cooper and Mumaw (1985) found that high spatial ability people were actually least 
likely to use a v1suo-spatial representative strategy for such tasks, preferring a less 
demanding analytic scanning strategy. 
However, such results might equally point to strategic flexibility, facilitated in some 
individuals and not others through contrasting cognitive styles. An association between 
cognitive style and reasoning strategy was also predicted but the data again indicate no 
such association. One explanation could be that the tests have not measured the constructs 
they claim to describe. However, a considerable body of research using both the CSA (see 
Riding and Rayner, 1998 for review) and REI (see Handley et al, 2000) have found them to 
be valid measures. The present study cannot really draw this conclusion without further 
evidence. The second possibility is that there really is no relationship between cognitive 
style and reasoning strategy. With regard to the CSA, given the description of styles 
presented by Riding and Rayner et al, it was expected that spatial reasoners' scores would 
place them highly on the imagery and wholistic ends of the style dimensions, whilst verbal 
reasoners would tend towards analytic and verbal styles. The present results show no 
evidence of this. The most noticeable between- strategy differences occur in the analytic- 
bimodal and ", holist-bimodal categories where a higher percentage of verbal and spatial 
reasoners fall respectively. This is a slight trend toxvards the a priori prediction, but the 
fact that both categories are described as bimodal suggests that on the verbal-imager\ scale 
(that where we might have expected the most differentiation), both verbal and spatial 
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reasoners fall in the middle of the dimension, i. e. they both present evidence of using both 
verbal and imagery based styles. Furthermore, Table 4.3 above shows that accuracv and 
processing speed were almost identical for the two strategy groups, across both 
dimensions. 
On the REI, again no differences were observed. To recap, the REI measures style 
according to two subscales concerned with rational and experiential thinking. No specific 
predictions were made as to how such measures would associate with reasoning strategy, 
and as Table 4.3 shows, mean scores on all four scales were remarkably similar for both 
strategy groups. However, when descnbing the REI, Epstein et al (1996) refer to the 
rational and experiential dimensions as conscious/intentional and automatic/preconscious 
respectively. Both reasoning strategies identified are clearly intentional and conscious even 
if their users do not always possess the flexibility to switch at will from verbal to spatial 
and vice versa. This is evident from the fact that the vast majority of subjects are able to 
articulate, at least to some extent, the tactics they have used in solving the syllogisms (cf 
Experiment 1). Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapters, many verbal reasoners are 
not using logical reasoning - even to the extent of the substitution rules suggested by Ford 
(1995). Rather they use a heuristic process of naive substitution, or, if rules are applied, 
they tend to take the fon-n allied to those suggested by matching theory (c. f Experiment 2). 
According to CEST (Epstein, 1994) heuristic or -illogical- thinking originates from the 
experiential system - no differences were observed between strategies according to this 
subscale. Moreover, the work of Klaczynski et al (1997) suggested that the REI will 
predict illogical, heunstic reasoning perfonnance (i. e. that influenced by belief bias) but 
not logical, rational thought. It may be that both verbal and spatial strategies represent 
different heuristic processes. Furthen-nore, neither the CSA nor the REI were found to 
predict rcasonim, accuracy. Nowstead ct al (in press) also found no association betwccii 
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REI scores and reasoning accuracy which seems to be in line with the current findings. 
However, to this author's knowledge, such comparisons have not previously been made 
between reasoning accuracy and the cognitive style as measured by the CSA. 
All of the above factors may contribute to the lack of a difference observed between verbal 
and spatial reasoners in terms of cognitive styles and abilities, at least as measured by these 
tasks. The key may lie in individual flexibility, the ability to change or modify a preferred 
strategy to effectively meet differing task demands or reduce cognitive workload. In other 
words, individuals may possess a preference for either a verbal or spatial strategy, but, 
some may have the capacity to change or adapt their usual approach to meet differing task 
demands. The composite cognitive style measure which Stanovich and West (1998) 
suggest may predict some of the variance in reasoning perforinance, included measures 
which claim to indicate an ability, or willingness, to engage in cognitive flexibility. Cary 
and Reder (2003) suggest that strategy selection, within and between individuals, may be 
regulated by metacognitive processes which respond to dynamic environmental features of 
which the reasoner may not even be aware. In terms of the REI, this seems in line with the 
claims of Epstein (1994) and Klaczynski et al (1997), that the experiential system is 
influenced by affective factors which may lead to the development of heuristic strategies in 
otherwise educated (and presumably rational) individuals. 
Developmental work has suggested that strategy development is associated with cognitive 
mechanisms which allow for strategic flexibility in response to environmental changes (for 
instance, Crowley, Shrager and Siegler, 1997) and Crowley and Siegler (1999) have shown 
that children create novel goal structures which allow them to persist in the use of a given 
strategy, even when other demands compete, and suggest that such problem solving tactics 
persist into the adult cognitivc repertoire. So IIII it is possible that whilst some reasoncrs 
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possess strategic flexibility, others persist with their usual strategy, or a vanation of it, 
even when new tasks seem to be demanding something else. Furthermore, Roberts and 
Newton (2001) have argued that individual differences in strategies hw, 'e implications for 
the interpretation of the very ability measures with which they may be experimentally 
associated. The psychometric properties of such measures are based on statistical analyses 
which assume that the same cognitive factor loadings apply to everyone, i. e. that everyone 
employs the same strategy. They particularly highlight spatial ability tasks which involve 
cube folding. These tasks tend to assume that high spatial ability individuals will use an 
imagistic strategy to imagine folding the cube. In fact, many use an analytical strategy 
whereby they make inferences from the appearance of the flattened cube presented in test 
items. When the results of such a test are factor analysed, users of the two different 
strategies typically present different patterns of factor loadings. Hence, even when test 
results do correlate with performance at another task, it cannot be inferred which strategy 
was being used. However, such results might equally point to strategic flexibility, 
facilitated in some individuals and not others through contrasting cognitive styles. The 
most efficient verbal reasoners are also likely to possess generally higher intellectual 
ability, explaining why WAIS-R IQ seems to predict VMRT perfon-nance for the verbal 
group. Spatial reasoners on the other hand, have a natural inclination towards a strategy 
which is compatible with the demands of VMRT, and so intellectual ability is not 
necessarily a predictor of perfon-nance. On the SILS, spatial reasoners seem to possess the 
skills, or perhaps flexibility, to perform comparably with verbal reasoners, in fact cognitive 
flexibility has been cited as a predictor of success on the abstract reasoning subtest 
(Zachary, 2000). However. given that this was a student sample, general educational 
attainment might explain the lack of variance on the SILS, especially for the vocabulary 
subtest, which it could be argued relies on knowledge and memory rather than reasoning 
ability. 
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In conclusion, Experiments I to 4 presented evidence for two distinct reasoning strategies 
which appear to be verbal -propositional and visuo-spatial in nature. This effect was 
replicated yet again in Experiment 5, and it was predicted that individual differences in 
verbal and spatial ability and/or cognitive style would underpin such strategic differences. 
However, neither style nor ability measures suggested any distinction between the two 
groups of reasoners. Overall, it would appear that these two factors (at least as measured 
by the four tasks used here) may not be base factors in determining individual differences 
in reasoning strategy. This leaves us with a number of outstanding questions regarding the 
nature of the two strategies. The distinct verbal and spatial representations which are 
presented in written protocols may in fact be external manifestations of the same, or 
similar, underlying process, as has been suggested by Stenning and Yule (1997, discussed 
in Chapter 1). Alternatively, strategies may be distinct but unrelated to abilities. In this 
case, even if individuals were resilient to changing task demands and used their preferred 
strategy throughout, no differences would be observed as function of strategy. 
However, some individuals may be able to draw effectively on both verbal and spatial 
resources. This type of cognitive flexibility may mask any underlying differences in 
strategy preference resulting in similar results on verbal and spatial ability measures, 
regardless of syllogistic reasoning strategy preference. Such flexibility has been associated 
with individual differences in verbal and spatial working memory systems (Schunn, Lovett 
and Siegler, 2001). Furthermore, individual differences in working memory capacity has 
also been associated with verbal and spatial abilities, and with reasoning strategies. 
Handley et al (2002) presented evidence to show that distinct working memory systems for 
dealing with spatial and verbal representations were involved in both conditional reasoning 
aml spatial problern sok-ing, whilst Capon, Handley and Dennis (in press) have suggested 
that sN, Ilogi, -, tic reasoning perforinance is predicted by both spatial and verbal working 
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memory span. Hence, maybe it is not verbal and spatial abilities per se that underpin 
strategy choice, but rather the ability to draw appropriately on verbal and spatial resources, 
including those within the working memory system. Experiment 6 addressed this question 
by means of an investigation into the relationship between verbal and spatial abilities, 
working memory capacity and syllogistic reasoning strategies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Reasoning Strategies and Working Memory 
5.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, individuals have a strong tendency to use either --., Isuo-spatial or 
verbal/propositional representations when reasoning syllogistically. Howevcr, it remains 
unclear what leads these individuals to prefer one strategy over another. Part of the answer 
may relate to their working memory capacity -a factor long associated with reasoning 
performance (see for instance Gilhooly, 1998; Johnson-Laird, 2001). Reasoning and 
memory are inextricably linked (Gilhooly and Logie, 1998). Memory involves the 
encoding, retention and retrieval of information, and storage may either be temporary or 
form part of a long-tenn knowledge base. Reasoning relies on both of these storage 
mechanisms. Whereas information in long-ten-n memory (for instance previous experience 
with the task, or pfior knowledge of the problem content) may be drawn upon, reasoning 
also necessanly involves the use of some kind of mental workspace where information is 
stored temporarily during inten-nediate stages of the task (Gilhooly, 1998). A short-tenn 
memory store can hold details of the situation in-hand and maintain a record of the 
processing stages involved in working through the problem. Similarly, information about 
the current task can be passed back to this short-term memory store. That information is 
retained just long enough for it to be used for the task. Hence this workspace is referred to 
as vi, orking memory (Baddeley, 1986). Hence working memory (WM) refers to aspects of 
on-line cognition, the moment-to-moment processing, monitonng and maintenance of 
infort-nation. Baddeley and Logie (1999, page 29) define it as comprising 
"those functional components which allow humans to comprehend and 
mentally represent their immediate environment, to retain infon-nation about 
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their immediate past experience, to support the acquisition of new knowledge, 
to solve problems, and to fon-nulate, relate, and act on current goals". 
5.1.1 The Working Memory Model 
Thinking is constrained by the ease with which stored knowledge can be retrieved, 
maintained and processed. Working memory is in turn constrained by it's architecture and 
the efficiency of operations within that architecture. Baddeley (1986,1997) described a 
tripartite model of working memory comprising a controlling attentional system, ten-ned 
the central executive which oversees and co-ordinates the operation of two slave systems: 
the phonological loop is concerned with processing linguistic material and comprises a 
phonological store served by an articulatory control process which allows for the 
maintenance of memory traces by means of subvocal rehearsal. The memory trace in the 
phonological loop (PL) is thought to decay after around one and a half seconds, but can be 
refreshed by the subvocal rehearsal. The other system, the vj*suo-spatial sketchpad Is 
responsible for the construction and manipulation of visuo-spatial images. It can be fed 
directly through visual perception or indirectly through the generation of a visual image. 
Hence, infori-nation presented in non-visual modalities can be converted into a spatial code 
through imagery. Storage is maintained by a spatial control process thought to involve eye- 
tracking (what Baddeley and Logie, 1999, refer to as the inner scribe). Considerable 
experimental and neuropsychological evidence supports these distinctions within WM (see 
Baddeley, 1986; 1997 for extensive discussion). However, the slave systems are thought to 
play a rather more passive role in higher level cognitive tasks which involve processing as 
well as storage of infori-nation. For instance, simple measures of phonological loop 
capacity, such as digit recall span, do not predict accuracy in reading comprehension as do 
inore complex measures which are assumed to also reflect the role of the central executive 
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(e. g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Gilhooly, 1998; Shah & Miyake, 1996). Jonides and 
Smith (1997) suggest that WM also comprises a further conceptual resource. over and 
above the verbal and spatial ones, which stores information such as semantic categories 
and facilitates the extraction of meaning from propositional material represented in the PL 
during semantically meaningful operations such as reasoning. For a discussion of recent 
developments in the working memory model see Baddeley and Logie (1999). Figure I 
presents a simplified representation of the WM model. 
Figure 5.1: A simplified representation of the working memory model (from Baddeley, 1997, Figure 
4.2, page 71). 
Visuo-spatial sketch 
pad II 
Central executive 
Phonological loop 
Smith and Jonides (1997) present evidence from positron- emi s sion tomography (PET) 
studies which clearly support the existence of different WM systems for spatial, object and 
verbal information. Within the verbal and spatial systems, separable components seem to 
be responsible for the passive storage and active maintenance of information. Moreover, 
separate executive functions processing the contents of WM (rather than simply storing or 
retrieving) were suggested, mediated by distinct brain areas in the frontal cortex. 
A number of studies have investigated the involvement of the three components of 
working memory in reasoning, primarily through the use of dual-task methodology, 
whereby secondary tasks are used to reduce available capacity for particular 
subcomponents. The phonological loop is typically loaded by secondary tasks which 
suppi-css subvocal articulation (such as concurrent repetition of a givcn word or numbcr) 
218 
and the visuo-spatial sketchpad by concurrent spatial tasks., such as moving the non- 
preferred hand in a set spatial pattern. Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn (1993) found 
that such secondary tasks did not significantly reduce syllogistic reasoning perfonnance, 
although a small but consistent interference by articulatory suppression was observed. 
Another secondary task, random number generation, did significantly affect performance 
and latencies for premise processing. This task was intended to interfere with the working 
of the central executive and the findings suggest that the central executive plays a major 
role in syllogistic reasoning with some minor involvement of the phonological loop (see 
also Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 2002, in which overall working memory load of the task 
was raised). 
However, no evidence was found for a visuo-spatial sketchpad contribution. Similar 
findings have also been reported in relation to propositional reasoning (Klauer, Stegmaier 
and Meiser, 1997) and conditional reasoning (Klauer et al 1997; Toms, Moms and Ward, 
1993). Gilhooly et al. (1993) note that this goes against some model-onented theories such 
as Euler circles, which have suggested the use of mental imagery. However, many subjects 
in their studies used superficial heuristics which place little demand on WM. Gilhooly et 
al. suggest that greater involvement of the visuo-spatial sketchpad might be observed if 
subjects were induced to employ other strategies. In more recent work, Gilhooly, Logie 
and Wynn (1998) explored performance of individuals who had been trained in syllogistic 
reasoning and found that those who produced the highest scores following training were 
rnost susceptible to the disruptive effects of random number generation. The training 
seemed to have resulted in better perforinance, but at the expense of greater load on WM. 
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5.1.2 Verbal and Spatial Strategies and Working Memory 
Both the mental models and rules theories of syllogistic reasoning reviewed in Chapter I 
suggest that working memory capacity is an important factor in reasoning perfon-nance. 
According to model theorists, working memory plays a key role in the storage of initial 
putative models and mental footnotes, and in searching for counterexamples (e. g. Gilhooly, 
1998; Johnson-Laird and Byrrie, 1991). Rule based accounts claim its importance in the 
retention of temporary reasoning subgoals (e. g. Rips, 1994) or the retrieval and application 
of reasoning schema (e. g. O'Brien, 1998). See also Section 1.5.2 previously. If the working 
memory model is considered in conjunction with the strategic differences identified thus 
far, the propositional nature of the verbal strategy suggests involvement of the 
phonological subsystem of WM. The research reviewed above suggests minimal (if any) 
involvement of the visuo-spatial sketchpad in reasoning. However, some of the reasoners 
in the previous five experiments clearly use a visuo-spatial approach which suggests that 
the v1suo-spatial component of WM may be important for these people. 
In discussing the working memory model and strategies, Gilhooly (1998) referred only to 
"verbal" strategies. For instance, he descnbes an implementation of the "atmosphere" 
strategy, whereby rules are retrieved from long-term memory and applied to the premises. 
These rules are remarkably similar to the "quantifier linking rules" used by some verbal 
and mixed reasoners and described in Experiment 2. Gilhooly suggests this approach may 
bc adopted because it places relatively little load on WM. He suggested also that, during 
reasoning, it is the central executive which stores information relevant to immediate 
processing and very recent processing, whilst the actual processing is camed out 
unconsciously by rules held in long-ten'n memory that respond to the infort-nation in CE. 
Hence the CE is a kcv storage sitc during on-line processing. The slave systems act as 
tcniporary caches which back up the CE to avoid overload (Logie, 1995). The infonnation 
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in the CE is held in an abstract propositional code, whilst that in the slave systems is in 
more literal codes (Toms et al 1993). Premise information in either a articulatory (PL) or 
visual image (VSSP) is used together with inten-nediate processing results (Gilhooly. 
1998). In terms of the verbal syllogistic strate ies, the latter may include temporary 91 
premise rearrangements in substitution, or the two quantifiers in the linking rule approach. 
However, for spatial reasoners, such on-line infori-nation might feasibly include an 
intermediate spatial arrangement of the A and B terrns as presented in premise one of a 
syllogism. Although the research reviewed above and by Gilhooly (1998) has suggested 
little involvement for VSSP, tasks which are thought to have a very strong spatial 
component, such as linear syllogisms containing spatial adjectives, are affected by 
secondary tasks which load the visuo-spatial sketchpad, however, the central executive 
also seems to pay a major role (e. g. Vandierenclonck & De Vooght, 1997). 
Shah and Miyake (1996) postulated a fractionated central executive with resources for 
spatial and linguistic infon-nation. To demonstrate this, they employed a series of simple 
and complex measures of verbal and spatial working memory span, the simple measures 
drawing on one or other of the slave systems and the complex measures drawing on either 
of these plus the central executive also. Using similar methodology, Handley, Capon, Copp 
and Harper (2002) presented evidence that two systems for dealing with spatial and verbal 
representations were involved in both conditional reasoning and spatial problem solving. 
However, although these appear to be distinct systems, factor analysis did suggest some 
common processing requirements. 
Capon, Handley and Dennis (2003) extended this research to syllogistic reasoning. They 
argued that if Shah and Miyake's thesis was correct, and verbal and spatial central 
exccutive rcsourccs arc dissociablc, then established theones of reasoning would ofter 
221 
differing predictions regarding the role of working memory in reasoning. Rule-based 
theories, which emphasise the role of propositional or language based representations 
(hence presumably a verbal strategy), would suggest that syllogistic tasks would draw 
preferentially on verbal resources. In contrast, model theories. (which encompass the 
spatial strategy), would predict a more important role for spatial working memory. 
Subjects completed two syllogistic reasoning tasks (with visual and verbal presentation of 
the premises) plus a series of working memory span measures. Correlational analysis 
indicated that syllogistic reasoning performance was predicted by both spatial and verbal 
working memory span. Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis showed that an 
orthogonal three factor model, comprising a verbal, spatial and general factor, fitted the 
data well. Interestingly, Capon et al. have since tested this three factor model on Shah and 
Miyake's data and found it to be an excellent fit. Overall, syllogistic reasoning 
perforinance (irrespective of presentation modality) loaded significantly, and to a similar 
degree, on both verbal and spatial working memory resources, and also on a third, general 
factor. 
Capon et al. offer two possible explanations; either that syllogistic reasoning involves both 
verbal and spatial forins of representation or, and perhaps more importantly for the present 
discussion, that individual differences exist: loadings on the two factors may in fact reflect 
different groups of individuals. In terms of the verbal and spatial strategies described 
earlier, the groups may differ in terrns of the verbal and spatial working memory capacity 
they have available. They may also differ in the extent to which they draw on working 
memory resources. For visually presented material, we would expect a degree of 
phonological loop involvement for all reasoners. Howevu, spatial reasoners may also dra,. v 
ori visuo-spatial sketchpad resources. Experiment 6 airned to investigate these questions. 
III 
5.2 Experiment 6 
5.2.1 Aims 
Experiment 6 aimed to investigate the relative role of the three working memory 
components for verbal and spatial reasoners. Given that individuals seem to possess a 
predilection towards one or other strategy, there were two possible predictions: 
either that the strategy groups differ in their verbal and spatial working memory 
capacities, or 
2. that their capacities are similar but they draw differentially on verbal and spatial 
working memory resources. 
The procedures followed were similar to those of Handley et al (2002) and Capon et al 
(2003). 
5.2.2 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 155 undergraduate and postgraduate students from University of 
Plymouth who volunteered to take part in return for their choice of course credit or 0.50 
cash. The sample comprised 128 females and 27 males with an overall mean age of 22-08 
years. All were native English speakers and none had received formal training in logic. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were run in pairs, each seated at a separate desk with a computer ten-ninal. 
Each participant was presented with six experimental tasks in a session lasting around one 
and a half hours. The six tasks are described below in the order presented to every 
participant. The computensed tasks were all developed in Visual Basic 6.0 and presented 
on a Pentium IV PC. Tasks 3 to 6 below were based on ones used by Shah and Miyake 
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(1996). These were also the four WM measures employed by Handley et al (2002) and 
were among those used by Capon et al (2003). In summary, the simple span tasks are 
designed to measure PL and VSSP storage capacity whilst the complex span tasks also 
include a processing component, and hence assume involvement of the central executive. 
1. Reasoning Strategy 
Exactly the same procedure as employed in Experiments I to 5. Again, the five syllogism 
task employed in Expenments 4 and 5 was used with only the occupation names changed. 
2. Syllogistic Reasoning Performance 
Exactly the same procedure was used as in Experiment 5. The 16 syllogisms presented 
were shown in Appendix 4A. For Experiment 6 the figure, mood remained as shown, only 
the occupation names were changed. Task instructions remained as shown in Appendix 4B. 
3. Simple Verbal Word Span (words) 
This task was designed to measure passive storage capacity for verbal information, with no 
explicit processing requirement. The words used in this task were all two syllable concrete 
nouns. They were selected by Capon et al from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database 
(Quinlan, 1992) and their usage frequency rating ranged from 5 to 216 according to the 
Kucera and Francis (1967) corpus of over I million words. 
To-be-remembered words were presented in sets of increasing size from two to seven 
Nvords, with five sets of each size. Each word appeared on the computer screen individually 
for 800 msecs, Nvith an interstimulus interval of 50 msecs. Written instructions were 
presentcd to participants at the outset. followed by two practice sets of two words. The 
instructions are shown in Appendix 5. A and all the word sets in Appendix 5B. At the end 
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of each word set, a lightbulb symbol appeared on the screen and the program paused to 
allow the participant time to write down the words presented on a simple paper response 
sheet. They were instructed to write down as many words as they could recall in the order 
presented on computer. Hence difficulty increased with set size. 
The simple verbal word span score was calculated by awarding one point for each correctly 
recalled word, in each correctly recalled set, regardless of level. For instance, if a 
participant completed four 2 word sets correctly and two three word sets correctly; score = 
(4x2) + (20) = 14. The maximum possible score was 135. 
4. Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrows) 
Again this task originated in the work of Shah and Miyake and developed in the present 
form by Capon et al. The task was designed to measure passive storage capacity for spatial 
information, with no explicit processing component. Again the stimuli were presented in 
sets, with three sets at each level of two to six items, 15 sets in total. However this time 
each item comprised an arrow pointing in one of eight possible orientations. Each arrow 
remained on the screen for 1000 msecs with an interstimulus interval of 250 msecs. 
Following each set of arrows, a grid was presented, showing all eight possible orientations. 
The task was to indicate, through a mouse click, the directions of each of the arrows in the 
set, in the order presented. The written instructions presented to each participant are 
presented in Appendix 5C and were followed by two practice sets of two arrows each. 
Figure 5.2 below shows a two arrow set and the response grid which followed all sets. On 
the grid shown, the correct response would be to click on the grid points indicated Nvith an 
asterisk (*). 
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Figure 5.2: A typical two arrow stimulus set and response grid as presented in the Simple Spatial Span 
task (arrows). 
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The Simple Spatial Arrow Span score was calculated by a similar procedure to that for the 
simple word span descnbed previously. One point was awarded for each correct arrow, in 
each fully correct set; i. e. if a participant got three two arrow sets correct and one three 
arrow set, (3x2) + (I x3) = 9. The maximum total score for this task was 60. 
5. Complex Verbal Sentence Span (sents) 
This task was based on the reading span test devised by Daneman and Carpenter (1980) 
and was also used by Capon et al (2003). It is intended to be a span measure of functional 
working memory capacity for verbal material and also requires the simultaneous 
226 
maintenance and processing of information. The task required participant to -verify sets of 
sentences as either true or false, whilst also remembering the final word of each sentence. 
Sentence order was randomised prior to the experiment and remained in that same order 
for all participants. Altogether the test comprised 25 sentence sets, xith 5 sets at each level 
from two to six sentence sets. Each sentence remained on screen for 800 msecs after which 
two buttons labelled "true" and "false" appeared. Participants were asked to click on the 
appropriate button to make their response. After, an interval of 250 msecs, the next 
sentence in the set was presented. After all the sentences in a set had been presented, the 
computer program would pause and allow time for the to-be-remembered words to be 
recalled and noted on a written response sheet. Again, participants were instructed to write 
down as many words as they could recall in the order presented. As with the Simple word 
span measure, the to-be-remembered words were all two syllable concrete nouns selected 
from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database (Quinlan, 1992) and frequency verified with 
the Kucera and Francis (1967) corpus. Appendix 5D shows all sentences in the task and 
Appendix 5E the instructions presented to each participant and example test screen fortnat. 
Scoring was by the same principle as for the previous two tasks. Hence, the maximum 
score was 100. The number of errors made in the verification component of the task 
(true/false judgement) was also recorded. 
6. Complex Spatial Letter Span (letters) 
This task was a span measure of functional working memory capacity for spatial 
information which also required the simultaneous maintenance and processing of spatial 
material. Again, the test items were presented in sets, this time of 2 to 5 items, with five 
sets at each lcvcl. Each item comprised one of five letters (either F, J, L, P or R) presentcd 
in one of eight possible orientations and either as a normal or mirror image. Presentation 
was cmistrained so that opposing orientations were not presented successively within a set 
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and that each orientation appeared only once per set. The letters remained on the screen for 
a maximum of 5000 msec. and participants were required to respond whether the letter was 
a normal or mirror image by clicking on an appropriate button. After an inter-stimulus 
interval of 250 msecs the next letter would appear. After each set, participants were 
presented with a grid identical to that used in the simple arrow span, and shown in 
Example 5.1 previously. They used the mouse to click and indicate the direction in -which 
the top of each letter was oriented, in the order the letters were presented. The instructions 
presented to each participant are presented in Appendix 5F and an example of a two item 
set in Figure 5.3 below. In the example, the correct response to the letter I would be to 
click the button labelled "mirrored" and for letter 2 the button labelled "normal". On the 
grid shown after this set, the correct boxes are again marked with an asterisk. 
Figure 5.3: A typical two letter stimulus set and response grid as presented in the Complex Spatial 
Span task (letters) 
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Sconng was calculated exactly as for the complex verbal sentence span. If a set was 
correct, regardless of level, one point was recorded per letter. The total possible sc(--)re was 
therefore 80. The number of errors on the verification component (normal/mirrored 
judgement) was also recorded. 
5.2.3 Results 
5.2.3.1 Strategies for Syllogistic Reasoning 
Verbal and spatial strategies were again identifiable from written protocols according to 
the same criteria as used in Experiments I to 5. In addition, 9 participants seemed to be 
using a mixture of the two approaches and 5 either produced protocols which were 
indeten-ninate, or no protocols at all despite instructions. Table 5.1 shows the proportion of 
participants within each strategy group. 
Table 5.1: Syllogistic reasoning strategies identified in Experiment 6. 
Strategy N 
Verbal 93 
Spatial 48 
Mixed 9 
Indeten-ninate 5 
Total 1 155 
Written protocols were similar to those presented in Experiments I to 5. Protocols 5.1 and 
5.2 show typical examples of how verbal and spatial reasoners respectively reached a 
conclusion to syllogism 1. 
Protocol 5.1: 
Syllogism I Some of the carpenters are dancers 
All of the dancers are birdwatchers 
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Participant 7 
=Som: 
e:: 
)f 
the carpenters arýdancers 
swap so start with a All Ali of the dancers are birdwatchers larger group of 
people. 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the carpenters are birdwatchers 
Protocol 5.2 
Syllogism I as above 
Participant 20 
Correct conclusion given: Some of the carpenters are birdwatchers 
5.2.3.2 Performance on all Measures 
Table 5.2 below shows descriptive statistics for the overall sample (N = 155) and for verbal 
and spatial reasoners on syllogistic reasoning and on all six working memory measures. 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics showing performance of whole sample (N = 155), verbal (N = 93) and 
spatial (N = 48) reasoners on syllogistic reasoning and all working memory measures. 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Reliability 
All Verbal Spatial All Verbal Spatial 
Syllogisms (max 16) 7.59 7.46 8.02 3.12 2.70 3.63 0.82 
Words (max. 135) 47.22 47.26 47.71 15.12 12.72 19.15 0.87 
Sents (max. 100) 27.60 27.76 26.33 16.98 15.68 17.77 0.93 
Sents error (max. 100) 8.59 8.16 9.10 5.56 5.63 5.95 - 
Arrows (max. 80) 22.84 21.87 23.73 9.31 8.78 9.93 0.89 
Letters (max. 100) 18.70 18.12 18.23 14.64 12.86 15.94 0.50 
Letters error (max. 100) , 11.41 , 12.61 9.52 8.88 8.69 8.67 
** Reliability estimates (split-half/Speari-nan-Brown) from those presented for identical tasks by Capon et al 
(2003, Experiment 3, page 227). 
As Table 5.21 shows, performance was remarkably similar across all three sets of 
participants (all, verbal and spatial) on all measures. On syllogistic reasoning, in line with 
the perforinaricc observed in Experiments 1-5, spatial reasoners (M = 8.02 correct out of 
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16) perforined slightly better than verbal (M= 7.46), but the difference was not significant. 
t(74.6) = 0.94, p>0.05. With regard to the working memory measures, of some interest 
are the processing error rates. Overall, participants made between 8-9% errors on the 
processing element of the complex verbal span task (sents. error) and 9-12% on the 
equivalent components of the complex spatial task (letter error). This is ývell below the 
chance rate of 50% which would be expected if they were simply guessing and suggests 
that participants were actively attempting the processing element of these tasks. Comparing 
the strategy groups on these measures, spatial reasoners made significantly fewer errors on 
the processing component of the complex spatial task (letters error) than verbal reasoners; 
t(139) = 2, p=0.05. The opposite trend was observed with regard to the verbal processing 
errors, but this effect did not reach significance (p > 0.3). Across all other measures, verbal 
and spatial perfon-nance was comparable (p > 0.05 in every case). There was slightly more 
variance in the spatial group, especially on the verbal working memory measures (words 
and sents) which was caused by a few exceptionally good all round perfonners. Overall 
however, the values shown in Table 5.2 were very similar to those found in the three 
experiments presented by Capon et al (2000). 
5.2.3.3 Correlational Analyses 
Working memory span measures 
Table 5.3 presents correlations between the six working memory measures for the whole 
sample (N = 155). Table 5.3 indicates that the strongest correlation is between the two 
verbal span measures (r = 0.54, p<0.001) and the second strongest between the two 
spatial span measures (r = 0.47, p<0.001). These results are to be expected if the verbal 
and spatial measures are tapping different working memory resources. Howcver, both 
verbal spans also correlated significantly with the spatial span measures. the relationship 
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being particularly strong with the complex spatial span (r = 0.42, p<0.001) and the m-o 
complex span measures are also correlated significantly (r = 0.42, p<0.001). The measure 
of verbal processing error correlated negatively, significantly and to a similar magnitude 
with all four span measures, whilst spatial error correlated significantly and negatively 
only with the spatial span measures. 
Table 5.3: Correlations between all working memory measures, across entire sample (N = 155). 
Simple Complex Verbal Simple Complex 
verbalspan verbalspan processing spatial span spatial span 
Measure (words) (sents) error (sents (arrows) (letters) 
error) 
Complex verbal span 
(sents) 0.54** - 
Verbal processing error 
(sents error) -0.19* -0.21 
Simple spatial span 
(arrows) 0.13 0.28** -0.18 
Complex spatial span 
(letters) 0.25** 0.42** -0.29** 0.47** 
Spatial processing error 
(letter error) -0.05 -0.7 -0.00 -0.28** -0.24** 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Overall, these findings are closely in line with those of Capon et al (2003). They suggest 
that the span measures share some common variance (possibly due to shared central 
executive resource on complex tasks) but, as the highest correlations tend to be between 
sarne-modality measures, spatial and verbal resources can be considered to possess a fairly 
high degree of independence. 
Working memory span and syllogistic reasoning 
Table 5.4 shows correlations between the span measures and syllogistic reasoning 
perforniancc both for the overall sample, and for the verbal and spatial strategy groups. 
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Overall, reasoning correlates significantly with all six measures, negatively -ýý-Ith the two 
error measures. Again this is in line with Capon et al's findings. For the individual strategy 
groups, the correlations show that simple verbal span predicted syllogistic performance for 
verbal (r = 0.36, p<0.05) but not spatial reasoners (r = -0.05, p>0.05); z=2.27, p<0.05. 
This finding is fully in line with prediction. The other WM measures show almost Identical 
correlations with syllogistic reasoning, across the two strategy groups. Not surprisingly 
given the coefficients in Table 5.4, none of these inter-strategic differences reached 
significance (p>0.05 in every case). 
Table 5.4: Correlation between syllogistic reasoning performance and working memory span, for 
overall sample and for verbal and spatial reasoners. 
Measure words sents sents error arrows letters letter 
Strategy (error) 
Syllogisms 
Overall 0.18* 0.38** -0.22** 0.34** 0.25** -0.2 1* 
Verbal 0.36* 0.37** -0.27** 0.30** 0.20 -0.18 
Spatial -0.05 0.37* -0.13 0.37** 0.19 -0.15 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5.5 presents a similar analysis which allows for examination of correlations between 
the working memory measures and verbal and spatial strategy. Again, many of the 
correlations are remarkably similar across strategy groups. In some of these cases (for 
instance, the relationship between sents error and words) correlations of similar magnitude 
are observed to be significant for the verbal group, but not for spatial. This can be 
attributed to the differing sample sizes within the two groups (N = 93 and 48 respectively). 
Again, the largest correlations are between related span measures for both strategy groups; 
for words*sents, r=0.57 and r=0.53 for verbal and spatial reasoners respectively, p< 
0.01 in both cases; for arrows *letters, r=0.33, p<0.05 and r=0.59, p<0.01, for verbal 
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and spatial reasoners respectively. The latter data suggest some difference between stratel(,,,,, 
groups, and this difference approximates to significance; z=1.86, p=0.06. 
Table 5.5: Correlations between all six working memory measures, by strategy group. 
Measure words sents sents error arrows letters 
Strategy 
sents 
V 0.57** 
S 0.53** - 
sents. error 
V -0.27* -0.23* 
S -0.15 -0.22 - 
arrows 
V 0.26* 0.22* -0.24* - 
S -0.02 0.26 -0.20 
letters 
V 0.36** 0.37** -0.33** 0.33* 
S 0.14 0.30* -0.33* 0.59** 
letters error 
V -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.28** -0.24* 
S -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.21 -0.13 
Some inter-strategic differences are apparent in the relationship between the simple word 
span (words) and the two spatial spans. For verbal reasoners, the former seems to predict 
the latter in both cases (r = 0.26, p<0.05 for arrows, r=0.36, p<0.001 for letters). For 
spatial reasoners, the correlations are much smaller (r = -0.02 and 0.14 respectively) and 
non-signifi cant. However, when the correlations were compared across strategy groups, no 
significant differences were observed; for words*arrows, z=1.58, p>0.1; for 
words*letters, z=1.3 1, p>0.1. 
Summary of findings so far 
Overall, the above analyses present evidence that verbal and spatial working memory are 
fairly distinct pools of resource. The simple and complex span measures are highly inter- 
correlated within modality, both for the whole sample and within each of the strategy 
groups. The dissociation seems to be especially strong in the spatial group where the 
spatial sparis are particularly highly correlated, compared to the verbal stratcgy. Ho%\, c% cr, 
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some overlap is apparent, which Is to be expected if a shared central executive resource 
operates in both complex spans. Moreover, there is tendency for an association between 
simple verbal span and both spatial measures for verbal reasoners, but not for spatial. This 
suggests that verbal reasoners were in fact drawing partly on their verbal resource during 
the spatial span tasks, whilst spatial reasoners had no need to do so. In terms of syllogistic 
reasoning (the task by which strategy groups were detennined), the simple verbal span 
predicted perforinance for the verbal reasoners, but not for spatial, suggesting the latter 
group do not rely to such an extent on verbal working memory ability when reasoning. 
However, the complex verbal span was a predictor for both groups, and to the same extent. 
This was also the case with the simple spatial span, although, perhaps surpnsingly, the 
complex spatial span predicted syllogistic performance for neither group. Overall, when 
conducting syllogistic reasoning, it would seem that whilst spatial reasoners draw almost 
exclusively on their spatial working memory capacity, verbal reasoners may need to draw 
on both verbal and spatial resources. Both groups also, of course, presumably draw upon 
central executive resources, as necessary, dur-ing the processing of infonnation. To test 
these assumptions, a confin-natory factor analysis was conducted. This process allows for 
the testing of theoretically motivated models against the above data. 
5.2.3.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Motivated by the findings of Handley et al (2002) described above, a correlated two factor 
model was tested. This assumes some common processing resources and is hence 
consistent with the WM framework (Baddeley, 1996; 1997). The sample sizes of N=93 
(verbal) and N=48 (spatial) are quite small for this type of analysis, especially in the latter 
c. tse. However, this is a fairly simple model with 16 parameters to be estimated. A 
niinimum of five subjects per free parameter is generally recommended (Bentler. 1995) 
and in this respect the present sample size is sufficient overall, though if taken alone, the 
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spatial group is a little small. The two factors were assumed to correspond to % erbal W%I 
(FI) and spatial WM (F2). Syllogistic reasoning was allowed to load freelý on either 
factor, the verbal measures (words, sents and sents errors) on the VWM factor and the 
spatial capacity measures (arrows, letters and letter errors) on the SWM factor. Syllogistic 
reasoning remained unconstrained in order to examine whether its relationship ývith the 
working memory components differed across strategy groups. Figure 5.4 below presents a 
path diagram illustrating the model. 
Figure 5.4: Path diagram of 2 correlated factor model 
A multi-population analysis, using the Maximum Likelihood method, was conducted to 
deten-nme whether the same model was appropriate for both verbal and spatial strategy 
groups. The six working memory measures were constrained to equality across the two 
groups, whilst syllogistic reasoning performance remained free to vary across groups. The 
full EQS program output for the model is presented in Appendix 5G. The Goodness-of-fit 
summary Chi-square suggested a fairly good 
fit; X2 = 34.96 df = 28, p=0.17. This was 
further supported by a comparative fit index (CFI) of 0.95 and a Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RN/ISEA) of 0.04. The 95% confidence interval for the RMSEA was 0 
- 0.081. The higher end of this interval would correspond to a model with less than 
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satisfactory fit, although at this small sample size (especially in the spatial group) it is not 
possible to test the model more rigorously. Overall, the two factor model was likelý to be 
appropriate for both strategy groups. The standardised, factor loadings are shown in Table 
5.6. 
Table 5.6: Standardised factor loadings for Model I (all measured variables constrained). CH = 0.96; 
RMSEA = 0.04. 
Variable 
Strategy 
Factor 1 (VWM) Factor 2 (SNNNI) R2 
Syllogisms 
Verbal 0.40* 0.15 0.26 
Spatial 0.25 # 0.30* 0.21 
Words 
Verbal 0.73* 0.53 
Spatial 0.60* 0.36 
Sents. 
Verbal 0.77* 0.59 
Spatial 0.90* 0.82 
Sents. error 
Verbal -0.31 0.10 
Spatial -0.36* 0.13 
Arrows 
Verbal 0.60* 0.36 
Spatial 0.80* 0.64 
Letters 
Verbal 0.63* 0.40 
Spatial 0.73* 0.53 
Letters error 
Verbal -0.25* 0.06 
Spatial -0.34* 0.12 
* Loading significant at the 0.05 level 
# Loading approximates to sig. (p = 0.07,1 -tailed) 
As these data show, some differences between groups were apparent. For verbal reasoners, 
syllogistic reasoning loaded significantly on Factor I (verbal resource) but hardly at all on 
Factor 2 (spatial resource). Spatial reasoners on the other hand, seem to draw similarly on 
x, crbal and spatial resources. This seems to suggest a pattern of loadings which would be in 
line with prediction 2. The correlation between Factors were also disparate (r = 0.67 for 
verbal reasoners and r=0.37 for spatial) suggesting that the relationship between vcrbal 
and spatial memory resource may be stronger for verbal reasoners. Otherwise, little 
difference betwcen the two groups was observed and some low R2 values suggest that a 
fair amount of variance remains unexplained. Overall, it must be acknowledged that the 
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differences observed between patterns of loadings across the two groups have not been 
directly shown to be significant, and, whilst they are fully in line with prediction 2, given 
the limited sample size, this finding should be seen as suggestive, rather than definitn, 'e. 
Another possibility is that the working memory measures may load differentially on the 
factors, across the two strategies. The pattern of inter-correlations shown previously in 
Table 5.5 indicated different patterns of relationships between verbal and spatial measures 
for the two groups. Similarly, correlations presented in Experiment 5 (see Table 4.6) 
showed that IQ scores correlated significantly with spatial ability for verbal reasoners (r = 
0.43, p<0.01) but not at all for spatial reasoners (r = 0) suggesting that verbal reasoners 
may have been drawing, to an extent, on the same resource for both the verbal abIlIty and 
mental rotation tasks. Therefore, a second model was tested, identical to the first, except 
that all constraints on the working memory measures were lifted, in effect fitting two 
separate models for the two strategy groups. The full EQS output from this model is 
presented in Appendix 5H. 
For Model 2, the fit indices again suggest a fairly well fitting model; X2 = 29-82, df = 24, p 
= 0.19, CH = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.04; RMSEA Cl =0-0.08. A chi square change test was 
conducted to compare the fit of the two models. This resulted in a XI change = 5.14, df = 4. 
For 4 df, the critical value of XI when p=0.05 is 9.49, which indicates that Model 2 does 
not fit the data significantly differently to Model 1. The standardised factor loadings for 
Model 2 are shown in Table 5.7. A pattern of loadings is observed which is again in line 
xvith the second d prion prediction for Experiment 6, namely that the two strategies draw 
differentially on working memory resources. However, this trend seems to be in the 
opposite dii-ection to that assumed following the correlational analyses of task perl'on-nancc 
data reported carlier. Like Model I previously, Model 2 indicates that, for verbal reasoners, 
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syllogistic performance draws significantly on verbal working memory (Factor 1) but not 
on Factor 2. Spatial reasoners on the other hand, appear to draw significantly, and 
similarly, on both spatial and verbal factors. All the WM measures loaded significantly on 
their respective factors. The correlation between the two factors was moderate, though 
significant, in the spatial group (r = 0.30, p<0.01) and strong and significant (r = 0.68, p< 
0.01) for the verbal group. 
Table 5.7: Standardised factor loadings for Model 2 (WM variables constrained). CH = 0.93; RMSEA 
= 0.05. 
Variable 
Strategy 
Factor 1 (VWM) Factor 2 (SNNNI) R2 
Syllogisms 
Verbal 0.43* 0.10 0.26 
Spatial 0.28* 0.3 1 0.22 
Words 
Verbal 0.75* 0.56 
Spatial 0.53* 0.28 
Sents. 
Verbal 0.73* 0.53 
Spatial 1.00* 1.00 
Sents. error 
Verbal -0.39* 0.15 
Spatial 
-0.22 
# 0.05 
Arrows 
Verbal 0.55* 0.29 
Spatial 0.92* 0.85 
Letters 
Verbal 0.68* 0.45 
Spatial 0.64* 0.41 
Letters error 
Verbal -0.34* 0.11 
Spatial -0.22- 
0.05 
* Significant loading at 0.05 level 
# Loading approximates to sig. (p = 0.06,1 -tailed) 
- Loading approximates to significance (p = 0.08,1 -tailed) 
5.3 Discussion 
Much research has related reasoning accuracy to working memory capacity, and the two 
most influential theones of reasoning (mental models and rules) both suggest that it plays a 
key role in reasoning processes (see Chapter 1). However, studies of working memory and 
reasoning havc not tended to consider the possibility of individual differences in how 
people reason, and whether this may lead them to use their working memory resource in 
239 
different ways. Experiment 6 aimed to investigate the relationship between working 
memory capacity and verbal and spatial strategies for syllogistic reasoning. Given that 
Experiment 5 has already shown that, whatever their strategic preference, individuals do 
not seem to differ in verbal or spatial ability, two possible predictions regarding -ýN'orking 
memory were suggested; either that strategy preference reflects differences in verbal- 
spatial working memory capacity, or, that individuals using different strategies draw 
differentially on those particular working memory resources. 
The first of these possibilities was investigated by examining the performance of the two 
groups of reasoners across the measures of working memory capacity. On the complex 
span tasks (those which involve both a storage and processing element) spatial reasoners 
made significantly fewer processing errors on the spatial task, whilst on the verbal task, the 
opposite trend was observed, although there was no overall difference in span scores. This 
suggests that indeed, the two groups may differ in their ability to process information 
within spatial and verbal domains. Nevertheless, the overall span score is unaffected, 
suggesting that spatial processing ability is not a key factor contributing to performance on 
the task. 
The second prediction was that strategy groups would draw differentially on working 
memory resources during syllogistic reasoning, spatial reasoners tending to draw on the 
spatial resource and verbal on the verbal resource. Correlational analysis suggested two 
main inter-strategic differences: firstly, that the simple verbal span (i. e. verbal storage 
capacity) predicted syllogistic reasoning performance for verbal, but not spatial, reasoners; 
secondly, this measure correlated significantly xvith both spatial spans for verbal reasoners, 
but not for spatial. This might suggest that verbal reasoners, to an extent, draw upon the 
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same resources for verbal and spatial tasks, whilst spatial reasoners draw almost 
exclusively on spatial resources for spatial tasks and verbal resources for verbal tasks. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allowed for the testing of a correlated two factor 
model against the data from Experiment 6, the factors corresponding to verbal and spatial 
working memory. This model was motivated by that used by Handley et al (2002), who 
have demonstrated that both verbal and spatial resource is implicated in reasoning with 
conditional premises. Capon et al (2003) have presented similar findings regarding 
syllogistic reasoning, their model also comprising a third general factor. However, 
Experiment 6 had too few participants (especially in the spatial group) for a three factor 
model to be technically viable. 
As previous work has suggested little involvement of the visuo-spatial scratchpad in 
reasoning (e. g. Gilhooly et al, 1993), all reasoners mi ight be expected to draw on verbal 
resources to some extent, and the CFA indicted that this was indeed the case in Experiment 
6. However, spatial reasoners also load significantly onto the spatial factor. In reviewing a 
number of studies, Gilhooly (1998) suggested that the general lack of evidence for VSSP 
involvement goes against model based theories which posit the involvement of mental 
imagery. One theory he cites particularly is that of Euler circles which, as all six 
Experiments in this thesis have shown, approximate to the protocol representations 
consistently presented by spatial reasoners. Gilhooly's participants however, used mainly 
heuristic strategies and he concedes that more VSSP involvement may be observed if 
rcasoners were induced to use other strategies. Certainly tasks which are known to possess 
a strong spatial component have been shown to require VSSP involvement. Experiments I- 
6 lici-e havc not required any inducement for around a third of reasoners to spontaneously 
produce representations allied to Euler circles. and to describe reasoning processes which 
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seem distinctly spatial in nature. These are the individuals Nvho, in Experiment 6, have 
been shown to draw on spatial working memory resources during reasoning. The verbal 
reasoners identified in Experiments 1-6, on the other hand, present strategies involving the 
substitution of terms and/or linking of quantifiers. In Gilhooly's terms, such processes 
would be classed as heuristic (certainly by comparison to the complex logical rules 
proposed by Rips, 1994, or even the substitution rules of Ford, 1995). For these 
individuals, syllogistic reasoning loads almost entirely on the verbal factor, totalk I as the 
research that Gilhooly describes would predict. 
Capon et al, in common with other research reviewed in this chapter, assumed strategic 
universality. Although they investigated individual differences in terrns of the relative 
extent to which reasoners draw on the three working memory components, they did not 
take into account possible differences in strategy - rather, they assumed that all reasoners 
were using basically the same functional approach and drawing on both resources. 
However, in discussing their findings, Capon et al offer an alternative, post-hoc, 
explanation - that individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning may exist, 
and that some reasoners draw primarily on verbal resource whilst others draw on spatial. 
This latter explanation is fully supported by the findings of Expenment 6. 
However, although inter-strategic differences are indicated, these are preliminary findings 
only and need to be treated with some caution. A fair amount of variance in performance is 
not cxplained by the two factor model presented here and hence, there may be other 
deten-ninants of perforinance which are as yet unaccounted for, and which may be relatcd 
to strateov choice. In addition, the sample size was quite small for this type of analysis 
(especially in the spatial strategy group). Ovcrall though, it remains that Expenment 6 has 
indicatcd intcr-stratcgic differcrices in how individuals draw on the verbal and spatial 
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components of working memory. This in turn further supports the hypothesis which this 
thesis set out to investigate, i. e. that the two groups of reasoners, which have been 
repeatedly identified throughout Experiments 1-6, are indeed employing functionally 
distinct reasoning strategies. Chapter 6, to follow, will surnmanse the findings presented in 
this thesis, the evidence they present for individual differences in strategies for syllogistic 
reasoning and the implications of such differences, across both theoretical and applied 
situations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of the experimental programme presented in this thesis was to investigate 
the nature and veracity of individual differences in strategies for human reasoning. The six 
studies described have presented clear evidence for the existence of such strategies. The 
aim of this final chapter is to discuss the findings of Experiments I to 6 and their 
implications. It will begin with a brief summary of the previous 4 experimental chapters in 
terms of the aims and results of the studies in question. The implications of these results 
will then be discussed in terrns of the theories of reasoning presented in Chapter 1. Possible 
future directions for the continuation of this line of research will then be considered before 
the final concluding comments. 
6.2 Summary of Experimental Findings 
The initial experiment was inspired by the work of Ford (1995). From verbal and written 
protocols produced during syllogistic reasoning, Ford concluded that two main types of 
reasoning behaviour could be observed and she tenned these verbal and spatial strategies. 
Those individuals which Ford tenned spatial reasoners used shapes such as circles or 
squares placed in different spatial configurations to represent the relationships between the 
terins in the premises. They provided written protocols illustrating such procedures 
diagrammatically, and their verbal reports frequently described these relationships in tenns 
of group membership, sets and subsets. The verbal reasoners, on the other hand, displayed 
%'arious types of substitution behaviour. To reach a conclusion, they replaced the middle 
terin from one premise with the crid ten-n from the other, as if solving an algebraic 
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problem. Ford presented some fairly complex substitution rules 'which she claimed were 
being used by the majority of verbal reasoners in her study. 
However, Ford's work has been criticised on methodological grounds, mainly due to her 
small sample size Oust N=8 in each strategy group) and for her reliance on verbal 
protocol. Furthermore, although some other researchers have found similar evidence to 
Ford in written protocols, verbal reports have proved inconclusive (e. g. Bucciarelli and 
Johnson-Laird, 1999). Hence, Experiment I attempted to replicate and extend Ford's study 
by using a larger sample and by investigating whether strategies may be identified without 
the need for verbal protocols. In pursuit of these aims, participants were allocated to one of 
two conditions, in one condition the procedure replicated that of Ford, in the other only 
written protocols were collected. Furthermore, all participants completed a questionnaire 
designed to elicit evidence of the reasoning behaviours described by Ford. 
Data from Experiment I clearly replicated the findings of Ford (1995). In the replication 
condition, both written and verbal protocols presented evidence of verbal and spatial 
strategies with characteristics as described in Ford's work. Moreover, in the other 
condition, written accounts of verbal and spatial strategies were identical in nature, clearly 
indicating that they were not just artefacts generated as result of asking participants to 
verbally articulate their reasoning. A small number of reasoners appeared to be using a 
mixed approach. The questionnaire also proved reliable for 8 items and this provided 
useful coiiverging evidence for the strategic distinction made from written reports. The fact 
that this questionnaire had not previously been piloted, and yet proved reliable. is further 
cvidencc that Ford's findings and those of Experiment I were compatible. 
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However, Experiment I did not fully replicate some of the more detailed perforinance data 
presented by Ford. Firstly, although verbal reasoners in Experiment I present clear 
evidence of using substitution behaviour, it only tended to be of the forin Ford describes as 
"naive substitution", i. e. it occurred in consistent way across all problems, irrespective of 
mood or figure. There was no evidence of reasoners attempting to use the more 
sophisticated substitution rules that Ford describes for more difficult problems. For 
instance, Ford makes a distinction between problems which require the modus ponens and 
modus tollens forms of her rules, and shows that her verbal reasoners found the latter most 
difficult. However, in no instance did the data from Experiment I suggest any similar 
difference. Rather than attempting the more formal or sophisticated substitution process 
that Ford describes for more difficult syllogisms, verbal reasoners appeared to use na*fve 
substitution throughout. On more difficult problems which contained an All premise, they 
frequently made precisely the type of conversion errors that Ford claims her reasoners 
eschew (assuming that All A are B is equivalent to All B are A). Similarly, Ford describes 
how syllogisms where premises are less constrained (in essence, she means that they can 
be represented in multiple ways) are more intractable for spatial reasoners. Experiment I 
found no such effect. For all problems, spatial reasoners presented a single model of the 
premises and showed little evidence of considering alternative representations on less- 
constrained problems. 
Moreover, when individual syllogisms are considered, more disparity with Ford's findings 
became apparent. For verbal strategy users, naive substitution can be successfully applied 
to all same-fon-n syllogisms and hence these are easy for them. But, because the verbal 
strategy relies on premise quantifiers in generating conclusions, it can lead to difficulty for 
different-forri-i problems, and verbal reasoners duly tended to produce conclusions which 
wcrc incorrect by virtue of containing the same quantifier as one of the premises. Howevcr. Z- 
246 
in Experiment 1, a similar trend was also observed for spatial reasoners. In mental-model 
terms, the different-form syllogisms are three-model and hence the most difficult of all 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and these are also described by Ford as less-constrained. 
However, unlike Ford, we found very little evidence of spatial reasoners attempting to 
represent multiple models of the premises, and this seemed to be a major factor in their 
difficulty with different-fon-n syllogisms. 
Experiment I presented an important, and overdue, replication. The findings presented 
some initial evidence that the two strategic behaviours are reliable and replicable and 
hence possibly a robust feature of how individuals reason. However, Experiment I (in line 
with Ford, 1995) only considered syllogistic reasoning in tenns of generating conclusions 
to valid problems. Experiment 2 was based on the premise that a further replication of the 
verbal and spatial strategies generally would present more credence to the proposal that 
they are inherent individual differences, and more so if they were also found to be 
employed during a conclusion evaluation task. Moreover, the nature of the verbal strategy 
would suggest that, when presented with invalid syllogisms, they would be likely to 
generate or evaluate more incorrect SF conclusions, and produce fewer NVC responses, 
than spatial reasoners. Further development of the reasoning behaviour questionnaire was 
also desirable. 
Experiment 2 presented all participants with both a syllogistic conclusion generation and 
evaluation task, followed by a revised version of the questionnaire. They were asked to 
provi ntten protocols whilst completing both reasoning tasks, but no verbal accounts ide wiI 
\\, ere collected. Although verbal and spatial strategies were clearly identified once again, 
much more variation in the nature of the protocols , vas observed than in Experiment 1. A 
Significant number of participants produced protocols which they tended to describe as 
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"flowcharts", and which showed terrns linked together by arrows. In this respect they 
resembled several of the verbal reasoners' protocols presented by Ford and indeed, the few 
of these that were observed in Experiment I were allocated to the verbal group. However. 
they were far more prevalent in Experiment 2, more so than substitution. Moreover, their 
protocols often suggested a spatial element to their representations and some participants 
did answer affin-natively to spatial questionnaire items. Most however, simply answered 
negatively to almost all items, seemingly showing that they used neither substitution, nor 
spatial strategies. Not surprisingly given this, the reasoning behaviour questionnaire proved 
less reliable than in Expenment 1. Experiment I suggested that verbal reasoners were 
using a strategy which relies heavily on premise form, but that this was less important for 
spatial reasoners. As such, it was predicted that in Experiment 2, verbal reasoners would 
generate more invalid SF conclusions than they correct NVC responses, whilst spatial 
reasoners would be more successful at identifying these problems as invalid. A trend in 
line with this prediction was observed, however none of the differences between strategies 
reached statistical significance. 
Overall, Experiment 2 was successful at replicating the verbal and spatial strategies 
observed in Experiment 1, but also suggested that that they may not be as homogeneous as 
Ford (1995) and Experiment I had suggested. Experiment 3 aimed to further investigate 
both inter- and intra-strategic differences as well as extending the research beyond 
syllogistic reasoning, to transitive inference and sentence-picture verification. Firstly, and 
most importantly, evidence for verbal and spatial reasoners was once again observed 
through verbal protocols. Some of the flowchart behaviour was again present, but it was 
not as prevalent as in Experiment 2 and, in this experiment, the questionnaire once more 
proved rchable. Moreovcr, the inclusion of a qualitative questionnaire item which asked 
participants to say more about their overall strategy revealed some very useful information 
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about how "flowcharters" reasoned. The vast majority it appeared were reasoning 
propositional ly, though not by substitution. Rather they applied an informal rule to link 
together the two end tenns and fonn a conclusion, the forrn of the rule varying according 
to the quantifiers present. These linking rules are described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
These participants were therefore designated as verbal reasoners. A minority of people 
used a combination of verbal and spatial approaches, some involving linking rules, others 
substitution, together with a spatial representation of premises. These were allocated to the 
mixed strategy group. 
A second important finding of Experiment 3 was that, for the most part, the two main 
strategy groups identified for syllogistic reasoning mapped onto two strategy groups 
identified for transitive inference. These latter groups were also identified from written 
protocols which suggested them to be the abstract directional and concrete properties 
strategies previously identified by Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982), the former mapping 
onto the verbal syllogistic strategy group and the latter onto the spatial group. Only a small 
minority of participants did not present this correspondence of strategies. The nature of 
these transitive inference strategies lend further support to the claim that the two groups of 
reasoners are using either a abstract propositional or a visuo-spatial approach. For 
transitive inference they differed in tenns of the degree of explicit visual representation of 
the relationship between terms which was required, just as they did for syllogistic 
reasoning. The findings regarding sentence-picture verification were less clear, and it 
would seem that latency data alone is insufficient to identify strategies on this task, and 
other supporting data (such as verbal protocol) may be required, as Marquer and Peneira 
(1990) have suggested. Howcver trends in the data suggest that similar strategies cannot be 
Wholly discounted. 
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Having repeatedly replicated the verbal and spatial strategies for syllogistic reasonin,,,,, 
Experiments 5 and 6 began an investigation into possible factors which may underpin such 
strategic differences. The rationale was that if strategies are an inherent feature of the 
individual, then they may be reflected in other aspects of their cognitive function. 
Experiment 5 examined verbal and spatial abilities and cognitive style. Two ability 
measures were used. For verbal ability, the Shipley Institute of Living Scale produces two 
measures, vocabulary and abstract reasoning, together with an estimation of IQ in line with 
that assessed by the well recognised WAIS. The spatial ability measure was the 
Vandenberg Mental Rotation Task, which involves the mental manipulation of a series of 
novel objects. Two cognitive style measures were also used, the Rational Experiential 
Inventory , and the Cognitive Style Analysis which measures style along two dimensions 
verbal-analytic style versus wholistic-imagistic which it was hoped would reflect verbal 
and spatial reasoners. All measures have been extensively researched previously and found 
reliable. Again, on a short syllogistic reasoning task, the distinctive verbal and spatial 
written protocols were observed indicating individual difference in strategy. Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the apparent nature of these strategies, no significant association 
between these and differences in verbal and spatial ability was apparent. The main 
predictors of syllogistic perfonnance for verbal reasoners were the SILS verbal ability and 
estimated IQ score, with this and SILS abstract reasoning correlating significantly with 
perfon-riance on the VMRT. However, for spatial reasoners, perforinance on the VMRT 
was also a significant predictor of syllogistic reasoning, whereas it had no relationship with 
SILS at all. The tendency for spatial ability to predict performance for spatial reasoners, 
but not verbal, was to be expected, however the difference in correlation between strategies 
was not significant. The relationships between the cognitive style measures were strikingly 
similar in both verbal and spatial strategy groups, correlations tended to be -,, cry weak and 
no style mcasure predicted stratcgic preferencc. 
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Experiment 6 continued this line of enquiry, this time focussing on working memory. 
Previous work has indicated individual differences in tenns of how syllogistic reasoning 
loads on the verbal and spatial components of working memory. Experiment 6 aimed to 
discover if this was the case between verbal and spatial reasoners. Six measures of working 
memory span were used, three each for verbal and spatial resource. Firstly, the verbal and 
spatial strategies were again replicated for syllogistic reasoning. However, no differences 
in verbal or spatial working memory capacity were observed between the groups. 
However, a confin-natory factor analysis was also conducted and a two correlated factor 
model was found to fit the data well, the factors relating to verbal and spatial working 
memory. It was found that whereas verbal reasoners drew primarily on the verbal resource, 
spatial reasoners drew significantly, and similarly, on both this and the spatial resource. 
Given the small sample size Oust N= 48 in the spatial group) these results need to be 
treated with some caution, but nevertheless do present some preliminary evidence that 
there is a fundamental difference in how verbal and spatial strategy users draw on working 
memory resource in syllogistic reasoning. 
Overall, the six experiments presented in this thesis have strongly suggested that individual 
differences in reasoning strategies do exist and have presented evidence suggesting that 
most individuals prefer to represent information in either a verbal-propositional or a spatial 
forin when reasoning. Moreover, this extends beyond syllogistic reasoning suggesting that 
strategic preference is a domain general phenomena, not simply a function of syllogistic 
reasoning processes, or an artefact of verbal protocol. Moreover, the final experiment has 
presented some preliminary evidence to suggest an association between strategic 
preference and differenccs in how individuals dravv on the verbal and spatial components 
ot'working memory. In all, this evidence suggests that stratc ic preferences are an int insic Pin 
cognitive feature within individuals, and hence may influence how people reason not only 
in experimental situations, but in their everyday dealings with the world. The two 
following sections of this chapter will expand on this to discuss the implications of such 
differences, firstly for theones of human reasoning and then for everyday and applied 
situations. 
6.3 Implications for Theories of Reasoning 
As Chapter I has described, theories of reasoning have tended to assume cognitive 
universality, that is, that all individuals reason in basically the same way. This applies not 
only to general reasoning theories, such as those based on logical rules (e. g. Rips, 1994; 
Braine and O'Brien, 1998) and mental models (e. g. Johnson-Laird and Byme, 199 ])which 
have been applied across reasoning domains, including syllogisms, but also to theories 
which have been developed specifically to explain syllogistic reasoning. The evidence 
presented in thesis clearly refutes such assumptions. The key finding presented in this 
thesis is concerned with the identification of verbal and spatial reasoning strategies. This 
section offers a summary of the overall findings as they relate to the theories of reasoning 
described in Chapter 1, with particular reference to syllogistic reasoning which has 
remained a consistent theme throughout this thesis. The reader is referred to Chapter I for 
a fuller explanation of the theories discussed below. 
Mental models accounts (e. g. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Bara and Bucclarelli, 2000) 
suggest that individuals construct analogous mental representations of possible states of 
affairs suggested by syllogistic premises. Spatial reasoners can be said to construct and 
manipulate spatial mental models of the premises, and a few presented protocols which 
m ere uncannily like mental model notation, althou-Ii they denied having knowledge of the 
theory (e. g. Protocol 2.24). However, the vast majority of spatial reasoncrs presented 
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models that were more like Euler circle representations (more on this later). Mental models 
theory does not make explicit exactly what form a model takes, indeed this has been one of 
the ongoing cnticisms levelled especially by rules theonsts (e. g. Rips, 1986,1994). 
Johnson-Laird (1983, page 125) describes mental models as "an internal tableau containing 
elements that stand for members of sets" and later descriptions add little to this definition. 
Certainly spatial reasoners represent sets, but they show no sign of representing the -finite 
sets of tokens mapped onto other finite sets of tokens" that Johnson-Laird and colleagues 
propose. Rather their circles represent the class or set itself, and not members of it. Ford 
(1995) made exactly this observation about her spatial reasoners, indeed one of the initial 
aims of her study was to show not only that some reasoners did not reason with models, 
but also that those who did use that approach, did not use the form of model proposed by 
the theory. However, mental models theory does make some predictions which seem to be 
bome out by spatial reasoners, especially with regard to the source of errors. Model theory 
predicts that errors occur due to the failure to flesh out an initial model, or to search for 
counterexamples. As the data in Chapter 2 show, very few spatial reasoners attempted to 
do either of these things, rather they constructed an initial model, representing premise 
first, then adding the information from premise 2 according to their initial interpretation of 
the relationships involved. Hence, their errors on more difficult problems, especially 
different forin syllogisms or those which contained some ... not premises (which they tended 
to represent as some) arose because alternative representations were not considered. 
Conversely, theories based on mental logic assume reasoning takes the forrn of a logical 
proof which uses inherent fonnal inference rules. A range of different rules are proposed 
for dealing with different quantifiers and connectives and representations are assumed to 
be propositional, or linguistic, in nature (e. g. Rips, 1994; Braine and O'Brien, 1998). 
Although some verbal reasoners in the present senes of studies did employ rules of sorts 
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(for instance to link quantifiers, see Chapter 3) these were of a superti In ic cial and heu isti 
nature, and certainly do not suggest an inherent understanding of logical principles. At no 
stage were reasoners observed to be using rules even approaching the levels of complexity 
suggested by Rips et al. Ford (1995) proposed that, on more complex problems, verbal 
reasoners employed what she termed sophisticated substitution rules, and claimed that 
these were similar to some of the fon-nal logical rules advocated by Rips (1994). Howe%-er, 
although the verbal reasoners in the present series of studies present many of the naive 
substitution behaviours suggested by Ford, they did not appear to employ these more 
sophisticated substitution rules. The verbal protocols in Experiment I present very clear 
indication of what verbal reasoners did, namely, obtain a value for the common/B ten-n 
from the universal premise and then simply substitute this for B in the other premise to 
reach a conclusion (Protocol 2.1 is an excellent example). In support of her claim that 
verbal reasoners were able to use more formal reasoning, Ford cites evidence from verbal 
protocols, or states, simply, that they were able to generate conclusions to more difficult 
problems. However, in the present studies, although those verbal reasoners who were more 
successful were able to recognise that naive substitution would not give the correct answer, 
they simply modified this approach to suit the problem (as in Protocol 2.14), rather than 
adopted more sophisticated rules. However, mental logic theories do acknowledge that 
some reasoners use propositional representations, as opposed to spatial mental models. 
Moreover, the version offered by Braine and O'Brien (e. g. 1998) also acknowledges the 
role of natural language understanding of quantifiers. Almost all reasoners here tended to 
make natural language based assumptions (such as assuming all to mean literally all, and 
not some, as fon-nal logic would claim). 
Howcvcr, Polk and NeNvclI (1995) claini that the use of both mental models and logical 
ruics arc a fon-n of transduction paradigm, processes designed to transfon-n presented 
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stimuli into an internal representation upon which specialised reasoning mechanisms can 
then operate. The results of such processes are then transduced back into a forrn suitable 
for presentation as a conclusion. Polk and Newell's verbal reasoning hypothesis (VRH) 
describes this process. The useful aspect here, given the nature of the strategies obser%ýed, 
is that the VRH allows for individual differences in representations, they may be either 
spatial/model based or propositional/language based. However, from the e\'Idence 
presented in this thesis, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about the degree to 
which the strategies observed reflect (in Polk and Newell's terms) reasoning or 
transduction processes. The spatial strategy remains underspecified especially in ternis of 
how the conclusion is actually drawn once the representation has been constructed. Both 
verbal and written protocols were inconclusive on this point, indeed, when questioned 
informally, spatial reasoners were unable to articulate exactly how they had arrived at their 
conclusion, whether they had simply read it off the diagram, or applied some form of rule. 
Hence, it may be that the construction of such spatial representations is a fort'n of 
transduction, with further, as yet unspecified, reasoning processes then taking place. 
However, for verbal reasoners, there is very little evidence that they formed an internal 
representation upon which they then operated. Rather, their substitution, or linking rules, 
allow them to reason heuristically with little need to pay more detailed attention to the 
premise content. However, Polk and Newell do state that, because in the VRH reasoning 
processes are based in knowledge from natural language, no mental logic is required, even 
for individuals who represent infonnation propositional I y. 
One theory which does seem to offer some explanation, for the spatial strategy at least, is 
that of Euler circles (e. g. Erickson, 1974). These reasoners present diagrammatic 
representation of premises alike to those sho,, N, n in Table 1.8, although they tended not to 
attempt more than onc possible representation of a premise. Evcn those few individuals 
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who considered alternative representations only did so in terms of the combination of two 
premises, not in terms of single premises. Hence, for an All premise, either an identity or a 
subset-set relationship would be used (see also Experiment 1, Chapter 2 for further 
discussion of this point). A some premise was always expressed as an overlap. as was 
some ... not, many reasoners assuming that one implied the other. No reasoners attempted to 
use the alternative set-subset representations for some... not. However, contrary to Euler 
circles theory, rather than constructing two models, one for each premise, and then 
combining them, spatial reasoners constructed a single model, initially from premise onc, 
then augmented with infon-nation from premise two. 
Conversely, Stenning and Oberlander (1995) have suggested that only one Euler circle 
type representation per premise is actually required, and that such an approach reduces 
abstraction and allows individuals to examine relationships between terms more simply. 
This idea certainly seems to fit with the approach of the spatial reasoners, who frequently 
claimed that their diagrams helped them to visualise the problem. Their equivalent 
representations for transitive inference further support the idea that these people dislike 
abstraction and require an explicit representation of the situation in order to reason. Hence 
they need to represent explicit relationships between sets in syllogistic reasoning, and 
between relative properties in transitive inference. 
However, although both of the above implementations of Euler circles offer some 
explanation regarding the behaviour of spatial reasoners, neither can offer an account of 
verbal syllogistic reasoning. However, Sternberg and Guyote's (1981) transitive chain 
theory, although based on Euler circles, exhibits no resemblance to the processes which 
seem to be used by spatial reasoners. Rather, it seems applicable to some of the processes 
observed in vcrbal rcasoners' protocols. Sevcral reasoners; dcscnbed a process of 
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cancelling out the common/B terrn and linking the other terms together, in effect forming a 
transitive chain. However, while Sternberg and Guyote assume that reasoners are using 
some forrn of set based representation, there was no evidence that the vast majority of such 
individuals were reasoning anything other than propositional I y. A small minority of 
individuals did claim to represent terms within an spatial layout before any cancellation or 
linking rules were applied. These were classed as mixed reasoners, but the numbers were 
too small to draw any firm conclusions about them (see discussion in Chapter 3). 
A very different explanation of syllogistic reasoning was offered by Geurts (2003) 
monotonicity theory. Geurts does offer an explanation of substitution behaviour in 
syllogistic reasoning, and this seems to predict the behaviour of verbal reasoners in terins 
of the conclusions they produce. However, whether verbal reasoning is based on an 
implicit knowledge of monotonicity is difficult to say. Certainly, according to their verbal 
and written protocols, their reasoning appears rather less sophisticated than the approach 
proposed by Geurts. Monotonicity theory is a very recent addition to the literature, and, 
although it presents some interesting and novel concepts, remains relatively under 
developed. Furthennore, it cannot account at all for spatial reasoners behaviour. 
A number of heuristic accounts of syllogistic reasoning have also been proposed, and three 
of these (atmosphere, matching and the probability heuristic model) will be considered 
here. All make similar predictions regarding the type of conclusion reasoners are likely to 
generate, although they attribute them to differing processes. The atmosphere theory (e. g. 
Woodworth and Sells, 1936) claims that the mood of a conclusion arises from the 
atmosphere created by the mood of the premises. For instance, a syllogism with the 
quantifiers alk nonc, will create a negative atmosphere leading to a negative (jVone) 
conclusion. Matchino theory (e., -,. Wethenck and Gilhooly, 1990; 1995) suggests that 
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reasoners will select the most conservative premise quantifier and match their conclusion 
to that mood. Hence for the same all; none syllogism, again a none conclusion ý, vould be 
predicted. Both these approaches suggest that reasoning is camed out in a non-logical 
heuristic fashion and both clearly predict conclusions typically presented by %, crbal 
reasoners, although they generally arrive at them by performing substitution. Interestingly 
however in view of the individual differences in strategies observed here, Wetherick and 
Gilhooly have pointed out that although some reasoners use matching, many do not. Some 
have an awareness of more logical principles whilst other may use different processes 
altogether. They do not make suggestions as to what these alternatives may be, but do 
acknowledge that individual differences in strategy are likely. Verbal reasoners in these six 
expenments do not seem to be matching in quite the way descnbed by Wetherick and 
Gilhooly, but their approach has some similarities. Their end quantifier does tend to be the 
most conservative and linking rules bear comparison to the idea that certain quantifier 
combinations necessanly (at least to those reasoners) suggest which should be chosen for 
the conclusion. 
Similar predictions are also made by the probability heuristics model (PHM, Chater and 
Oaksford, 1999) although in this case, heunstics are used to decide a conclusion based on 
the relative infon-nativeness of the premises, as suggested by probability. Hence, to return 
to the above example, for an all; none syllogism, the quantifier none will be selected for 
the conclusion. Again, although the types of conclusions drawn by verbal reasoners can be 
accounted for, neither the PHM nor matching can fully explain the process of verbal 
reasoning by substitution. There is little evidence that relative conservati-ý,, eness (or 
informativeness) is a factor in the choice of end-quantifier for those people. However. for 
some other verbal reasoners (such as those using linking rule approach) some participants 
did dcscribe thinking of some quantifiers as -stronger- than others, with all being, the 
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strongest (see for instance Protocol 2.22) which may be an indicator that some kind of 
quantifier evaluation process was occurring for those people. However, this xas mentioned 
by only a few participants. Also, although spatial reasoners often produce similar 
conclusions to verbal (especially to same-form problems), their strategy is simply not 
accounted for in the above heuristic theories. 
At this point, it is pertinent to briefly mention theories of transitive inference, a task which 
was employed in both Experiments 3 and 4, and for which strategies were found to map 
closely onto those for syllogistic reasoning. For this task, neither the abstract directional 
not the concrete properties strategy can be fully accounted for by any one theory. Only a 
small proportion of participants used a purely propositional strategy (Clark, 1969), and 
those who did so, used the same approach for all problems, irrespective of the relational 
adjectives present, contrary to the theory. Moreover although the AD reasoners certainly 
produced a spatial array (as per DeSoto et al, 1965; Huttenlocher, 1968) almost all 
produced a horizontal array to all problems, even those with adjectives such as "taller" 
which the theories suggest tend to prompt a vertical array. The few reasoners who 
presented vertical arrays did so as a matter of course, again to all problems. The same can 
be said for concrete properties reasoners who, although showing explicit representations of 
relational properties, still presented the terms in a directional array, either vertically or 
(most commonly) horizontally. Hence the tendency towards using one or other form 
appears to be a function of individual preference, rather than problem type. The findings of 
Experiments 3 and 4 and their implications for mainstream theories of transitive inference 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Overall, it is apparent that althou, ýh some of the theories discussed above can account for 
some aspects of reasoning behaviour, in one or othcr stratcov, none of them can account, 
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even partially, for both verbal and spatial reasoning strategies. This is a clear reflection of 
the dichotomous nature of reasoning theories, as discussed previously in Section 1.7. 
Consequently, the findings presented in this thesis have some important implications for 
theories of reasoning as they stand at present. The data present evidence of individual 
differences in reasoning strategies, but indicate few distinctions in perfornance as a 
consequence of these. Verbal and spatial reasoners do not differ substantially in their 
overall patterns of accuracy, even though their errors arise for different reasons. Hence 
traditional behavioural measures, based on accuracy and types of errors (on which many 
theories are based), may not tap into these strategies. A number of accounts claim to have 
successfully modelled syllogistic reasoning data from differing theoretical perspectives 
(e. g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird, 1999; Chater and Oaksford, 1999; Polk and Newell, 
1995; Rips, 1994) but these models may not capture the subtleties which underlie the 
production of that data. Any comprehensive theoretical account of human reasoning needs 
to present an explanation of the differing nature of strategies and what underlies their 
development in logically untrained individuals. 
6.4 Directions for Future Research 
Although the observation of verbal and spatial strategies seems to be a fairly robust 
phenomena (replicated six times across these experiments) a number of issues remain 
unresolved. Firstly, the spatial strategy especially remains underspecified. Further work 
needs to investigate particularly how such reasoners draw their conclusions once a spatial 
rpresentation been constructed. Moreover, ftirther evidence is needed to clariýy the extent 
to which the strategies really are verbal and spatial in nature. 
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The findings presented in this thesis suggest that spatial reasoners require a more explicit 
visual image in order to reason. Hence, it could be predicted that these people xill have 
more difficulty with material which does not lend itself to such representation. 
Comparisons between reasoning performance on material presented in visual and -verbal 
modalities, as a function of strategy, could prove informative. Using problems which 
conflict with belief may also support an inter-strategic distinction, with spatial reasoners 
more prone to belief bias as results of their greater semantic involvement with problem 
content. It is also still unclear whether other individual differences in cognitive function 
underlie strategic differences. In Experiment 6, confinnatory factor analysis has suggested 
some differences in how the strategies draw on the verbal and spatial components of 
working memory. However, these were preliminary findings only and require further 
investigation with a larger sample. 
Another outstanding issue concerns how and why logically untrained Individuals develop 
different strategies for reasoning - what Johnson-Laird, Savary and Bucclarelli (2000, page 
238) have called "the Holy Grail" of reasoning research. Given that some strong evidence 
for strategic distinctions has been observed, an investigation into whether the verbal-spatial 
preferences are reflected in the selective remembering and subsequent application of 
learned material is suggested. Training studies, possibly incorporating a test-retest 
methodology with control for inherent strategic preference, may indicate effects on 
reasoning perfon-nance as a function of whether the strategy participants are made to use, 
after training, matches their natural preference. 
Further to the abovc, and in pursuit of the same aim, developmental research might 
im-cstigate the stage at which strategies develop during cognitive maturation and the extent 
to which any inherent approach to reasoning retlects educational attainment. An -interaction 
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between verbal-spatial strategies and learning has implications for teaching methods, for 
instance, number lines are often used to teach young children mathematics and these apply 
a spatial dimension to the solving of abstract numerical problems. Reasoning is integral to 
the education process (e. g. Perkins, Farady and Bushey, 1991) and if Indl-vIduals do indeed 
represent and manipulate information in different ways, as the present research suggests, 
then this has obvious implications for learning and problem solving in the real world, both 
in formal educational settings, and as part of the general lifelong learning process. 
Although a fair amount of research has already been conducted into individual differences 
in thinking process during learning, much of this work has been concerned primarily with 
differences in cognitive styles and/or associated learning styles. For instance, the wealth of 
studies discussed by Riding and Rayner (1998, Chapter 7), have all used learning style 
measures evolved from the Cognitive Style Analysis used in Experiment 5. Here, no 
association was found between cognitive style , as measured 
by the CSA, and reasoning 
strategy. Learning styles were not examined in Experiment 5, but these have often been 
developed in line with associated theories of cognitive style (see for instance Riding and 
Rayner, 1998, who present a comprehensive summary of both their own (CSA based) 
learning style model and others). Given that Experiment 5 found absolutely no effects of 
cognitive style on strategy use, it may also be the case that inter-strategic differences in 
learning style would equally not be observed. Similarly, much research examining 
individual differences in factors such as motivation for learning (e. g. the work of 
Klaczynski and colleagues) has also used thinking style measures such as the REI, which 
again Nvas used in Expenment 5 and found not be associated with reasoning strategy. 
Pcrkins, Jay and Tishman (1993) have argued that such cognitive styles havc implications 
not only for rcasoning generally, but also for issues of culture and education. Howcver, 
giveii the findings of Experiment 5, for the present purpose, altematl\ c forms of 
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investigation, which examine differences in thinking and reasoning strategy on educational 
tasks such as mathematics, are advocated, rather than reliance on psychometric stde 
measures. 
Finally, what about other forms of everyday reasoning? If individual differences in 
strategies for reasoning are observable under experimental conditions, it is reasonable to 
suppose that they may also be present in other settings. This is even more likely given the 
present findings which strongly suggest that such strategies are an intrinsic feature of how 
individuals reason, rather than an experimental artefact. Galottl (1989) has stated that the 
justification for studying syllogistic reasoning must be grounded in its relationship to 
everyday reasoning, and that the results need to extend to reasoning which is typical of that 
in ordinary life. Although everyday reasoning seems to requires a rather different form of 
"logic" to fonnal tasks (see for instance Galotti, 1989, page 335 for a comparison), Perkins 
et al (199 1) have highlighted how the two forms of reasoning may challenge individuals in 
very similar ways, errors often arising from incomplete consideration of alternatives and 
belief bias. The lack of fon-nal structure and containment in many everyday reasoning 
situations may mean that verbal and spatial strategies per se are inappropriate. However, if 
individual differences in approach were observed, strategy classifications may prove to 
map onto those for syllogistic reasoning, just as they did with transitive inference strategies 
in Experiments 3 and 4. 
Overall, the above suggestions would allow for the line of research presented in this thesis 
to be extended, and provide further supporting evidence for the strategic distinctions 
highlighted in Expenments I-6. Although the ten-ns verbal and spatial have been used to 
describe the strategies throughout this thesis (after Ford, 1995, and in line with the 
propositional and spatial representations they producc in protocols) further evidcnce is 
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required before a definitive statement regarding their nature can be made. Moreover, a 
greater understanding of strategic acquisition and development, together with associated 
effects on learning processes, can be translated into more effective teaching methods and 
the acquisition of new and flexible skills to meet the changing needs of society. 
6.5 Concluding Comments 
To recap, the overall purpose of this series of experiments was to establish evidence for the 
existence of individual differences in reasoning strategies. The programme aimed to 
investigate the nature of such differences, whether they generalised across differing 
reasoning domains, and some of the underlying cognitive factors which may give rise to 
them. From an accumulation of evidence across the six experiments, four particularly 
important findings have emerged: 
1. Experiments 1-6 have presented some strong and consistent evidence for individual 
differences in strategies for human reasoning. Verbal and wntten protocols produced 
during Experiment I showed clear differences in how individuals chose to represent 
syllogistic premise information, and have suggested of some key qualitative differences 
between two main strategies. Those individuals that have been ten-ned verbal reasoners 
seem to reason propositionally, manipulating the written forrn of the premises in order 
to arrive at a conclusion. Conversely, the spatial reasoners prefer to represent premises 
in the forrn of sets and subsets, generating a diagram to show the relationships between 
terms spatially. This finding was replicated a furtherfive times during the course of this 
programme of study, and without the need for verbal reports. Moreo%, cr, a 
questionnaire has been developed which has proven to be a reliable indicator of the 
prcscilcc of these strategic differences. 
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2. No significant differences are observed between reasoning performance of verbal and 
spatial reasoners. Not only do they tend to perform similarly overall, thev present 
similar patterns of errors, both performing least well on problems where the conclusion 
is of different form to that of either premise. However, such errors occur for different 
reasons. The verbal reasoning strategy (be it substitution or linking of quantifiers) uses 
premise forrn quite literally in generating a conclusion where the quantifier tends to be 
the same as that for one or other premise. Spatial reasoners on the other hand, only tend 
to consider one possible representation of the premises and their failure to incorporate 
alternatives into their representations can lead to the correct conclusion being 
overlooked. Hence individuals can present an outward appearance if universality, 
despite using very different reasoning strategies. These are important findings given the 
ubiquity assumed by many theories of reasoning. 
3. Strategic preferences have been shown to extend beyond syllogistic reasoning. Two 
strategies have also been identified for transitive inference, an abstract directional and a 
concrete properties strategy. These differ mainly in the degree to which the relative 
qualities of the terms are represented, the former being based on a simple abstract scale 
and the latter on a more complex and explicit representation of the qualitative nature of 
the terrns. Individuals using verbal and spatial syllogistic strategies also tended to be 
those who adopted an abstract or a concrete transitive inference strategy respectively. 
This clearly suggests that individual differences in strategies may be an intrinsic 
cognitive factor, one which remains consistent between individuals across reasoning 
domains. 
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4. Verbal and spatial strategies draw differentially on working memory resources. 
Confinnatory factor analysis has indicated that whilst verbal reasoners draw on verbal 
working memory resources during syllogistic reasoning, spatial reasoners draw on both 
verbal and spatial resources. This further supports the idea of some form of basic 
cognitive distinction between the two groups of individuals. 
Overall, and in conclusion, the experiments described herein seem to have ftilfilled their 
overall aims. Having demonstrated consistent differences in syllogistic reasoning 
strategies, they also present some preliminary indications that the preferences are domain- 
general and that they may be underpinned by fundamental cognitive differences. These 
findings have potentially important and far reaching implications for the theories of human 
reasoning which assume strategic universality. It is suggested that future research 
concentrate on consolidating these findings with regard to the distinctive qualitative 
natures of strategies and to establishing their cognitive antecedents. With these features 
firmly documented, comes the task of getting the concept of individual differences in 
strategies for reasoning acknowledged in the wider academic community. As fTesh insights 
and data come to the fore, theoretical accounts are constantly being updated, and new 
models proposed. These cannot hope to offer a comprehensive explanation of human 
reasoning behaviour unless the possibility of individual differences is taken into account. 
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APPENDIX 2A 
Experiment 1: The 27 valid syllogistic problems presented to all participants. Shovvn 
with their valid conclusions. 
I Some of the archaeologists are atheists 15 Some of the painters are linguists 
None of the archaeologists are smokers All of the linguists are birdwatchers 
Some of the atheists are not smokers Some of the painters are birdwatchers 
2 All of the parents are teachers 16 All of the greengrocers are bellringers 
Some of the teetotallers are not teachers None of the greengrocers are hedonists 
Some of the teetotallers are not parents Some of the bellringers are not hedonists 
3 All of the athletes are lawyers 17 Some of the doctors are not singers 
All of the lawyers are comedians All of the doctors are intellectuals 
All of the athletes are comedians Some of the intellectuals are not singers 
4 None of the pianists are mechanics 18 None of the criminals are florists 
Some of the experts are mechanics Some of the florists are trainspotters 
Some of the experts are not pianists Some of the trainspotters are not criminals 
5 All of the zookeepers are surfers 19 Some of the gymnasts are nurses 
Some of the zookeepers are not homeowners None of the nurses are alcoholics 
Some of the surfers are not homeowners Some of the gymnasts are not alcoholics 
6 None of the philosophers are saxophonists 20 Some of the hikers are not politicians 
Some of the boxers are philosophers All of the cyclists are politicians 
Some of the boxers are not saxophonists Some of the hikers are not cyclists 
7 None of the winedrinkers; are biologists 21 Some of the farmers are freemasons 
All of the biologists are potters All of the farmers are prizewinners 
Some of the potters are not winedrinkers; Some of the freemasons are prizewinners 
8 None of the bankers are buddhists 22 None of the astronomers are naturists 
All of the jugglers are bankers Some of the astronomers are flautists; 
None of the jugglers are buddhists Some of the flautists are not naturists 
9 All of the cooks are bookworms 23 Some of the dentists are guitarists 
None of the poets are bookworms None of the skydivers are dentists 
None of the cooks are poets Some of the guitarists are not skydivers 
10 All of the librarians are skaters 24 None of the psychologists are catholics 
Some of the sculptors are librarians All of the psychologists cricketers 
Some of the sculptors are skaters Some of the cricketers are not catholics 
II All of the churchgoers are chemists 25 All of the weavers are gardeners 
None of the chemists are footballers All of the vegetarians are weavers 
None of the churchgoers are footballers All of the vegetarians are gardeners 
12 All of the historians are philatelists 26 All of the students are golfers 
None of the beekeepers are historians All of the students are drivers 
Some of the philatelists are not beekeepers Some of the golfers are drivers 
13 Some of the clubbers, are pilots 27 None of the chessplayers are bookbinders 
None of the rockclimbers are pilots All of the dancers are bookbinders 
Some of the clubbers are not rockclimbers None of the chessplayers are dancers, 
14 All of the plumbers are gamblers 
Some of the plumbers are snowboarders 
Some of the gambler-, are snowboarders 
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Experiment 1: The Reasoning behaviours questionnaire administered to all 
participants. V or S in parentheses indicates whether item was intended to identify a 
verbal or spatial strategy behaviour, and were not shown on original document 1Nýhen 
presented to participants. 
This short questionnaire aims to gather some further information about how you personally 
approached the 27 reasoning problems. If none of the options in a particular question seem 
appropriate to you, just write a short note alongside explaining your approach. If you have 
any difficulties or need to clarify anything, please ask the researcher at any time. 
1. Please indicate the extent to which you thought about each of the following during 
the task. 
A lot 
a) Groups or sets of people (S) 
b) The words used in the statements (V) 
Not at all 
I 
........... ............. 
3 
...... ..... 
4 
............ 
5 
I ........... ............. 
3 
...... ..... 
4 ............ 5 
c) The structure of the statements (all, some etc) I ........... 2 ............. 3 ...... ..... 4 ............ 5 M 
d) The order in which the occupations were ........... 2 ............. 3 ...... ..... 4 ............ 
5 
presented (either) 
2. Please describe the kind of mental images/representations which came to mind 
while you were solving the problems. Mention anything you thought of, and how 
you used/manipulated the image to help you solve the problems. (S) 
2a. Which of the following best sums up the mental image/representations which were 
niost helpful to you. Indicate the extent to which this representations were helpful 
in deciding on a conclusion 
A lot 
a) Pictonal (of the people descnbed) (S) 
b) Shapes (circles/other shapes in spatial 
relationships) (S) 
c) Linguistic (e. g. sentences/words) (V) 
d) Numeric (e. g. numb crs'equ ati ons) (V) 
Not at all 
I 
........... ............. ...... ..... ............ 
I 
........... ............. ...... ..... ............ 
I ........... ............. ...... ..... ............. 
5 
I ........... ............. ...... ..... ............ 
5 
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3. Did you think about setsNenn diagrams (similar diagrams to that shov, 'n below) 
either using circles or any other shape? (S) 
YES/NO 
(M 
3a. If yes, what symbols did you imagine within the shapes? (S) 
a) People of different occupations 
b) letters 
c) numbers 
d) other symbols (please describe) ................................................................................... 
3b. If you answered letters, numbers or other to question 3a above, describe why you 
chose to do this to help you solve the problems . ........................................................... 
4. Did you attempt to substitute terms/occupations from one statement to another 
(i. e. switch the occupations around between statements)? YES/NO. (V) 
A lot Not at all 
4a. If yes, roughly how often did you do this? I ............. 
2 
............. 
3 
............ 
4 ............ 
5 
5. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to form a single, longer, 
verbal description? YES/NO (V) 
A lot Not at all 
5a. If yes, how often did you do this? I ............. 
2 
............. 
3 ............ 
4 ............ 
5 
6. Did you attempt to reverse the position of the occupations within the statements? 
YES/NO (V) 
A lot Not at all 
6a. If yes, how often did you do this? 1 ............. 
2 ............. 
3 ............ 
4 ............ 
5 
7. Did you develop a rule or set of rules to help you, v, 'hich you then re-applied to 
each subsequent problem? YES/NO (V) 
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7a. If yes, at what point in the overall task did you develop the rule(s)? 
a) Near the start (i. e. during the practice items or first one or two test statements) 
b) Fairly early on (i. e. around statements 6/7) 
c) About half way through (i. e. around statements 13/14) 
d) Towards the end (i. e. after statement 20) 
7b. Please try to descnbe the rule(s) ....................................................................................... 
8. If you did not develop any rules, did you approach each problem in an entirely 
individual way? YES/NO (Either) 
9. Did you apply a rule or rules which you already knew about from things you have 
done in the past, rather than develop a new rule for this task? YES/NO (Either) 
9a. If yes, please describe the rule(s) and how you knew about it ........................................... 
10. Most people find some of these problems harder than others. Describe the type of 
problem you found hardest. (either) ............................................................................... 
I Oa. What made these problems harder than others in the test? ............................................. 
11. Please try to sum up your overall approach (either) ................................................... 
12. Did you change your approach entirely at any point during the task? YES/NO 
(either) 
12a. If yes, roughly at what point? 
a) Fairly early on (i. e. around statement 6/7) 
b) About half way through (i. e. around statement 13/14) 
c) Towards the end (i. e. after statement 20) 
13. Did you adapt or develop your initial approach (rather than change it completely) 
as the task went on and you became accustomed to the problems? YES NO 
(either) 
13a. lio\ý did you do this? ....................................................................................................... 
2, ', 
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Experiment 1: SPSS output from reliability analysis of reasoning behaviours 
questionnaire completed by all participants. 
Analysis 1: all qualitative items 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
QlA 29.4118 40.0871 . 1127 . 6421 
Q1B 31.0588 38.0565 . 3569 . 5971 
QlC 31.6863 42.4596 . 1688 . 6261 
QlD 30.0000 40.3200 . 1551 . 6298 
Q2B 29.6471 34.7929 . 4111 . 5806 
Q2C 30.7843 36.1725 . 4211 . 5824 
Q2D 29.2745 39.9231 . 1456 . 
6338 
Q3 32.4510 40.6925 . 4654 . 
6049 
Q4A 29.7059 33.7318 . 4777 . 
5651 
Q5A 29.4314 36.2102 . 2890 . 
6086 
Q6A 30.0784 35.1937 . 4419 . 
5760 
Q7 32.7647 42.5835 . 2183 . 
6244 
Q2A 29.4706 41.4941 . 0419 . 
6532 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 51.0 N of Items = 13 
Alpha = . 6301 
Analysis 2: Item 2A removed 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
QlA 25.9020 36.8902 . 1625 . 
6600 
QlB 27.5490 36.4525 . 2998 . 
6325 
QlC 28.1765 39.8682 . 1956 . 
6487 
QlD 26.4902 37.3749 . 1964 . 
6495 
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Q2B 26.1373 32.4008 . 4228 . 6064 Q2C 27.2745 34.0031 . 4151 . 6107 
Q2D 25.7647 37.4235 . 1538 . 6592 Q3 28.9412 38.4165 . 4518 . 6306 
Q4A 26.1961 31.2808 . 4964 . 5893 
Q5A 25.9216 34.7137 . 2428 . 6477 
Q6A 26.5686 32.6502 . 4652 . 5988 
Q7 29.2549 40.1137 . 2296 . 6482 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 51.0 
Alpha = . 6532 
N of Items = 12 
Analysis 3: Item 1A removed 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
Q1B 23.9804 32.2596 . 2850 . 
6426 
QiC 24.6078 35.4431 . 1796 . 
6576 
QlD 22.9216 32.6737 . 2174 . 
6548 
Q2B 22.5686 28.3302 . 4177 . 
6150 
Q2C 23.7059 29.3718 . 4487 . 
6104 
Q2D 22.1961 33.6408 . 1072 . 
6783 
Q3 25.3725 33.8784 . 4699 . 
6355 
Q4A 22.6275 26.6784 . 5374 . 
5849 
Q5A 22.3529 29.9129 . 2733 . 
6511 
Q6A 23.0000 29.2400 . 4086 . 
6176 
Q7 25.6863 35.3396 . 2790 . 
6526 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 51.0 N of Items = 11 
Alpha = . 6600 
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Analysis 4: Item 2D removed 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
Q1B 20.2745 28.8831 . 3122 . 6595 QiC 20.9020 32.2902 . 1725 . 6786 QlD 19.2157 29.5725 . 2168 . 6774 Q2B 18.8627 25.4008 . 4192 . 6379 Q2C 20.0000 25.7600 . 5081 . 6191 Q3 21.6667 31.1067 . 4055 . 6602 
Q4A 18.9216 24.3137 . 5013 . 6169 
Q5A 18.6471 26.4729 . 3025 . 6689 
Q6A 19.2941 26.3718 . 4024 . 6415 
Q7 21.9804 32.0596 . 2995 . 6712 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 51.0 N of Items = 10 
Alpha = . 6783 
Analvsis 5: Item 1C removed 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
QlB 18.9804 27.7796 . 2965 . 
6632 
QlD 17.9216 28.3137 . 2141 . 
6797 
Q2B 17.5686 24.0902 . 4277 . 
6349 
Q2C 18.7059 24.8118 . 4849 . 
6227 
Q3 20.3725 29.8784 . 3915 . 
6625 
Q4A 17.6275 23.0384 . 5096 . 
6126 
Q5A 17.3529 24.8729 . 3283 . 
6631 
Q6A 18.0000 25.3600 . 3851 . 
6452 
Q7 20.6863 30.6996 . 3081 . 
6723 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 51.0 
Alpha = . 6786 
N of Items = 
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APPENDIX 2E 
Experiment 1: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tables. 
Table 2E. I: Comparison of mean reasoning behaviour scale scores across three strategy groups (c. f. 
section 3.1.1.2) . 
Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 486.49 2 243.25 10.35 . 00 Within groups 1128.02 48 23.50 
Total 1614.51 50 
Table 2E. 2: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoners' performance on same and different form 
svIlo2isms: Within-subiects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Syllogism Form 58909.12 1 58909.12 144.05 
. 
00 
Syll form *Strategy 1191.53 1 1191.53 2.91 0.09 
Error (Form) 17993.55 44 408.94 
Table 2E. 3: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoner' performance on same and different form 
svlloi! isms: Between-subiects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Intercept 189263.67 1 189263.67 449.82 0.00 
Strategy 853.29 1 853.29 2.03 0.16 
Error 18513.35 44 420.76 
Table 2E. 4: Simple main effects analysis of interaction between syllogism form and strategy: Same- 
form nrohit-m. -. 
Type 111 
Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Corrected model 14.08 1 14.08 0.07 0.80 
Intercept 229676.91 1 229676.91 1055.50 . 
00 
Strategy 14.08 1 14.08 0.07 0.85 
Error 9574.43 44 408.94 
Total 251479.59 46 
Corrected Total 9588.51 45 
2 () 5 
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Table 2E. 5: Simple main effects analysis of interaction between syllogism form and strategy: Different 
-form problems 
Type 111 
Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Corrected model 2030.74 1 2030.74 3.31 0.08 
Intercept 18495.88 1 18495.88 30.22 0.00 
Strategy 2030.74 1 2030.74 4.97 0.03 
Error 26932.47 44 408.94 
Total 45680.47 46 
Corrected Total 28963.21 45 
Table 2E. 6: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoners performance on the four same-form, multi- 
model syllogisms: Within subjects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Syllogism Pair 13695.65 1 13695.65 10.96 
. 
002 
Syll pair *Strategy 13695.65 1 13695.65 10.96 . 
002 
Error (pair) 55000.00 44 1250.00 
Table 2E. 7: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoners performance on the four same-form, multi- 
model svllogisms: Between subjects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Intercept 152899.41 1 152899.41 85.22 . 000 
Strategy 725.50 1 725.50 0.40 . 528 
Error 78948.41 44 1794.28 
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Experiment 2: Syllogisms presented to all participants. N-P% refers to percentages of 
Necessary and Probable conclusions endorsed by subjects in Evans et al (1999). 
Valid Same-form (both conditions) Valid Different-form (both conditions) 
No. Figure Syllogism N-P % No. Figure Syllogism Vp % 
1 4 Some B are A 6 2 No B are A 73-80 
All B are C 73-87 Some C are B 
Some C are A Some C are not A 
2 1 All A are B 73-80 7 2 All B are A 43-80 
All Bare C All C are B 
All A are C Some A are C 
3 2 All B are A 8 1 No A are B 
Some C are B 83-87 All B are C 47-57 
Some C are A Some C are not A 
4 3 No A are B 9 4 Some B are A 
All C are B 80-93 No B are C 70-83 
No A are C Some A are not C 
5 3 All A are B 10 1 Some A are B 
No C are B 80-80 No B are C 83-93 
No C are A Some A are not C 
Invalid Same-form (evaluation on y Invalid villerent-form (evaluatio oniy) 
No. Figure Syllogism N-P % No. Figure Syllogism N-P % 
11. 1 Some A are B 50-47 16. 1 No A are B 40-70 
No B are C No B are C 
Some C are A Some C are not A 
12. 4 Some B are A 17. 2 Some B are A 
Some B are C 57-90 All C are B 63-77 
Some C are A Some C are not A 
13. 3 All A are B 18. 3 All A are B 
Some C are B 67-70 All C are B 47-60 
Some A are C Some C are A 
14. 3 No A are B 43-77 19. 2 Some B are A 83-87 
No C are B Some C are B 
No A are C Some A are not C 
15. 3 All A are B 20. 2 Some B are A 
All C are B 60-83 No C are B 67-77 
All A are C Some C are not 
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Experiment 2: Syllogisms presented to all participants. 
Indeterminate (production onlv) 
No. Figure Syllogism N-P % 
21. 1 Some A are B - 
Some B are C 
22. 3 All A are B - 
All C are B 
23. 3 Some A are B - 
All C are B 
24. 2 Some B are A - 
All C are B 
25. 3 All A are B - 
Some C are B 
2Q 
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Experiment 2: Revised questionnaire presented to all participants after the two 
reasoning tasks. V or S in parentheses indicates whether item intended to identiýv 
verbal or spatial reasoning behaviours respectively. Items I to 10 were presented with 
a5 point response scale with possible responses from "a lot" to "not at all". 
Reasoning Style Questionnaire 
This short questionnaire aims to gather some further information about how you personalb" 
approached the reasoning problems you have just completed. Please answer every 
question. For questions I to II indicate your answer by circling the appropriate response. 
For question 12 please try to describe your overall approach as clearly as you can. If you 
have any difficulties or need to clarify anything, please ask the researcher at any time. 
1. To what extent did you think about the words used in the statements? (V) 
2. To what extent did you use mental images of shapes (e. g. circles/other shapes in spatial 
relationships) in deciding on a conclusion? (S) 
3. To what extent did you represent the information in linguistic forin (e. g. 
sentences/words) in deciding on a conclusion? (V) 
4. Did you attempt to substitute term s/occupations from one statement to another (i. e. 
switch the occupations around between statements)? (V) 
5. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to form a single, longer, verbal 
description? (V) 
6. To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the occupations within the 
statements? (V) 
7. Did you attempt to organise the occupations into groups and sub-groups/sets and sub- 
sets? (S) 
Did you represent the relationship between the occupations diagrammatically? (S) 
9. Did you work with the statements in the order they were presented (I. e. dealt wIth 
infon-nation in the first statement first, then went on to the second statement)? (S) 
10. Did you think about sets/Venn diagrams (similar to that shown below) either using 
circles or any other shape? YES/NO OD (S) 
1. Did you develop a rule, or set of rules, to help you which you then re-applied to each 
subsequent problem? YES/NO If vcs, please try to desc. be to descbe the rule(s). (V) 
12. Pleasc try to suin up your ovcrall approach. (Both) 
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Experiment 2: Written instructions presented to participant prior to the two 
syllogistic reasoning tasks. In each case, two practice items were also presented 
following the instructions. 
Instructions for the conclusion production task. 
Please read the instructions below before you begin. 
Conclusion Production Task 
This task consists of 10 pairs of statements about groups of people, similar to those 
presented in examples I and 2 below: 
Example 1: All of the beauticians are actors 
Some of the chemists are beauticians 
Example 2: None of the plumbers are naturalists 
Some of the naturalists are tapdancers 
Your task is to read the statements and in each case work out what conclusion you can 
draw, if any, about the relationship between the people. Your conclusion should be based 
solely on the information given and not on any prior knowledge. 
You will notice that the pairs of statements have an occupation in common (in the above 
example I it is beauticians and in example 2 it is naturalists). Your conclusion should be a 
statement which describes the relationship between the two other occupations, i. e. those 
which appear only once. For instance, possible conclusions to example I above might be: 
All of the chemists are actors 
All of the actors are chemists 
None of the chemists are actors 
None of the actors are chemists 
Some of the actors are chemists 
Some of the chemists are actors 
Some of the actors are not chemists 
Some of the chemists are not actors 
No valid conclusion is possible 
Each pair of statements is presented on a separate page. Because we are trying to find out 
how people solve these problems it is vital that we have a written record of your "working 
out". Therefore, we would like you to show how you have worked out the conclusion in 
the space provided beneath each problem. This can include diagrams, words, arrows, 
symbols or any other Nvritten form that helps you to use the information in the statements to 
find a conclusion. When you have decided on a single conclusion, state that conclusion 
clearly in writing and move on to the next page. You must only state one conclusion for 
each problem. If you think there is no possible valid conclusion to a particular problem, 
state that instead of a conclusion. On the following page the above examples are presented 
again. Try and Nvork out the correct conclusion to each example and practice represeilting 
your work on paper. You can write in the space beneath each example. 
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2. Instructions for the conclusion evaluation task. 
Please read the instructions below before you begin. 
Conclusion Evaluation Task 
This task consists of 20 pairs of statements about groups of people. In each case, the 
information in the statements has been used to reach a conclusion which describes the 
relationship between two of the groups. This conclusion is also presented. The sets of 
statements are similar to those in examples I and 2 below: 
Example 1: All of the teachers are cellists 
Some of the hikers are teachers 
Conclusion: Some of the hikers are cellists 
Example 2: None of the pilots are anglers 
Some of the anglers are pianists 
Conclusion: Some of the pianists are not pilots 
Your task is to read the statements and in each case decide whether the conclusion 
presented is valid or invalid. For a conclusion to be valid, it must be true given that the two 
initial statements are true. If this is not the case, then the conclusion is invalid. Your 
decision should be based solely on the infori-nation given and not on any prior knowledge. 
Each set of statements is presented on a separate page. Because we are tryi ng to find out 
how people solve these problems it is vital that we have a written record of your "working 
out". Therefore, we would like you to show how you have worked out the conclusion in 
the space provided beneath each problem. This can include diagrams, words, arrows, 
symbols or any other written forin that helps you to use the information in the statements to 
reach a decision about the validity of the conclusion presented. When you have decided 
whether the conclusion is valid or not, indicate your decision by ticking the appropriate 
box alongside each problem. 
On the following page the above examples are presented again. Try and work out whether 
the conclusion stated in each case is valid or invalid and practice representing your work 
on paper. Use the space beneath each example for your working out. 
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Experiment 2: SPSS output for reliability analysis on reasoning behaviour 
questionnaire. 
Analysis 1: all items included. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Ql 1.0000 
Q2 -. 1814 1.0000 
Q3 . 1464 . 2541 1.0000 
Q4 . 0437 . 0697 -. 0478 1.0000 
Q5 . 1228 . 1691 . 
0291 . 5071 1.0000 
Q6 . 0263 . 1777 . 
1431 . 5537 . 5220 
Q7 -. 0480 -. 0595 -. 0716 -. 2158 -. 2681 
Q8 . 0176 . 2733 . 
2630 . 0440 . 0731 
Q9 . 1538 -. 1267 . 
0360 . 1618 . 1714 
Q10 -. 1309 . 7089 . 2576 -. 
0531 . 1805 
Q11 -. 0213 . 1358 . 
0355 -. 0534 -. 0803 
Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Q6 1.0000 
Q7 -. 3200 1.0000 
Q8 . 0359 . 1163 
1.0000 
Q9 . 2955 . 
0460 . 0483 
1.0000 
Q10 . 2547 . 0305 . 
2987 -. 0947 1.0000 
Q11 -. 1474 . 0614 . 
0607 -. 1118 . 118 
Qll 
Qll 1.0000 
N of Cases 68 .0 
Item-total Statisti cs 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
Q1 25.0000 28.7761 . 0451 . 1133 . 
4981 
Q2 24.2353 24.1528 . 2545 . 5516 . 
4375 
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Q3 24.8235 25.9087 . 2369 . 1809 . 4457 Q4 24.1176 25.0904 . 2901 . 4556 . 4280 
Q5 23.8676 23.5195 . 3638 . 3868 . 3981 
Q6 24.1912 23.6495 . 4006 . 5466 . 3894 
Q7 24.4412 31.4741 -. 1860 . 1887 . 5808 
Q8 23.4706 24.0439 . 2822 . 1689 . 4269 
Q9 23.2941 26.8077 . 1741 . 1771 . 4649 
Q10 26.7794 28.2640 . 4245 . 6017 . 4468 
Qll 26.5147 30.3431 -. 0084 . 0605 . 4938 
Reliability Coeff icients 11 items 
Alpha = . 4839 Standardized item alpha . 5017 
Analysis 2: Item 7 remo ved. 
REL IABILI TYANA LYSIS-SC ALE (A LPH A) 
Correlation Matrix 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q1 1.0000 
Q2 -. 1814 1.0000 
Q3 . 1464 . 2541 1.0000 
Q4 . 0437 . 0697 -. 
0478 1.0000 
Q5 . 1228 . 1691 . 
0291 . 5071 1.0000 
Q6 . 0263 . 1777 . 
1431 . 5537 . 5220 
Q8 . 0176 . 2733 . 
2630 . 0440 . 0731 
Q9 . 1538 -. 1267 . 
0360 . 1618 . 1714 
Q10 -. 1309 . 7089 . 2576 -. 
0531 . 1805 
Q11 -. 0213 . 1358 . 0355 -. 
0534 -. 0803 
Q6 Q8 Q9 Q10 Qll 
Q6 1.0000 
Q8 . 0359 1.0000 
Q9 . 2955 . 0483 
1.0000 
Q10 . 2547 . 
2987 -. 0947 1.0000 
Qll -. 1474 . 0607 -. 1118 . 
1185 1.0000 
N of Cases = 68.0 
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Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
Ql 22.3676 29.5494 . 0573 . 1122 . 6000 
Q2 21.6029 24.8101 . 2683 . 5460 . 5556 
Q3 22.1912 26.5748 . 2540 . 1762 . 5565 
Q4 21.4853 25.2087 . 3515 . 4549 . 5298 
Q5 21.2353 23.3468 . 4453 . 3738 . 4983 
Q6 21.5588 23.3547 . 4988 . 5155 . 4855 
Q8 20.8382 25.4809 . 2409 . 1573 . 5634 
Q9 20.6618 27.8988 . 1581 . 1507 . 5804 
Q10 24.1471 29.2318 . 4093 . 5889 . 5550 
Q11 23.8824 31.3591 -. 0241 . 0605 . 5950 
Reliability Coefficients 10 items 
Alpha = . 5808 Standardized item alpha . 5738 
Analysis 3: Item 1 removed. 
RE LIABIL ITY ANAL YS I S- SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Q2 1.0000 
Q3 . 2541 1.0000 
Q4 . 0697 -. 0478 1.0000 Q5 . 1691 . 0291 . 5071 1.0000 Q6 . 1777 . 1431 . 5537 . 5220 
1.0000 
Q8 . 2733 . 2630 . 0440 . 
0731 . 0359 
Q9 -. 1267 . 0360 . 1618 . 1714 . 
2955 
Q10 . 7089 . 2576 -. 0531 . 1805 . 
2547 
Qll . 1358 . 0355 -. 0534 -. 
003 -. 1474 
Q8 Q9 Q10 Qll 
Q8 1.0000 
Q9 . 0483 1.0000 
Q10 . 2987 -. 0947 1.0000 
Q11 . 0607 -. 1118 . 
1185 1.0000 
N of Cases 68.0 
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Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
Q2 19.5294 22.2529 . 3260 . 5350 . 5613 Q3 20.1176 25.0606 . 2291 . 1414 . 5867 
Q4 19.4118 23.4100 . 3547 . 4549 . 5519 
Q5 19.1618 21.8093 . 4315 . 3584 . 5260 
Q6 19.4853 21.5072 . 5135 . 5137 . 5030 
Q8 18.7647 23.6155 . 2462 . 1571 . 5870 
Q9 18.5882 26.3951 . 1293 . 1410 . 6115 
Q10 22.0735 27.1736 . 4524 . 5885 . 5718 
Q11 21.8088 29.4107 -. 0206 . 0601 . 6168 
Reliability Coefficients 9 items 
Alpha = . 6000 Standardized item alpha . 6011 
Analysi s 4: Item 11 removed. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Q2 1.0000 
Q3 . 2541 1.0000 Q4 . 0697 -. 0478 1.0000 
Q5 . 1691 . 0291 . 5071 1.0000 Q6 . 1777 . 1431 . 5537 . 5220 
1.0000 
Q8 . 2733 . 2630 . 0440 . 0731 . 
0359 
Q9 -. 1267 . 0360 . 1618 . 1714 . 
2955 
Q10 . 7089 . 2576 -. 0531 . 1805 . 
2547 
Q8 Q9 Q10 
Q8 1.0000 
Q9 . 0483 1.0000 Q10 . 2987 -. 0947 1.0000 
N of Cases 68.0 
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Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
Q2 18.9706 22.3275 
Q3 19.5588 24.9666 
Q4 18.8529 23.2019 
Q5 18.6029 21.5564 
Q6 18.9265 21.1736 
Q8 18.2059 23.5689 
Q9 18.0294 26.1185 
Q10 21.5147 27.0893 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 6168 
Analysis 5: Item 9 removed. 
Corrected 
Item- Squared 
Total Multiple 
Correlation Correlation 
. 3111 . 5336 
. 2260 . 1410 
. 3618 . 4519 
. 4427 . 3574 
. 5335 . 5021 
. 2402 . 1571 
. 1409 . 1399 
. 4417 . 5859 
8 items 
Standardized item alpha 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
. 5881 
. 6085 
. 5706 
. 5431 
. 5169 
. 6105 
. 6297 
. 5927 
. 6463 
RELIABILITY ANALYS IS-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Q2 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q8 
Q10 
Q8 
Q10 
1.0000 
. 2541 
. 0697 
. 1691 
. 1777 
. 2733 
. 7089 
Correlation Matrix 
Q3 Q4 
1.0000 
-. 0478 
. 0291 
. 1431 
. 2630 
. 2576 
Q8 Q10 
1.0000 
. 2987 1.0000 
N of Cases 
1.0000 
. 5071 
. 5537 
. 0440 
-. 0531 
68.0 
Q5 
1.0000 
. 5220 
. 0731 
. 1805 
Q6 
1.0000 
. 0359 
. 2547 
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Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
Q2 15.1912 18.5450 
Q3 15.7794 21.7864 
Q4 15.0735 20.4273 
Q5 14.8235 18.8639 
Q6 15.1471 18.8437 
Q8 14.4265 20.4572 
Q10 17.7353 23.6901 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 6297 
Analysis 6: Item 8 removed. 
Corrected 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 3776 . 5297 . 5817 
. 2324 . 1406 . 6256 
. 3415 . 4503 . 5928 
. 4246 . 3557 . 5630 
. 4817 . 4630 . 5457 
. 2447 . 1475 . 6299 
. 4963 . 5814 . 6018 
7 items 
Standardized item alpha . 6696 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Q2 1.0000 
Q3 . 2541 1.0000 
Q4 . 0697 -. 0478 1.0000 
Q5 . 1691 . 0291 . 5071 1.0000 
Q6 . 1777 . 1431 . 5537 . 5220 
Q10 . 7089 . 2576 -. 0531 . 1805 
Q10 
Q10 1.0000 
N of Cases 68.0 
1.0000 
. 2547 
307 
APPENDIX 21 cont. 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
Q2 11.5882 14.1861 
Q3 12.1765 17.1326 
Q4 11.4706 14.9394 
Q5 11.2206 13.5178 
Q6 11.5441 13.3264 
Q10 14.1324 18.4449 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 6299 
Corrected 
Item- Squared 
Total Multiple 
Correlation Correlation 
. 3217 . 5287 
. 1657 . 0994 
. 3820 . 4436 
. 4714 . 3554 
. 5579 . 4546 
. 4569 . 5689 
6 items 
Standardized item alpha 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
. 6110 
. 6572 
. 5778 
. 5378 
. 5023 
. 6057 
. 6648 
Analysis 7: Item 3 removed. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
Q2 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q10 
Q2 1.0000 
Q4 . 0697 1.0000 
Q5 . 1691 . 5071 
Q6 . 1777 . 5537 
Q10 . 7089 -. 0531 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
Q2 9.3382 11.8690 
Q4 9.2206 11.4581 
Q5 8.9706 10.2976 
Q6 9.2941 10.4794 
Q10 11.8824 15.4188 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 6572 
1.0000 
. 5220 1.0000 
. 1805 . 2547 
1.0000 
68.0 
Corrected 
Item- Squared 
Total Multiple 
Correlation Correlation 
. 2586 . 5207 
. 4541 . 4370 
. 5287 . 3544 
. 5733 . 4424 
. 4169 . 5675 
5 items 
Standardized item alpha 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
. 
6976 
. 
5839 
. 5424 
. 5218 
. 6489 
6910 
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Analysis 8: Item 2 removed. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q10 
Q4 
1.0000 
. 5071 
. 5537 
-. 0531 
N of Cases 
Item-total Statistics 
1.0000 
. 5220 1.0000 
. 1805 . 2547 
68.0 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
Q4 6.3824 6.4785 
Q5 6.1324 5.7882 
Q6 6.4559 5.9532 
Q10 9.0441 11.1771 
Corrected 
Q10 
1.0000 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 5609 . 
4185 . 5798 
. 5948 . 
3544 . 5561 
. 6463 . 
4349 . 5143 
. 1568 . 
1371 . 7688 
Reliability Coefficients 4 items 
Alpha = . 6976 Standardized 
item alpha 
Correlation Matrix 
Q5 Q6 
. 6608 
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Experiment 2: Analysis of Variance (AýNOVA) tables. 
Table 211: Comparison of mean reasoning behaviour scale scores across strategy groups, when scale 
based on all II questionnaire items. 
Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 750.32 4 187.58 8.47 . 
000 
Within groups 1284.19 58 22.14 
Total 2034.41 62 1 
Table 2J. 2: ScheW Post-hoe comparisons of differences between mean reasoning behaviour scale 
scores, c. f. above ANOVA 
Strategies Mean 
Difference Std. Error Sig. 
Verbal Spatial -9.86 2.03 0.00 
Mixed -9.93 1.40 0.22 
Flow (verbal) -3.43 1.85 0.13 
Flow (spatial) -6.88 3.47 0.10 
Spatial Mixed -0.07 2.04 1.00 
Flow (verbal) 6.43 2.37 0.05 
Flow (mixed) 2.98 3.77 0.81 
Mixed Flow (verbal) 6.50 3.48 0.49 
Flow (mixed) 3.06 3.68 0.95 
Flow (verbal) Flow (mixed) -3.44 1.86 0.50 
Table 213: Comparison of mean reasoning behaviour scale scores across strategy groups, when scale 
based on 4 most reliable items. 
Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 750.32 4 25.04 2.19 0.08 
Within groups 1284.19 58 11.43 
Total 2034.41 62 
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Table 2J. 4: ScheM Post-hoc comparisons of differences between mean reasoning behaviour scale 
scores, c. f. above ANOVA 
Strategies Mean 
Difference Std. Error Sig. 
Verbal Spatial -2.84 1.45 0.44 
Mixed -1.70 2.49 0.98 
Flow (verbal) -0.65 1.01 0.98 
Flow (spatial) -3.36 1.33 0.19 
Spatial Mixed 1.14 2.71 0.10 
Flow (verbal) 2.19 1.47 0.70 
Flow (mixed) -0.52 1.70 1.00 
Mixed Flow (verbal) 1.05 2.49 0.99 
Flow (mixed) -1.67 2.64 0.98 
_Flow 
(verbal) 
. 
Flow (mixed) -2.71 1.34 0.40 
Table 2J. 5: Comparison of strategy groups on overall performance on conclusion production and 
evaluation tasks: Within-subiects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Task 21477.53 1 21477.53 225.22 0.00 
Task*strategy 586.71 4 146.68 1.54 0.20 
Error (task) 5531.149 58 95.37 
Table 2J. 6: Comparison of strategy groups on overall performance on conclusion production and 
evaluation tasks: Between-subiects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Intercept 111350.25 1 111350.25 425.57 0.00 
Strategy 853.22 4 213.31 0.82 0.52 
Error 15175.74 58 261.65 
Table 2J. 7: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoners on number of correct conclusions produced to 
SF and DF cvIlaorkmv- Wi thin-rui hi Pete. Week. 
Type III 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Forrn 61.16 1 61.16 59.03 0.00 
Form *strategy 7.45 4 1.86 1.80 0.14 
Error (forrn) 60-10 58 1.04 
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Table 2J. 8: Comparison of verbal and spatial reasoners on number of correct conclusions produced to 
SF and DF syllogisms: Between-subjects effects 
Type Ill 
Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 136.44 1 136.44 97.56 0.00 
Strategy 3.37 4 0.84 0.60 0.66 
Error 81.12 58 1.40 
Table 23.9: Comparison of all strategy groups in terms of number of correctly evaluated conclusions to 
SF and DP'valid and invalid syllogisms: Wi hin-subjects ef fects 
Type Ill 
Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
squares squar 
Forin 95.86 1 95.86 44.95 0.00 
Form*strategy 7.22 4 1.81 0.85 0.50 
Error (fon-n) 123.69 58 2.13 
Validity 8.76 1 8.77 11.77 0.001 
Validity* strategy 2.23 4 0.56 0.75 0.56 
Error (validity) 43.21 58 0.75 
Fonn*validity 12.17 1 12.17 8.25 0.006 
Fon-n *validity* strateg 3.78 4 0.64 0.64 0.64 
y 85.58 58 1.48 
Error (fon-n*validity) 
Table 2J. 10: Comparison of all strategy groups in terms of number of correctly evaluated conclusions 
to SF and DF. valid and invalid sviloLyisms: Between-subiects effects 
Type 111 
Sum of df Mean square F Sig. 
squares 
Intercept 1153.17 1 1153.17 772.02 0.00 
Strategy 4.42 4 1.11 0.74 0.57 
Error 86.64 58 1.49 
APPENDIX 3A 
Experiment 3: The 10 syllogisms presented to all participants. In each case, line 3 
represents the logical conclusion. 
No. Syllogism Figure Form 
Some churchgoers are not butchers 4 same 
All churchgoers are pilots 
Some vilots are not butchers 
2 All smokers are cyclists 3 same 
Some cricketers are not cyclists 
Some cricketers are not smokers 
3 No biologists are musicians 3 different 
Some vegetarians are musicians 
Some vegetarians are not biologists 
4 All criminals are chessplayers 4 same 
Some criminals are not catholics 
Some chessplayers are not catholics 
5 No gardeners are dentists different 
All dentists are bellringers 
Some bellfingers are not ga deners 
6 All singers are athletes 2 same 
Some plumbers are singers 
Some t)lumbers are athletes 
7 All actors are parents 2 different 
No chemists are actors 
Some parents are not chemists 
8 Some drivers are cooks 
No politicians are cooks 
Some drivers are not DOlitiCians 
different 
Some students are farmers 
All fan-ners are painters 
Some students are painters 
10 All lavvyers are golfers 
All lawyers are homeowners 
Some w1fers are homeowners 
I same 
different 
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Experiment 3: The 16 three-term series problems presented to all participants . 
Note that in each case, the two premises were presented followed by the standard question 
"What is the relationship between x and y? ", where x and y are the two end terins. The 
third premise shown below represents one possible correct response, but inverse responses 
which represented the correct relationship were also accepted as correct (for example, for 
item 1, if the participant stated D was darker than S, that D was not as light as S, or that S 
was not as dark as D). 
No. Problem 
I S is lighter than P 
P is lighter than D 
S is lighter than D 
2 B is weaker than W 
W is weaker than J 
J is stronger than B 
3 R is smoother than X 
N is rougher than X 
N is rougher than R 
4 G is happier than M 
G is sadder than V 
V is happier than M 
5 T is not as thin as L 
L is not as thin as C 
T is fatter than C 
6 Q is not as tall as A 
A is not as tall as F 
F is taller than Q 
7 H is not as rough as Z 
0 is not as smooth as Z 
0 is rougher than H 
8 L is not as dark as E 
L is not as light as I 
I is lighter than E 
No. Problem 
9 Y is stronger than P 
P is not as weak as K 
Y is stronger than K 
10 E is darker than V 
V is not as light as T 
T is lighter than E 
II X is thinner than M 
U is not as thin as M 
U is fatter than X 
12 R is taller than G 
R is not as tall as Q 
Q is taller than G 
13 F is not as dark as S 
S is lighter than W 
F is lighter than W 
14 H is not as fat as T 
T is thinner than X 
X is fatter than H 
15 N is not as rough as D 
J is rougher than D 
J is rougher than N 
16 B is not as -ýveak as P 
B is weaker than L 
L is stronger than P 
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APPENDIX 3C 
Experiment 3: Instructions presented to participants prior to the transitive inference 
task. 
Please read the instructions below before you begin. 
Object Relationship Task 
This task consists of 16 pairs of statements which describe the relationship between three 
objects. In each case the objects are represented by three different letters. You will be 
asked to describe the relationship between two of the letters. The problems are presented 
as shown in examples I and 2 below: 
Example 1: J is fatter than W 
P is thinner than W 
What is the relationship between J and P? 
Example 2: R is not as small as G 
T is larger than R 
What is the relationship between T and G? 
Your task is to read the statements and use the inforination given to work out the 
relationship which is asked for. For instance, the relationship between J and P in example I 
above might be any one of the following: 
J is fatter than P 
P is thinner than J 
P is fatter than J 
J is thinner than P 
No relationship (there is insufficient information to detennine relationship) 
Each pair of statements is presented on a separate page. Because we are trying to find out 
how people solve these problems it is vital that we have a written record of your "working 
out". Therefore, we would like you to show how you have worked out the conclusion in 
the space provided beneath each problem. This can include diagrams, words, arrows, 
symbols or any other written forin that helps you to use the information in the statements to 
determine the relationship requested. When you have decided on the relationship, state that 
relationship clearly in writing and move on to the next page. You must only one gi, "c one 
answer to each problem. If you think there is insufficient information to detennine a 
relationship, say so. 
On the following page the above examples are presented again for you to practice. TrN and 
Nvork out the relationships that are asked for and practice representing your work on paper. 
You can write in the space beneath each example. 
APPENDIX 3D 
Experiment 3: Reasoning behaviour questionnaire presented to participants following 
the syllogistic reasoning task. 
Note that items I to 8 were each presented with a five point rating scale and participants 
asked to give a response in the range "A lot" ... to... "Not at all". 
Reasoning Style Questionnaire (Conclusion Production Task) 
This short questionnaire aims to gather some further inforination about how you personally 
approached the reasoning problems you have just completed. Please answer every 
question. For questions I to 8 indicate your answer by circling the appropriate response. 
For question 9 please try to describe your overall approach as clearly as you can. If you 
have any difficulties or need to clarify anything, please ask the researcher at any time. 
To what extent did you use images of shapes (e. g. circles/other shapes in spatial 
relationships) in deciding on a conclusion? 
2. To what extent did you represent the infori-nation in linguistic forin (e. g. as 
sentences/words) in deciding on a conclusion? 
3. How often did you attempt to substitute terrns/occupations from one statement to 
another (i. e. switch the occupations around between statements)? 
4. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to form a single, longer, verbal 
description? 
5. To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the occupations within the 
statements? 
6. Did you organise the occupations into groups and sub-groups/sets and sub-sets? 
7. Did you work with the statements in the order they were presented (i. e. dealt with 
infori-nation in the first statement first, then went on to the second statement)? 
8. Did you use set diagramsNenn diagrams (similar to that shown below) either using 
circles or any other shape? YES/NO 
CU 
9. We are trying to find out how people solve these problems. Please try to describe the 
ýN, ay in which you approached the problems, giving as much detail as you can about 
what you did andxvhy. 
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APPENDIX 3E 
Experiment 3: Reasoning behaviour questionnaire presented to participants following 
the transitive inference task. 
Note that items I to 8 were each presented with a five point rating scale and participants 
asked to give a response in the range "A lot" ... to... "Not at all"'. 
Reasoning Style Questionnaire (Object Relationship Task) 
This short questionnaire aims to gather some further information about how you personally 
approached the reasoning problems you have just completed. Please answer e\'erv 
question. For questions I to 8 indicate your answer by circling the appropriate response. 
For question 9 please try to describe your overall approach as clearly as you can. If you 
have any difficulties or need to clarify anything, please ask the researcher at any time. 
1. To what extent did you use images depicting the physical properties of the three 
letters? 
2. To what extent did you place the three letters in various positions on a scale or 
continuum according to their relationship? 
3. Did the physical properties of the three letters seem to differ between problems? 
4. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to forrn a single, longer, verbal 
descnption? 
5. To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the letters within the 
statements? 
6. Did the three letters appear to lie in a set sequence/order? 
7. Did you work with the statements in the order they were presented (i. e. dealt with 
infori-nation in the first statement first, then went on to the second statement)? 
8. Did you find that a particular letter could be cancelled out/ignored? 
9. We are trying to find out how people solve these problems. Please try to describe the 
way in which you approached the problems, giving as much detail as you can about 
what you did and why. 
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APPENDIX 3F 
Experiment 3: SPSS output from reliability analysis conducted on the 8 quantitative 
syllogistic reasoning behaviours questionnaire. The questionnaire items were presented in 
Appendix 4D. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
SQ1 SQ2 SQ3 SQ4 SQ5 
SQ1 1.0000 
SQ2 . 7217 1.0000 
SQ3 . 3468 . 4654 
SQ4 . 3443 . 4221 
SQ5 . 2785 . 3463 
SQ6 . 5409 . 5599 
SQ7 . 1117 . 1659 
SQ8 . 8567 . 7607 
SQ6 SQ7 
SQ6 1.0000 
SQ7 . 1025 1.0000 
SQ8 . 5864 . 0761 
N of Cases = 
Item- total Statist ics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
SQ1 19.1774 38.8041 
SQ2 19.3871 40.4707 
SQ3 18.6129 39.5854 
SQ4 17.9194 45.0590 
SQ5 18.7903 43.8406 
SQ6 18.5806 42.0836 
SQ7 17.8065 50.8472 
SQ8 21.3548 50.6261 
Rel iability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 8005 
S 
1.0000 
. 4636 1.0000 
. 6293 . 2900 1.0000 
. 3316 . 2333 . 2997 
. 1736 . 0421 . 1999 
. 4295 . 3936 . 2516 
SQ8 
1.0000 
62.0 
Corrected 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 6311 . 
7560 . 7578 
. 7300 . 
6484 . 7439 
. 6052 . 
5373 . 7627 
. 4537 . 
2808 . 7867 
. 5041 . 
4384 . 7793 
. 5399 . 
3923 . 7738 
. 1803 . 
0646 . 8209 
. 7449 . 
8018 . 7867 
8 items 
tandardized item alpha . 8259 
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APPENDIX 3G 
Experiment 3: SPSS output from reliability analysis conducted on the 8 quantitative 
transitive inference behaviours questionnaire. The questionnaire items were presented in 
Appendix 3E. 
initial Analysis (all items) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ2 TO TQ4 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ2 -. 0027 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 . 0298 1.0000 
TQ4 . 1267 . 1176 . 1138 1.0000 
TQ5 . 2657 -. 0715 . 3059 . 3185 1.0000 
TQ6 . 0397 . 2056 . 0613 . 1976 . 1458 
TQ7 -. 2629 . 1719 -. 2961 -. 0905 -. 4371 
TQ8 -. 1558 -. 0623 -. 0068 . 1652 . 2710 
TQ6 TQ7 TQ8 
TQ6 1.0000 
TQ7 . 1283 1.0000 
TQ8 . 0149 -. 2375 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
1.0000 
62.0 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ1 19.4677 17.2039 . 2923 . 
5358 . 2636 
TQ2 20.8548 23.0114 . 1074 . 
0846 . 3698 
TQ3 19.5000 16.8443 . 3845 . 
5223 . 2112 
TQ4 18.2903 18.9635 . 3196 . 
1518 . 2698 
TQ5 18.8710 17.7864 . 3130 . 
3421 . 2579 
TQ6 19.9677 19.8350 . 2319 . 1179 . 
3125 
TQ7 20.3710 27.5159 -. 3380 . 2959 . 
5483 
TQ8 18.0323 22.5563 . 0042 . 1774 . 
4186 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 3793 
8 items 
Standardized item alpha = . 3491 
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APPENDIX 3G cont. 
Analysis 2 (item 7 excluded) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ2 TQ3 TQ4 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ2 -. 0027 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 . 0298 
TQ4 . 1267 . 1176 
TQ5 . 2657 -. 0715 
TQ6 . 0397 . 2056 
TQ8 -. 1558 -. 0623 
TQ6 TQ8 
TQ6 1.0000 
TQ8 . 0149 1.0000 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
TQ1 1ý. 6452 18.9212 
TQ2 19.0323 26.3596 
TQ3 17.6774 18.5172 
TQ4 16.4677 21.5973 
TQ5 17.0484 18.8665 
TQ6 18.1452 23.2737 
TQ8 16.2097 24.6274 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 5483 
1.0000 
. 1138 1.0000 
. 3059 . 3185 1.0000 
. 0613 . 19-76 . 1458 
-. 0068 . 1652 . 2710 
62.0 
Corrected 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 3603 . 
5314 . 4709 
. 0552 . 
0720 . 5674 
. 4596 . 
5173 . 4240 
. 
3258 . 1507 . 
4912 
. 4397 . 
2565 . 4346 
. 1782 . 
0861 . 5451 
. 
0685 . 1510 . 
5840 
7 items 
Standardized item alpha . 5168 
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APPENDIX 3G cont. 
Analysis 3 (item 8 excluded) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S- SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ2 TQ3 TQ4 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ2 -. 0027 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 . 0298 
TQ4 . 1267 . 1176 
TQ5 . 2657 -. 0715 
TQ6 . 0397 . 2056 
TQ6 
TQ6 1.0000 
N of Cases = 62.0 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
TQ1 13.4839 15.2702 
TQ2 14.8710 23.3273 
TQ3 13.5161 15.5981 
TQ4 12.3065 19.3308 
TQ5 12.8871 17.1838 
TQ6 13.9839 20.4424 
1.0000 
. 1138 
. 3059 
. 0613 
Corrected 
1.0000 
. 3185 
. 1976 
1.0000 
. 1458 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 4566 . 4994 . 4678 
. 0766 . 
0691 . 6093 
. 5031 . 5121 . 
4460 
. 2920 . 1393 . 
5506 
. 3696 . 
1999 . 5158 
. 1856 . 
0850 . 5920 
Reliability Coefficients 6 items 
Alpha = . 5840 Standardized item alpha . 
5522 
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APPENDIX 3G cont. 
Analysis 4 (item 2 excluded 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ3 TQ4 TQ5 TQ6 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 1.0000 
TQ4 . 1267 . 1138 
TQ5 . 2657 . 3059 
TQ6 . 0397 . 0613 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
TQ1 12.1452 13.9622 
TQ3 12.1774 14.3778 
TQ4 10.9677 18.2940 
TQ5 11.5484 15.6943 
TQ6 12.6452 19.6097 
1.0000 
. 3185 
. 1976 
62.0 
Corrected 
Item- 
Total 
Correlation 
. 4781 
. 5175 
. 2774 
. 4017 
. 1510 
1.0000 
. 1458 1.0000 
Squared Alpha 
Multiple if Item 
Correlation Deleted 
. 4989 . 
4864 
. 5105 . 
4666 
. 1271 . 
5951 
. 1834 . 
5342 
. 0474 . 
6484 
Reliability Coefficients 5 items 
Alpha = . 6093 Standardized 
item alpha . 5960 
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APPENDIX 3G cont. 
Analysis 5 (item 6 excluded) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ3 TQ4 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 1.0000 
TQ4 . 1267 . 1138 1.0000 
TQ5 . 2657 . 
3059 . 3185 1.0000 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
TQ1 9.9194 
TQ3 9.9516 
TQ4 8.7419 
TQ5 9.3226 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 6484 
Analysis 6 (item 4 excluded) 
Corrected 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 5361 . 
4987 . 4959 
. 5681 . 
5101 . 4758 
. 2339 . 
1037 . 6920 
. 
3918 . 1779 . 
6054 
4 items 
Standardized item alpha . 6378 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ3 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 
1.0000 
TQ5 . 2657 . 
3059 1.0000 
N of Cases = 62.0 
62.0 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
10.4360 
10.9320 
15.3094 
12.6155 
APPENDIX 3G cont. 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
TQ1 6.0161 6.7374 
TQ3 6.0484 7.1288 
TQ5 5.4194 9.6901 
Corrected 
Item. - Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 6012 . 4976 . 4684 
. 6458 . 5100 . 4184 
. 3087 . 0986 . 8242 
Reliability Coefficients 3 items 
Alpha = . 6920 Standardized item alpha . 6892 
Analysis 7 (item 5 excluded) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
TQ1 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ3 . 7034 
N of Cases 
Item-total Statistics 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ3 
1.0000 
62.0 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ1 2.6935 2.6095 . 7034 . 
4948 
TQ3 2.7258 3.0875 . 7034 . 
4948 
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 
Alpha = . 8242 Standardized 
item alpha . 8259 
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APPENDIX 3H 
Experiment 4: Reasoning behaviour questionnaire presented participants following 
the transitive inference task in phase 1. Note that items I to 6 were each presented 
with a rating scale on which participants were asked to give a response ranging from 
44a lot" to 44not at all". 
Reasoning Style Questionnaire (Object Relationship Task) 
This short questionnaire aims to gather some further information about how you personally 
approached the reasoning problems you have just completed. Please answer e%-ei-Ný 
question. For questions I to 8 indicate your answer by circling the appropriate response. 
For question 7 please try to describe your overall approach as clearly as you can. If you 
have any difficulties or need to clarify anything, please ask the researcher at any time. 
1. To what extent did you use images depicting the physical properties of the three 
letters? 
2. To what extent did you place the three letters in various positions on a scale or 
continuum according to their relationship? 
3. Did the physical properties of the three letters seem to differ between problems? 
4. Did you attempt to combine the two statements into one to forrn a single, longer, verbal 
description? 
5. To what extent did you attempt to reverse the position of the letters within the 
statements? 
6. Did the three letters appear to lie in a set sequence/order? 
7. We are trying to find out how people solve these problems. Please try to describe the 
way in which you approached the problems, giving as much detail as you can about 
what you did and why. Continue overleaf if you need to. 
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APPENDIX 31 
Experiment 4: The 16 basic sentence-picture verification trial types presented to all 
participants. Four sets of the following items were presented, in a different random 
order for each participant. 
True affirmative (TA) I False affirmfifivt- (FA) 
No. Sentence - TPicture No. Sentence T - Picture 
I A is above B A 5 B is above A A 
B B 
2 B is above A B 6 A is above B B 
A A 
3 A is below B B 7 A is below B A 
A B 
4 B is below A A 8 B is below A B 
B A 
True negative (TN) False negative (FN) 
No. Sentence Picture No. Sentence Picture 
9 A is not above B B 13 B is not above A B 
A A 
10 B is not above A A 14 A is not above B A 
B B 
11 A is not below B A 15 A is not below B B 
B A 
12 B is not below A B 16 B is not below A A 
A B 
", d'! 
APPENDIX M 
Experiment 4: Instructions presented to participants prior to the computerised SPN' 
task in phase 2. 
In this expenment you will be asked to make Judgements about whether a simple picture 
presents a true illustration of the situation described in a given sentence. In each case, you 
will first be presented with a short sentence describing the relationship between txN, o 
objects, represented by the letters A and B, as in the example below: 
Example sentence: A is above B 
This will remain on the screen for as long as you need to read and understand it. When you 
are satisfied that you have understood the sentence, click on the button marked ready. A 
picture will then appear which also describes a possible relationship between A and B, for 
instance: 
Example picture: A 
B 
Your task is to decide whether you think the relationship shown in the picture is true or 
false according to the sentence you saw previously. If you think the picture is a true 
representation of the sentence, click on the button labelled TRUE. If you think the picture 
is false, click on the button labelled FALSE (in the above example the relationship shown 
in the picture is true). After a short break, a warning dot will appear, after which the next 
sentence will be presented and the above procedure can be repeated. 
Before you begin the experiment, you will be presented with a series of practice trials to 
get you used to the procedure. If you have any questions about what you need to do please 
ask the experimenter now. There will be further opportunity for questions after the practice 
trials. When you are ready to begin the practice, press the space bar to start. When you 
have completed the practice, tell the experimenter. 
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APPENDIX 3K 
Experiment 4: SPSS output from reliability analysis on syllogistic reasoning beha-, iour 
questionnaire completed by participants. 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPHA) 
SQ1 
SQ1 1.0000 
SQ2 . 4976 
SQ3 . 3565 
SQ4 . 2592 
SQ5 -. 1213 
SQ6 . 3948 
SQ7 . 1598 
SQ8 . 6508 
SQ6 
SQ6 1.0000 
SQ7 . 1404 
SQ8 . 3444 
Correlation Matrix 
SQ2 SQ3 
1.0000 
. 3150 
. 4383 
. 1828 
. 3102 
. 1294 
. 4311 
1.0000 
. 3591 
. 4400 
. 2075 
. 1541 
. 2719 
SQ7 
1.0000 
. 1620 
SQ8 
1.0000 
N of Cases = 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
SQ1 19.3714 
SQ2 19.8714 
SQ3 19.4714 
SQ4 18.7571 
SQ5 19.5143 
SQ6 19.2429 
SQ7 18.3000 
SQ8 21.9714 
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = . 7003 
70.0 
SQ4 
1.0000 
. 2022 
. 3736 
. 0469 
. 2375 
SQ5 
1.0000 
-. 0961 
-. 0034 
. 0492 
Corrected 
Item- Squared Alpha 
Total Multiple if Item 
Correlation Correlation Deleted 
. 4894 . 
5851 . 6469 
. 5736 . 
3915 . 6265 
. 5250 . 
4041 . 6416 
. 4826 . 
3085 . 6490 
. 1381 . 
3559 . 7244 
. 3987 . 2706 . 
6704 
. 1747 . 0531 . 
7122 
. 5484 . 4605 . 
6785 
8 items 
Standardized item alpha . 72 
, 28 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
26.3528 
27.1571 
28.6586 
28.0996 
33.7896 
28.8242 
33.9812 
34.3760 
APPENDIX 31, 
Experiment 4: SPSS output from reliability analysis on transitive inference reasoning 
behaviours questionnaire completed by participants. 
Analysis 1 (all 6 items) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS IS -SCALE (ALPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ2 TQ3 TQ4 TQ5 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ2 . 0669 1.0000 
TQ3 . 3905 . 0403 1.0000 
TQ4 -. 0686 . 0212 -. 1145 1.0000 
TQ5 . 0827 -. 0645 -. 1389 . 2498 1.0000 
TQ6 -. 0399 . 2054 -. 2595 . 0800 . 1433 
TQ6 
TQ6 1.0000 
N of Cases 70.0 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ1 14.3286 9.8760 . 1637 . 1802 . 
1041 
TQ2 15.6000 12.4754 . 1102 . 
0631 . 1724 
TQ3 14.1714 13.1586 -. 0061 . 2351 . 
2512 
TQ4 13.5857 11.6665 . 0717 . 
0751 . 1997 
TQ5 14.0143 11.0578 . 1420 . 
1157 . 1363 
TQ6 14.5143 12.1375 . 0497 . 
1305 . 2167 
Reliabi lity Coeffi cients 6 items 
Alpha = . 2130 Standardized 
item alpha . 1984 
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APPENDIX 31, cont. 
Analysis 2 (item 3 removed) 
REL IABILIT Y ANAL YS IS -S CALE (A LPHA) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ1 TQ2 TQ4 TQ5 TQ6 
TQ1 1.0000 
TQ2 . 0669 1.0000 
TQ4 -. 0686 . 0212 1.0000 
TQ5 . 0827 -. 0645 . 2498 1.0000 TQ6 -. 0399 . 2054 . 0800 . 1433 1.0000 
N of Cases 70. 0 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ1 11.2571 10.0778 
. 0121 . 0255 . 3324 TQ2 12.5286 11.1513 
. 1019 . 0596 . 2253 TQ4 10.5143 9.8186 
. 1227 . 0733 . 2042 TQ5 10.9429 9.1271 
. 2124 . 0998 . 1114 TQ6 11.4429 9.8155 
. 1563 . 0724 . 1725 
Reliability Coeffici ents 5 items 
Alpha = . 2512 Stand ardized item alpha . 2662 
Analysis 3 (item 1 removed) 
REL IABILIT YANAL YSIS-S CALE (A LPH A) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ2 TQ4 TQ5 TQ6 
TQ2 1.0000 
TQ4 
. 
0212 1.0000 
TQ5 -. 0645 . 2498 1.0000 
TQ6 
. 2054 . 
0800 
. 1433 1.0000 
N of Cases 70. 0 
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APPENDIX 3L cont. 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ2 9.6143 8.3273 . 0780 . 0520 . 3619 
TQ4 7.6000 6.3884 . 1987 . 0652 . 2401 
TQ5 8.0286 6.4629 . 1965 . 0872 . 2430 
TQ6 8.5286 6.5427 . 2182 . 0682 . 2168 
Reliability Coefficients 4 items 
Alpha = . 3324 Standardized 
item alpha . 3214 
Analysi s4 (item 2 removed ) 
REL IABILIT YANALYSIS-S CALE (A LPH A) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ4 TQ5 TQ6 
TQ4 1.0000 
TQ5 . 2498 
1.0000 
TQ6 . 0800 . 
1433 1.0000 
N of Cases 70.0 
Item- total Statisti cs 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ4 5.9571 4.7083 . 2205 . 
0644 . 2505 
TQ5 6.3857 4.5012 . 2694 . 
0777 . 1479 
TQ6 6.8857 5.4360 . 1410 . 
0226 . 3998 
Relia bility Coeffic ients 3 items 
Alpha = . 3619 
Standardized item alpha . 3597 
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APPENDIX 31, cont. 
Analysis 5 (item 6 removed) 
RELIABILITY ANALYS I S-SCALE (ALPH. Tý) 
Correlation Matrix 
TQ4 TQ5 
TQ4 1.0000 
TQ5 . 2498 1.0000 
N of Cases 70.0 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha 
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
TQ4 3.2286 2.1499 . 2498 . 0624 
TQ5 3.6571 2.1996 . 2498 . 
0624 
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 
Alpha = . 3998 Standardized 
item alpha = . 3998 
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APPENDIX 3M 
Experiments 3 and 4: Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tables. Post-hoc test tables are 
also included where appropriate. 
Experiment 3 
Analysis 1: Performance on syllogistic reasoning, by strategy and syllogism form. 
Table 1.1: Within-subiects effects 
Type Ill Sum of I 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Forrn 43004.20 1 43004.20 5. 0.03 
Form* strategy 2276.93 1 2276.93 0.28 0.60 
Error (form) 425744.89 53 8032.92 
Table 1.2: Between-subjects effects 
Type IlI Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 453120.09 1 453120.09 77.33 0.00 
Strategv 0.09 1 0.09 0.99 
Error 310567.18 53 5859.76 
Experiment 4 
Analysis 1: Transitive inference: comparison of strategy groups on comprehension 
and verification response times. 
T%hip 1 
-1 - Within-viihiect., z t-ffpct. -. 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
RT 710229881.80 1 710229881.8 38.01 . 00 
RT* strategy 8612498.41 1 8612498.41 0.46 . 50 
Error (RT) 1177299617 63 18687295.51 1 
Tahlp 1-2- RptwPen-vihii-etc. t-fft-rtv. 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 5329840065 1 5329840065.0 1411.13 . 00 
Strategy 474128.78 1 474128.78 . 126 . 72 
Error 237951923.7 63 3777014.66 1 
Table 1.3: Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons 
APPENDIX 3M cont. 
Experiment 4 ANOVA tables cont. 
Analysis 2: Transitive inference: comparison of comprehension and verification 
response times for two strategy groups as a function of end-anchoring. 
Table 2.1: Within-subiects effects 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
RT 1535910852.7 1 1535910852.7 41.16 0.00 
RT* strategy 15378765.85 1 15378765.85 0.41 0.52 
Error (RT) 2350781886 63 373139998.19 
End-anchoring 3320739.35 1 3320739.35 3.62 0.06 
End-anch* strategy 991.46 1 991.46 0.00 0.97 
Error (end-anch) 57731716.88 63 916376.46 
RT* end-anch 11494750.44 1 11494750.44 11.51 0.001 
RT* end-anch* strategy 48511.11 1 48511.11 0.05 0.83 
Error (RT* end-anch) 62933742.89 63 998948.30 
Table 2.2: Between-subiects effects. 
Type Ill Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 10805942291 1 10805942291 14440.87 0.00 
Strategy 478100.43 1 478100.43 0.06 0.80 
Error 471166585.6 63 7478834.69 
Analysis 3: Transitive inference: comparison of comprehension and verification 
response times for two strategy groups as a function of the presence of inverse 
adjectives. 
Table 3.1: Within-subiects effects 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
RT 1274282932 1 1274282932.2 35.86 0.00 
RT* strategy 13714467.26 1 13714467.26 0.39 0.54 
Error (RT) 2238516897 63 35532014.24 
Inverse 2580616.23 1 2580616.23 2.58 0.11 
Inverse* strategy 789841.71 1 789841.71 0.79 0.38 
Error (Inverse) 63098261.51 63 1001559.71 
RT* inverse 64788.54 1 64788.54 0.06 0.81 
RT* lilx, crsc* strategy 1524100.67 1 1524110.67 1.40 0.24 
Error (RT* in%-ci-sc) 68443345.54 63 1086402.31 
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Table 3.2: Between-subiects effects. 
Type III Sum of 
squares df Mean square FSi 
Intercept 10536000722 1 10536000722 1371.37 0.00 
Strategy 120851.92 1 120851.92 0.90 
Error 484020012.1 63 7682857.34 
Analysis 4: Sentence-picture verification: Comparison of verification response times 
across trial types, as a function of truth and polarity. 
Table 4.1: Within-subjects effects 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Truth 2736910.37 1 2736910.37 74.80 0.00 
Error (truth) 2524859.74 69 36592.17 
Polarity 6096809.48 1 6096809.48 32.41 
Error (polarity) 12979475.41 69 18810834 0.00 
Truth* polarity 342439.41 1 342439.41 6.86 0.01 
Error (truth* polarity) 3445781.51 69 49938.86 
Analysis 5: Sentence-picture verification: comparison of comprehension and 
verification response times by strategy group. 
Table 5.1: Within-subiects effects 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
RT 13127068.04 1 13127068.04 36.97 0.00 
RT* strategy 8797.03 1 8797.03 0.03 0.88 
Error (RT) 22372492.91 63 355118.94 
Table 5.2: Between-subjects effects 
Type 111 Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 347416691.3 1 347416691.26 829.18 0.00 
Strategy 704655.52 1 704655.52 1.68 0.20 
Error 26396345.09 63 418989.61 
APPENDIX 3M cont. 
Experiment 4 ANOVA tables cont. 
Analysis 6: Sentence-picture verification: Comparison of verification response times 
across trial types, as a function of truth, polarity and strategy group. 
Table 6.1: Within-subjects effects 
Type I 11 Sum of 
squares df 
I 
Mean square F Sig. 
Truth 2357492.32 1 2357492.3-1 0.00 0.00 
Truth* strategy 23989.34 1 23989.34 0.61 0.44 
Error (truth) 2463865.22 63 39108.97 
Polanty 6036476.83 1 6036476.83 30.64 0.00 
Polarity* strategy 169725.09 1 169725.09 0.86 0.36 
Error (polarity) 12411924.37 63 197014.67 
Truth* polarity 371480.46 1 371480.46 7.74 0.01 
Truth* polanty* strategy 116941.60 1 116941.60 2.44 0.12 
Error (truth* polarity) 3023775.73 63 47996.44 
Table 6.2: Between-subjects effects 
Type IlI Sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Intercept 454845433.1 1 454845433.07 618.46 0.12 
Strategy 1187982.80 1 1187982.80 1.62 
Error 46333071.24 63 735445.58 
" 16 
APPENDIX 4A 
Experiments 5 and 6: Syllogisms presented in reasoning performance task. Problems are 
shown in order presented, together with figure, mental model count and conclusion form as 
indicators of relative difficulty. 
No. Syllogism Figure Mental model Conclusion 
count form 
Some of the bankers are managers. B-A 
All of the bankers are chefs. B-C I same 
Some of the managers are chefs 
2 None of the journalists are pilots. B-A 
Some of the journalists are divers. B-C 3 different 
Some of the divers are not pilots 
3 None of the farmers are clowns. A-13 
All of the butchers are clowns. B-C 3 same 
None of the farmers are butchers 
4 None of the journalists are mechanics. B-A 
All of the drivers are journalists. C-B I same 
None of the drivers are mechanics 
5 All of the librarians are journalists. A-B 
None of the journalists are reporters B-C I same 
None of the librarians are reporters 
6 None of the jugglers are clowns. A-B 
Some of the clowns are cricketers. B-C 3 different 
Some of the cricketers are not jUgglers 
7 All of the clowns are chemists. B-A 
Some of the parents are clowns. C-B I same 
Some of the parents are chemists 
8 Some of the athletes are singers. A-B 
All of the singers are dancers. B-C I same 
Some of the athletes are dancers 
9 Some of the lawyers are bankers. A-B 
None of the bankers are sailors. B-C 3 different 
- 
Some of the lawyers are not sailors 
to None of the bankers are teachers. B-A 
Some of the sculptors are bankers. C-13 3 different 
Some of the sculptors are not teachers 
None of the historians are singers. A-B 
Some of the hairdressers are singers. C-B 3 different 
Some of the hairdressers are not historians 
12 Some of the surgeons are journalists. A-B 
None of the golfers are journalists. C-B 3 different 
Some of the surgeons are ot golfers 
13 All of the nurses are bankers. A-B 
None of the politicians are bankers. C-B I same 
None of the nurses are politicians 
14 Some of the singers are carpenters. B-A 
None of the weavers are singers. C-13 3 different 
Some of the carpenters are not weavers 
15 Some of the clowns are pianists. B-A 
None of the clowns are surfers. B-C 3 different 
Some of the pianists are not surfers 
16 All of the singers are hikers. B-A 
Some of the singers are publicans. B-C I same 
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Experiments 5 and 6: Instructions and practice item presented to participants prior to 
computerised syllogistic reasoning performance task (as per Capon, Handlev and Dennis, 
2003). 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to so ý/e 16 
syllogisms A syllogism is a pair of statements proyiding you wrth 
information about the relationships between three classes The 
three ciassesmll be labelled by professions (e g bakers, 
painters etc ) On the basis of the information proAded by the 
two statements, you will be asked to draw a conclusion between 
two of the classes One of tie classes is common to both 
statements. your task is to produce a conclusion linking the 
other two classes 
The 16 syllogismsoAll appear one by one on your screen Shortly 
after the appearance of each problem, 2 questionwill also 
appear on the screen asking you to relate two of the classes 
using the quantifiers shown below. You will be reminded which 
two terms need to be linked in the conclusion 
Ne, d >ý 
YOU SHOULD REM EM BE R THAT YOUR CONCLUSION MUST 
ALWAYS CONTAIN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUANTIFIERS 
AJI of the .ý.. are . .. 
(as in the example below), 
Some of the -. are 
None of the ..... are ..... 
Some of the ..... are not ..... 
You also have the option of writing 'no valid conclusion'. 
For example the problem may contain the following two 
statements 
All of the painters are bakers 
All of the bakers are farmers 
2 
Ne, d 
4 
5. 
The screen will adso display a blank box in wbich you must type 
your response to each problem For example, if you thouqht the 
answer was "AJI of the painters are farmers" then this is what you 
should type There will be a button to press to mow onto the next 
problem 
Please take your time and be certain you have the logically correct 
answer before stating it If you haye any questions please ask 
them now as the experimenter cannot answer after the task has 
commenced You must not make notes or draw diagrams of any 
kind to aid you in this task A practice problem will now be gwen to 
show you the format of each of the 16 problems 
Nod >> 
I 
Please write a conclusion in the box provided Your 
conclusion should link painters and farmers 
Remember that your conclusion must include one of 
the follo, *ing quantifiers: All. No, Some, or Some not 
If you think no conclusion is possible, please wnte 'no 
valid conclusion'. 
Some of the painters are bakers. 
All of the bakers are farmers. 
Yw aný I 
PTm Re"n to cor&ý 
Cýtýý Sýulthepa"-aelaýs 
Nýd 
In the pr,, ýious example, you would be asked to find a 
conclusion that links the terms 'painters' and 'farmers' So. you 
may corr@cW draw the conclusion 
AM of the painters are farmers 
So for the previous example these are all of the conclusions you 
might have produced (the first one being the only correct 
conclusion') 
AJI of the painters are farmers. 
All of the farmers are painters. 
Some of the painters are farmers. 
Some of the farmers are painters. 
None of the painters are farmers. 
None of the farmers are painters 
Some of the painters are not farmers 
Some of the farmers are not painters. 
No yalid conclusion. 
Nwd ý> 
I 
3. 
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Experiment 5: Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) items. The construct measured bN. each 
item is presented in parentheses as per the following key. 
RA: Rational ability 
RE: Rational engagement 
EA: Experiential ability 
EE: Experiential engagement 
Each item was presented with a scale as below. 
12345 
Definitely not Mostly not Equally true Mostly true Definitely 
true true and false true 
REI Test Items 
I am not that good at working out complicated problems (RA) 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me 
(RE) 
3.1 try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something (RE) 
4.1 don't have a very good sense of intuition (EA) 
5.1 am much better at working things out logically that most people (RA) 
6.1 like to rely on my intuitive impressions (EE) 
7.1 am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis (RA) 
8.1 enjoy intellectual challenges (RE) 
9.1 usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions (RA) 
10. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in working out problems in my life (EA) 
11. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction (RE) 
12. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems (EE) 
13. Using logic usually works well for me in working out problems in my life (RA) 
14.1 can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know (EA) 
15.1 often go by instincts when deciding on a course of action (EE) 
16. My snap judgements are probably not as good as most people's (EA) 
17.1 enjoy thinking in abstract terms (RE) 
18.1 don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition (EE) 
19.1 prefer complex to simple problems (RE) 
20.1 suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate (EA) 
2 1.1 think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition (EE) 
22.1 don't like to have to do a lot of thinking (RE) 
23.1 think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings (EE) 
24.1 trust my initial feelings about people (EA) 
25.1 don't reason well under pressure (RA) 
26.1 don't think it's a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions 
(EE) 
27.1 have a logical mind (RA) 
28.1 generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions (EE) 
29.1 enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking (RE) 
30.1 would not ý, vant to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitivc 
(EE) 
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31.1 am not a very analytical thinker (RA) 
32.1 tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions (EE) 
33. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me (RE) 
34.1 believe in trusting my hunches (EA) 
35.1 have no problem in thinking things through carefully (RA) 
36. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings (EA) 
37. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity (RE) 
38. Reasoning thing out carefully is not one of my strong points (RA) 
39. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes (EA) 
40.1 hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer (EA) 
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Experiment 5: Matrix 
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APPENDIX 4E 
Experiment 5: Correlations between cognitive style measures for verbal and 
spatial reasoners. 
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APPENDIX 5A 
Experiment 6: Computer presented instructions for Simple Word Span task. 
Simple Word Span Instructions 
In this part of the experiment, you must remember sets of words that will 
appear on the screen. The number of words to remember in each set will 
increase throughout the test. 
An example of a set of words can be seen below'. 
The screen displays the word GUITAR 
Then the screen displays the word LORRY 
Then the screen displays 
Your task is to remember the set of words, in the order they were presented. 
For the above example, you would write down the wordsýGUITAR LORRY 
You are provided with a response sheet to mark down your responses to 
each set of words. Please have a look at the sheet now to ensure you 
understand how to mark your responses. 
If you DO NOT understand the task, please tell the experimenter now. 
If you DO understand the task, please click the button below and you vvil I be 
given three practice sets of words. 
Start the Practice Set 
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APPENDIX 5B 
Experiment 6: Words presented for Simple Word Span task, sho-,, v-n in order and in 
sets as presented to all participants. 
Practice Sets 
Berry Lemon Jersey 
Cattle Singer Apple 
2 Word Sets 
Wallet Movie Banner Silver Planet 
Coffee Kitten Forest Cannon Table 
3 Word Sets 
Adult Mother Banker Dinner Flower 
Carpet Tower Insect Ankle Jockey 
Dollar Hotel Otter Tunnel Hammer 
4 Word Sets 
Bucket Medal Battle Ribbon Manor 
Pepper Organ Sugar Cabin Supper 
Cotton Collar Angel Pocket Dancer 
Stable Doctor Rabbit Bishop Racket 
5 Word Sets 
Anchor Metal Cherry Valley Island 
Liver Butter Engine Bubble Party 
Needle Father Pillow Driver Canoe 
Window River Statue Circle Basket 
Mirror Candy Market Locker Letter 
6 Word Sets 
Puzzle Cement Bottle Artist Giant 
Marble Ferry Turtle Willow Barrel 
Tiger Infant Candle Ticket Eagle 
Hunter Python Gravel Summer Rocket 
Saddle Woman Jacket Circus Cellar 
Basin Lax\--\-ci- Maple Lobby Demon 
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APPENDIX 5B cont. 
7 Word Sets 
Mutton Cigar Honey Coral Music 
Sister Rubber Cable Monkey Penný, 
Buckle Elbow Prison Shower Olive 
Office Powder Money Fabric Resort 
Clover Button Number Bullet Salad 
Lever Garden Brandy Heaven Alley 
Paper Linen Water Arrow Walnut 
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APPENDIX 5C 
Experiment 6: Computer presented instructions for Simple Spatial Arrow Span task. 
Briefing 
You will be shown a series of arrows pointing in various directions. 
You must remember which way each is pointing. 
At the end of each set of arrows you will be shown a grid. Click on 
the diamonds that the arrows were pointing to, IN THE ORDER 
THAT THEY WERE SHOWN. Your response is being timed so 
please respond as quickly and accurately as you can. As you 
proceed the number of arrows in each set increases. There are a 
practice set to begin with. 
Click on the button to start practice. 
Continue 
ý ..... ................ . ............................... ...................................... . . ....... ............ .... 
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APPENDIX 5D 
Experiment 6: The Complex Verbal Sentence Span. Sentence sets in order presented 
to all participants with indication of correct response (T = True, F= False). Final 
word in each sentence to be recalled. 
Practice Set 
A wallet holds money (T) 
Cotton wool is hard (F) 
2 Sentence Sets 
4 Sentence Sets 
The number three is even (F) 
Fish live on the land (F) 
Gold has a high value (T) 
A lemon is a flower (F) 
A bird has feet (F) 
Singers have a good voice (T) 
Breakfast is eaten in the morning (T) 
A ruler draws a straight line (T) 
Mountain tops are high (T) 
Winners come in second (F) 
The conclusion comes first (F) 
England is a country (T) 
3 Sentence Sets 
There are floors in a house (T) 
A square is round (F) 
After four comes five (T) 
Officers work in the police force (T) 
Kittens like to play (T) 
Carpets hang on a wall (F) 
The ace of hearts is black (F) 
English drive on the left (T) 
Twenty months make a year (F) 
Winners come in last (F) 
A prince is a woman (F) 
Tomorrow is in the future (T) 
A penny is a coin (T) 
The sun comes out at night (F) 
There are toes on a hand (F) 
A dinghy is a boat (T) 
Cartoon characters are real (F) 
The leader is at the front (T) 
Bill' i ions are smaller than a million (F) 
Polar bears are white 
Elephants are very small (F) 
Families live in a home (T) 
Lifts go up and down (T) 
English drive on the right (F) 
Windows can be open (T) 
Memories are from the past (T) 
A slope is level (F) 
Miners work in school (F) 
Clocks tell the time (T) 
Cars drive on a road (T) 
5 Sentence Sets 
A brother is a girl 
Keyboards are used to type (T) 
Seven comes before four (F) 
People live in a city (T) 
Football is a sport (T) 
At night time it is light (F) 
Electricity is a forin of power (T) 
Water is found down a well (T) 
Rock music is sung in church (F) 
Legs are part of the face (F) 
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APPENDIX 5D continued. 
Experiment 6: Complex Verbal Sentence Span test items. 
5 Sentence Sets cont. 
Judges work in court (T) 
Crops grow in a wood (F) 
Museums are open to the public (T) 
One person makes a group (F) 
Carpets cover the floor (T) 
Water lights a fire (F) 
Planes fly around the world (T) 
Seventeen comes before three (F) 
Chess is a game (T) 
A frog has hair (F) 
The hospital sends mail (F) 
Towns are full of sand (F) 
The ocean contains water (T) 
An apple is a fruit (T) 
Cars are made of bone (F) 
6 Sentence Sets 
A hand has a palm (T) 
You find fur in a salad (F) 
Plug rhymes with leaf (F) 
Bald people have a fringe (F) 
Haunted houses have a ghost (T) 
Brownies go to camp (T) 
Tea is kept in a flask (T) 
Lions sleep in a cradle (F) 
Cigarettes come in a pack (T) 
The sea is made of gravy (F) 
Cement is a spice (F) 
You wake up with an alarrn (T) 
Canoeists use a paddle (T) 
You sit on a stool (T) 
Vodka is found in a lake (F) 
Ninety seconds equals one hour (F) 
Pigs take offfrorri an airport (F) 
red is the colour of lime (F) 
6 Sentence Sets cont. 
You keep animals in a file (F) 
You eat with a sword (F) 
The sea is near the coast (T) 
A cinema has a spire (F) 
You can mow a lawn (T) 
People walk along a pier (T) 
You can suck your thumb (T) 
Peasants live in a palace (F) 
You can drink from a goblet (T) 
A daffodil grows from a bulb (T) 
You stay dry in the rain (F) 
Pubs sell crisps and beer (T) 
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Experiment 6: The Complex Verbal Sentence Span. Written instructions and 
example of test screen format as presented to all participants. 
1. Instruction Screen 
Readinq Span Instructions 
In this part of the experiment, your task is to decide whether sets of 
sentences are true or false whilst remembering the last word of each 
sentence. The number of sentences to veriN in ea ch set will increase 
throughout the test. The test can be completed by using mouse clicks. 
An example of a set ofwords can be seen below 
The screen displays a sentenceý THE SKY IS BLUE 
Then the screen displays another sentence THE SUN IS PINK 
Your task is to decide whether the sentence is true (T) or false (F) In this 
case you would click the mouse in the "TRUE" button for the first and false 
for the second. You must remember the last word ofthe sentence. 
Then the screen displays 
17 
When the recall lightbulb appears, your task is to remember the last word in 
each sentence, in the order in which they appeared. For the above example, 
you would write down the wordsý blue and pink. 
You are provided with a response sheetto mark down your responses to 
each set ofsentences. Please have a look at the sheet now to ensure you 
understand how to maik your responses. 
Ifyou DO NOT understand the task, please tell the experimenter now- 
Ifyou DO understand the task, please click the button below and you will be 
given a practice set of sentences. 
Start the Practice Set 
2. Typical test item presentation and response screens 
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APPENDIX 5F 
Experiment 6: Complex Spatial Letter Span. Instruction screen presented to all 
participants. 
L Briefing 
You will be shown a series of letters, some will be a mirror image of 
the normal letter, and all will be rotated to a particular angle. 
As each letter appears decide if it is 'normal' or the 'mirror' image 
and click on the correct button. At the same time note which way the 
top of the letter points. At the end of each series of letters you will 
be shown a grid. Click on the diamonds that are at the same angle 
as the letters, IN THE ORDER THAT THEY WERE SHOWN. All 
your responses are being timed so please respond as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. 
As you proceed the number of letters in a group increases. There 
are some practice letters before you start. 
Click on the button to begin practice. 
Continue 
..................... .......... 
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Experiment 6: Full EQS output of Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Model 1. 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM MULTIVARIATE SOFTWARE, INC. COPYRIGHT 
BY P. M. BENTLER VERSION 5.7b (C) 1985 - 1998. 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
1 /TITLE 
2 spatial 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 VARIABLES=7; CASES=48; 
5 ANALYSIS = COV; GROUP=2; 
6 METHODS=ML; 
7 MATRIX=CORRELATION; 
8 /LABELS 
9 Vl=SYL; V2=WORD; V3=SENT; V4=SENTERR; V5=ARROW; V6=LETTERS; V7=LETTERR; 
10 /EQUATIONS 
11 V1 =+ *Fl + *F2 + El; 
12 V2 =+ *F1 + E2; 
13 V3 =+ *Fl + E3; 
14 V4 =+ *Fl + E4; 
15 V5 =+ *F2 + E5; 
16 V6 =+ *F2 + E6; 
17 V7 =+ *F2 + E7; 
18 /VARIANCES 
19 F1 = 1.00; 
20 F2 = 1.00; 
21 El = 
22 E2 = 
23 E3 = 
24 E4 = 
25 E5 = 
26 E6 = 
27 E7 = 
28 /COVARIANCES 
29 Fl, F2=*; 
30 /MATRIX 
31 1 
32 -0.046 1 
33 0.368 0.529 1 
34 -0.133 -0.154 -0.223 1 
35 0.371 -0.022 0.256 -0.198 1 
36 0.192 0.137 0.297 -0.331 0.594 1 
37 -0.152 -0.091 -0.056 -0.099 -0.205 -0.132 1 
38 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
39 3.629 19.147 17.765 5.947 9.925 15.934 8.659 
40 /TECHNICAL 
41 ITR=50; 
42 /END 
42 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 1) 
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PAGE :2 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
43 /TITLE 
44 verbal 
45 /SPECIFICATIONS 
46 VARIABLES=7; CASES=93; 
47 METHODS=ML; 
48 MATRIX=CORRELATION; ANALYSIS = COV; 
49 /LABELS 
50 Vl=SYL; V2=WORD; V3=SENT; V4=SENTERR; V5=ARROW; V6=LETTERS; V7=LETTERR; 
51 /EQUATIONS 
52 V1 =+ *Fl + *F2 + El; 
53 V2 =+ *Fl + E2; 
54 V3 =+ *Fl + E3; 
55 V4 =+ *Fl + E4; 
56 V5 =+ *F2 + E5; 
57 V6 =+ *F2 + E6; 
58 V7 =+ *F2 + E7; 
59 /VARIANCES 
60 F1 = 
61 F2 = 
62 El = 
63 E2 = 
64 E3 = 
65 E4 = 
66 E5 = 
67 E6 =k 
68 E7 = *; 
69 /COVARIANCES 
70 Fl, F2=*; 
71 /MATRIX 
72 1 
73 0.357 1 
74 0.367 0.568 1 
75 -0.274 -0.265 -0.226 1 
76 0.301 0.260 0.219 -0.237 1 
77 0.204 0.362 0.373 -0.328 0.332 1 
78 -0.177 -0.054 -0.037 0.031 -0.282 -0.241 1 
79 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
80 2.701 12.721 15.678 5.630 8.779 12.857 8.692 
81 /CONSTRAINTS 
82 (1, V2, Fl)= (2, V2, Fl); 
83 (1, V3, Fl)= (2, V3, Fl); 
84 (1, V4, Fl)= (2, V4, Fl); 
85 (1, V5, F2)= (2, V5, F2); 
86 (1, V6, F2)= (2, V6, F2); 
87 (1, V7, F2)= (2, V7, F2); 
88 /TECHNICAL 
89 ITR=50; 
90 /PRINT 
91 FIT=ALL; 
92 /LMTEST 
93 /END 
93 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 2) 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 3 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 7 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 7 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 48 CASES. 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 13.170 
WORD V 2 -3.196 366.608 
SENT V 3 23.725 179.937 315.595 
SENTERR V 4 -2.870 -17.536 -23.560 35.367 
ARROW v 5 13.363 -4.181 45.137 -11.687 98.506 
LETTERS V 6 11.102 41.797 84.071 -31.365 93.938 
LETTERR V 7 -4.776 -15.087 -8.614 -5.098 -17.618 
LETTERS V6 
LETTERR V7 
LETTERS 
V6 
253.892 
-18.212 
LETTERR 
V7 
74.978 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =7 
DEPENDENT V'S :1234 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 9 
INDEPENDENT F'S :12 
INDEPENDENT E'S :123 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 16 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS 9 
567 
4567 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE :4 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 7 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 7 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 93 CASES. 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 7.295 
WORD V 2 12.266 161.824 
SENT V 3 15.541 113.282 245.800 
SENTERR V 4 -4.167 -18.979 -19.948 31.697 
ARROW v 5 7.137 29.036 30.143 -11.714 77.071 
LETTERS V 6 7.084 59.207 75.186 -23.742 37.473 
LETTERR V 7 -4.155 -5.971 -5.042 1.517 -21.519 
LETTERS V6 
LETTERR V7 
LETTERS 
V6 
165.302 
-26.932 
LETTERR 
V7 
75.551 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 7 
DEPENDENT V'S :1234567 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 9 
INDEPENDENT F'S :12 
INDEPENDENT E'S :1234567 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 18 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS 7 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 6101 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 100000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 1 IS 0.23014E+14 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 2 IS 0.24603E+13 
IN ITERATION # 1, MATRIX W CFUNCT MAY NOT BE POSITIVE DEFINITE. 
YOU HAVE BAD START VALUES TO BEGIN WITH. 
IF ABOVE MESSAGE APPEARS ON EVERY ITERATION, PLEASE PROVIDE BETTER START 
VALUES AND RE-RUN THE JOB. 
IN ITERATION # 1, MATRIX W CFUNCT MAY NOT BE POSITIVE DEFINITE. 
YOU HAVE BAD START VALUES TO BEGIN WITH. 
IF ABOVE MESSAGE APPEARS ON EVERY ITERATION, PLEASE PROVIDE BETTER START 
VALUES AND RE-RUN THE JOB. 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: 
MULTIPLE POPULATION 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
5 
Alison Bacon 
ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
APPEAR IN ORDER, 
WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR 
v1 V2 V3 V4 
SYL v 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -18.599 -22.925 
SENT V 3 3.144 -7.034 9.550 
SENTERR V 4 0.037 8.879 11.734 -2.571 
ARROW V 5 2.292 -38.444 -0.643 -5.219 
LETTERS V 6 -5.581 -9.835 15.083 -21.619 
LETTERR V 7 -0.444 -1.678 9.302 -7.629 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 -4.929 
LETTERR V 7 17.414 -4.781 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ARROW 
V 
3.724 
2.903 
6.024 
8.6435 
9.2160 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.268 -0.063 
SENT V 3 0.049 -0.021 0.030 
SENTERR V 4 0.002 0.078 0.111 -0.073 
ARROW V 5 0.064 -0.202 -0.004 -0.088 0.038 
LETTERS V 6 -0.097 -0.032 0.053 -0.228 
0.018 
LETTERR V 7 -0.014 -0.010 0.060 -0.148 
0.070 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 -0.019 
LETTERR V 7 0.126 -0.064 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0725 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0830 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 6 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 2, V 
-0.268 
4, V 
0.111 
7, V5 
0.070 
V 6, V4 
-0.228 
V 6, V 
-0.097 
V 7, V 
-0.064 
V 5, V2 
-0.202 
V 5, V 
-0.088 
5, V 
0.064 
V 7, V 
-0.148 
V 4, V 2 
0.078 
V 2, V 
-0.063 
V 7, V6 
0.126 
V 4, V 4 
-0.073 
V 7, V3 
0.060 
V 6, V3V3, V1V5, V5V6, V2V3, V3 
0.053 0.049 0.038 -0.032 0.030 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
---------------------------------------- 
20- 
15- 
10- 
---------------------------------------- 
123456789ABC 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
1 -0.5 0 0.00% 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.00% 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 3 10.71% 
5 -0.1 - -0.2 1 3.57% 
6 0.0 - -0.1 12 42.86% 
7 0.1 - 0.0 10 35.71% 
8 0.2 - 0.1 2 7.14% 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
c ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
TOTAL 28 100.00% 
EACH "' REPRESENTS 1 RESIDUALS 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 7 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
SYL =Vl = . 896*Fl + 1.091*F2 + 1.000 El 
. 603 . 628 
1.486 1.737 
WORD =V2 = 11.829*Fl + 1.000 E2 
2.150 
5.501 
SENT =V3 = 15.806*Fl + 1.000 E3 
2.512 
6.292 
SENTERR =V4 = -2.233*Fl + 1.000 E4 
. 668 
-3.342 
ARROW =V5 = 7.772*F2 + 1.000 E5 
1.380 
5.631 
LETTERS =V6 = 11.713*F2 + 1.000 E6 
2.184 
5.362 
LETTERR =V7 = -3.042*F2 + 1.000 E7 
1.117 
-2.724 
TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 8 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
VF 
I Fl Fl 1.000 1 
I F2 F2 1.000 1 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 9 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
E D 
El SYL 10.450*1 
2.275 1 
4.593 1 
I 
E2 - WORD 249.599*1 
61.122 1 
4.084 1 
I I 
E3 - SENT 56.223*1 
57.743 1 
. 
974 1 
I 
E4 -SENTERR 32.952,11 
7.013 1 
4.699 1 
I 
ES -ARROW 34.371*1 
16.182 1 
2.124 1 
I 
E6 -LETTERS 121.638*1 
41.711 1 
2.916 1 
I 
E7 -LETTERR 70.507*1 
15.098 1 
4.670 1 
I 
TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE : 10 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
COVARIANCES AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
VF 
I F2 F2 . 373*1 
I Fl Fl . 168 1 
1 2.218 1 
II 
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TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE : 11 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
SYL =vl . 247*Fl + . 301*F2 + . 891 El . 207 WORD =V2 . 599*Fl + . 800 E2 . 359 SENT =V3 . 903*Fl + . 429 E3 . 816 SENTERR =V4 -. 363*Fl + . 932 E4 . 131 ARROW =V5 . 798*F2 + . 602 E5 . 637 
LETTERS =V6 . 728*F2 + . 686 E6 . 530 
LETTERR =V7 -. 341*F2 + . 940 E7 . 116 
TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE : 12 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
vF 
I F2 F2 . 373*1 
I Fl Fl I 
II 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END0FMETH0D 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: 
MULTIPLE POPULATION 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
13 
Alison Bacon 
ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
APPEAR IN ORDER, 
WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLY IMPOSED 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR 
V1 V2 V3 V4 
SYL V 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.059 3.494 
SENT V 3 -0.928 1.236 -9.131 
SENTERR V 4 -1-840 -3.150 1.202 1.101 
ARROW V 5 1.084 -3.931 -13.907 -5.491 
LETTERS V 6 -2.038 9.526 8.806 -14.365 
LETTERR V 7 -1.786 6.931 12.197 -0.918 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 2.029 
LETTERR V 7 -9.984 2.382 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVA RIANCE RES IDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVA RIANCE RES IDUALS 
STANDARDIZE D RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR 
V1 V2 V3 V4 
SYL V 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.002 0.022 
SENT V 3 -0.022 0.006 -0.037 
SENTERR V 4 -0.121 -0.044 0.014 0.035 
ARROW V 5 0.046 -0.035 -0.101 -0.111 
LETTERS V 6 -0.059 0.058 0.044 -0.198 
LETTERR V 7 -0.076 0.063 0.090 -0.019 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 0.012 
LETTERR V 7 -0.089 0.032 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
ARROW 
V 
-2.832 
-5.835 
-10.271 
4.8734 
5.4993 
ARROW 
V5 
-0.037 
-0.052 
-0.135 
0.0556 
0.0659 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 14 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 6, V 
-0.198 
V 7, V 3 
0.090 
6, V2 
0.058 
V 7, V 5 
-0.135 
V 7, V 6 
-0.089 
V 6, V5 
-0.052 
V 4, V 
-0.121 
V 7, V 
-0.076 
5, V 
0.046 
V 5, V 
-0.111 
7, V 2 
0.063 
V 4, V 2 
-0.044 
V 5, V3 
-0.101 
V 6, V 
-0.059 
6, V3 
0.044 
V 3, V3V5, V5V5, V2V4, V 4V7, V 7 
-0.037 -0.037 -0.035 0.035 0.032 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
----------- 
20- 
------ --- -------------------- 
15- 
10- 
5- 
----------- 
123 
------ 
45 
--- 
6 
-------------------- 
789ABC 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
1 -0.5 0 0.00% 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.00% 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 0.00% 
5 -0.1 - -0.2 5 17.86% 
6 0.0 - -0.1 12 42.86% 
7 0.1 - 0.0 11 39.29% 
8 0.2 - 0.1 0 0.00% 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
c ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
TOTAL 28 100-00% 
EACH "*" REPRESENTS 1 RESIDUALS 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 15 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
SYL =Vl = 1.383*Fl + . 595*F2 + 1.000 El 
. 723 . 840 
1.913 . 708 
WORD =V2 = 11.829*Fl + 1.000 E2 
2.150 
5.501 
SENT =V3 = 15.806*Fl + 1.000 E3 
2.512 
6.292 
SENTERR =V4 = -2.233*Fl + 1.000 E4 
. 668 
-3.342 
ARROW =V5 = 7.772*F2 + 1.000 E5 
1.380 
5.631 
LETTERS =V6 = 11.713*F2 + 1.000 E6 
2.184 
5.362 
LETTERR =V7 = -3.042*F2 + 1.000 E7 
1.117 
-2.724 
TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 16 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
v F 
I Fl - Fl . 599*1 
1 . 213 1 
2.818 1 
I 
I F2 - F2 . 476*1 
1 . 191 1 
1 2.490 1 
I I 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 17 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
E D 
El - SYL 5.391* 1 
. 
880 1 
6.125 1 
I I 
E2 - WORD 74.472*1 
17.690 1 
4.210 1 
I 
E3 - SENT 105.220*1 
29.147 1 
3.610 1 
I 
E4 -SENTERR 27.608*1 
4.197 1 
6.578 1 
I 
E5 -ARROW 51.163*1 
10.615 1 
4.820 1 
I 
E6 -LETTERS 98.010*1 
22.174 1 
4.420 1 
I 
E7 -LETTERR 68.767*1 
10.432 1 
6.592 1 
I 
TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 18 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
COVARIANCES AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
VF 
I F2 F2 . 359*1 
I Fl Fl . 121 1 
1 2.968 1 
II 
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TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 19 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
SYL =vl . 396*Fl + . 152*F2 + . 860 El . 261 WORD =V2 . 728*Fl + . 686 E2 . 530 SENT =V3 . 766*Fl + . 642 E3 . 587 SENTERR =V4 -. 313*Fl + . 950 E4 . 098 ARROW =V5 . 600*F2 + . 800 E5 . 360 LETTERS =V6 . 632*F2 + . 775 E6 . 400 LETTERR =V7 -. 245*F2 + . 969 E7 . 060 
TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 20 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
vF 
I F2 F2 . 672*1 
I Fl Fl I 
II 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END0FMETH0D 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 
STATISTICS FOR MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLY IMPOSED 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE 187.344 ON 42 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 103.34423 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = -62.50368 
MODEL AIC = -21.03712 MODEL CAIC = -131.60240 
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CHI-SQUARE = 34-963 BASED ON 28 DEGREES OF FREE: ýC', ' 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.17095 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.813 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.928 
COMPARATIVE FI T INDEX (CFI) 0.952 
BOLLEN (IFI) FIT INDEX= 0.956 
McDonald (MFI) FIT INDEX= 0.963 
LISREL GFI FIT INDEX= 0.937 
LISREL AGFI FIT INDEX= 0.874 
ROOT MEAN SQUA RED RESIDUAL (RMR) 9.753 
STANDARDIZED R MR 0.086 
ROOT MEAN SQ. ERROR OF APP. (RMSEA)= 0.043 
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF RMSEA ( 0.000, 0.081) 
ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 9.767826 0.50000 1.72750 
2 13.985048 0.50000 0.84900 
3 11.423270 1.00000 0.48973 
4 8.343430 1.00000 0.28490 
5 2.922937 1.00000 0.25626 
6 1.716993 1.00000 0.25268 
7 0.617836 1.00000 0.25183 
8 0.528792 1.00000 0.25161 
9 0.207439 1.00000 0.25156 
10 0.172477 1.00000 0.25154 
11 0.083013 1.00000 0.25153 
12 0.058729 1.00000 0.25153 
13 0.031843 1.00000 0.25153 
14 0.020617 1.00000 0.25153 
15 0.011904 1.00000 0.25153 
16 0.007374 1.00000 0.25153 
17 0.004401 0.06250 0.25153 
18 0.003962 0.06250 0.25153 
19 0.003569 0.06250 0.25153 
20 0.003214 0.06250 0.25153 
21 0.002895 0.06250 0.25153 
22 0.002608 0.06250 0.25153 
23 0.002351 0.06250 0.25153 
24 0.002118 0.06250 0.25153 
25 0.001910 0.06250 0.25153 
26 0.001722 0.06250 0.25153 
27 0.001552 0.06250 0.25153 
28 0.001400 0.06250 0.25153 
29 0.001263 0.06250 0.25153 
30 0.001140 0.06250 0.25153 
31 0.001029 0.06250 0.25153 
32 0.000929 1.00000 0.25153 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 21 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST (FOR RELEASING CONSTRAINTS) 
CONSTRAINTS TO BE RELEASED ARE: 
CONSTRAINTS FROM GROUP 2 
CONSTR: 1 (1, V2, Fl)-(2, V2, Fl)=0; 
CONSTR: 2 (1, V3, Fl) - (2, V3, Fl) =0; 
CONSTR: 3 (1, V4, Fl)-(2, V4, Fl)=0; 
CONSTR: 4 (1, V5, F2)-(2, V5, F2)=0; 
CONSTR: 5 (1, V6, F2)-(2, V6, F2)=0; 
CONSTR: 6 (1, V7, F2)-(2, V7, F2)=0; 
UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: 
NO CONSTRAINT CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
----------- ---------- ----------- 
1 CONSTR: 1 0.742 0.389 
2 CONSTR: 2 2.823 0.093 
3 CONSTR: 3 1.144 0.285 
4 CONSTR: 4 1.210 0.271 
5 CONSTR: 5 0.167 0.683 
6 CONSTR: 6 1.327 0.249 
CUMULATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 
---------------------------------- 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D. F. PROBABILITY 
---- ----------- ---------- ---- ----------- 
1 CONSTR: 2 2.823 
2 CONSTR: 6 4.149 
3 CONSTR: 4 4.797 
4 CONSTR: 3 5.181 
Execution begins at 16: 37: 00.12 
Execution ends at 16: 37: 00.56 
Elapsed time = 0.44 seconds 
UNIVARIATE INCREMENT 
-------------------- 
CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
---------- ----------- 
1 0.093 2.823 0.093 
2 0.126 1.327 0.249 
3 0.187 0.647 0.421 
4 0.269 0.384 0.535 
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Experiment 6: Full EQS output of Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Model 2. 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM 
COPYRIGHT BY P. M. BENTLER 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
MULTIVARIATE SOFTWARE, INC. 
VERSION 5.7b (C) 1985 - 1998. 
1 /TITLE 
2 spatial 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 VARIABLES=7; CASES=48; 
5 ANALYSIS = COV; GROUP=2; 
6 METHODS=ML; 
7 MATRIX=CORRELATION; 
8 /LABELS 
9 Vl=SYL; V2=WORD; V3=SENT; V4=SENTERR; V5=ARROW; V6=LETTERS; V7=LETTERR; 
10 /EQUATIONS 
11 V1 =+ *Fl + *F2 + El; 
12 V2 =+ *Fl + E2; 
13 V3 =+ *Fl + E3; 
14 V4 =+ *Fl + E4; 
15 V5 =+ *F2 + E5; 
16 V6 =+ *F2 + E6; 
17 V7 =+ *F2 + E7; 
18 /VARIANCES 
19 Fl = 1.00; 
20 F2 = 1.00; 
21 El = 
22 E2 = 
23 E3 = 
24 E4 = 
25 E5 = *; 
26 E6 = 
27 E7 = 
28 /COVARIANCES 
29 Fl, F2=*; 
30 /MATRIX 
31 1 
32 -0.046 1 
33 0.368 0.529 1 
34 -0.133 -0.154 -0.223 1 
35 0.371 -0.022 0.256 -0.198 1 
36 0.192 0.137 0.297 -0.331 0.594 1 
37 -0.152 -0.091 -0.056 -0.099 -0.205 -0.132 1 
38 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
39 3.629 19.147 17.765 5.947 9.925 15.934 8.659 
40 /TECHNICAL 
41 ITR=50; 
42 
43 /END 
43 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 1) 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 2 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
44 /TITLE 
45 verbal 
46 /SPECIFICATIONS 
47 VARIABLES=7; CASES=93; 
48 METHODS=ML; 
49 MATRIX=CORRELATION; ANALYSIS = COV; 
50 /LABELS 
51 Vl=SYL; V2=WORD; V3=SENT; V4=SENTERR; V5=ARROW; V6=LETTERS; V7=LETTERR; 
52 /EQUATIONS 
53 V1 =+ *Fl + *F2 + El; 
54 V2 =+ *Fl + E2; 
55 V3 =+ *Fl + E3; 
56 V4 =+ *Fl + E4; 
57 V5 =+ *F2 + E5; 
58 V6 =+ *F2 + E6; 
59 V7 =+ *F2 + E7; 
60 /VARIANCES 
61 Fl = 1; 
62 F2 = 1; 
63 El = 
64 E2 = 
65 E3 = 
66 E4 = 
67 E5 = 
68 E6 = 
69 E7 = 
70 /COVARIANCES 
71 Fl, F2=*; 
72 /MATRIX 
73 1 
74 0.357 1 
75 0.367 0.568 1 
76 -0.274 -0.265 -0.226 1 
77 0.301 0.260 0.219 -0.237 1 
78 0.204 0.362 0.373 -0.328 0.332 1 
79 -0.177 -0.054 -0.037 0.031 -0.282 -0.241 1 
80 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
81 2.701 12.721 15.678 5.630 8.779 12.857 8.692 
82 /TECHNICAL 
83 ITR=50; 
84 /PRINT 
85 FIT=ALL; 
86 /LMTEST 
87 /END 
87 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 2) 
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TITLE: spa,: i-al 
09/16/03 PAGE 3 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 7 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 7 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 48 CASES. 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 v5 
SYL v 1 13.170 
WORD V 2 -3.196 366.608 
SENT V 3 23.725 1-79.937 315.595 
SENTERR V 4 -2.870 -17.536 -23.560 35.367 
ARROW V 5 13.363 -4.181 45.137 -11.687 98.506 
LETTERS V 6 11.102 41.797 84.071 -31.365 93.938 
LETTERR V 7 -4.776 -15.087 -8.614 -5.098 -17.618 
LETTERS V6 
LETTERR V7 
LETTERS 
V6 
253.892 
-18.212 
LETTERR 
V7 
74.978 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 7 
DEPENDENT V'S :1234 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 9 
INDEPENDENT F'S :12 
INDEPENDENT E'S :123 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 16 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS 9 
567 
4567 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 4 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 
BASED ON 93 CASES. 
-, -erbal 
7 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 7 VARIABLES) 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 7.295 
WORD V 2 12.266 161.824 
SENT V 3 15.541 113.282 245.800 
SENTERR V 4 -4.167 -18.979 -19.948 31-697 
ARROW V 5 7.137 29.036 30.143 -11.714 77.071 
LETTERS V 6 7.084 59.207 75.186 -23.742 37.473 
LETTERR V 7 -4.155 -5.971 -5.042 1.517 -21.519 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 165.302 
LETTERR V 7 -26.932 75.551 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 7 
DEPENDENT V'S :1234567 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 9 
INDEPENDENT F'S 12 
INDEPENDENT E'S 234567 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS 16 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS 9 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 5153 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 100000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 1 IS 0.23014E+14 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 2 IS 0.24603E+13 
TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE 5 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E3, E3 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 6 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION TH EORY) 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v1 0.000 
WORD V2 -16.723 0.000 
SENT V3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SENTERR V4 -1.099 -4.103 0.000 0.000 
ARROW V5 0.317 -31.799 -3.302 -8.071 0.000 
LETTERS V6 -3.564 10.748 29.613 -27.300 0.130 
LETTERR V7 -2.001 -9.212 1.690 -5.867 0.132 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 0.000 
LETTERR V 7 1.742 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RES IDUALS 5.6220 
AVERA GE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RES IDUALS 7.4960 
STANDARDIZE D RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL V 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.241 0.000 
SENT V 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SENTERR V 4 -0.051 -0.036 0.000 0.000 
ARROW V 5 0.009 -0.167 -0.019 -0.137 0.000 
LETTERS V 6 -0.062 0.035 0.105 -0.288 
0.001 
LETTERR V 7 -0.064 -0.056 0.011 -0.114 0.002 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 0.000 
LETTERR V 7 0.013 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 0.0503 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 0.0670 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 7 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 6, V4 V 2, V1 V 5, V2 V 5, V4 V 7, V 4 
-0.288 -0.241 -0.167 -0.137 -0.114 
V 6, V 3 V 7, V 1 V 6, V 1 V 7, V 2 V 4, V 1 
0.105 -0.064 -0.062 -0.056 -0.051 
V 4, V 2 V 6, V 2 V 5, V 3 V 7, V 6 V 7, V 3 
-0.036 0.035 -0.019 0.013 0.011 
V 5, V1V7, V 5V6, V5V3, V1v1, v 
0.009 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
---------------------------------------- 
20- 
sp -ý ý- ial 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
15- 
1 -0.5 - -- 0 0.00% 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.00% 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 2 7.14% 
10- 5 -0.1 - -0.2 3 10.71% 
6 0.0 - -0.1 15 53.57% 
7 0.1 - 0.0 7 25-00% 
8 0.2 - 0.1 1 3.57% 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
C ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
--- ----- ---------- ----- -------- 
TOTAL 28 100-00% 
-------------------- 
123456 
-------------------- 
789ABC EACH REPRESENTS 1 RESIDUALS 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 8 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
spa -- _4 a1 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
SYL =vl = . 998*Fl + 1.130*F2 
. 518 . 572 
1.929 1.974 
WORD =V2 = 10.129*Fl + 1.000 E2 
2.590 
3.911 
SENT =V3 = 17.765*Fl + 1.000 E3 
1.832 
9.695 
SENTERR =V4 = -1.326*Fl + 1.000 E4 
. 857 
-1.548 
ARROW =V5 = 9.135*F2 + 1.000 E5 
1.942 
4.705 
LETTERS =V6 = 10.269*F2 + 1.000 E6 
2.747 
3.739 
LETTERR =V7 = -1.943*F2 + 1.000 E7 
1.361 
-1.428 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 9 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
1.000 El 
spatial 
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VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
V 
I Fl - Fl 
I F2 - F2 
F 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 10 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
E D 
El SYL 10.222*1 
2.178 1 
4.694 1 
I 
E2 WORD 264.016*1 
54.462 1 
4.848 1 
I 
E3 SENT . 
000*i 
. 
000 1 
. 
000 1 
I 
E4 -SENTERR 33.608*1 
6.933 1 
4.848 1 
I 
E5 -ARROW 15.064*1 
29.404 1 
. 
512 1 
I 
E6 -LETTERS 148.431*1 
48.113 1 
3.085 1 
I 
E7 -LETTERR 71.203*1 
14.839 1 
4.798 1 
I 
1.000 1 
1.000 1 
spatial 
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TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 11 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
COVARIANCES AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
VF 
I F2 F2 . 299*1 
I Fl Fl . 150 1 
1 1.996 1 
II 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 12 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
spatial 
spatial 
R-SQUARED 
SYL =V1 . 275*Fl + . 
311*F2 + . 881 El . 
224 
WORD =V2 . 529*Fl + . 849 E2 . 
280 
SENT =V3 1.000*Fl + . 000 E3 
1.000 
SENTERR =V4 -. 223*Fl + . 975 E4 . 
050 
ARROW =V5 . 920*F2 + . 
391 E5 . 847 
LETTERS =V6 . 644*F2 + . 765 E6 . 
415 
LETTERR =V7 -. 224*F2 + . 974 E7 . 
050 
TITLE: spatial 
09/16/03 PAGE : 13 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 1 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
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CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
F 
I F2 F2 . 
299*1 
I Fl Fl I 
II 
-------------------- 
-------------------- 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: 
MULTIPLE POPULATION 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
END0FMETH0D 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
verbal 
14 
Alison Bacon 
ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
APPEAR IN ORDER, 
WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
MATRIX (S-SIGMA) : 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR ARROW 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.706 0.000 
SENT V 3 -0.016 4.727 0.000 
SENTERR V 4 -1.171 1.922 5.117 0.000 
ARROW V 5 1.966 -1.820 -6.860 -4.589 
0.000 
LETTERS V 6 -2.267 3.410 8.275 -10.859 -4.168 
LETTERR V 7 -1.007 12.813 17.484 -2.820 -7.500 
LETTERS LETTERR 
V6 V7 
LETTERS V 6 0.000 
LETTERR V 7 -1.583 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 3.6100 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 
4.8133 
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STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
SYL WORD SENT SENTERR 
v1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
SYL v 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 -0.021 0.000 
SENT V 3 0.000 0.024 0.000 
SENTERR V 4 -0.077 0.027 0.058 0.000 
ARROW v 5 0.083 -0.016 -0.050 -0.093 0.000 
LETTERS V 6 -0.065 0.021 0.041 -0.150 -0.037 
LETTERR V 7 -0.043 0.116 0.128 -0.058 -0.098 
LETTERS V6 
LETTERR V7 
LETTERS 
V6 
0.000 
-0.014 
LETTERR 
V7 
0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 15 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 6, V4V7, V3V7, V2V7, V5V5, V 
-0.150 0.128 0.116 -0.098 -0.093 
V 5, V1V4, V1V6, V1V4, V 3V7, V 4 
0.083 -0.077 -0.065 0.058 -0.058 
V 5, V3V7, V1V6, V3V6, V5V4, V 2 
-0.050 -0.043 0.041 -0.037 0.027 
3, V2V6, V2V2, V1v5, v2V7, V 6 
0.024 0.021 -0.021 -0.016 -0.014 
0.0436 
0.0581 
verbal 
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DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
---------------------------------------- 
20- 
15- 
10- 
---------------------------------------- 
123456789ABC 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
1 -0.5 0 0.00% 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.00% 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 0.00% 
5 -0.1 - -0.2 1 3.5T', 
6 0.0 - -0.1 19 67.86 
7 0.1 - 0.0 6 21.43ý 
8 0.2 - 0.1 2 7.14% 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
c ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
TOTAL 28 100.00% 
EACH "' REPRESENTS 1 RESIDUALS 
TITLE: verbal 
09/16/03 PAGE : 16 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
SYL =vl 1.169*Fl + . 287*F2 
. 533 . 569 
2.192 . 505 
WORD =V2 9.514*Fl + 1.000 E2 
1.383 
6.877 
SENT =V3 = 11.410*Fl + 1.000 E3 
1.704 
6.695 
SENTERR =V4 = -2.197*Fl + 1.000 E4 
. 647 
-3.397 
1.000 El 
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ARROW =v5 4.799*F2 + 1.000 E5 
1.099 
4.365 
LETTERS =V6 8.678*F2 + 1.000 E6 
1.690 
5.134 
LETTERR =V7 -2.921*F2 + 1.000 E7 
1.095 
-2.668 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 17 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
VF 
I Fl Fl 1.000 1 
I F2 F2 1.000 1 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 18 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
ED 
El - SYL 5.391*1 
. 885 1 
6.092 1 
I 
E2 - WORD 71.302*1 
18.568 1 
3.840 1 
verbal 
verbal 
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I 
E3 - SENT 115.620*1 
27.932 1 
4.139 1 
I 
E4 -SENTERR 26.871*1 
4.198 1 
6.400 1 
I 
E5 -ARROW 54.042*1 
10.450 1 
5.171 1 
I 
E6 -LETTERS 90.002*1 
24.870 1 
3.619 1 
I 
E7 -LETTERR 67.017*1 
10.588 1 
6.329 1 
I 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 19 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
COVARIANCES AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
--------------------------------------- 
VF 
I F2 F2 
I Fl Fl 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 PAGE : 20 
EQS/EM386 Licensee: Alison Bacon 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
verbal 
676*1 
128 1 
5.279 1 
I 
verbal 
R-SQUARED 
SYL =V1 . 433*Fl + . 106*F2 + . 
860 El . 261 
WORD =V2 . 748*Fl + . 664 E2 . 
559 
SENT =v3 . 728*Fl + . 686 E3 . 
530 
SENTERR =V4 -. 390*Fl + . 921 E4 . 
152 
ARROW =v5 . 547*F2 + . 837 E5 . 
299 
LETTERS =V6 . 675*F2 + . 738 E6 . 
456 
LETTERR =V7 -. 336*F2 + . 942 E7 . 
113 
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CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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I F2 F2 . 
676*1 
I Fl Fl I 
II 
verbal 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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1 
STATISTICS FOR MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE 187.344 ON 42 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 103.34423 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = -62.50368 
MODEL AIC = -18.17624 MODEL CAIC = -112.94647 
CHI-SQUARE = 29.824 BASED ON 24 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.19066 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.841 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.930 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) 0.960 
BOLLEN (IFI) FIT INDEX= 0.964 
McDonald (MFI) FIT INDEX= 0.969 
LISREL GFI FIT INDEX= 0.946 
LISREL AGFI FIT INDEX= 0.874 
ROOT MEAN SQUARED RESI DUAL (RMR) 8.611 
STANDARDIZED RMR 0.077 
ROOT MEAN SQ. ERROR OF APP. (RMSEA)= 0.043 
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVA L OF RMSEA ( 0.000,0.084) 
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ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 11.302238 1.00000 3.55956 
2 11.952324 1.00000 0.97489 
3 8.372164 0.50000 0.84599 
4 7.630892 1.00000 0.79746 
5 9.102877 1.00000 0.57550 
6 8.161210 1.00000 0.25979 
7 6.393053 1.00000 0.22138 
8 0.867268 1.00000 0.21514 
9 0.531189 1.00000 0.21467 
10 0.040459 1.00000 0.21458 
11 0.095571 1.00000 0.21456 
12 0.008350 1.00000 0.21456 
13 0.017941 1.00000 0.21456 
14 0.001446 1.00000 0.21456 
15 0.003488 1.00000 0.21456 
16 0.000473 1.00000 0.21456 
TITLE: 
09/16/03 
EQS/EM386 
1 
Execution 
Execution 
Elapsed t 
PAGE :22 
Licensee: Alison Bacon 
begins at 16: 19: 40.71 
ends at 16: 19: 40.93 
ime = 0.22 seconds 
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